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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the managerial incentive of insider trading. A research subject 
that has not been empirically examined in the UK yet. In doing so, this study merges 
two parallels but related tracks: The infon-nation contents of insider tradnig which is a 
Finance subject backed by the Effiecient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the managerial 
incentives of insider trading which is a Management subject backed by the 
-\, 
-, 
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Theory. In fact, the managerial incentives of insider trading only becomes testable once 
there is evidence that insider trading is profitable. 
In detecting the information contents of insider trading, this research differs from 
previous literature in that (1) it employed three signal definitions, (2) it used dally data, 
(3) it used the security' return index, instead of share prices, (4) it used a most recent set 
of data, (5) it used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate the expected 
returns, (6) it reports the results within a shorter event window and (7) it provides, for 
the first time, empirical evidence on the Executive Share Options (ESO) transactions, in 
addition to ordinary shares. In terms of the managerial incentive part of this research, a 
major contribution of this research is that it provides evidence for the first time on the 
managerial aspects of insider trading by directors in the UK. 
The analysis has examined the short-term profitability of FTSEIOO directors trading in 
their own firm's ordinary shares and executive shares options, over recent years (1999 to 
2000). The empirical results of this study shows that except for the executive share 
options portfolios, the empirical results significantly reject the null hypothesis that 
directors trading in their own company's securities are not profitable. Instead they 
suggest the alternative hypotheses that directors buying portfolios achieve positive 
abnormal return and those of selling ones avoid negative abnormal returns. The results 
of this study have been checked on by re-running the analysis taking into account thin 
trading, confounding events, year-by-year analysis, and firm size. The robustness check 
analysis shows that there is no thin trading problem in the sample securities, no firrn keý 
cventlannOUncenient conoccured with the director dealing transactions, thus the director 
dealing abnormal returns are not a result of other eveilts. In addition, smaller firms 
outperforni 1ýirger ones, particLilarly M the Ion er evem windows of bUying transactions. Z, 
-9 
and directors buying in the year 2000 outperfonn those in 1999. However. the year 
1999 was a successful selling year for FTSE 100 directors. 
Two important conclusions are suggested by employing different signal methodologies. 
These are first, different signal definition produce different results, not only in ternis of 
the level and sign of cumulative abnormal return (CAR), but also in terms of the 
significance of the statistical results. On one hand, multiple (MS) and quantitative (QSs) 
signals produced significant CARs at earlier days than single signal (SS). This leads to 
suggest that the market reacts significantly sooner to successive signals than to a single 
signal. On the other hand, none of the other signals produce significantly results that 
reject (accept) what has been accepted (rejected) by the single signal. The results of 
three tests, parametric (standard errors) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
Test), about the equality of the means of CARs of SS and of MS, QSI, QS2, QS3 and 
QS4 might lead to suggest that while the magnitude of CARs across various signals is 
identical, the time when these CARs becomes significant is varied. CARs of 
compounded signals (MS and QSs) are significant at earlier days in the event window, 
while those of SS are significant at later days in the event window. This suggests that 
none of other signals can be considered as an alternative or a counterpart to the single 
signal with daily data. Second, each signal definition requires certain data frequency. 
Single signal produces robust results when daily data are used, while those of multiple 
and quantitative signals are mixed. Monthly data is recommended with multiple signals, 
whereas both monthly and daily data can be used with quantitative signal. 
In the context of EMH, the empirical result of this study shows clearly that the stock 
exchange is significantly inefficient in terms of the strong level of market efficiency. On 
the other hand, the availability of abnormal returns to outsiders following the publicly 
known information, i. e. insiders' transactions, can be seen as a direct test to the semi- 
strong level of market efficiency. The empirical results indicate that abnormal returns 
can be earned by outsiders' imitating insiders' transactions. Hov, 'ever, taking into 
account the transaction cost, such returns would end up with zero, if not negative 
returns. 
In terms of the managerial incentive of insider trading, the model states that as the 
number of insiders in the fin-n increases. competition to insider trading increases and 
III 
each insider's expected returns decreases. On the other hand. as number of insiders' 
increases, the explicit form of director's compensation should increase to offset his 
insider trading returns decreases. This concept leads to an empincallý testable 
assumption that the director's expected compensation has two forms, (1) an explicit 
forrn (salary, bonuses, perks and other ex ante measurable incentives) wliich is predicted 
to be positively correlated with the number of insiders; and (2) an implicit form (his 
expected insider trading returns) which is predicted to be negatively correlated xN, Ith the 
number of insiders in his firm. 
The empirical prediction, presented in a multivariate model, was tested usinc, FTSE 100 
chief executive officers (CEO) data. The data and the justification behind using each 
and every dependent and independent variable in the test is discussed. Also, the 
variables for the regression model, which is used to explain the relationship betwcen the 
CEO explicit forrn of compensation (dependent variable) and the number of insiders in 
his firm, as well as his personal and job characteristics (independent variables), are 
analysed and assessed. 
The results were very much in favour of the model. The positive relation between the 
explicit forrns of CEO compensation and the number of insiders in the UK FTSE100 
fin-ns was found to be quite robust. That is, the significant relation does not depend on 
(1) whether the model accounts for CEO internal experience and industry sector, (11) 
whether the model accounts for CEO's capacity to trade and his actual insider trading 
returns and (111) whether an omitted variables problem is accounted for by using panel 
data. This leads to conclude that insider trading is an integral part of the director's total 
compensation package, and thus, can be considered as a managerial incentive. 
A by-product finding from the analysis indicates that there is an indication that the 
labour inarket for top management in FTSEIOO might not be competitive. This 
conclusion is brought about by the positive associatian found between director's pay 
and his realized insider trading returns. However, this conclusion is subject to the 
definition of CAR used in the analysis. 
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PART 1: 
INTRODUCTION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
(1.1) INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is organised in four parts and seven chapters. The first part is an introductory 
one which consists of this introduction (chapter one) and an institutional background to 
insider trading by directors and managerial incentives which anns at presenting the 
main economic, ethics, legal and institutional (disclosures) aspects of the research issues 
(chapter two). Part two presents the main theories and reviews the empirical evidence 
on both research issues, i. e. infon-nation content and managenal incentives (chapter 
three and four). The empirical tests of the research hypotheses are employed and 
reported in part three (chapters five and six). Finally, part four concludes the thesis and 
summarises the findings (chapter seven). 
This chapter lays the foundation for this thesis. Firstly, it justifies the research in section 
(1.2), and then it defines the term of insider trading in section (1.3). The theoretical 
backgrounds to the research issues are introduced in section (1.4). Whilst the research 
objectives and hypotheses are presented in section (1.5), section (1.6) addresses the data 
and the methodology used to test the research hypotheses. The research limitations are 
outlined in section (1.7) and finally the thesis structure is presented in section (1.8). 
(1.2) ATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
This research merges two parallels but related tracks. The information content of 
insider trading which is a Finance subject backed by the EMH and the managenal 
incentives of insider trading which is a Management subject backed by the Agencý' 
Theory. The research problem examined in this study is about detecting the information 
content and cxamining the managerial incentive of insider trading by the UK lal-,, est 
firn-i directors. The information content analysis is motivated by important academic as 
Nvcll as ii-istitutional benefits that can be achieved by a marginally developed 
methodology and most recciitly set of data; and the managcrial incetitive analysis is 
motivýited by a reseýirch issue that has not been empirically examined by the existmg 
literature. The objectives wci-c (1) to enhance the academic Linderstanding, on a 
I 
persistence phenomenon on individual (director). institutional (firmý shareholders and 
regulators) and market (the stock exchange and the managerial labour market) le\-els. 
(2) to provide the stock exchange investors with beneficial practical implications about 
following the timing and direction of the director trades; (3) to provide the shareholders 
with a better bargaining position in contracting their firm's directors compensation and 
(4) to provide the stock exchange and corporate governance regulators with an 
affin-native academic backup to their regulation. 
(1.2.1) The Information Content of Insider Trad 
In the last two decades, insider trading has been the subject of considerable debate in the 
U`K, USA, and Europe [see section (2.2)]. Despite over twenty years of regulatino 
insider trading in the U-K and seventy years in the USA [see section (2.3)] and 
numerous theoretical and empirical research [see section (3.4)], the issue is still 
intriguing. Not only in terms of the efficacy of prohibition against it, but also, in terms 
of the interpretation of its meaning and its economic impact on a firm's Naluc, market 
efficiency, managerial behaviour, and social welfare. 
The hypothesis that insiders trade profitably upon inside information is in response to 
fin-n-specific factors [the most recent examples are Aboody and Lev (2000) and 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1999)] and economy-wide inforination [see, for example, 
Gregory et al. (1997), Kara and Denning (1998) and Seyhun (1988b)] that affect the 
stock return. 
Opponents of insider trading believe that it is inherently immoral, detrimental and 
illegal. That is so, simply, because of the ability of the insiders to benefit from prior 
knowledge of, for instance, "bad nexN, s". It is widely believed that insider trading results 
in three types of damage to the economy. The first one is related to the trade's 
behax, lour that is executed in the market, discussed, for example, in Moore (1994), 
Prodlian (1994a) and Werliavc (1994). The second is related to the market confidence 
[see, for example. Cinar (1999)] and the third is related iiiconsistentlý, \\-ith the stron, 
-, 
form of market efficiencý'. as advocated by, for example. Leland (1992) and Keenan 
(2000a) and (2000b). This is based on a belief that, despite regulation. insidci-s do trade 
upon private pricc-sensitive information in their own firm's shares. Section (2.2) 
reviews this point of view. This study examines the information content of such tradbigy 
on the UK's stock exchange. 
Proponents, on the other hand, regard it as a viable, efficient, and beneficial economic 
means to serve the best interests of shareholders and the market at whole. This VieNv was 
initially advocated by Manne (1966) and later on supported by Carlton and Fischel 
(1983). The Marine School argues that insider trading improvcs managerial incentivcs. 
and thus decisions [see, for example, Antle and Smith (1985) and (1986)], and increases 
the market efficiency as a result of impounding more infori-nation in the stock price [see, 
for instance, Ross (1978)]. In addition, the widespread existence of insider trading and 
profitability in the most advanced stock exchanges, such as London Stock Exchangc 
(LSE) and New York Stock exchange (NYSE), presents argument against the first two 
damages mentioned above. 
(1.2.2) The Managerial Incentives of Insider Trading by 
Directors 
Agency Theory hypothesises that long-term managerial incentives, through the means 
Of, 1*17tCl- alias, perfon-nance-related compensation' can be used, firstly, to counter the 
agency problem between managers (agent) and owners (principal) and, secondly, to 
motivate managers to improve shareholders' value [see section (4.2.2) for managerial 
incentive theory]. 
Although there have been many empirical studies examining the various issues of 
insider trading by directors, few have empirically examined the issue of insider trading 
by directors as a managerial incentive [see section (4.4) for literature review on insider 
trading as a managerial incentive]. It is expected that this research will fill the gap and 
provide a comprehensive review and empirical evidence on this issue in the UK. 
Moreover, almost all-empirical research has excluded ESOs from their insider trading 
by directors' samples. This research will examine wliat is excluded. 
This research is thereforc focusing on the information content and managmal Incentives C) 
that can be draN\n from directors' trading in their own fin-i-i's stocks, with particular 
4 
reference to the trading signal. The importance of this research lies in the debate on 
important issues that have ethical, legal. managerial and economic aspects. It also lies in 
providing up-to-date and new evidence on the currently debated issues of insider tradith-, 
by directors, and by contributing to the existing paradigm of the top management 
compensation theory. Finally, it is expected that the results of this research will haN'c 
many implications not only for the stock exchange regulations, but also for corporate 
governance and the agency problem. 
(1.3) DEFINITION OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading literally means the buying or selling the firm's stock by insiders. Since it 
is widely accepted that the fin-n's directors are well informed about their own firm's 
prospects, their trades convey their belief about the future of their firrn's stock value. 
This belief is therefore related to the infon-nation they solely possess. If this were the 
case, trading upon information not publicly disclosed and, thus, not already reflected in 
the stock prices would, of course, result in a more advantageous position than for the 
uninfon-ned traders. This information is considered as price-sensitive information 
because 
, 
if it were made public, it would change the stock price significantly. It is ý1 
material fact that this infon-nation if released will affect the stock price. Therefore, it is 
material information. In the context of insider trading, this sort of information is inside 
infon-nation. 
Insiders are those persons who, by virtue of their duties, have access to the fin-n's inside 
infon-nation, and are aware of this endogenous possession. Hence, the ten-n insider 
refers not only to firm's directors, officers, and staff, but also it includes the firm's 
external advisers, such as bankers, auditors, lawyers, and financial advisers. This study, 
however, limits its empirical investigation on the firrn's directors only. Thus, insider 
trading implies two distinctivc terms: insiders' transactions (buying or selling their o\\-n 
firm's securities) and inside infon-nation (price-sensitive, pnvatc and non-disclosed 
inforniation). 
To sum up, the tcrm of insider trading can be defined as IInI the transactions in secu ities by 
licrsons who, by virtue of their privileged relationship to the issuance firrn (such as 
Other nicans include appointing, non-executive and Independent d1rectors 'n the boards [see Sc-tion 
directors, officers, staff, and advisers), trade upon price-sensitive. private and not made 
public Information. This can result in achieving more than the average market return, by 
acquiring more of such secunties; or avoiding loss, by disposing or reducing holdincys. It I- 
can also be used for portfolio diversification, or just for liquid1tv reasons. Different 
definitions of insider trading can be seen, for example, in Ashe and Nlurphy (1992), 
Hopt and Wymeersch (199 1), Moore (1994), Suter (1989) and Viandier (199 1). 
(1.4) RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The issue of insider trading as a profitable device and its effect on market efficieiicý' in 
general and as a managerial incentive in particular is increasingly important. This is due 
to the economic (market efficiency), financial (investment strategy), managerial 
(incentive-perfon-nance), legal (fair game), ethical (fraud), and political (corporate 
governance) aspects of this issue. fn the last two decades, insider trading has been tile 
subject of considerable debate in the UK, USA, and Europe. Despite over twenty years 
of regulating insider trading in the UK and seventy years in the USA and numerous 
theoretical and empirical researches, the issue is still intriguing. Not only in ten-ns of the 
efficacy of prohibition against it, but also, in terms of the interpretation of its meaning 
and its economic impact on a firrn's value, market efficiency, and social welfare. This 
section aimed at providing a theoretical background on both research hypotheses: the 
insider trading and the managerial incentive. 
(1.4.1) Insider Trading and The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The company's management is commonly assumed to have an informational advantage 
over outside investors, either current outside investors, such as shareholders, or 
potential outside investors. This infori-nation is related to the company "true" stock 
valLie and future prospects. The company's stock price quoted on the stock exchange is 
assumed to represent the "fair" x, alue of the stock. When the stock exchange values all 
the stocks fairly, then it is considered as an "efficient" market. Efficiency is a "relatiN-c- 
term. It has to do with nothing but information. So, the more finn specific, lndustrý, 
- 
related, and cconomy-wide information reflected in the stock price, the higher the level 
of the market efficici-icy. 
2.7)J. 
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In the context of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (E. N/IH), Fama (1970) defines three 
levels of efficiency. These are weak, semi-strong, and strong forms of efficiency. The 
difference between these forms depends on the level of information embodied In the 
stock prices. The first level of infon-nation includes historical market trading data, while 
the second consists 
, 
in addition to the first level, all publicly available information about 
prospects of a firm, and the third, the extreme version, incorporates, in addition to the 
first and second levels, "inside information" and future economic e\, ents. Each of these 
levels has a distinctive test. Fama (1991) outlines these tests as the Random Walk 
Hypothesis to test the first level, Event Study for the second, and MultiNýariate Analysis, 
in addition to the event study, for the third. Section (3.2) provides a comprehensivc 
review to the ENIH. One might argue that the capital market with insider trading is more 
efficient than without, because stock prices fully reflect all, including inside priN, ate, 
information. This study will examine this prima facie as a consequence of considering 
insider trading by directors as a managerial incentive. 
Inside information is, simply, private, non-disclosed, price-sensitive information. It has 
social attitudes toward dealing with it, i. e. it is unethical, and the consequences that 
follow such dealing are manifested in legal restrictions. In the context of the Agency 
Theory, this study will question these attitudes. Section (4.4) addresses this issue. 
Insider trading is regulated in the United Kingdom by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, 
Part (V), reviewed in section (2.6). The purpose of insider trading regulation is not to 
prohibit insider trading completely, but to regulate the timing and the disclosure of such 
trading. Section (2.4) provides a full discussion of the main theories behind such 
regulations and section (2.5) reviews these laws. It can be argued, however. that the 
widespread nature and popularity of insider trading can be regarded, inter alias, as an 
explicit consent to agent trading given by the owners (principals). The a postehoi-i 
argument is that the principal has provided the agent with the tools (insider trading 
2 
and/or ESO) and approved hi S incentives (profit). In this context, insider trading cannot 
be seen as breachino the fiduclarv duties, or as a misappropriation. This study will 
present more analysis on this argument. 
2 
or her. Throughout this thesis, the "masculine" pronouns are used in a gelleri .c rather than a -endered 
scilse. 
(1 
. 
4-2) Insider Trading by Directors and the Agency Theory 
Certain aspects of agency theory are particularly important in the context of this 
research. These are the principal-agent model and the managerial incenti\ýcs. discussed 
and reviewed in chapter four. 
Agency Theory states that the principal (sharehol ders)- agent (managers) problem can be 
reduced by appropriate incentive schemes. Thus, managerial incentives should be 
related to the increase in shareholders' wealth, which is better measured by market share 
price. These schemes implicitly encourage insiders trading. In other words, insider 
trading by directors can be seen as a managerial incentive scheme used to impro\-c not 
only the alignment of interests between principal and agent, but also the principals' 
values. 
The fin-n directors act as agents for the shareholders (principals), with a presumably 
objective function of maximising shareholders' wealth. Cited reasons for the deviatioll 
from this hypothesis include the complexity of the managenal decision process and the 
separation of ownership and management. The latter reason is an agency problem, 
which can be reduced by designing appropriate incentive schemes, such as the one that 
relates directors' remuneration to the firm's performance. Two tools can be used to tie 
managerial wealth with shareholders' welfare. These are share-price-influenced 
compensation, e. g. executive share options (ESO), and/or insider trading 3. Pay 
performance literature well documented the former mechanism, which is out of this 
research boundary. 
Agency Theory emphasises the positive relationship between directors' remuneration 
and the firm's perfon-nance. This relationship is referred to in the literature as the pay- 
performance relationship. Director's compensation includes salary (fixed component), 
bonus (short-tern-i performance-related), other perquisites (perks, e. g. pension and 
golden parachutes), and E S04 (long-ten-n remuneration). The perfori-nance-related pay I 
3 ESO plays an important role in this context. It provides the firm's managers with the shares (t000 to 
trade, while the information they possess provides them Nvith profit (Incentive) to earn. However. 
allowing directors to trade in their own firm's ordinary shares exhibits the same role as those of LSO. 
4 1: s, () olvcn to the firm',, directors arc ri . ghts to buy shares at some tinie in the future (usuafly three vears) 
at today's price. The intention, from the shareholders' vie\\-point, is to motivate directors to do their 
utmost to raisc the share price. Therefore directors' gain from the positive dIfferciicc bet-ween the future 
share price (cwrcise price) and todav*s share price (granted pr, ceý. On the other hand, sharehold ers gain 
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is the device used to align directors' objectives with those of the shareholders. 
Numerous articles in the literature have examined the pay-performance relationship in 
UK corporationS5 [the most recent examples are Conyon and Murphy (2000), Main et 
aL (1996), McKnight and Tomkins (1999) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998)]. 
However, this research is not about pay-performance analysis. Instead, it is about 
whether a non-counted form of a managerial pay can be considered as part of their 
incentive scheme. That is whether insider trading by directors can be considered as an 
implicit part of the compensation package. In the context of Agency Theory, this issue 
can be re-written as whether directors (agents) trade on private price-sensitive 
information is beneficial to shareholders (principals), and on what costs, if any. 
Manne (1966) was the first to address this issue by arguing that the ability of an agent to 
trade on his informational advantage could be considered as a part of an explicit or 
implicit contract between the principals and the agent. In a principal-agent context, 
Carlton and Fischel (1983), Dye (1984), Easterbrook (1995) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) supported Manne's view and pointed out that agent trades might be socially 
beneficial and that both shareholders and managers can gain from devices that 
ameliorate the aligning divergence of interest. 
Two relative questions have been addressed in the literature. The first is about when it is 
beneficial to the manager (agent) and the shareholders (principal) to give the manager 
discretion in the selection of his compensation. While the second is regarding how 
insider trading aligns both parties' interests. Dye (1984), for example, addresses these 
from the increase in their wealth, which is better measured by share value. ESO presents no cost to the 
firm however it is a contingent liability that would result in diluting equity. Black and Scholes (1973) 
model a formula, commonly used in literature as a B-S option-pricing model, to estimate the value of 
ESOs and MacBeth and Merville (1979) develop the B-S model. From the directors' viewpoint ESOs are 
not taxable income even after selling them. The profit is a capital gain that is liable to a lower rate than 
income tax. In addition, directors lose nothing except the opportunity cost of such incentives if share 
prices fall. There are a large number of studies examined this issue, inter alias, Acharya et aL (2000), 
Blasi et aL (1996), Bryan et aL (2000), Fenn et aL (200 1), Johnson and Tian (2000), Loderer and Martin 
(1997), Reitman (1993), Samuels and Lymer (1996) and Yermack (1997). 
r' The topic of the relationship between management compensation and firm performance is the most 
researched subject in management, with more than 300 researchers over the past seventy years. As part of 
corporate governance, this relationship is subject to academic interest, as well as regulatory and political 
interest. The importance of this topic is due to the factors that affect management compensation, such as 
regulation, investment opportunities, product differentiability, industry structure, demand instability, and 
capital intensity. Barkerna and Gomez-Mejia (1998) provide an intensive review of relevant literature 
and Demirag et al. (2000) suggest a number of areas for further research. 
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issues and concludes that if the manager is initially compensated with earnings- 
contingent contracts, then his wealth as well as the shareholders welfare could be 
improved by allowing insider trading. In addition, Hu and Noe (2001) de\-clop a model 
that links moral hazard and information asymmetry aspects of insider trading and Find 
that insider trading provides both low-cost incentives for managerial efforts and 
increases price infon-nativeness, i. e. efficiency. Noe (1995) reached the same conclusioll 
and argues that insider trading improves the bargaining position of shareholders relatiVe 
to managers, thus reduces the willingness of shareholders to provide expensive effort- 
assuring managerial compensation packages. Furthermore, Zhang (2001) examines this 
issue but through the role of insider trading in facilitating shareholders' control and 
shows that with proper regulation, insider trading mitigates the problem of information 
asymmetry and subsequently allows shareholders to better control their firm. Other 
researchers have examined the issue from different angles. Bebchuk and Fershtman 
(1994), for example, examine how insider-trading affect's the manager's choice among 
different project's risk levels. They exhibit that under certain conditions, the managerial 
contract that allow insider-trading leads to a relative increase in the degree to which 
manager's salary depends on the firrn performance. In short, literature established two 
mechanisms per which insider trading might reduce agency costs by improving the 
managerial incentives. Firstly, by increasing shareholders' welfare, and secondly, by 
enhancing shareholders' control. Section (4.3) reviews this literature. 
As part of corporate restructuring in the UK, managerial compensation has undergone 
significant change and received increased attention during the last decade, 
consummating in influential reports by Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998) committees [section (2.7)]. Among other things, the reports recommended a 
framework for setting executives pay, board's monitoring responsibilities and 
introducing non-executive outside directors in the board, as well as expanding the 
disclosure requirements for executives' compensation. 
(1.5) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
This study examines the rationalc bchind using, insider trading by directors as a 
mamig, crial incentivc and its implications on finn's stock perfomiance and shareholders' 
N\ cit', ii-c. The li\l)othcsis that insiders tradc upon private and price-sensitiN c inforniation 
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can earn abnormal returns. Such profit can simply be considered as an implicit part of 
the managerial remuneration packages. 
Stock pnce reactions to company announcements of price-sensitive information, SLICh as 
take-overs, equity issues, repurchases, new investments, dividends, are well recognised 
in the semi-strong forrn of the EMH. Despite regulation, there is mounting, evidence of 
significant insider trading by directors' profitability. This profitability can be seen as a 
managerial incentive, not only to reduce the agency problem, but also to in1prove the 
firrn's performance. Allowing the firm directors to trade in their own firm's share 
provide them with the tool while their insider trading expected returns are their 
incentives to function in alignment with shareholders' objectives. Thus, understanding 
this relationship is important in order to study firm's stock performance as well as to 
understand effects on the shareholders' welfare. 
(1.5.1) Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to provide comprehensive but precise answers to 
the following principal questions: 
(1) What is the infon-nation content 
, 
if any, conveyed by directors trading in their own 
firin's shares? That is, what sort of private information is not reflected in the stock 
prices prior to directors' trading? (Profitability of insider trading by directors). 
(2) What is the effect of insider trading on the stock returns? To what extent the 
directors' trade in their own firm's shares affect the stock exchange? (Market 
efficiency). 
(3) In the context of the Agency Theory, can insider trading by directors be considered 
as a managerial incentive? (Management compensation). 
(4) If so, how can insider trading by directors is considered managerial incentives be 
proven? (A model to link finance issue with management matter). 
By answering these basic questions, the research aims at obtaining evidence on (I ) tile 
degree of profitability of the directors trading in their own firm's shares on the UK I 
stock cxchangc, (21) the extent to which insider trading by directors can be used as a 
managcrial Incentive. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the managerial incentives of insider 
trading by directors. This %ý'ill be achieved by attaining two objectives. The first one is 
to examine the incremental information content of insider trading in the UK, usilig, a 
daily security returns in an event study. This study employs different signals definition 
that might be relevant to an understanding of not only the information content of insider 
trading, but also the timing with which the market reacts to such signals. Prior UK 
insider trading based literature defines the event in a number of ways. These are the net 
number/value of shares traded per month [Gregory et al. (1994,1997)], referred to 
hereafter as a Quantified Signal (QS), the net number of insiders traded monthly [Pope 
et al. (1990)], referred as a Multiple Signal (MS), or the net transaction type, i. e. buy or 
sell, per month [King and Roell (1988)], referred as Single Signal (SS). This previous 
research recognised that the method of defining the signal has an important impact on 
the conclusion drawn because that the market knows that there is an asymmetry in the 
distribution of liquidity trades of insiders [Gregory et al. (1997), p. 340]. In addition, 
this study argues that the market reactions to different signals are not identical. The 
current academic interest in the economics of the infori-nation content of insider trading 
[see, for instance, Fenn et al. (1991), Park et al. (1995) and Udpa (1996)] and the 
substantial interest of financial market professionals (such as the regulatory bodies and 
the specialised media), market participants (mainly the market-makers, in addition to 
the institutional and individual investors) and the management compensation 
committees [see section (2.7) for managerial compensation policies], together provide 
the stimulation for the current study. 
The second objective of this study is to investigate whether insider trading by directors 
can be considered as an implicit part of the managerial compensation package. That is 
by examining empirically the remuneration packages of FTSE 100 directors, namely the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), during the period (1999 and 2001). The i It) importance 
of this investigation is two-fold. Firstly, it relates empirically two separate disciplines, 
i. c. managerial incentiN, cs (Management) and insider trading by directors (Finance). . t) - 
Secondly. it provides evidence for the first time on the managerial aspects of insider 
trading by directors in the UK. 
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Hypotheses 
If insider trading by directors is induced by the possession of private good (bad) ne\vs. it 
is expected that a strong buy and holding (selling) pattern would exist. Shareholders 
because of their concern of the agency problem motivate their directors to trade for 
profit in their firrn's shares, and provide them with the tool (allowing insider trading) to 
do so. Despite the regulation, directors must trade if they are to benefit from private 
information. If this argument is correct, then insider trading by directors convevs private 
price-sensitive information not already incorporated in the stock price [this represents 
the first hypothesis of the study]. This will lead to significant changes reflected in tile 
stock price [this is the second hypothesis]. Moreover, the use of different signal 
definitions will add to the knowledge, based on ex ante expectations of their differential 
information impact, in the since that additional signals complement single signals so 
that we expect a cumulative (but perhaps asymptotic) effect in terms of timing and 
magnitude of market response and that alternatively different signal types Substitute for 
one another applying different signal definitions is expected to produce different level 
of infori-nation content of directors trading [this is the third hypothesis]. In addition, 
directors trading in different type of shares, i. e. ordinary shares and Executive Share 
Options are expected to produce different level of information content of such trading 
[this is the fourth hypothesis]. 
In addition, this research hypothesises that the director's expected return from insider- 
trading is an implicit form of the managerial compensation, where as the explicit part 
consists of salary and bonuses. However, as the number of insiders at the company 
rises, the competition to use their private information and consequently release their 
signal increases, the expected trading profit of each insider decreases. Moreover, the 
explicit form of directors' compensation should be increased to offset the diluted 
insider-trading returns. Thus, the remuneration committee has to take this into 
consideration when detennining the explicit form of the compensation package for each 
director. Consequently, as the number of insiders increases, the explicit fon-n of the 
compensation for each dii-ector increases. Thus, the director's total compensation is a 
function of, intcr alias, the number of insiders in the firm [this is the fifth hypothesis of 
the stLid\, ]. In fact, this hypothesis only becomes testable once there is evidence froni the 
pi-eviotis h\jiothescs, i. e. directors trading is profitable. 
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11.6) RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section aimed at providi methodolo(j%, ing a brief overview of the data used and 
employed in this study. Since all the data required testing this research hypotheses are 
of secondary sources, this research pursues the quantitative research paradigm. A 
justification for following this paradigm includes the attributes of the research problems 
to be addressed. That is the information content, i. e. signal. of insider trading by 
directors and insider trading by directors as a managerial incentive, i. e. the causal 
relationship. 
(1.6.1) The Data 
(1.6.1.1) Insider Trading By Directors 
Since 1976, UK listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) have been 
required to notify the Stock Exchange of insider transactions in their companies' stocks 
or debentures. The Companies Act 1989 and London Stock Exchange's "Yellow Book" 
detail the requirements for UK directors' transactions in their own companies' stocks. 
The Stock Exchange issues such notifications in its Weekly Official Intelligence. In 
addition, the Financial Times publishes such transactions weekly in its Saturday issues, 
while the Hemscott. NET's website (www. hemscott. com) reports these transactions for 
the last twelve months. Moreover, Datastream provides a summary of accounting 
statements, financial data, market prices and other data on UK quoted companies. The 
research will capitallse on the detail provided in these reports and databases to construct 
company specific proxies for directors' trade. 
The sample firins consists of all of the FTSE 100 companies experiencing directors' 
trading in their fin-ns' ordinary shares and/or executive share options during the period 
1/5/1999-1/7/2000, collected from the Hemscott. NET's website'. The initial sample 
consists of 1200 transactions (96,245,713 shares), of which 285 transactions 
(31,029,571 shares) for the directors exercised their execut'N, e share option (BEO), ai-id 
1 
-52 transactions shares) of sold cxecuti\ýc share options (SSO). In addition. 
there arc 508 transactions (I 3.6S3,912 shares) of which directors bought their own 
firm's ordinary share (Buy). and 157, transactions (19.8421,685 shares) of sold ordinary 
N 
-cr, 98 transactions (8,070,19- shares) are excluded because thcsc share (Sell). Moreo\ 
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are non-markets and non-executive share options transactions. such as those resulted 
from inheritance, mamage, divorce, and gifts. 
All securities in the FTSE100, with continuous daily trading wei-e chosen. Of the 
FTSE100 securities,, 96 securities satisfied this condition. Market-based data, for each 
fin-n during the period I/l/1997-1/l/2001 was collected from DataStream. These are (1) 
the share's daily return, (2) the daily FT All Share return, as the market portfolio's 
return, and (3) daily LTK Treasury bond benchmark, as a risk-free security [see section 
(5.4.2)]. 
(1.6.1.2) Managerial Characteristics and Compensation 
The data set was collected from the Corporate Register for the period (1999 and 2001), 
which is prepared and updated annually by PriceWaterHouseCoopers 7. The Corporate 
Register provides yearly infon-nation on the total compensation and personal and job 
characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in each company listed in London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Since the population element of interest in this research is 
FTSE 100, the data base is constructed so as to conform the following criteria: 
(1) Availability of firm's number of executives during the period (1999 and 2001). 
(2) The CEO's compensations are available during the period (1999 and 200 1). 
(3) There is enough infori-nation about CEOs personal characteristics. 
(4) Data availability about the CEOs job characteristics, such as his firm's size 
[measured by total number of employees and/or market capitalisation] and 
perfon-nance [represented by earnings per share (EPS) and/or price-eamings ratio 
(P/E)] and industrial category. 
(5) The Company was in FTSE 100 index and included in the insider-trading database. 
These requirements are, firstly, to satisfy the application of the Model outlined in 
section (6.2). The total number of executives is to serve as a proxy for number of 
insiders, personal and job characteristics are attributes for CEO's market equilibrium 
value and insider-trading data is for director's expected returns from insider trading. 
Sccondly, to servc as pre-conditions for other purposes. One rationale behind such 
requirements, for cxarnple, is that FTSE100 firms represent about 80% of LSE market 
I Icniscott is a public shareholding investment company. URL: wwwAiemscott. coni. 
7 Published quartcrlý- by HS Financial Publishing, London. 
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capitalisation, and thus the index considered as a leading example for the other 15(M) 
corporations listed in LSE. Consequently, any conclusion made from FTSE100 
corporations can be generalised in the markets, either director's labour market or stock 
exchange market. Another rationale is that the time period under investigation (1999 
and 2001) coincided with our insider trading by directors' data base period (1999 and 
2001). This is necessary to satisfy the assumption that the firm's director contracts are of 
long-term basis. Taking the time of conducting this research (2002), it is reasonable to 
have a three-year penod [following Cadbury (1992) recommendation, discussed in 
section (2.7)] ending with the most recent data (2001) available. Finally, the other 
variables, firm size and profitability, can be used to serve not only as proxies for CEO 
job characteristics, but also as control variables in the multivaniate regression of the b 
model. Although FTSE100 index represents the largest 100 firms in the LSE, in terms 
of market capitalisation, the size and profitability among these firms are varied sharply. 
(1.6.2) The Method 
In the following subsections a brief overview of the research methodologies will be 
outlined. Subsection (1.6.2.1) presents the methodology used to detect the information 
content of insider trading by directors, and subsection (1.6.2.2) explains the 
methodology used to test the validity of considering insider trading by directors as a 
managerial incentive. 
(1.6.2.1) The Information Content of Insider Trading by Directors 
In order to examine the research hypotheses, the distribution of profitable insider 
trading by directors will be examined. That is 
, 
if insider trading by directors m,, 'ere to 
take place on price-sensitive pnvate information, stock prices would be expected to 
change after the announcement of such trades. 
Director's return from insider trading, i. e. abnormal returns, will be measured by 
applyino the conwi-itional Eveiit Study, using the Capital Asset Pric ng Model (C, AP%I) 
to estimate the expected returns and the Market Model to estimate the C. 
-\P. %l 
parameters [see section (-S. 2.1.4)]. 
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The research methodology extends prior UK research on the information content of 
insider trading by using an up-to-date daily set of data. It is hence among the first to 
incorporate the insider trading effects of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act (CJA). In 
addition, it uses the security return, instead of share prices used in the prior literature. 
Also, it used three different definitions of the event itself. These are the single signal 
(SS), multiple signal (MS) and quantified signal (QS). In line with pnot- studies, the 
simple Market Model's (MM) parameters are used in the Capital Asset Pricing %lode] 
(CAPM) to estimate expected returns and abnon-nal returns. Finally to mitigate bias, the 
study reports the results within a shorter event window than used in the literature. 
(1.6.2.2) The Mana_qerial Incentive of Insider Tradinq by Directors 
The conceptual structure of the research hypothesis, i. e. considering insider tradint, by 
directors as a managerial incentive, is examined and tested in a cross-sectional researcli 
technique. In addition, data analysis will be employed to validate the conceptual 
structure of considering insider trading by directors as a managerial incentive. These 
include univariate (correlation) and multivariate (multiple regression) analysis. 
The operational model used to test this relation such that as the number of insiders in 
the firm increases, competition to insider trading increases and each insider's expected 
returns decreases. On the other hand, as number of insiders' increases, the explicit forrn 
of director's compensation should increase to offset reductions in his insider trading 
returns. This concept, fon-nulated in section (6.2), leads to an empirically testable 
assumption that the director's expected compensation has two forms, (1) an explicit 
fon-n (salary, bonuses, perks and other ex ante measurable incentives) which is predicted 
to be positively correlated with the number of insiders; and (2) an implicit forrn (his 
expected insider trading returns) which is predicted to be negatively correlated %\, ith the 
number of insiders in his fin-n. This ended-up with two main models. The first one 
employs insider trading returns indicator, i. e. number-of-Insiders, only [section (6.5.1)], 
while the second category incorporates the actual returns and the director's capacitv to 
trade [section (6.5-21)]. 
Literature [analyscd in section provides sYstematic evidence on the relationship 
bctwccii CEOs compensation and their personal characteristics such as internal 
cxpcrIencc as CEO and educational and professional credentials. Given that personal 
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and job characteristics are among the variables used in a competitive labour market to 
deten-nine the market equilibrium for director's compensation level. It is expected that 
such infon-nation can be utillsed as proxies in the model. Whereas director's personal 
characteristics can be represented by the director's experience and education attributes 
[detailed in section (6.3.3)], and director's job characteristics by his firm size aiid 
performance [discussed in section (6.3.4)]. 
Thus, the Model used assumes that the explicit forrn of CEO's compensation level is 
subject to three groups of variables. These are his personal attributes, his job 
characteristics and the number of insiders in his fin-n. In other words, the Model 
suggests that CEO's insider-trading indicator, represented by number of insiders in his 
firm, can explain, inter alias, his compensation level. The full sample of FTSF100 
CEOs compensation data of 1999 and 2001 is employed in an empirical version of the 
Model, articulated in regression equation. 
(1.7) RESREARCH LIMITATIONS 
Insider trading can be researched from different angles, mentioned below, than those 
fon-nulated in this thesis. That a boundary has to be established to control for the 
conceptual structure formulated in this study. This boundary maintains the focus on the 
research hypotheses of detecting the information content of insider trading by 
measuring the short-term profitability, and examining insider trading by directors as a 
managerial incentive by considering the long-terrn incentives. 
This study is placed on a major concept in formulating the framework: the information 
asymmetry, which is a well-establi shed paradigm in finance (e. g. signal theory) and 
management (e. g. agency theory) sciences, and widely empirically examined in the 
literature. This emphasis, however, does not undennine other issues existing in insider 
trading literature, such as: 
(1) Insider trading behaviour around specific fin-n-related evcnts 
(1) Earnings'dividends announcements: [see, for example, John and Lang 
(1991), Lustgarten and 'vlande (1998), Park et al. (199-5). Sivakurnar and 
WaNiiiirc (1994) and LTdpa(1996)]. 
Nlci-, 
-, 
ci- and acquisition: [scc. for instance. Arshadi and Eyssell I 
is 
(199 1), Chakravarty and McConnell (1999). Cornell and SIM 
(1992) and Meulbroek (1992)]. 
(iii) Leverage buyout and self-tender offering: [examples on this literature call 
be found in Harlow and Howe (1993), Lee (1992) and Liu and Gonibola 
(1998)] 
(v) Equity offering: [see, for example, Garfinkel (1993), Gombola et 
al. (1999) and (1997), Hauser et al. (2003), Karpo ff and Lee (199 1) and 
Lee (2002)]. 
(lv) Stock split: [for recent example, see Ma et al. (2000)]. 
(vi) Corporate bankruptcy: [see, for instance, Gosnell et al. (1992), 1qbal and 
Shetty (2002/a) and Seyhun and Bradley (1997)]. 
(vii) Market listing/delisting: [for recent example, see Lamba and Khan (1999)]. 
(2) The roles, measures and effectiveness of relevant regulations: [see, for example, 
Bettis et al. (200 1), Boardman et al. (1998), Minenna (2003)), Neihaus and Roth 
(1999) and Seyhun (1992)]. 
(3) Insider trading effects on bid/ask spreads: [see for instance, 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) and (1997), Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) and Seyhun (1986)]. 
(4) Insider trading timing, seasonal pattern and distribution: [examples include 
Anderson (1999), Hiller and Marshall (1998), Seyhun (1988a) and Yen-nack 
(1997)]. 
(5) Ethical views of insider trading: [see, for instance, Moore (1994), Prodhan (I 994b), 
Strudler and Orts (1999) and Werhave (1994)]. 
Moreover, this research gives no consideration of directors' trades in stock market 
flotation, i. e. initial public offerings (IPO) and unseasoned equity offerings (UEO). 
Instead, it is limited to those companies listed on the secondary market and ordinary 
shares, either through open market operations or executivc share options. The main 
reason behind the intuition for not addressing these issues empirically is the lack of 
publicly available pi-ccise data, as specified in section (1.6.2.1) above. This is a 
technical problem i-clated to the a\, ailability of sufficient data for cross-sectional and 
time-sci-ics cAculation, and for accuratc and timclv (lata re, 
-, 
ýtr(]Ing directors' 
compensation and dealmos. 1ý1 
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[1.8) 1. HESIS STRUCTURE 
This research is organised as follows: 
Part One: Introduction and Institutional Background 
(Chapter I) Introduction: This chapter introduces the research subject ii-i terms of its 
Rationale, background, objectives 
methodology, and limitations. 
and hypotheses, data and 
(Chapter 2) Insider trading and Managerial Incentives: Institutional Background: The 
aim of this chapter is to present a comprehenslN, e review of insider 
trading issues in ten'ns of their economic essence, i. e. debate; regulatory 
background, i. e. ethics, and development, i. e. legislation as wcll as 
financial implications and disclosure requirements. In addition, it 
provides an institutional background on managerial compensation 
policies as well as disclosure requirements in the UK. 
Part Two: Theory and Evidence 
(Chapter 3) The Information Content of Insider Trading: Theories and Empirical 
Evidence: 
This chapter expands previous chapters with the aim of conceptualising 
the theoretical foundation of the study. By reviewing the theory (EMH) 
and empirical evidence on insider trading, this chapter aims at 
conceptualising the relevant research issues. 
(Chapter 4) Insider Trading and Managerial Incentives: Agency Theory and Empirical 
Evidence: Continuing the theme of chapter 3, this chapter discusses the 
theoretical background of the research second issue, the managerial I 
incentive of insider trading. That is by discussing the Agency Theory. 
analysing the agency problem, relating the Agency Theory to insider 
trading and revicNving the literature. 
Part Three: Empirical Tests 
(Chapter 5) The Information content of Insider Trading 
,: 
Signal Nlethodology and 
Empirical Results: 
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This chapter empincally examines the information contcnt of insider 
trading by directors. By employing the everit study methodology on 
FTSEIOO company's directors' trading in their own firm's ordiiiary 
shares and/or executive share options, it measures the short-tenn 
profitability of such trading and its impact on market share prices. 
(Chapter 6) The Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading: Model and Empirical 
Evidence: 
This chapter constructs a conceptuallsed testable model and pro\, Ides 
empirical evidence into the managerial incenti\, es of insider trading by 
directors. It employs a multivariate model on FTSE100 CEO 
compensation packages. 
Part Four: Summary and Conclusion 
(Chapter 7) Summary and Conclusion: 
This chapter summarises the study and concludes the main findings in 
terms of both research hypotheses, i. e. infon-nation content and 
managerial incentives of insider trading. Also, it suggests a list of 
recommendations in terms of further research, current regulations and 
disclosure requirements. 
-) I 
Chapter Two 
Insider Trading and Managerial 
Incentives: Institutional Background 
(2.1) INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading has attracted widespread attention not only in the financial and academic 
communities, but also in the legislative and media communities. It is a phenomenon of 
the 1990s [Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)]. Investors are concerned with the cffects of 
such trading on stock prices and returns, while the academics are interested in knowing 
the private infori-nation insiders possess and reveal. Regulators and the legal 
community, on the other hand, are concerned with the fairness of the likelihood of 
abnormal returns attained by insider trading. Finally, the media, as always, is looking 
for breaking news. 
This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive review of insider trading issues. The 
purpose is to demonstrate a broad, but precise, understanding of insider trading issues in 
terms of its economic essence, i. e. debate; regulatory background, i. e. ethics, and 
development, i. e. legislation, as well as its financial implications. 
This chapter starts with discussing and analysing briefly the economic aspects of insider 
trading in section (2.2). Section (2.3) raises ethical aspects of the issue. The legal 
theories and legislation development of insider trading in the UK, USA, and European 
Union (EU), formerly European Economic Community (EEC), will be reviewcd in 
section (2.4) and (2.5) respectively. Due to the empirical investigation of this thesis 
being based on the London Stock Exchange, the current law on insider trading in the 
UK xvill be detailed in section (2.6). Section (2.7) provides a summary of the latest 
policy issues addressed, in the context of corporate governance, regarding management 
compensation and incentives, while section (2.8) describes the regulations govemin", 
the corporate infori-national disclosures. Finally, section (2.9) concludes the chapter. 
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2.2) THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSIDER TRADING: 
The purpose of this section is to lay down the economic aspects of insider trading'. That 
is by answering firstly, why insider trading is an economic Issue and secondly what are 
the economic aspects of insider trading. 
Infori-nation, the essence of insider trading issues, has different economic 
characteristics: (1) it has a private value, such that a one's expectation of future returns 
of a particular security. This is private infon-nation; (2) it has a social value, particularly 
when it has to be made public. This is public information; and (3) it has a right value, 
that is the property right of the generating, issuing, source. Private information 
[discussed in section (3.3.1)] is the property right of that private source, ývhlle public 
infon-nation is that of the market, i. e. the stock exchange. Fenn et al. (1991) provide 
more details about the economics of information in terms of its characteristics and 
forms, and relative to insider trading issues. 
Opponents debate that insider trading, in terrns of economic theory, can be considered 
as a trading based on an imbalance of inforination resulting in profit taking (buying), or 
loss avoiding (selling), by the informed party over a profit losing (selling), or loss 
taking (buying), by the uninfon-ned counterparts. Cinar (1999) argue that insider trading 
results in two forms of damage to others. The first one is related to trades behaviour that 
are executed in the market, by which inside trading may trigger stop loss limits that 
other investors put there to protect their positions. The second type is related to the 
market confidence, especially when the publics perceive insider trading in the financial 
markets, lose confidence and stop investing. Opponents argue that insider trading harms 
others who engaged, unknowingly, in an unfair playing field. However, identifying 
insider-trading victims is a rather difficult issue. Starting with the uninformed, i. c. the 
ordinary investor, who sold securities to the insider, one apparently finds that he \voLild 
liowever have sold them anyway to informed or uninformed traders. A contrary \, Ic\\ 
NvoLild point out that he would not havc sold if he knew that there would be significant 
changes in sccurity prices. This, however, presents a contrary argument to that of King 
and Rocll (1988) presented in this regard. Practically, the market maker, \ý'ho executed 
the transaction. would be the direct one to be harmed. But, as he recognises the presence 
of asynimetric inforniation Nvith the informed trader, he would protect himself by 
\videning the bid-ask spreads of these securities. Based on market equilibnLim, risk- 
it on each neutral competing market makers set pnces at which their net expected prof 
transaction is zero. By widening the bid-ask prices, the profits gained from trading with I 
uninfon-ned offset the losses incurred from trading with the informed traders. Thus. tile 
loss would be distributed on all stock market investors. King and Roell (1988) provide a 
leading example on this process. 
Once again, opponents claim that insider trading erodes the market confidence. In its 
economic sense 
, 
inforination deten-nines prices. Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), discussed in more detail in Section (3.2), the ideal market operates in such a 
way that all investors have equal access to the information needed to make competitix, c 
investment decisions'. This leads to the Market Equilibrium, by which the stock prices 
are efficient in reflecting all publicly available related information. An efficient pricing 
process, of course, removes volatility and speculation, and increases the confidencc and 
attractiveness of the investment in the market. In this context, insider trading 
undermines that confidence. However, the presence and persistence of insider trading 
phenomena in the world most advanced financial market, i. e. LSE, highlights the 
weakness of opponents' arguments when it comes to the real world. 
Insider trading, in fact, must be evaluated in respect of both the purpose (performance) 
and function (efficiency) of the stock exchange. The objective performance of the stock 
exchange is to facilitate the channel, and allocation of savings from surplus units to 
deficit units, in the primary market, and to provide liquidity to long-term assets and 
hence reduces risk in the secondary market. The efficient function of the stock exchange 
is to do the above within a fair price mechanism. Fair pricing helps to efficiently 
allocate financial sources among various opportunities. An efficient price is that which 
reflects the intrinsic value of a firm, which incorporates all publicly available 
information. Thus, market efficiency has three aspects; (1) allocations efficiency, by 
xx'hich the market allocates capital to users in that those who can make the best use of 
capital are considered for investment first, while those who make the poorest use of 
capital ýii-c the last, (22) pricing efficiency indicates that market prices fully i-eflect all 
avýiilable i1riforinatioii, and (3) administration efficiency (with regard to transactioii 
' Needless to say the ideal market does not imply that all investors should have equal information. Rather, 
it presumes that investors should haNe equal access to obtain costlessly relevant information before 
making investment decisions. 
N 
costs) which states that the higher of these costs will discourace trading, b", investors 
who keep the market pricing efficient. West (1975). In considering the distinctions 
between pricing efficiency and administration efficiency, refers to the former as all 
44 external efficiency" and the later as an "Internal efficiency". 
How much and what type of information reflected in the stock prices determines the 
level of the functional efficiency of the stock exchange. The EMH is based oil a number 
of unrealistic assumptions; there are no transaction costs, information is costless 
available to all market investors, all investors value the current information at the 
current and distribution of future prices (market consensus), and transaction volume 
does not affect security prices, i. e. stock prices are not elastic to supply and demand. 
Section (3.2.3) defines the three levels of efficiency. In short, the EMH states that if the 
capital market is strongly efficient then trading on the publicly disclosed and 
professionally analysed information at the current market price is a non-positive NPV 
transaction, unless the inside information is used and traded upon. 
Thus, in addition to Cinar's (1999) forins of damage, mentioned above, a third damage 
caused by insider trading can be added. According to the EMH, this type of trading is 
inconsistent with the strong form of market efficiency. Keenan (2000a and b), for 
example, reviewed and examined relevant literature about the linkage between insider 
trading and market efficiency. However, the strong forrn of efficiency is a theoretical 
level, which is almost impossible to exist. Prohibiting insider trading would not lead the 
market to be strongly efficient. In fact, opponents could not deny that the stock prices 
are more efficient after insider trading transactions than before, because of the 11exv 
information impounded and reflected in the prices, which would not be available 
otherwise. 
Based on the EMH, the Capital Asset Pricing ModeI2 (CAPM) holds that investors 
value securities by considering only their returns discounted by non-di vers I fi able 
markct risk. Known as Beta. the risk measures the security's return variation. In 
addition. CAPM states that security prices are the most accurate indicators of the 
security value as measw-cd by return and risk. In an equilibrium market, risk and return 
. 
-\Ithouoh there have been many criticisms about the reliabilitN of the model, CAP%I still vields 
institutional investors' consensus in pricing securities and constructin(-, investment portiollos. 
are associated in that "more expected return is associated xvith more nsk". Excluding 
legal penalty costs, insider's expected returns are more than that of the market, while. at 
the same time, insider's risk is assumed to be the same as that of the market. In fact. this 
depends on the type of the insider. While firm's outsiders (e. g. advisers and bankers) call 
diversify their holdings and reduce the r-isk associated with their inside trading, firm's 
directors could not. Instead, they are investing not only their monev but also their 
human capital as well, which makes their nsk higher. 
To sum up, opponents claim that the effect of insider trading on market efficiency call 
be viewed in terms of (1) outside investors, who will invest less because of the 
unfairness of the market ground. This will lower securities' prices and ilivestment as 
well, (2) market liquidity, which will be reduced as a result of the withdrawal of many 
outsiders and, hence, han-ning the remaining uninformed traders, and (3) price volatility, 
which will become more sensitive to the widening bid/ask spreads. 
However, proponents, such as Ross (1978), argue that insider trading will bnng more 
new and related material fact information into security prices, thus reducing risk, 
improving perfon-nance, encouraging more investment, and hence increasing market 
efficienc 
. 
Although it is widely accepted that insider trading may bring more 
information to the market, there is strong potential that insiders, who trade for their 
personal profit, have a strong incentive to delay such new information, to avoid being 
reviewed as illegal trading. Thus, insider trading may slow down the dissemination of 
new information [King and Roell (1988)]. Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) exhibits that 
more disclosure leads to greater liquidity and reduces expected insider-trading profits. 
More recently, Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) show in their simulation model that 
insider trading can improve outsiders' welfare and nsk sharing among outsiders, which 
compensate for their adverse selection losses to insiders. 
Another defence presented to support the proponents view, is that insider trading can be 
considered as a managerial motivc for improving managerial incentives and decisions 
[see, for instance. Friederich ct al. (2002)]. Manne (1966) has provided the most 
controversial work in supporting this view. He e\-aluates managerial incentives and Z71 C 
ar', ILICS that -salaries are inappropriate for stimulating entrepreneurial flair, bonuses arc 
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ions are too inflexible-4. Thus. he concluded. insider too conspicuous, and stock opt' 
profits are a suitable form of managenal compensation. Antle and Smith (1985) and 
(1986) and Dye (1984), among others, studied the theory behind using returns to 
insiders as a compensation componentq and this research provides empincal evidence on 
this conclusion. 
To some extent Marine's argument is accepted by most economists, but leaving 
directors to trade their own securities will give them the opportunity to escape the bad 
management results, by disposing of their holdings before the market knows the bad 
news. However, labour market forces, corporate governance regulation and the current 
level of insider trading regulations would prevent directors from taking such 
opportunity. 
In summary, opponents argue that insider trading is beneficial because it can be 
considered as (1) a disclosure device, as it increases the quality and lower the cost of 
infon-nation, thus increasing stocks value; and (2) a compensation device, as it creates 
useful incentive effects. This research will empirically investigate both arguments [in 
chapters 5 and 6, respectively]. 
It is obvious; however, that insider trading has benefits and costs. Thus, insider-trading 
regulations have to take into account when the social costs exceed the efficiency 
benefits thus criminalizing it. 
(2.3) THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INSIDER TRADING: 
The reason behind addressing the ethical aspects of insider trading in this study come 
from the fact that insider trading has been viewed since long time ago in the UK as an 
cvil and unacceptable face of capitalism5. Thus, it is not unreasonable to theoretical1v 
discuss most of insider trading issues without addressing its ethical aspect. However, i III it 
See Leland (199-1), p. S60 and Pope et al. (1990), p. 360. ,I 
See Pope et al. (1990), p. 360- 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle of 1872, for example, referred to insider trading as "a vo-i 
givat evil". In addition, Sir Winston Churchill considered such practice of the Editor of the Financial 
Xcxv, as insulting ana' libc1lous". More recently. Edward Heath, the then Prime Minister, had 
condemned it and describes it as the "unacceptable Ja(e Qf Capitalisin". Rider ( 1991 ) provides more 
information about the historical background ofthe insider ti ading regulation in the UK [Rider ( 1991 ), p. 
31 14 
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is not the purpose of this study to empirically examine these aspects. Nevertheless. the 
purpose of this section is to lay down the ethical aspects of insider trading. That is b%' 
answering firstly, when insider trading is considered as unethical practice and secondl)- 
what are the main theories behind this consideration. Strudler and Orts (1999) argue, 
"Economic analysis is not the best approach to understand insider trading because tile 
core controversies in the area of law are really about ethics and not economics". 
When securities transactions are based on private, non-disclosed, economic-related and 
price-sensitive infon-nation, it can be seen as a value-neutral positivc activity proillotillo 
profit for the trader, without regard for the social consequences that follmv from dealim, 
with it. The social disregard of such dealing is manifest in unethical and illegal practice. 
The underlying dealing is self-interest and is short-terrn deal-making, rather than loilo- 
term investment. Finance 
, 
in this context, is simply the investment in the informatioii 
and opportunities, not in goods, services, or people. 
The stock exchange is a marketplace in which there are always winners and losers, and 
where regulation, mainly information disclosures 
, 
is made to enforce the fair-game 
rules. The fairness game, however, does not imply that there would be no losers, but it 
ensures that the winners have won according to the rules of the game. By definition, 
insiders trading breaches the game rules by using a confidential device, i. e. not 
disclosed information, for the purpose of gaining profits and avoiding losses. In case, 
profit or loss, this would be on the account of the insiders' counterparts, the uninfon-ned 
outsiders such as market makers and ordinary investors. Moore (1994) argues that 
insider trading is unfair not because the two parties do not have equal access to 
information, but because one party deceives the other by not performing his duty to 
disclose information. For more details about this issue, see, for example, Prodhall 
(1994/a) and Werhave (1994). This, however, might be the case when the insider has 
definite positive (negatiN, e) non-disclosed information. But would not be applicable 
N\, hen lie thinks of the current stock price as undervalued (overvalued). 
Another cthical ISSLie In Insi trading anises from the fact that *nformat*on has a value 
TIILIS, it can bc considered as a property, and hence has a right. The law protects 
property in faVOLir of the owiicr. Inside inforniation is a kind of property that belongs to 
the fin-n's shareholdcrs. In the publicly listed firms, it is almost impossibic to count and 
2S 
name the shareholders. Therefore, there should be a body, which fajrlý' represents all the 
changeable names and numbers of the shareholders at any point and all of the time. This 
body should have the property right of the firm's information 6. The marketplace, the 
stock exchange, is the best-fit body to have the property right for the entire finn's 
information. Moore (1994) argues that the firm's information is the property right of the 
shareholders and if they allow the insiders to trade upon the inside information, then 
insider trading, from this viewpoint, might be considered ethical. But, he added, this 
practice would be harmful to other prospective investors. Hence, regulating the 
information disclosure is one of the most important roles of the stock exchange. In this 
context, insider trading misappropriates the information, which belongs to the firin if it 
has to be abstained; or to the market if it has to be disclosed. 
In addition, Moore (1994) points to other ethical issues in insider trading. On one hand, 
it harms the ordinary investors who engage in trades with insiders; and on the other 
hand it erodes the confidence in the market. Leland (1992), for example, empirically 
investigates who would be the winners and the losers of the insider trading practice. He 
finds that, with the existence of insider trading, outside investors and market makers 
will be hurt, and that the market would be less liquid. These arguments elaborated more 
in section (2.2). It seems that the ethical view on insider trading is ideological rather 
than practical one, which makes it difficult to support or to oppose. 
O'Hara (2001) subjects the main ethical arguments against insider trading to critical 
scrutiny, i. e. asymmetry of information, unequal access to infon-nation, property right 
and fiduciary duty. He concludes that among these arguments, fiduciary duty is the 
strongest but still has a problem, and that the ethical notion against insider trading is not 
clear-cut case against it. 
We could not say "Inside infor-niation" In this statement, because sometimes the firm has to keep some 
information confidential. Suc 
-h 
as R&D results which must be kept from the market and the competi . tors, 
in order to take AN antage of such information for the sake of maximisation of shareholder, ý -wealth, not 
g upon it. f`Or trading 
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(2.4) THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSIDER TRADING: 
The purpose of this section is to lay down the legal aspects of insider trading. That is by 
answering firstly, why and when insider trading is illegal and secondly %vhat are tile 
main legal theories behind insider trading regulations. 
Stock exchange regulations arise whenever there is inefficiency that might lead to 
general market failure. In a perfect strongly informational efficient and allocation 
optimal market, there would be no place for regulations. Insider trading is but one 
practice that affects the informational efficiency and needs to be regulated. The purpose 
of the insider trading regulation is to minimise such trading; and whell it has to be made, 
it should not be made on price-sensitive information. This indeed implies that not c\, cl*\, 
trade by insiders is illegal. Insiders may trade their company's stock for a number of 
reasons. These include (1) portfolio diversification and liquidity adjustment, (2) 
corporate control, (3) sentimental reasons, and (4) profit inducements. It can be seen 
clearly that there is no reason for legal and, of course, ethical concern in the first three 
categories. Even the fourth reason might be legal if the insiders act on their belief and 
judgement, not on the inside information they possess; though it is difficult to 
differentiate between these. 
The question of regulating insider trading has been a subject of great debate. There are 
two opposite schools. The Orthodox School supports such regulation based on two 
grounds: the public confidence in the stock exchange must be maintained, and the 
firm's confidential information must be secured. For more information about this view, 
see, for example, Ashe and Murphy (1992), Keenan (2000a), Keenan (2000b). 
Kraakman (1991), Moore (1994), Ronen (2000), Strudler and Orts (1999), Viander 
(1991), Walker (2000), Werhave (1994) and Williams (2000). 
The opposite vicw is placed on the Deontological Moral Theory. which indicates that a 
penalty is imposed for an act only when it involvcs committing a wrong against 
someone. if thcrc is no victim, then. no actionable offence occurs. So. it considers the 
insider dealino as a victimless crime since it is very difficult to name who actualk, gets 
hurt. 
. 
-\she and Murphy (1992), Kraakman (1991), %loore (1994), Strudler and Orts 
(1999), Suter(1989). Viander(1991) and Werhavc (1994) re\, Ic\\ thistheorv. 
As the attitudes toward insider trading have changed from toleration to condenination to 
toleration, many legal theories have emerged In the UK, USA. and Europe. Following 
the importance of the stock exchange in the English speaking countries, mainly the UK 
and USA, the regulation of the stock exchange is one of the most important economic 
regulations in these countnes. The stock exchanges of Europe are less important due to 
the domination of the banks on the stock exchange and because they ha\. e little to do 
with the average person (as in Germany). Or because most of the blue-chip companies 
are in the public-sector (as in France). Or because of the social attitudes toward the 
stock exchange as a gambling market (as in Japan). 
Although they almost seem similar, the legal theories of insider trading in the English 
speaking countries are much different from those of Europe. Therefore, the legal 
theories of insider trading can be grouped in two. The first includes those of the UK and 
USA, and the second are of Europe. These theories have been developed over time. 
They have been explained below in chronological order. The legal theories of insider 
trading in the UK and USA [see, for example, Arshadi (1998), Kraakman (1991) and 
Strudler and Orts (1999)] are: 
(1) The Equal Access Theory states that all traders owe a duty to the market either to 
disclose or abstain from trading on non-public fin-n's infon-nation. it views the 
unfaimess as that to other traders that gives rise to a duty to disclose. 
(2) The Fiduciary Duty Theory commonly referred to as the Traditional Theory, bans 
trading on non-public infon-nation when an insider owes a disclosure duty based on 
a pre-existing relationship of trust and confidence to uninfonned traders. It 
considers insider trading as fraud in which a disclosure duty can only arise from a 
fiduciary relationship. 
(3) The Misappropriation Theory refers to the theft or otherwise improper use of 
information belonging to another for the purpose of secunties trading. It implies 
that insider trading can be considered as a fraud-on-the-investor as well as a fraud- ltý 
on-the-source. 
In continental Europe the lc, 
-, 
al hNliotheses of insider trading statccl chronically [see, for 
cxample. Viandier (1991)] are: 
(1) Protection of the Company, which states that since the company's value is liable to 
be affected by privileged infonnation, then it is justifiable to criminalize insider 
trading. This hypothesis contradicts the Traditional Theory above. 
(2) Protection of the Market, which emphasises that banning insider trading, would 
guarantee the smooth working of the investment security market. 
(3) Protection of Information, which claims that information, is a common patrimonial 
as well as a corporate element, and since it belongs to the firm the insider has no 
right to use it as long as it remains privileged to the fin-n. This follo\vs that tile 
insider should disclose this information or abstains from trading upon it. This 
hypothesis offsets the Equal Access Theory. 
Regardless of either group of the above theories, each of the legal theories has its 
advantages over the others as well as limitations. But collectively, all of these theories 
have provided a strong ground not only to regulate the legal insider trading but also to 
crimmalize the illegal insider trading. 
To sum up, legislation provides two methods for regulating the flow of information to 
investors, per se the stock exchange; (1) Anti-Fraud provisions for false or misleading, 
provided or omitted, material fact inforination, and (2) Disclosure of what, when, and 
how information must be disseminated. 
(2.5) LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING: 
The case for insider trading is a philosophical justice and efficiency view of the 
workings of capitalism and financial markets [O'Hara (2001)]. The main regulatory 
fi-arnework behind the securities exchange, including insider trading has developed ovcr 
time from "market fairness" to "market confidence", and more recently to "invcstor 
protection 7- 
. 
This section reviews the development of insider trading regulation ill the 
UK and USA while appendix (A2.1) exhibits those regulations in other European 
countries. 
Insider trading law cvolved firsth, in the United Statcs, then, but with a slower pace, in 
the l7nited Kingdom, and i-cccntlv by continental Europe. After the Great Depression, 
7 It can tic said that "Iii\-c,,, tor Protection" is the main drivim-, force behind the "Big Bang" 
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the USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) attempted to deal with the issues 
of fraud and manipulation on the stock exchanges. The SEC made sanctions against 
illegal insider trading, inter alias with the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (SEA)8. The basic regulation of insider trading is carried out under Section 169. 
However, the sources of insider trading litigation have been developed through 1960s 
case law1o, which resulted in the enforcement of Section l0b" of the SEA 1934, and 
most importantly Rule I Ob-5 12 of 1942. 
As illegal insider trading volume and profitability has increased, the need for more 
restrictive regulation has become more important. During the 1980s, several steps were 
taken by the USA Congress to enhance compliance with insider trading regulations. 
Therefore, the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984 (ITSA) was adopted to amend and 
supplement the remedies available under SEA 1933 and SEA 1934, by which it 
increased both the civil and criminal penalties for illegal insider trading. This law was 
followed by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
(ITSFEA), which aimed at increasing the maximum jail sentence to 10 years, and the 
maximum criminal penalties from US$100,000 to US$1 million' 3. The enactment of 
these laws, accompanied by intensification in the SEC's enforcement procedures, 
constituted significant shifts in the effective insider trading regulations. Boardman et al. 
(1998), for instance, investigates the 1980s tightening of illegal insider trading 
regulation on the USA corporate take-overs and found that the tightening is effective in 
reducing illegal insider trading. Allen (1990), Arshadi (1998) and Arshadi and Eyssell 
8 In fact, previous to this SEA 1934, the SEC adopted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 (SEA 
1933) to establish a higher standard to truthfulness in securities trading than those of the common law 
fraud. The main difference between SEA1933 and SEA1934, in short, is that SEA 1933 established 
regulation on new securities (Primary Market), while that of 1934 determined how securities would be 
regulated after issuance (Secondary Market). [See Laird (1995)]. 
9 Section 16 is the only provision dealing specifically with insider trading. It deals with: (a) the disclosure 
of insider's transactions (b) allows corporations to recover short swing profits made by insider trading in 
the shares of their own firms, (c) outlaws short sales by insiders. [See Ashe and Murphy (1992), p. 36]. 
10 Specifically, the legal cases against Cady, Roberts and Co. in 1961 and against Texas Gulf Sulphur in 
1968. [See Laird (1995) and Kraakman (1991). 
11 Section I Ob of the SEA prohibits persons from employing "in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities 
... 
any deceptive or manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such values and 
regulation as the commission (SEC) may proscribe. " [See Zekos (1999), p. 24]. 
12 Rule lOb-5 prohibits the exploitation of inside information by insiders, which are defined as corporate 
officers, directors and large shareholders (who owns 10% or more of the firm's issued shares), and 
requires that firms disclose material information in a forthright and timely manner. However, this Rule 
enforcement has been left to private litigation, i. e. investors, who have been damaged by the lack of 
disclosure, against insiders. See, for example, Givoly and Palmon (1985), Laird (1995) and Niehaus and 
Roth ( 1999). 
13 See Arshadi ( 1998), Boardman et al. (1998), and Gombola et aL (1997). 
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0 991 ) show that insider-trading regulations have been reasonably effective in detem 119 
illegal insider trading. 
Insider trading has been unlawful in the UK since 1980. Such late regulation. however, 
should not be interpreted as lack of the stock exchange's recognition of this issue. or 
lack of the existence of this form of market abuse. On the contrarý', the English law, 
since many years ago 14 
, 
has recognised the importance of protecting the intearnty and 
fairness of the market 15 
. 
Theoretically, section 13 of the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act 1958 (PFIA), now Section 47(l) of the Financial Services Act 1986 
(FSA), made it possible to prosecute insider traders. Moreover, insider trading was an 
offence under the Companies Act 1967 (CA), which prohibited the firm's director to 
purchase an option to acquire or dispose of securities in his fin'n, or related firm, for 
himself or on behalf of his spouse. This provision, however, is aimed at insider 
speculation or manipulation rather than the misusing of inside priý'ate information 16 
. 
In fact, Part V (Sections 68-73) of the CA 1980 was the third attempt to adopt an insider 
trading law in the UK. Bills introduced in 1973 and 1978 failed to be enacted due to the 
intervention of the general elections. The 1980 legislation, however, provided no civil 
remedies. But, by introducing the FSA 1986 17 (FSA), it was possible to prosecute 
insider trader by either the damaged person or the Secunties and Investments Board 
(SIB) 18 
. 
The enactment of the Companies Secunties (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (IDA), 
while repeating Part V of the CA 198019, vested the power to prosecute exclusi\, ely in 
the hands of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) or Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry (SSTI). The IDA recOgnised the different fonns of Insider trading, 
particularly trading on inside information by the firm's employees and the firrn advisers 
and creating a false market in the firrn's shares in a critical period such as that of take- 
14 11,1696, for example, Commissioners appointed by Parliament reported that the Lnglish economY was 
undermined by, intei- (ilias, insider trading i iss I in new ues of stock [In Rider (1991), p. 31 3-3 14]. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 in Charkham and Simpson ( 1999) discuss the regulation of the stock exchange. 
company and the law oil directors 
I t' slitcr (1989), p. 'N 14. 
17 The F, 
-,.. 
\ ITSO repealed tile Stock Exchanue (Lj-, ting) Regulation 1984. 
" 
. 
-Vslic and Muilihy ( 1902), p. 4 1. 19 Rider ( 1991) argues that this Act provided nothin,, ne-w but repeating Part V of the CA 1980. tý 
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over 20. For the purpose of providing the minimum standard of investor protection, the 
new CA 1989 made amendments to the company laýv legislation. including FSA 1986. 
Insider trading was not illegal in most European countries up until tile beginning of 
1990s when the then European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union 
(EU), adopted in 1989 the public offers Directive 89/592: /EEC (the DirectlN, c) to co- 
ordinate the prohibition of and ensure the provision of minimum standards for hisidet- 
trading throughout the member states of the EEC. The Directive stated that, by 
1/6/1992, each member states must prohibit natural persons from taking advantage of 
inside information by acquiring or disposing, effected directly or otherwisc, for his 
account or for a third party, securities of the issuer to which that information relates. 
21 More recent 
, 
it has been reported that a new red tape burden on companies will be 
implemented in 2004. Such that companies will have to maintain complete lists of all 
directors, staff, advisers, lenders and even rating agencies who could have acccss to 
inside information under new European market-abuse rules. 
Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA) has been enacted in the UK to implement 
the Directive provisions. The main provisions of this Act will be reviewed, separately, 
in the next section (2.6). Moreover, various Self-Regulating Organisations (SRO), set 
up under FSA 1986, as well as the Take-Over Code of the Panel on Take-over and 
Mergers, have made insider trading prohibited. Appendix (A2.1) reviews insider trading 
regulation developments in the major European countries. 
Internationally, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) surveyed the world stock markets iii 
103 countries at the end of 1998 and find that insider trading law existed in 87 
countries, but enforcement evidenced by prosecutions, had taken place in only 38 of 
these countries. Before 1990 the respective numbers were 34 and 9. 
20 i3emcen January IQS7 and June 1993, onk 33 people prosecuted under such lc, 
-, 
Islation, and on1v 16 
pcople NN cre convictcd, of \N hich none vvere went to prison. (Herrington and Glover 1994), p. 5 
21 I'lic Financial Tinics, in 23 o5,2003. 
1% f2.6) CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993, PART V (INSIDER 
TRADIN 
The CJA 1993 enacted and came into force in 1993. Part N' (Insider Dealing) of CJA. 
substituted IDA 1985, and designed to implement the EEC Directive provisions. Insider 
trading regulations under CJA are based on a number of simpler, but broader and \\ idcr 
definitions. Section 54 of CJA applies not only to corporate securities, but also debt 
securities, warrants, depository receipts, options, futures, and contract for diffei-ciices. 
The definitions of information 
, 
insiders, and dealing are key factors in insider trading 
offences. Dealing in securities, according to s55, refers to a person who agrees, or enters 
into a contract, as a principal or agent, for acquiring or disposing of securities-, or 
procures, directly or indirectly, an acquisition or disposal by any other person. For the 
purpose of the law, s56 states four basic features for information to be considered as 
inside information. These are (1) it must be related to particular securities or to a 
particular issuer(s) of securities, (2) it must be specific and precise, (3) it has not been 
made public, and (4) it must be price-sensitive information, that is if it were inade 
public, it would have a significant effect on the price (value) of the securities. In 
addition, s57 defines the insider, as a person who has infori-nation who knows it is inside 
infonnation; and has it, knowingly, from an inside source. An inside source is defined 
as being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities, or someone 
having access to the information by virtue of his/her employment, office, or profession. 
Moreover, s58, s59, and s60 define when the infon-nation is made public, the 
professional intermediary, and the regulated market and the issuersl respectively. 
The prohibition of insider trading under s52 of CJA occurs in one of three fori-ris, 
namely (1) Insider Dealing: a person who has inside pnce-sensitive information deals in 
price-affected sccunties in relation to that information. (2) Insider Encouragement: a 
person who has inside price-sensitivc information and who encourages another person 
to deal in price-affected securities in relation to that information. (-"')) Insider Disclosure- 
a person who has insidc price-sensitivc information discloses that information to 
another person in a way inappropriate in the performance of his Iler employment. officc. 
or prol'ession. 
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For the purposes of the law, the person has to be a natural person. not an institutional 
entity, i. e. company. The benefit of excluding companies from those persons who are 
able to commit illegal insider trading is that it enables companies to continue to trade in 
securities by the establishment of the "Chinese Wall' 22 
. 
This is an internal arrai-io-enicrit 
designed to prevent information flows from one part of a company's business, e. g. 
stockbroker, to another part of the same company's business. e. g. advising on take-o\-ct-. I: ) 
As for the penalties and costs of convicted illegal insider trading, s6l of CJA proý"Ides 
imprisonment of up to 7 years and/or an unspecified fine on indictment, and 
imprisonment for up to 6 months and/or af 5000 fine on summary. Howevcr, 
proceedings of insider trading offences require the consent of either the SSTI or the 
DPP. Zekos (1999) and Herrington and Glover (1994) provide a more cxplanatory 
review on Part V of the CJA 1993. 
(2.7) ANAGERIAL COMPENSATION POLICIES: 
Insider trading legislation has impacts not only in the stock exchange but also on tile 
corporate governance, including managerial incentives and behaviour. For the later 
effect, see Maug (2002), who analysed the impact of insider trading on the corporate 
governance. However, the objective of this section is to review the main institutional 
background of the managerial compensation policies in the UK companies. 
23 As part of corporate restructuring in the UK 
, 
managerial compensation has undergone 
significant change (reform) and recel 11 24 attention during the last decade 
, 
consummating in influential reports by Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998) committeeS25 
. 
Among other things, the reports recommended a framework for 
setting executives pay, board's monitoring responsibilities and introducing nori- 
22 The legal aspect of this concept is discussed and analysed by McVea (1989) [the only Ph. D. thesis on 
insider trading in I 
-ýi\\ I. 23 For more background information about this subject, see, for example, Wright et al. (1990) pp. 1-28. 
24 This attention is traced back to the early 1990, when the bosses of the newly privatised utilities made 
headlincs as they NNcre accused of being excessively unýjustifiably paid. For more information and 
cxamplcs of' those pay. see. for instance, Beaver (2000), Black and Coffee, Jr. (1994) and Coný on and 
Murphy (2000). While Ashburrier ( 1997) and Ogden ( 199-) studv the corporate governance in privatised 
Nvater industry and in the N1 IS public sector in the L'K, respectl\, el\.. 
Demirag, ct al. (2000) sunimarise the development of' UK corporate governance regulations in one 
table. 
executive outside directors in the board, as well as expanding the disclosure 
requirements for executi%, es' compensation. 
The Cadbury committee, named after its chairman Sir Adrian Cadbury. was formed in 
May 1991 with initial role limited to preventing financial fraud in the UK listed 
companieS26 
, 
but soon expanded to target corporate governance 27 
. 
The Cadbury report, 
published in May 1992, with a Code of Best Practice designed to achieý, e the necessary 
high standards of corporate behaviour. The report focuses on accountability and risk 
management aspects of corporate governance. The main recommendations of the report, 
in terrns of the boards, were: 
(1) The position of the chain-nan and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be 
separated, with the board chairman monitoring the perfon-nance of the 
management, i. e. executive directors. 
(2) Firrns should have at least three non-executive directors (NED) with the 
majority of them independent and free of any business or financial connection 
with the company or executive directors. 
(3) Executive contracts should not exceed three years without shareholders' 
approval. 
(4) Boards should appoint remuneration committees consisting mainly NEDs, and 
that executives play no act in deciding their own remuneration. 
(5) Boards should completely disclose and explain the executives' present and 
future benefits 
, 
including stock options and stock appreciation rights, and how 
they have been determined. In addition, separate figures should be given for 
their salary and performance-related elements. 
(6) Boards should appoint audit committees composed of NEDs ýý, ith the majority 
of independent NEDs. 
Many of the committee's recommendations were implemented because key influential 
institutions supported the committee's efforts, such as London Stock Exchamye (LSE), 
Bank of England and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). In fact, Cadbury 
committee established a monitoring SUb-committee to rc%-ie%%, compliaiice with the Code 
2" The committee %N as formed in the awake of the Pollv Peck scandal, a major British firm Nvent bankrupt 
after N'cars of falsit'vim-, its financial reports. 
27 
- Fhe committee's role was expanded in the awake of the BCCI bank and Maxwell scandals. 
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of Best Practice and reported, in Cadbury Compliance Report (1995). that the overall 
response by companies had been positive. 
Cadbury's corporate code was re-enforced by Greenbury Report (1995), a government- 
backed committee on board pay. The committee published the Code of Best Practice in 
July 1995. The main objective of this report is to recommend on ho\\- boards should set 
the pay of their executive directors, i. e. link pay with firm perfon-nance. In addition, tile 
report recommended that the basic pay increases of directors should be in line witil 
those of employees within the firm. Greenbury states that the fundamental principles in 
relation to directors' remuneration should be accountability (shareholders approval on 
the board's remuneration report), transparency (remuneration policy) and linkage to 
performance (ESO). Moreover, the report recommends that the remuneration committee 
should be set up by independent non-executive directors only. Conyon (1997) revic\Vs 
the report in the context of the institutional arrangements for setting directors' 
remuneration in UK companies. 
LSE's Listing Rules were amended, in October 1995 and June 1996, so that companies 
have to show the extent of compliance with Greenbury's recommendations. McKnight 
and Tomkins (1999) argue that the Greenbury report has had little influence on the 
remuneration policies and practices of the UK companies. In addition, Hewitt 
Associates (1996), remuneration consultants, surveyed British companies and found that 
over half of them were refusing to comply with key recommendations of the Greenbury 
report28. 
The establishment of Cadbury and Greenbury committees were, in fact, in response to 
public concerns (corporate failures in the first case and unjustified excessive pay in the 
privatised utilities in the second case) and to prevent abuse. But not to provide coherent 
development for corporate governance policy and practice in the UK. Hampel Report 
(1998) recognised this matter [Hampel (1998), para. 1.7] and differentiated itself by 
moving a\\-ýiy from a set of rules towards applying broad principals of corporate 
governancc in a more flexiblc \vay. Thus, the report has a set of principics and code, 1. 
\N-hich embraced Cadbury and Greenbui-y works, as well. On July 1998, the comrnittee 
published the Conihincd Code. \\-hich consists of IS principles and 48 code provisions. 
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The new substantive change from previous proposals was the requirement for non- 
executive directors to account for a third of the board subject to a minimum of I 
Although none of the current regulations of LSE's Listing Rules or the Companies Act 
makes any reference to remuneration committees. Various studies have shown high 
levels of compliance with corporate governance recommendations [see, for instance, 
Black and Coffee, Jr. (1994), Conyon (1997), Dewing and Russell (2000), and Vasfeas 
and Theodoron (1998)]. However, as Demirag et al. (2000) argue, many of the apparent 
changes recommended by Cadbury, for example, may have been the result of the 
introduction of internal codes and procedures adopted by the companies themselves. On 
the other hand, Booth et al. (2002) examine whether regulation can be used to substitute 
for internal monitoring mechanisms to control for agency conflicts in a firm. They find 
that to the extent that regulations reduce the impact of managerial decisions on 
shareholder wealth, effective internal monitoring of directors becomes less important in 
controlling agency conflicts. 
Nonetheless, the government, represented by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), issued a consultative document on directors' remuneration in 199929 
. 
The 
document welcomed the establishment of remuneration committees in the LSE listed 
companies and emphasised the independence of its members from executive directors as 
well as the chairman. In addition, the document set up various proposals regarding the 
pay linkages to performance, remuneration and service contracts disclosures, and 
directors' accountability to shareholders. In fact, much of the document's proposals are 
repetition of the committee's recommendations. However, the document contributed in 
addressing the technical matters by explaining and defining what were not clear in the 
committees' proposals. 
Despite these reports, however, executive directors' pay, namely Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs), increased by more than 18% in 1997 30 and 16% during 1999-2001 
28 In McKnight and Tomkins (1999), p223 
-224. 
29 In fact, the government continues to declare its view about the corporate governance issues when there 
is a public concerns. Such that the Prime Minister Mr. Tony Blair supports the recent (21/5/2003) revolt 
by GlaxoSmithKIine (of FTSEIOO) shareholders against excessive boardroom pay. In addition, it's 
reported (Financial Times, 21/5/2003) that the government is about to issue a new consultation paper on 
the directors' contracts, performance, and service payments and the linkage between them. 
30 Conyon and Murphy (2000), p. 640. 
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[see table (6.1) in chapter 6]. and still breaking the news 31 
. 
On the other hand, if the 
British government is to increase the performance related portion of the compensation 
package, it can do so by enacting a tax legislation limiting the deductibility of non- 
performance related compensation over, say one million pounds. For the effect Of Such 
legislation see, for instance, Perry and Zenner (2001). 
Although all the corporate governance reports admitted the importance of ESO as a 
mechanism to align the divergence of interests between management and shareholders, 
none, however, has come across the terminology of insider trading as another 
mechanism to align interests or as a managerial incentive. This, thus, providing another 
rationale for this study. 
(2.8)7 1 HE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURES: 
In the past two decades, information disclosure research in accounting and finance 
emerged from a handful of studies to a substantial and well recognised body of 
literature. Verrecchia (2001) surveyed the literature and Healy and Palepu (2001) 
provide a framework for analysing managersi reporting and disclosure decisions in a 
capital market setting. However, this section is not about the theoretical aspect of 
disclosure. Instead it aimed at providing an institutional background on the main 
regulations govern the disclosure of insider trading transactions and managerial 
incentives. 
Disclosure requirements were modestly increased in response to the 1980s take-over 
wave. The CA 198932 
, 
amended the CA 1985, requires that every firm must keep a 
register of directors' share and debenture interests. This shall be available for inspectioil 
by shareholders and the general public. Also, it requires that the directors must notif%, 
the firrn, within five working days, of a transaction carried out for their personal use and 
the fin-n has to make an entry in the Company Register within three working days. On 
-11 The most recent cxarnple was the dispute over the CEO pay of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). which made 
the news, for instance, of the Financial Times over the Nveek 19-24 5 2003 in 12 reports, 5' of which are in 
one single issue (2 l, '051-'00', ) [such that Schroder joins investor dissent over GSK executive pay plans, 
Blair supports invcstor unrest over pay levels, investors need help to tackle corporate 
-ureed, after 
Gamier: 
\N l1v cxccutIvc rewards in the US, and the UK are unlikely to converge, and pay question gocs to heart of 
cap itallsm] 
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the other hand, the Stock Exchange Yellow Book, the Model Code, details the 
requirements for any listed firm's directors trading in their own firm's shares. It requires 
that the firm must inform the Stock Exchange of such a transaction by the following 
day, it is then published immediately. It is also prohibited for the directors to trade their 
own firm's shares for a "closed period" of two months prior to the announcement of 
price sensitive information as well as preliminary year-end and half-year results. 
Due to the increased attention on the high level of financial remuneration of firm 
executives, accounting standard-setting bodies have had to reconsider certain aspects of 
the financial reporting of executives' pay and other forms of remuneration granted to 
them, such as ES033 
. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an 
exposure draft in 1993 and a statement in 1995 examining the issue of the accounting 
treatment of ESO. Also, the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF, 1994) make expressed 
recommendation on the minimum level of disclosure that should be provided on the 
ESO to each director 34 
. 
Cadbury (1992), once again, expressed the concern about the 
quality of financial reporting and that the extent to which executives can manipulate 
reported earningS35 can affect the quality of financial statements. In fact, one of the main 
objectives of Cadbury Code [see section (2.7)] is to re-enforce board effectiveness in 
promoting high quality (true, fair and reliable) financial statements and disclosures 36 
. 
Moreover, transparency was one of the fundamental principles underlying the 
Greenbury (1995) Code of Best Practice, and has several provisions relating to 
disclosure. Such as how performance is measured, how rewards are related to 
performance, how performance measures relates to longer-term company objectives, 
how the company performed over time relative to competitors, detailed remuneration 
report to include each element in the package for each director. While Hampel report 
32 In fact, this Act consolidated most of the regulation governing company law, including the Business 
Names Act 1985, the Companies Securities (Insider Trading) Act 1985, and the Compames Consolidation 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1985. All of these acts are supplement to the CA 1985. 
33 Conyon and Sadler (2001) examine the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO 
0. ytions and the incentives created by those options. 
3 In Samuel and Lymer (1996), p. 250. A study that deals with the practical problems that needs to be 
addressed when valuing and accounting for ESO. 
35 Bushman and Smith (2001) note that due to the lack of conceptualised operating figures in published 
company accounts, directors are able to select earnings numbers in determining their annual bonuses [in 
Demirag et al. (2000), p. 344] 
36 In fact, O'Sullivan (2000) examines, among other thing, the effect of board composition on audit 
quality in the LJK prior to Cadbury (1992) and finds that non-executive directors encourage more 
intensive audit as a complement to their own monitoring role. 
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(1998) broadly accepted Greenbury recommendations. it requires that such disclosure 
be more infon-natIve, stating the remuneration policy and be more accessible. 
Furthermore, the LSE Listing Rules requires that the boards of listed companies are 
required to make a report to shareholders on directors' remuneration, disclose the 
amount of each element in the remuneration for each director, and prior shareholders' 
approval of long-term incentives. The disclosure requirements in the Companies Act 
1989 are designed to underpin these requirements. However, the listed companies are 
not required to report the linkage between pay and performance. 
0% (2.9) CONCLUSION: 
This chapter provided a broad theoretical and institutional background to insider trading 
issues. Insider trading is simply the firrn's insiders' simple buy/sell of their own firm's 
securities in the market place [section (1.2)]. The issue, which is due to its aspects and 
effects 
, 
is attracting extensive attentions of the financial and academic communities, the 
regulatory bodies, and the media. 
In its economic essence, insider trading represents on one hand a signal of nc\\. 
infon-nation (to be) reflected in the stock price. On the other hand, it represents a 
challenge to the strong form of the EMH [section (2.2)]. Insiders can earn abnon-nal 
returns, or avoid abnormal loss, when they trade on their private information. In the 
context of the financial ethics, this privilege over other players in the market has been 
seen as ruling out the fairness of the game's rules. In addition, insider trading is also 
seen, from ethical viewpoint, as a misappropriation of the firm's information, harming 
outsiders and eroding the market confidence [section (2.3)]. These, in fact, ideological 
views but not practical ones. Hence, it is rather difficult to have a crystal clear support 
or otherwise opposc such views. 
If insider trading is a crime then it is a victimless one. That's Nvhy the legal theories 
behind the regulation of insider trading have been changed ovcr time. either in the ýX 
and USA, or in continental Europe. It was the equal access theory behind the regulation, 
and then changed to the fiduciary duty and finally the misappropriation in UK and USA. 
Whilc that in Europc it was about protecting the cornpany. then the market and firially 
the Information itscIf [section (2.4)]. 
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Insider trading regulation developed over time [section (2.5)]. In the L: K. it started in 
1980, while in the USA it started in 1933. The latest CJA (1993) was enacted to 
implement the 89/592/EEC Directive. In companson with European counterparts 
[appendix (A2.1)], the UK's CJA (1993) is the most sophisticated act, not only in terms 
of its way of dealing with the incidence, but also in terms of its coN-crage of the various 
aspects relating to the issue [section (2.6)]. 
In addition, this chapter provides some institutional background on corporate 
governance issues that are related to this research hypotheses. These are the board 
remuneration [section (2.7)] and financial infon-nation disclosure [section (2.8)]. It 
shows that Cadbury report (1992) is the most influential document in corporate 
governance aspects of the British companies, such as board remuneration, structure, 
control, practice and monitoring. Other committees formed and reports ývere published 
to re-enforce Cadbury committee's recommendations, such as Greenbury (1995) and 
Hampel (1998). Two main conclusions can be drawn from these reports, which are 
related to this research, are: Firstly, managerial remunerations have to be decided by 
independent non-executive directors, and secondly the boards have to disclose not only 
the components of the compensation for each director, but also to justify and explain the 
measures of those perform ance-related components. However, none of these reports 
have come cross the concept of insider trading and its place in the corporate 
governance, as an implicit incentive component of the managerial compensation. 
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PART II: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
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Chapter Three 
The Information Contents of Insider 
Trading: Theories and Empirical 
Evidence 
(3.11 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one established the foundation of this research in which section (1.3.1) briefly 
introduced the relevant body of literature, and chapter two provided a comprelieiisiVc 
overview for the institutional background of this research. This chapter expailds that 
section with the aim of conceptualising upon the theoretical foundation of this study. 
That is by discussing relevant theories and reviewing the current body of literature. 
There have been numerous studies examining the various issues of insider trading in 
general and in terrns of its outcomes (profitability) and consequences (market 
efficiency) in particular. Relevant literature, however, will be reviewed not only to shed 
light on the dominant paradigm in this stream, but also to point out the current gaps in 
the literature. 
This thesis examines two specific research issues (1) detecting the information content 
of insider trading and (2) the managerial incentive of insider trading. This chapter is 
concerned with the theory of and evidence for the first issue, while the second issue will 
be the subject of chapter (4). Hence, section (3.2) introduces the parent discipline in 
relation to insider trading. That is the market efficiency theory. Section (3.3) outlines 
the theories that explain insider trading. The pioneered and early research is reviewed in 
section (3.4.1), whilst the recent empirical evidence on insider trading is discussed in 
section (3.4.2). Finally, section (3.5) concludes this chapter. 
(3.2) EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY 
This section presents the theory and reviews the relevant litcrature on the parent 
discipline of the first issue of this study. It aims at showing the major fundamental 
concepts of cfficient market theory and its relation to this research. Chronologically, 
this section will introduce the Efficicnt Market H%liothesis (E%IH): definition and 
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I ion development [section (3.2.1)], sources and determinants [section (3-2.2)] levels [sect' 
(3.2.3)], issues and relation to the thesis [section (3.2.4)] and summary of the ENIH 
[section (3.2.5)]. 
(3.2.1) Conceptual Development of Efficient Market Theory 
The development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) as a successor of [Ile 
Random Walk hypothesis, is the outcome of pioneering theoretical contribution and 
empirical research traced back to as early as 1900 At the time, researchers wcrc 
2 
concerned with price movements and prediction 
. 
They concluded that if the market is 
efficient, then price changes couldn't be anticipated. That is because price movements 
follow a random walk with no predetermined direction. Thus, market efficiencý" 
indicates that price changes fully represent the information and anticipations of all 
market participants. 
Rees (1995) characterised the EMH as "the gradual triumph of academic evidence over 
conventional practice In fact, the empirical work has contributed to the development 
of the theory (Fama, 1970). The EMH has become a wel I-establi shed conceptual 
paradigm in the economics of the financial markets. Fama (1970) summarises the 
conceptual framework of previous literature, and Fama (1991) discusses the 
developments in testing the theory. 
Efficiency is a relative term. It has to do with nothing but infori-nation. The term 
becomes informational efficiency to indicate that stock returns fully reflect 4 all available 
information. This implies a precondition that infori-nation and transaction costs are 
always zero (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Since there are always transaction costs and 
informed traders, such as insiders, this definition presents the extreme version of EMH, 
which Fama (1991) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) recognised as impossible to exist, 
thOLIgII it can be seen as a benchmark. However, since the term "fully reflect" has no 
empirical testable indications, three models have been used not only to test but also to 
precisely define this ten-n. These, detailed in Fama (1970) and discussed in Strong and 
Such those Nvoi-ks of Bachelier (1900), Kindall (19-5 
-1). Roberts (1959) and Samuelson ( 196-5), reviewed 
in Farna (1970). 
te, 'des a comprehensive reN exv of many earl% 2 In addition to Farna (1970), Berns in (1992) prov, 
contributions, such as those mentioned in footnote ( 1) above. 
3 Rcc,, ( 1995). Pa--c 1 -8 
- 
4-, 
Walker (1987), are (1) expected return or "fair game" models, (2) the sub-martingale or 
"trading rules" models, and (3) the Random Walk model. 
Jensen (1978), however, introduces a weaker but more sensible version of EMH, which 
states that prices reflect the information that their marginal benefits do not exceed their 
marginal costs. Accordingly, the efficiency level depends on the information set 
incorporated in stock prices. In other words, a market is efficient in relation to certain 
information set (0t) available at a point in time (t), if it is not possible to profit by 
trading on this specific set (0t) (Jensen, 1978). Thus, the market is relatively efficient 
depending on the relative proportion of information fully reflected in the stock prices at 
a certain point of time. In addition, an efficient market is the market that is efficient in 
processing information (Fama, 1977). That is how quickly prices respond to 
information. Recently, Busse and Green (2002) study the segments report analysis' view 
about individual stocks and are broadcasted when the market is open 5. 
How much and what information set reflected in the stock prices determines the level of 
the functional efficiency of the stock exchange. The EMH is based on a number of 
unrealistic assumptions, such as there are no transaction costs, information is costless 
available to all market investors, all investors value the current information at the 
current market prices and distribution of future prices (market consensus), and 
transaction volume does not affect security prices, i. e. stock prices are not elastic to 
supply and demand. 
In modem literature, there seems to be a general agreement about the definition of 
market efficiency. That is t he m arket is efficient if( 1) stock prices a ct as t hey fully 
reflect all available information, and (2) they react spontaneously and unbiased to the 
new information. This definition can be found, for example, in [Begg (1982), Dykman 
and Morse (1986), Keane (1983), Minford and Peel (1983), Sheffrin (1983)]6 and Fama 
(1970). 
In fact, Bussie and Green (2002) study the morning call and midday call segments on CNBC TV the 
USA, and find that prices respond to reports within seconds of initial mention, with positive reports fully 
incorporated within one minute. 
6 In Strong and Walker (1987), p. 122. 
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(3.2.2) Sources of Information and Determinants of Market 
Efficiencv 
In the context of EMH, stock returns fully reflect all available information. As a new set 
of price related information becomes available, market participants would buy or sell 
using this new information. Stock pnces instantly, or sometimes gradually, adjust to tile 
new level of price equilibrium, i. e. to reflect the new level of expected returns and its 
associated risk level, to end up with a zero net present value (NPV) trading. 
Individual and institutional investors, financial analysts, brokers, and the media, all 
create a competitive market environment, by which the concern is searching for 
profitable investment opportunities. Not only by looking for a new set of pricc-related 
information, but also by developing new models and using information technology to t) 
identify mis-priced stocks. All of which results in constant pressure on prices to reflect 
the intrinsic value of the stocks. 
It seems that inforrnation availability, however important, is but one determinant of 
market efficiency. Rees (1995) states six features of market efficiency. These are 7: 
(1) The number of market participants. LSE, for example, is made up of many 
thousands of participants. It is almost impossible that one participant would likely 
be able to influence prices deliberately and effectively. This indicates that there 
exists perfect competition in the market [Laffont and Maskin (1990)]. 
(2) Information availability. In addition to that discussed above, it is worth stating that 
information availability does not necessanly indicate a full set of data. In such a 
developed and well-organised LSE, the concern is about how quIckly stock prices 
adjust to a new set of price-related infonnation. 
(3) Low transaction costs. These consist of commission, stamp duties, and market 
spread. However, these costs do not exceed a few percentage points of the total 
value of the transaction 
8. 
(4) Location independence. Regardless of the geographical location of investors, 
trading in the stock cxchange can easily be made by fax. telephone, or through the I 
Intemet. 
Rees (1995). 
-, 
cctl("' 
-5.5-1. page 17-5. 
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(5) Homogeneity. Ile main consideration of all market participants is about the 
expectation of future returns of the stocks at an equilibrium9 level of risk. 
(6) Competitive analysis. Market intelligence always tries to identify mis-priced 
securities. Human error is always there, but it is almost impossible that all analysts 
make the same error regarding the same set of information. 
(3.2.3) Levels of Market Efficiena 
In an efficient capital market, stocks are fairly priced, and trading in these stocks will 
have an expected zero NPV. Evidence of market efficiency for one set of data category 
does not necessarily mean efficiency for another set of data or even the same set of data 
at a different time. Thus, it is almost impossible to test every set of data at different 
times (Rees, 1995). Therefore, it is widely accepted that capital markets are efficient 
unless proved to be otherwise. 
According to the category of the information set reflected in the stock prices, Fama 
(1970) suggested three categories of market efficiencylo. These are weak, semi-strong, 
and a strong level of efficiency. While the terms and concepts of these levels have not 
been c hanged, Fama (199 1) h as suggested new t ests for each of these c ategories, as 
explained below. 
The weak level assumes that the information set Ot represents only those data that are 
incorporated in the historical returns. In other words, stock returns fully reflect all past 
price changes and dividends. Under this form of efficiency, future stock returns cannot 
be predicted by using the past stock returns. That, trading on this information will lead 
to a "non-positive Net Present Value (NPV)", because the price of any given stock is 
moving stochastically, randomly, and hence, unpredictability. Thus, the test for this 
form of efficiency should not be only about "how well do past returns predict future 
returns, [that is the test ofl the forecast power of past return, [but should cover also] 
tests for return predictability" [Fama (199 1), p. 1576]. The Random Walk, filter trading 
rules, runs test, and serial correlation of successive price movements models are used to 
test this level of efficiency. 
9 An equilibrium level of risk that is agreed upon by all market participants, and almost always defined by 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
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The semi-strong level assumes that the information set Ot represents not only historical 
but also all publicly available information, such as announcements of annual returns, 
stock splits, stock dividends, fundamental data of the firm's product/service line, 
management quality, ownership structure, balance sheet composition, accounting 
methods and classifications, and most importantly, earnings forecast. That stock returns 
fully reflect past and publicly available information. This indicates that, using publicly 
available information would not help in predicting future returns. Thus, the test of this 
forrn has to be concerned with "how quickly do stock [returns] reflect public 
information announcements [and] event[s]" [Fama (1991), p. 1576]. Event study 
methodology is a well-establi shed test for this level of efficiency. The event is the 
disclosure of any price-sensitive information, such as earnings announcements, 
accounting information disclosure, and merger and acquisition news. A substantial body 
of empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that LSE is efficient both at the weak 
and semi-strong levels. 
Finally, the extreme version of market efficiency is the strong level. It assumes that the 
information set Ot represents all historical, publicly available information and, most 
importantly, private information. That stock returns fully reflect past, publicly available 
and private information, such as "inside information", and future economic events, such 
as company bankruptcy. This indicates that, future returns cannot be anticipated by 
using private information. Thus, the test of this form has to be concerned with is there 
private information that is not yet reflected in the stock returns. In this context, insider 
trading based on private price-sensitive information can be seen as a challenging 
incidence of this level of market efficiency. A large body of literature, reviewed in 
section (3.4), provides strong evidence that insider trades are firstly, based on private 
price-sensitive information, thus revealing information not disclosed to the market or 
reflected yet in stock returns, and secondly, achieve abnormal returns, i. e. more than 
expected by the market. E vent s tudy and multivariate in odels are widely u sed in t he 
literature to detect the information content of insider trading, and to measure the 
abnormal returns. 
10 In fact, Fama (1970) recognised that Roberts (1959) was the first to suggest the distinction between 
weak and strong categories. 
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0 (3.2.4) Issues in the Efficient Market Hvpothesis 
As the EMH has become a dominant paradigm in the economics of financial markets. 
the academic society is concerned with what makes the markets inefficient. As there is 
general consensus about the assumption that the capital market is efficient unless found 
to be otherwise, this section is concerned with elaborating the cases in which the market 
is inefficient. These are the problems of asymmetric information and the principal-agent 
problem. The importance of this section concerns both this research issues, i. e. insider 
trading and managerial incentive. In fact, this section can be seen as an introduction to 
section (3.3) as well as section (4.3). 
The EMH is based on an assumption that all market participants, economic agents, havc 
access (costless) to the same level of information. This indeed does not rule Out 
uncertainty in the market, provided that all participants have the same level of 
uncertainty [Postlewaite (1990)]. Despite accounting information disclosure 
requirements and insider trading regulations, the assumption of symmetrically informed 
market participants does not hold in the real world. In this context, it is reasonable to 
expect that a company's directors have information asymmetry about the true value of 
their company. In fact, not only the directors, but also other insiders, who are in 
business with the company, have access to privately non-disclosed fin-n-related 
infori-nation. These parties are called insiders, such as the fin-n's bankers, legal advisers, 
accounting auditors, employees, and large and institutional investors. 
In order to overcome the problem of asymmetric information in the market place, one 
might learn from adverse-selection literature. Akerlof (1970) explains the problem of 
adverse selection within a used-car market with asymmetric information, and Wilson 
(1980) and (1990) generalises the Akerlof analysis by examining, market equilibrium 
with adverse selection. An adverse selection problem occurs in a market with 
asyminetrically informed participants, which results in a less than average product, 
compared with a market with symmetrically informed participants. To ovcrcome this 
problern, Spence (1973) shows that the infornied seller can send a si gnal to the buycrs I- 
to help identify above avcragc products. 
In the used-car markets, this signal might be a warranty and'or a test before buv. 
In the context of EMH, insider trading can be seen as a signalling device that helps 
other market participants to identify asyrnmetrically infonned trades and/or assess the 
current market value of the stock prices. The insider signal, hoN, ý, ever. differs from tile 
seller signal in the adverse- selection context in that it cannot be manipulated 
independently by insiders [Strong and Walker (1987) p. 165]. However, both si unals are 
costly. Being caught by law is the cost of the insider signal and Nvarrant,,,, and testing 
failure is the cost of the seller signal. Another cost of insider trading signal is reflected 
in a widening bid-ask spread. The intitution behind this is to compensate market makers 
for the increased level of uncertainty resulted from infori-ned traders. Cornill and Sirri 
(1992) argue that the greater the infon-national advantage the insiders have ovel- the 
market, the greater the adverse selection problem and the wider the spread. Section 
(3.3.1) provides the theory behind the cost of the insiders' signal and section (3.4-2.1.2) 
reviews the empirical literature, which examines the effect of insider trading on bid-ask 
spreads. 
The second issue in the EMH continues the theme of the first one discussed above, but 
from different view. That is the problem of controlling the behaviour of the well 
inforined by the less informed. This is, in fact, the subject of the Agency Theory, which 
is concerned with the contractual relationships that exist between a party (principal) that 
hires another party (agent) to undertake certain activities [more about this source of 
asymmetric infon-nation and the principal-agent problem can be found in chapter 4]. 
(3.2.5) Summary of the EMH 
The market efficiency theory has developed through different phases. Firstly, it was 
believed that the market is not efficient, and that using technical and/or fundamental 
techniques 12 would enable investors to anticipate future price movements. The Random 
Walk model, run test, and trading rules are empirically employed and proý'Ide strong 
CN'Idence that taking into consideration the transaction costs and serial dependency of 
successivc price changes does not provide investors v, -ith abnormal returns. As a result, 
that Niew has changed dramatically in the second phase. The market is N'lc\\-cd as 
cfficient, but in the wcak lc\, cl sense. Financial analysts and trust fund managers as well 
as acadcrnic researchcrs have tried to anticipate stock returns using publicly availabic 
For compi-chensive details about these techniques. see Rut-terford ( 1993), chapter 10, pp ") 1 -103, 
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information, such as earnings announcements, accounting infon-nation disclosLires and 
firm-related news. The conclusion is that the market is efficient in the semi-stronLy lex-el 
sense. In the third phase, using private information, many studies find anomalies that 
contradict the strong level of EMH. Infori-nation asymmetry is the main cause of 
inefficiency. Insiders and more specifically agents are most likely to have informational 
asymmetry over outsiders and more importantly principals. On one hand, insider trading 
based on pnvate price-sensitive infonnation anticipates stock retums. thus reducing the 
market efficiency. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) show two adverse effect of insider 
trading on stock price efficiency: firstly, the presence of a better-informed insider deters 
outsiders from acquiring information and trading and secondly, the infomiation in tile 
market is not evenly distributed across traders. On the other hand, more insidel- trades 
taking place, more private inforination revealed and reflected in the stock prices, thus 
increasing the market efficiency [Ausubel (1990), p. 1025]. In the context of the strong 
level, the market is inefficient before the insider trading and efficient thereafter. 
(3.3) INSIDER TRADING THEORIES 
Section (3.2) introduced the first parent discipline of this study. This included market 
efficiency theory and infori-nation asymmetry. In this section, the concern is with the 
theoretical aspects of insider trading. In a market with symmetric information, it is 
expected that the true stock value is an unbiased estimate of the stock market price. 
Insider trading would not be an issue of interest if all market participants wcrc 
symmetrically infon-ned. The EMH, discussed in the previous section (3.2), indicates 
that markets with asymmetric information would allow the infon-ned trader to earn 
abnormal returns. By definition, insider trading indicates the stock true value is not the 
current stock price. Thus, insider trading can be seen as an infori-national signal about 
the true value of the stock, and as evidence on the impossibility of market efficiency. 
The theoretical explanations offered by the literature to these two issues are subjects of 
the following two sub-sections (3-3.1) and (3.3.2). 
(3.3.1) The Economic Theory of Insider Trading: The Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium 
in an efficient markct, the stock price represents the present value of the future cash 
-gains, 
from the stock over a period of time. Future flows, i. c. dividends and capi 
-II cash 
5 
flows, however, are uncertainly valued 13 
. 
Thus, the market price Is based upon cich 
trader's expectation on future cash flows, which depends on information available to 
him. As Fenn et al. (1991) point out; information about the expected future cash floNvs 
may be obtained in three different ways: 
(1) Publicly available information is costless information and. thus, automatically 
allocated to every market participant. It indicates that ex-ante-trading strategies are 
limited to those concerned with the anticipation of disclosure of nexýý Information. 
That is the timing of the next disclosure. A recent example on this can be found ill 
Tan and Gannon (2002) who investigates the inforl-nation effect of economic ncx\-s 
on the share price index. 
(2) Privately acquired information by financial analysts through efforts to uncovei, 
facts. It is costly to acquire but less than that to disseminate. Thus, ex-ante-trading 
decisions are concerned with the appropriate level of effort. Kothari (2001), for 
example, provides an extensive survey on the empirical research on the relation 
between capital markets and financial statements. 
(3) Privately owned information by corporate insiders, who are engaged in tasks and 
decisions that may have an effect on the firm's future value. It is free information to 
insiders, but costly to disclose. The ex-ante trading strategies are concerned with the 
current market equilibrium for the firm's stock price. That is the quantity of trading. 
See section (3.4) for literature review on this sort of infon-nation disclosure. 
Different market participants have different expectations, viz. different information 
about the state of the world and the future cash flows expected from certain stock. 
Equilibrium in this market has been subject to a body of literature that defined, analysed 
and terined this problem as the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). See, for 
example, Ausubel (1990), Bernhardt et al. (1995), Fishman & Hagertý' (1992), and 
Glosten (1989). One characteristic of REE is that market participants are assumed to 
consider the market stock price as an additional source of information. That is so 
because prices are a product of aggregate demands and supplies equilibrating the 
process. With different non-price information among different participants, it is natural 
to infer sonic inforniation from stock pnce changes, and to consider the stock price 
itsclf as an additional source of information. 
13 Both in terms of the expected amount of future payments and in terins of the discount factor used to 
compute the present valuc of these payments. 
REE has two versions. Firstly the fully revealing REE (FRREE). %\-hich is a state \vhen 
the REE pnce reveals to each market participant the non-price information of all agents 
collectively. Secondly, partially revealing REE (PRREE) is the case \'. 'hen the REE falls 
to be fully revealing. It is partitions observable events and non-pnce informational 
differentials [Strong and Walker (1987)]. Laffont and Maskin (1989), however. sllo\\- in 
their model that as the number of traders grows, the equilibrium moves towards the 
fully revealing competitive equilibnum. 
In such an economy, uninfon-ned rational traders, i. e. outsiders, must learn from the 
relationship between stock prices and the private information available to infon-ned 
traders, i. e. insiders. Ausubel (1990) argues that in order for insiders to profit, the 
equilibrium price in this competitive economy has to be partially rcNýealing (PRREE). 
That is so because, with asymmetric information, the equilibrium price is that of a price 
function, as a random variable. Otherwise outsiders, by observing the market-clearing 
price could infer the precise set of insiders' private information. This conclusion, in fact, 
is supported by the informational signalling theory, introduced in the following sub- 
section (3.3.2). 
More recently, Levine and Smith (2003) generate an equilibrium explanation for partial 
revealing of information by an insider to privileged associates (such as Institutional 
investors and analyst). They find that because profits from liquidity traders are bounded, 
the equilibrium depends on the balance between the number of associates, the quantity 
of information and the number of liquidity traders. Partially revealing information 
adjusts this balance by restricting the inforinational advantage of individual associates. 
(3.3.2) The Informational Signallinq Theory of Insider Trading 
Theoretical literature on insider trading and asymmetric information in the marketplace 
focuses on the signal of information for the market maker and, in particular, the total 
noisy order floxv. See, for example, Damodaran and Liu (1993), Jain and Mirmam 
(1999), Kylc (1985), Laffont and Maskin (1990) and (1989) and Rochet and VIla 
(1994). 
The FNIH Indicates that in a market wIth signIficant as-vilimetric infon-nation, 
cquilibl-iLlIll priccs aggregate inforniation effectivcIv. 
-A signalling equilibrium in the 
market can be defined as a set of conditional probabilistic information for the market 
maker which, when translated into pr]ces. nolsy traders response Instaiitl,,,,. are 
confinned by the new level of noisy order flow" 
One possible inforinational signal" about the true value of a stock could be realised 
from insider trading. In a pioneering work, Kyle (1985) constructs a model for the effect 
of insider trading on the stock price when the market maker observes the insider's 
signal. He shows that a risk-neutral and perfectly inforined insider can strategically 
trade on his unique access to private information about the e. v-post liquidation value of 
the stock, and can earn abnormal returns. Moreover, the equilibrium examined features 
that this signal, insider's private information, is incorporated gadually. Kyle, in fact, 
based his model (1) on one signal, and (2) upon assuming that (i) the ex-post liquidation 
value and the quantity traded by noisy traders, i. e. uncertain variables, are normally 
distributed and (11) the prices and quantities are simple linear functions of the 
observations defining the relevant infori-nation sets, i. e. linear equilibrium. 
In fact, Noldeke and Troger (2001) show that the normality Is not only sufficient but 
also necessary for the existence of linear equilibrium in the Kyle model. However, on 
one hand 
, 
it is not evident that the normality assumption holds in the stock market. On 
the other hand, signalling literature, such as Laffont and Maskin (1990) and (1989), 
shows clearly that the multiple, not the simple linear, equilibrium is the rule. 
Rochet and Vila (1994) investigate Kyle's model under non-non-nality and multi- 
equilibrium assumptions and found that there exists a unique equilibrium independently 
of the distribution of uncertainty and that the expected profits of insider decrease under 
incentive constraints. However, they confirin Kyle's findings that the ex-post stock 
price reveals half of the private information. This conclusion is consistent Xvith the 
economic theory, introduced in the previous sub-section (3.3.1.1). 
Both Kyle and Rochet and Vila build their models upon one signal. It is typical, 
howcvcr, to cxpect that the market maker, who obsen7es the insider trading, viz. the first 
14 This definition, in fact, is based upon Spence ( 1973) definition of the signalling equilibrium in the 
labour market. 
Other possible signals include the firm's choice of the capital structure, dIvIdend decision. and 
investment decision. 
signal, gathers more infon-nation from various publicly available sources relevant to the 
stock value, viz. the second signal. By extending Kyle's model, Jain and Nhrrnan (1999) 
examine the effect of two correlated signals, related to the value of the stock, observed 
by the market maker on stock pnce and insider trading profitability. They shoNv that 
under the linear-normal equilibrium of Kyle, the stock price varies positively xvith 
positive realisation of both signals, and negatively when the realisations are negatiVc. 
That, stock pnce becomes more informative in that it reveals more than half of insider's 
private information. Moreover, they find that the level of insider trading remains 
unchanged while the information content of trade changes. Insider's profits are lower 
than those of Kyle's are' 6. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical literature on insider trading and 
informational signalling. Firstly, modelling price changes, as a function of ncx\, 
information 
, 
is consistent with modelling price changes as a function of quantities 
traded. Secondly, trading upon private inforination by insiders does not contradict witli 
prices being set efficiently in the semi-strong sense [Kyle (1985), p. 1335]. 
Kyle's model assumes that insiders are risk-neutral, while, in fact, they are risk-averse. 
Baruch (2002) extends Kyle model by introducing risk-aversion insiders and allowing 
for the liquidity traders spontaneous demand to depend on cost of trading and stock's 
risk. He finds that the price pressure decreases with time (which is consistent with Kyle 
model) because insiders care about the impact of liquidity trading on future prices. 
(3.4) EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING 
Despite the legislator restrictions, much empirical evidence indicates that insiders 
continue to trade on inside infon-nation and, consequently, earn abnormal retunis. 
Academic research supports the widely held belief that insider dealings do have access 
to prix, ate information of the ex post liquidation value of their company's stock. 
"' In a recent Nvork, Jain and Mirman (2002) study the relationship between the market structure in the 
real sector and the effect of insider trading. The%, find that, in a monopoly market, when insider chooses 
ice not the quantity. While i the price of the real good, insider trading increases the pri II in a competitive 
market, where insider competes Nvith another company in the real sector, when he chooses quantity. the 
output increase,, due to insider trading but by less than in a monopoly market, and the stock . price 
becomes more informative. 
Due to the lack of a comprehensiý'e reviev, - of the empirical research concerning insider 
trading issues in any single reference. This section aims at providing a review to help 
future research in recognising the different aspects, issues and methods addressed in 
insider trading literature. Heuristically, one might detect a new way to in n vestigate this 
subject. This study, as well as all relevant literature follows the positivism approach. A 
broader view of the issue might help in establishing not only a different way to address 
the issue, i. e. phenomenological approach, but also a different methodolog\' to anaIN'se 
insider-trading aspects, i. e. qualitative techniques. 
This section will be organised as follows: Section (3.4.1) provides a short revlc\\, of the 
early empirical research, through academic theses, during the 1950s and 1960s (3.4.1 
- 
1) 
and the pioneering articles, which examined the issue during the 1970s (3.4.1.2). The 
recent empirical literature, with particular emphasis on UK literature, will be re\, Ic\\, cd 
in section (3.4.2). 
(3.4.1) Early and Ploneerinq Research 
This section outlines the early and pioneering research on insider trading. The 
significance of this section is to provide a one-stop-shop to the relevant literature for 
future reference. The intuition behind separating these studies from the recent literature 
is, in fact, due to methodological and data availability issues. Due to the significant 
developments in the firms and market disclosures and the development of research 
methodology it is expected that the results of these early researches are very likely to be 
influenced by the lack of accurate and timely data as well as the early-stage 
methodology. 
(3.4.1.11 EarIv Research 
It is worth noticing that early research investigating insider dealing issues were 
conducted through the means of academic theses. Driscoll (1956)17 was the first to 
in\, esticyate some aspects of insider dealing. He examined the insiders' transactions prior It) 
to di\-idend changes, and found that insiders buy more than tlicý- sell in the six months 
17 
-St III, (, ofCorporate InsiderSiock Holdings and Trading Under Section 16h of theSc(urities 
und Evchim', 
', 
c ComMisSioll Act 1, )-, 4". An NIBA Thesis, Umversity of Penns yI vaTI la, U, 'ý)'A, [111 Jaffe 
( 19 74a). p. 411 ]. 
before dividend decreases. This followed by Wu (1963)18, who studied the price 
movement of stocks one-month after the month of insider dealings. It concluded that 
there is no relationship between price changes and insider dealings. Then, Rogoff 
(1964)19 examined the forecasting properties of insider dealing, and found that after six 
months of trading, insiders earn more than the market return. This issue also examined 
by Glass (1966)20 
. 
The overall results support those of Rogoff s, but insiders earn more 
returns than in Rogoff2l after seven months. 
Driscoll and Wu found no significant information contained in insider trading, while 
Rogoff and Glass found evidence on insiders' forecasting capability and, thus, 
profitability. Such contradicting results might arise due to the difference in the sample 
size, period length, data manipulating, or methodology used. 
Driscoll, for example, used two signals, the event month and the dividend 
announcement date. He defined the event month by the quantity of shares bought/sold 
by insiders of a given company during a calendar month. The others used one signal, i. e. 
the event month by which the number of insiders' buy/sell quantities of shares of their 
own company within a calendar month. Wu classified the event month as a net buying 
month if the insiders buy specific stocks more than they sell in that month, referred to in 
this study as a quantified signal; while Rogoff and Glass used the number of inside 
buyers/sellers to classify the event month, termed as a multiple signal. 
As for the length of the insiders-pro fitability-investi gating period, i. e. event window, 
Driscoll used six months period between insider trading date and dividend signal date. 
Wu investigated the insiders' profitability after one month of the event month, while 
those of Rogoff and Glass were after six and seven months, respectively. 
Finally, as pointed out by Jaffe (1974a), all the earlier studies failed to control 
adequately the potentially confounding effects of systematic risk differences between 
18 "Corporate Insider Trading Profitability and Stock Price Movement". A Ph. D. Dissertation, University 
of Pennsylvania, USA. (In Jaffe (1974a), p. 411 and Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), p. 37]. 
19 "The Forecasting Properties of Insider Transactions". A DBA Thesis, Michigan State University, 
USA. [In Jaffe (I 974a), p. 4 10 and Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), p. 48]. 
20 "Extensive Insider Accumulation as an Indicator of New Term Stock Price Performance". A Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Ohio State University, USA. [In Jaffe (1974a), p. 410 and Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), p. 
44). 
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secunties. Dimson and Marsh (1986) demonstrate that the size effect can distort long- 
ten-n performance measures. In fact, none of these earlier researches had taken into 
consideration the size effect in the sample data. Other shortcomings, which have to be 
taking into account when considenng these studies, are data availabilitv and 
methodology employed. 
(3.4.1.2) Pioneering Research 
The first published article in this context is that of Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968). Table 
(3.1) summarises their work. They examined stock perforinance of a random sample of 
150 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies following months of insider trades 
during the period 1950-1960. The number of insiders who trade monthly defines the 
event. They constructed buy and sell portfolios, by which the buy (sell) portfolio 
consists of those fin-n transactions where the number of buying (selling) insiders is more 
than the number of selling (buying) insiders by at least two per fin-n-month. They found 
that a stock price of a company experiencing an extensive buying month is more likely 
to increase, relative to the market, by at least 8% in the six month following the event 
month; and vice versa. They concluded that insider dealings are a significant predictor 
of large price changes. 
Jaffe (1974a), in the second pioneering research, reached the same conclusion of Lorle 
and Neiderhoffer. As shown in table (3.1), he tested the information content of 952 
insider dealings in 200 large companies published in the Official Summary 22 of the SEC 
during the period 1962-1968. By taking account of the systematic risk and transaction 
sizes, lie found that the monthly cumulative average residuals for the whole sample 
were significant at 11.8% and 13.6% after two and eight subsequent months 
respectively. For the large transaction sample, the results were 13.4% and 18.4%. He 
concluded that insiders could forecast returns in the near term better than that in the 
long ten-n. Obviously, such abnormal return covers the 2% transaction costs, assumed 
by Jaffe. Also it encounters, we argue, the higher risk associated with non-diý'erslfied 
insider portfolios as well. 
2' Sec Jaffe (1974a), p. 410-41 1, and Pope et al. (1990), p. 363. 
22 U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: pfficial Swnmaiý- of Stock Transactions and Holdings of 
Officers. Directors, and Principal Stockholders. (Referred here ina fter as the "Ollicial Summai-C 
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Moreover, as stated in section (2.6), the source of insider dealing litigation in the USA 
was developed through 1960s case law. Jaffe (1974b), summansed in table (-)'. I) 
examined the effect of three important legal decisions concerning insiderS23 
, 
durin, 
-Y the 
period 1962-1968, on the volume and profitability of insider dealings. He found no 
evidence of any cumulative effect of the three events neither on profitability nor on the 
volume of insider trading. Instead, the volume increased slightly. So, he suggested, "the 
SEC must prove not only that an insider made abnon-nal profit but also he traded on 
material inforination"24 
. 
Finally, he concluded that changes in regulation had no effect 
on the properties, i. e. profitability and volume, of insider trading. 
The overall results of "Lone and Neiderhoffer" and "Jaffe" provide evidence that 
insider dealings do have special information used to attain abnormal returns, whicil 
persist several months after the transactions are disclosed. Outsiders, thus, who follmN' 
the Official Summary Insider Transactions, can also earn abnormal returns. This 
contradicts the semi-strong fon-n of the EMH, which states that all publicly available 
information is fully reflected in the stock prices immediately. 
Finnerty (1976b) noticed that the previous research mentioned above had a major 
shortcoming. That is the data availability. Before 1965, neither precise stock price nor 
the date of insider transactions was reported to the SEC and thus not available in the 
Official Summary. With time the publication of insiders' transactions becomes more 
detailed. It incorporates the actual stock price paid (received) by the insider transactions, 
as well as the date of reporting such transaction to the SEC. Also, Finnerty argued that 
previous research suffered from the bias resulting in selection of samples based on 
intensive insider trading, i. e. ignoring the average insider 25 
. 
He admitted that such bias 
while not affecting these studies' results relative to the semi 
-strong- form would, 
however, invalidate the findings for a test of the strong form of the EMH. To counter 11 
these problems, Finnerty, as showi-i in table (3.1), examined the whole population 26 of 
the insider transactions reported in the Official Summary, for NYSE companies, during 
23 These are: (1) The Cady. Roberts decision (Nov. 8,1961), (2) The Texas Gulf Sulphur indictment 
(April 19,1965), and (3) The Texas Gulf Sulphur deci 1 
24 Jaffe (I 974b) page 114. 
ision (Aug. 19,1966). 
25 
-, \N-cra-c Insider" means those insiders' transactions excluded, by previous research, due to the 
definition of the event, such that the number of insiders buy (sell) their own company's shares, in a gi I ven 
month, should be three or more. 
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the period 1969-1972. He constructed monthly insider buý- (sell) portfolios. Each of. 
which comprised the securities bought (sold) during a giveii month. The nuinber of 
insiders bought (sold) that particular security in the given month xN-el, 2hts each secuntv 
in the portfolio. 
By using CAPM, Finnerty found that the buy portfolio returns are significantly above 
the market returns, and the sell portfolio have not only negatiý'e returns but are also 
below the general market decline. Thus, he concluded, insiders are able, in the short 
terrn, to identify profitable situations in their own companies. Hence, the strong fort-il of 
the EMH is refuted. It is clear that Finnerty results and findings are consistent \\'ith the 
previous research. 
It might be argued that insiders are induced not by past or current information but, 
instead, by future expectation of accounting and financial variables. Finnerty (1976a), 
once again, addressed this issue by developing a Multiple Discriminate Analysis 
(MDA) model to examine the relationship between insider trading and the subsequent 
announcement of six sets of accounting and financial vanables. These are the size, 
financial leverage, earnings, operating leverage, capital intensifies, and dividends. Tablc 
(3.1) summarises this work. It shows that by employing the MDA on insider 
transactions for 854 companies from NYSE during 1971, Finnerty found that insider 
buying occurs in the companies characterised by smaller size, large earnings, and larger 
dividends. While insiders selling occurs in companies charactensed by the opposite. 
Thus insiders rely on their expectations of future values of these variables when they are 
deciding to trade. Moreover, their decisions rely on the relative magnitudes of the 
infori-nation. Finnerty concluded that the systematic identification of the characteristics 
of the buying and selling groups is an important step in identifying the information 
content of insider trading. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, King and Roell (1988) were the first to examine 
insider trading in the UK. Much of their work, in fact, was about the rationale for 
insider trading regulation, effects on prices and participants and the economic and social 
výiluc of the information. King and Roell employcd the Nlarket Adjusted Returns 
2o 
: \s ill previous research, Finnert\ excluded the stock acquired bý the exercise of options or through 
compensation plans, as \\cll as gifts and privatc sales. 
() I 
(MAR) to estimate the expected returns in event study methodology. They constructed 
two portfolios, one for insider buying and another for insider selling. Table (3.1) 
summarises the empirical aspect of their work. The results show that the bu%-ing 
portfolio outperformed the market significantly over 1,3 and 12 month following 
publication, while the selling one was not. Thus, they concluded that the market is not 
efficient in the semi-strong level. However, they admitted that the market respond 
promptly and efficiently to insiders' sales but to neglect the infon-nation content of 
insiders buying. In fact, Gregory et al. (1994) investigates King and Roell findings bý' 
re-examined their data using the Market Model instead of MAR in the event study and 
Dodd and Warner's (1983) t-test instead of the standard errors 27 
. 
They found varied 
results than that of King and Roell. For buying portfolio, Gregory et al. show that the 
results are significantly positive during the month of publication and after 12 and 24 
month but not during the third month. For selling portfolio, strangely enough, they 
found positive (negative) but insignificant results during the month of publication and 
one month (3,6,12 and 24 month) after publication. 
More elaborations about the findings of these pioneering studies and comparisons with 
recent literature are introduced below [section (3.4.2)]. 
(3.4.2) Recent Empirical Literature 
Although numerous studies have examined the issue of insider trading in USA's stock 
exchange markets, only few studies have examined this issue in the UK. Friedench et 
al. (2002) and (1999), Gregory et al. (1994) and (1997), Hillier and Marshall (2002 a, b 
and c) and (1998), King and Roell (1988) and Pope et al. (1990) examined the 
information content and the share price reaction following UK directors' dealing in their 
own company's shares. 
Empirical research can be classified into vanous types of categories and proposed by 
Pope ct al. (1990) into two main categories. The first examined the information content 
of inside information. while the second examined the market reaction to the infori-nation 
rcvealed and inferred from insider dealings. Or that, proposed by Pettit and Vankatesh 
(1995) whcrc the first examined insider trading as a one-signal event, and the other 
27 In fact. the main intuition behind this is to compare their data results with other UK literature, on one 
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investigated insider trading around different pre-selected announcements, i. e. illuitiple 
signals event. 
Such classifications, however, do not capture the various aspects of insider trading 
issues, which are covered by numerous studies. Therefore, an ex post approach has been 
employed, for the purpose of this section, to classify these studies. This classification 
comprises of four categories 28 
. 
The first two categories include the immediate literature 
on this area, while the rest of the categories are those, referred to in section (1 
-6), of 
different issues. The categories are: 
(1) The information content of insider trading: 
(a) Firm-specific infori-nation, and 
(b) Economy-wide information. 
(2) Insider trading effects on stock prices and market efficiency. 
(3) Insider trading activity around specific firm-related events: 
(a) Eamings/dividends announcements, 
(b) Merger and acquisition, 
(c) Leverage buyout and self-tender offering, 
(d) Equity offering, 
(e) Stock split, 
(f) Corporate bankruptcy, 
(g) Market listing/deli sting, 
(4) The role and effectiveness of relevant insider trading regulations. 
Accordingly, the relevant empirical research (categories I and 2 above) will be 
reviewed in this section. Table (3.1) provides a summary of empirical literature on the 
infori-nation content of insider trading as well as insider trading effects on stock market. 
One purpose of the table is to lay down the structure of the insider trading issues 
analysed in the current literature. The table cites the literature according to the year of 
publication where the most recent is reported first. Column (1) names the author(s). the 
publication year of the study and the country in which the study was conducted. It can 
be seen that insider-trading issues are investigated less in the UK (9 out of 42 studies), 
hand, and to examine the effect of size and risk factors on the empirical restilts. 
28 This classification depends only on the literature available to the researcher. 
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and in Europe (I in each of Czech, NorNvay and Spain) and Canada (I study), compared 
with the USA (28 out of 42 studies). Column (2) indicates the subjects examilled within 
insider trading issues and the specific event. That is the information content of what 
type of insider trading. 
The test period, the numbers of transactions and number of firrns in the studý, sample 
are reported in column (3). The test period indicates the period of insider trading 
transactions, over which the abnormal returns are measured. Despite the latest 
regulations, i. e. CJA 1993, governing the insider trading, in general, and director 
dealing in particular, these incidences have only been investigated by few studies in the 
UK since 1990. In addition, all of the UK studies, except for King and Roell (1988), 
used very old data relative to the publication year. For example, Hillier and Marshall 
(2002/a), which is the most recent study, used data that was five years old (1991-1997). 
While Hillier and Marshall (2002/b) is the only work examined the effectiveness of the 
LSE Model Code "Close Period"[see section (2.8) about this regulation]. 
Moreover, given the data availability and the breadth of the market, i. e. number of 
securities listed on the market, it is obvious that the USA literature often uses a larger 
number of transactions than their counterparts in the UK. It can be deduced from the 
table that the average number of transactions per fin-ns examined in the USA literature 
is more than 32 transactions [29000 / 901]. While that in the UK are less than 4 
transactions [4602 / 1061]. This is due to data availability in the USA where there are 
many institutions [e. g. the Official Summary of Insider Transactions Tapes supplied by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Official Summary), the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), CDA/Investnet database, the Annual Compustat 
Industrial tape (COMPUSTAT) and Institute for the Study of Security Markets database 
(ISSM)] which gather, classify, update and make available to the researchers insider 
trading transactions, using the latest information technology, while it is a commercial 
servicc in the UK [Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), p. 103 ]. Another reason might be that 
UK director and other insiders' trade less frequentlý, than their counterparts in the USA. 
Column (4) shows the control variables investigated, either to control other factors that 
might affect insider-trading returns. Such as the firm's financial position qualitv 
jobin's Q) [scc, for exanip1c, Roth and Saporoschenko (1999)], risk factors [as 
-F -cr- cxamined b)' Eckbo and Smith (1998) and Hillier and Nlarshall (200"a)]. market ox 
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reaction [see, for instance, Rozeff and Zaman (1998)]. earnings prIce ratio (E P) [see, 
for example, Rozeff and Zaman (1988)] and January effects [see. for instance, Hillier 
and Marshall (2002/c) and Seyhun (I 988/b)]. Or to validate the event stud-,., findings, i. e. 
cause relationship between insider trading returns and such factors. Such as the type of 
insiders [see, for example, Seyhun (1986)], the firm size [Hillier and 
_Nlarshall (20021a), 
Gregory et al. (1997) and Lustgarten and Mande (1998) provide good cxanlplcs oil 
this] 
, 
insider trading portfolio weight [see, for instance, Eckbo and Smith (1998)], 
uninformed portfolio [see, for example, Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) and 
Friedench et al. (2002 and 1999)], earnings and dividends ratios [Finnerty (I 976a)] and 
fin-n industry sector [as in Iqbal and Shetty (2002/b)]. Column (5) defines the event and 
event window(s). Such definition is an important factor in conducting the event test. It 
can be seen, however, that there is no consensus among the literature regarding one 
single definition of the insider-trading event. Column (6) refers to the 
methodology/model used in computing the expected returns. The majority of cases [7 
out of 9 in UK, 13 of 28 in USA and 4 out of 5 other markets] used event study 
methodology. Finally, column (7) shows the empirical results of insider trading 
transactions during the specified event window(s). 
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F, Table (3. I/A) Summmy Review of Empirical Literature on the UK Insider Trading. 
'E, aci study 
is summarized accord-ing to the subject examined, the sample used, the model used to test the hypotheses and the 
--sou -vat anu uLam resuits. ine most recent scu(nes re ponea nrn wnue me oiaest reportea iast. 
Sibuidy Subject Exandned sonvipa Control Focused Model Main 
No, (131ibItcad" Yew) 
] 
viAin insider tradi, Pie. ofDeals 
I 
Variables 
I 
Event & 
I 
Used Results 
& Spec& Ew-W 1%. of Firt ms Period 
I Hillier & Marshall Info Content 
. 
17/9/91 to Firm size 
'Trading month 
Event Study Directors outperform the market 
(2002/ a) JBFA from outsider3 31/03/97 & risk & Multivanate Subsequent INT ARs are related to large increas 
Viewpoint Buys 4098 in directors holdings & number of drecturs tradin 
Sales 3708 
--- ----  
Info content of sales are not related to trade 
13.50 Fms charactenstLcs. 
Directors sell after abnormal performance 
2 Hillier & Marshall Info Contents I/l/P2 to Close Period Interim & Final Event Study The ClosePeriod affects timing of directors trades 
(20 02/ b) JOCF BVT around 31/12/96 -1 "2 months befojEamings News but not ther trades performance or distribution 
farnings 3871 Buys Earnings News 60 days prior Directors earn AR regardless the period they trad 
Announcements 3521 Sales Earnings News They Buy after bad Earnings News & Sell after 
"timing" good Earnings News. 
3 Hillier & Marshall Info Contents 29/9/91 to Tax-loss Turn of the yeasMultivariate There is a Jan effect in firms returns that is 
(2002/ c) IRFA ffff & Jan Effect 31103/97 selling effect "January" unrelated to either INT activities orTax-Loss 
, 
4088 Buys Selling. 
3708 Sales 
4 Friederich, Gregory, Info Contents 1986-1990 No FT`EI00 Net Quantity of Event Study Directors sell after positive price changes & ARs 
Matatko & Tonks Stock Returns 1991-1994 Thin Trading shares traded in are negative after directors sale. 
(2002) EFM & Around XT 1887 Buys Larger AR an event clay. Price reversal starts occunng on the day before 
(1999) FMG-DP 1522 Sales TransCost directors trade but not caused by that trade 
196 Fims Large stock price changes occur around INT 
p hases than sales. After transaction costý no urc 
positive AR for outsiders maitating I NT. 
5 Hillier &Marshall Info Contents 17/9/91 to Earnings Trading Directors abstain from trading 40 days before 
(1998) Waround 31/12/94 Announcement. Distribution announcement. But INT increases on 
Earnings Buys 3006 160 days around event day up to + 10 days. 
Announcements Seles2691 Anriouncement Directors Buy in the event day & one day after, 
"timing" 1350 Fims 
-80 to +80 but sell over I month thereafter. 
6 Gregory, Matatko & Info Contents. 1186-12/90 Finn's size. No. of traders, Event Study Size effect is important where CAR is long post- 
Tonks i Size effect 6756 deals Volume of trade, DW83 event window & where large no. of small firms is 
1 (1997) 1683 firms Value of trade, MM in the sample. The appropriate benchmark return 
monthly. model must be one that control for size. Signal 
0 to 24 months definition has important impact on results. CAR 
of volume buy are +small but significant for 24 
months. Sell are negative and significant but for 
short period. If transaction cost counted, ARs 
are not attractive. Thus LS E is semi- strong e fficie 
7 Gregory, Matatko, Info Contents. 1'1/84-12186 Firm's siZe, Net volume of Event Study: Significant CAR of buy(sell) for after 6(3) months 
Tanks &Rurkis Sim effect 1440 deals Thin tradings, buy-sell monthly DW83 No significant CAR at 0. CAR of buy for small & 
(1994) 150 firms & overlaps. 0,3,6,12 & 24 MM medium firms are > large firms, & vice versa for 
months holding sell. An control variable reduce CAR, but size 
period. has the greatest effect. 
8 Pope, Morris & Info Contents & 4M- 12/84 Similar buy Net no. of Event Study. CAR (I to 6) of sell(buy) is negative(positive) & 
Pool market ef 
. 
ficgency 564 deals & sell sample buyers/sellers MAR, MM significant(not). Sharp reaction around INT date. 
(1990) Market reaction or >2 &MM 
_No 
evidence on market inefficiency in serni & 
around NT 
-6 to +6 months adjusted. strong levels. 
9 King & Roell Info Contents & 1/86-8/87 Publication Event Study. Buy(sen) portfolio outperformed the market 
(1988) market efficiency 564 deals date Market & signific andy(insignificandy). Thus. the market 
Price eff 1,3 &12 months Mean is not seni-trong effiecient7be Market respond 
Adýuted promptly & efficiently to insiders'sales but not 
Returns to purchases. 
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Tabl! 
_(3. 
IJB) Summary Review of Empirical literature on USA Insider Trading 
stwly Sibject Exanoinied I S"W1. %ri. 4 Contm Focused Model Main 
N (131ý11cation Year) inside,, 
k 
0 
' 
No. efDeals Variables 
I 
Event & Used 
I 
Results 
)wc#1c Event vent A 
- 
s p. 1%. effirsts Period 
I l9bal & Shetty Info Contents. 1/88-12/98 Firm Size INT month Granger Large impact of stock returns an subsequent INT - 
(2002/b) Causality with 2521 Firms Firm, Sector Net No of Deal Causality However. the adverse relationis weak 
_ aock Returns Net Vol of Dei (AutoRegressive Insiders Buy after stock price decreases & Sell 
Buy Deals Models) after stock price increases 
Sell Deak 
2 Carpenter& ESO Exercise 1/84-12/90 Firrn Size A month of Distribution& Exercises occur after strong stock performance 
Remmers Timing 1/92-11/95 exersice Pattern ARs are sig negative after exercises, 
(2001) 201003 Exef cis es thus no inside info. : ýýJl 20 to + 12 day 
7560 Firms Before May 1991 Regulation Before May 199 1, ARs were sig positive 
(ESO to be held for 6 months) suggesting the use of inside info. 
3 Aboody &Ley Info Contents, 1/85-12/97 I. Small Stocks No. of shares Fama&French INT in R&D firms 
(2000) R&D Expenditures. 104 547 deals 2. BV/MV boughtisold 1993- 3 factor gain MORE than those 
3818 firms 3. Non-R&D monthly model in non- R&D firms 
148491 '(6195) Deal's day to I day. 
before fiffirg day 
4 Chakrznrty&NkCow*n Effects on Price. 6/84-8/84 Uninformed Sener/Buyer Regression The market does NOT 
Acquisition Offer & 9/84 buy/sell, Initiated (Trades of hourly distinguish the price 
1711200 volume, near Bid/Ask). returns effect of informed from 
Carnation 7160400 Boe sky' 9 buys the uninformed purchases 
....................... 
shares Carnation to Nestle offer 
shares. of acquisition 
5 Roth & Saporeschertko Info Contents. 1993-1995 Tobin's Q, WSJ published Event Study. Significant CAR for (-7 to 0) (-7 to +7) (0) 
(1999) Large stock 142 deals P/BV, P/E, & Published day, Market & (0 to 252). INT leakage before publication. 
purchases 139 firms log TA (size) 
-14 to +I 4days, A djuted Initial + reaction to event is not revised within 
I of purchase 0 to +90, Returns &a year. Thus, info content of large INT are not 
+252day. regression temporarily. Small & undervalued firms & 
managers (who are not aligned with their owners) 
convey more info (about future incentive). 
.......... .............. ................. . . ......... ..... ......  ..... Info content are not captired by market at time 
of INT. Negative relation between P/E and stock 
F- 
price performance INT decrease info asymmetry 
. . 
6 Anderson ESO Exercise 992 and 1993 When IV/BS=l Distribution of Top 5 Executives at large firms exercise their ES( 
(1999) Timing 199 Directors Intrinsic Value/ when theIV/BS is about equal to one. Subsequenj 
373 Exercise Black-Scholes sotck price performance is sig. poorer for exerciso 
65 Large Firms 
......... ......... ...... ........ 
J 
that are made when the IV < BS value. 
---. - -- ---------- 
7 Chang& Suk Info Contents. 8/88-12/92 Sensitivity I NT date, Event Study Insiders' sales(buys) are preceded by unusually 
(1998) Large stock 707 deals confounding SEC filing date DW83 good(poor) stock performance INT info gets 
purchases & sales news announc, WSJ published MM partially revealed to the market via private channels 
price changes 19 to 22 days as soon as insiders trade. WSJ has info contents 
inunchanged but not SEC. Results are NOT due to confounding 
bid/ask spread, effects, or bid/ask spreads, or the slow price adj 
..........   -
slow price to the SEC filing date. Trading volume supports 
INT i f d h b l h l i ease n o a justment t ea ove resu ts t at re s assoc- 
.......... .....  .... .... ........ 
arte d with an mcre ase in trading activity 
8 Chung & Ckamemvong Effect on Bid/Ask 1988 1. Size (MV) No. of NET Event Study Spread is greater with INT 
(1998) Spreads. 11522 deals, 2. DealVolume insider deals for spread in cross-sectional, but 
. 
0VT intensity. 1001 firms 37radeSize 5 days before & cross-sectiomNO evidence with time 
4. Price &5 after INT &time series 
'series 
regression- 
No. ofExchs regressions 
9 Kara& Denning Profit Determinan 3n9-7180 'l. RiskAversion Transactions, Regression 60% of deals are profitable. 
(1998) & Strong-forni 36134 deals 2. Transact4on &+ returns Insiders' profits are subject 
of EMH. Costs &- returns. to transaction costs & risk 
NT 7'ransactions. 6 mnths &I day aversion degree The market 
holding period Is NOT strong-form effiment. 
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10 LU94PftWAYANDle Effect onForecaste 7/86-12/90 1, Fum Sac, No of NET Tone-senes More insider buying is link 
(IM), 
-- 
Accuracy &2 Earnings' insider btqu4 regression with less forecast error. & 
Dispersion. Annomeement Allis strono affects forecast 
Adurv earnings, 
, Month of INT accuracy in large than small 
firms Selling has little effect 
11 Rozeff & Zaman Info Contents & 1978-1991 CF/P deciles 10 deciles of Regression Insider buying intensified (1998) Over-reaction- 6442 deals CF/P & BVIP. no. of insiders in value than growth stock 
............ 
Growth & Value 1216 Fums 12 months purchases/ & greater after low returns 
Stocks (defined by through May all firm-year & lower after high returns. 
CFIP ratto)ý each year. transactions Value stocks he below 
fundamental value & 
growth stocks he above. 
12 Summers & Svffleney Misstated Financial 1980-1987 Same size Fraud Cascaded Pre 
-fraud financial statements (1998) Statements. 51 deals_ & industry 4 occurance Iogit explains fraud before occur. 
Discowrfraud no-firaud From perpetr- analysis Insiders sell intensively in 
firms ation fraud to fraud firms compared with 
(51) 
........... 
its discovery no 
-fraud frims. 
13 Ch*mvzriy&? & comma Effects on Price, 6/84-8/84 7160400 Boesky's buys. Regression Boesky large purchases 
Bid /Ask Spreads d& 9/84 Carnation 13 oe sky s buys of hourly increase stock prices. 
. Depths (Market LiW 1711200 shares to Na stle offer returns No adverse effect on bid/ 
. ......... 
.....  ........ ...  ...... 
Acquisition Offer Carnation of acqiusdion 
'ask 
spreads (market liquidity) 
shares 
14 Yermack 
I ............ I ........ 
ESO Exercise 620 ESO Predictable Award Date Event Study The timing of awarding ESO is sig associated 
(1 7' Rý 
......................  
tLr=g 1992/1993- award. 
 
-20 to +120daysBW1983 with stock price movements than trading OS by 
................. 
1993/1994 Member of award CEO He receives ESO shortly In advance of 
corntruttee 
.............  
favourable news. 
Earnings Announcement 
Leaking award date. 
15 Toutkoushlan Determinants of 1/75-12/81 1 director buys/ Event Study Factors affect outsiders 
(19916) Abnormal Returns 22695 deals sells in month (MM) returns are # of I NT deals, 
& Semi-Strong EMH. without opposite &regression size of deals, & delay in 
outsiders follow deal by any disclosures. However, the 
....................... - ...... 
insiders. 
..... 
director. market is senu-strong efficient 
-20 +59 days 
16 Pettit & Venkatesh Info Contents, 1/80-8/87 Year 
-1 CAR Net insiders Event Study Strong tendency for insider net purchases to be 
(1995) Long term 100000 deals as base year purchases. MM & related to subsequent & prior performance. Also, 
firm-specific & 1718 firms 1,0, +1 years abnormal insiders reverse their positions in after good 
........................... 
market related INT activity performance period. Thus insiders can anticipate 
stock performance_ future return path reasonably well & act on these 
forecasts. 
117 Cornell& Sirri 
. . ... 
Effects on Price 0711982 & 1/6/80-2/11182 Augmented Prices rise in INT-buy day 
... ...... . ... 
. . I 
MM 
. 
Bid/Ask Spreads 12181-11/82 1/12/81-2/11182 MM for daily But no impact on spread 
. ....... ... . . .... ... - t. Acquisition offer. 265600 deals returns or adverse selection. 
78 trades 
RoU(1984) model for spread. 
............. 
Glosten&Hanis(1 989) for hquidity& costs. 
18 Moulbro*k Effects on Price. 1980-1989 ARs without INT & news. Event Study I NT incre as e stock pric e 
(1992) Illegal BVT. 229 deals INT or news Transaction to AR_, &_CAR 
'accuracy. 
INT_voh= const- 
218 firrns day & regression itutes most of unusaul trade 
to price volume. 
........... 
changes 
19 Rozeff & Zanum Info Contents & In3-12182 Size & E/P : 3buyers(seflers) Event Study AR of OUT is profitable. But with 29/6 tratisaction 
(1988) market efficiency. 698 INT with no I sell MM cost & E/P effect AR is not. Tins suggests INT 
Outsiders afkr 622 OUT (buy) monthly AR is a sign of return differentials due to low 
insiders &1 
....... .. 
0,3,6& 12 price of high UP ratio. R6ect strong level EM H. 
transactions cost. months holding but do not support that insiders have more info 
period, & they trade on it 
20 Seyhun Info Contents & V75-101 1. Size (MV) 1. Net no. of Keim1983 Insiders in small firms increase 
(1988b) Seasonal Patterns. 59148 deals 2. Risk Transactions. seasonal their net purchases in December 
January effects. 769 firms Month of INT patterns to capture January returns, 
& regressions opposite to those in large firnis 
INT does not affect Jan prices 
21 S eyhUn Info Contents &1 t75.1 DA 1 1. Size (MV) Netno of Regressions Aggregate I NT positively 
2. Risk Market Efficiency 59148 deals 
'transactions correlated with market . Bconoxywidefac 769 firms in a month-firm returns In risky & large firms. 
Month of INT 
Tý 
insiders observe econornywide 
factors In small firms, 
insiders trade on firm-related 
Palp w --t TO BE CONT19M 
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22 Seyhun Info Contents & 1975-1981 Fum's sac & Net number Event S tudy Insiders purchase(sM prior to (un)favourable 
(1986) market efficiency. 
1 
59148 deals type of insiders of buyWseUer) DW1983 - info releases Insiders reffiun from purchasing 
Owsiders & 769 finns monthly MM & until after unfavorable info is released Results 
bid(a A spreads Oast I NT date) regression are not sensitive to model used CAR & Svolume 
199 to + 300 CAR to firm ratio are related negatively with firm size INT 
days. size I. mpose significant costs on uninformed traders 
-- ----- - - ... ... .... 
re fle cte d by bid/ask spre act which rise s as 
the Svahx of INT increases. The $value of INT 
4 
-- 
is not related to insider info CAR increases 
with the number of net insiders in said firms 
- Outsiders cannot earn AR following insiders. 
23 Givoly & Palmon Info Contents. 1973-1975 Firm size Good, bad & Event Study: Insiders able to iden* profitable & unprofitable 
(1985) Effects of 1531 deals neutral news. MM in their firms. No tendency for insiders' purchases 
disclosure of 68 firms 0 to 239 days (sales)to precede good(bad) news. No relation 
specific news (10 days intervals) between deal Uize & inside info or subsequent 
disclosure of news INT superior performance is 
not due to inside info. but to assessment of their 
T 
firms' affairs & tendency of outsiders to follow. 
24 Finnerty Info Contents & 1969-1972 Buy / sell Event Study-. Insiders purchases(sales) eam(avold) AR(loss) 
(1976b) market efficiency. 31089 deal monthly CAPM ' siders can iden* profitable & unprofitable In 
Strongform i 
of EMH 
deals portf, ho. 
From 0 to 11 
to in their firms. Thus, refixte the strong level 
'of 
EMH. 
month holdings 
........... 
25 Finnerty Info Contents. 1971 1. Size ýNet No. of MDA & Insiders rely on fixture fin & 
(1976a) ýPbture FInancial 854 deals 2. Fin Leverage transactions multivanate acc. info. Insiders'buy intesified 
& Accounting 3. Eamings & shares held. analysis in small, large earnings & 
Vatiables. 4. Oper Leverage Months in 1971 dividend firms. In average 
3. Capital Intensity firms, insiders sell. 
16. Dividencis 
ý26 Jaffe Profitability arouncl 1962-1968 Net numb er Event Study-. Insiders earn AR. Intensive trading sample has 
(1974b) law decision, 362 deals of buyer(seller) CAPM special info & can forecast up to 8 months. No 
Regulation effect 200 firms in month differcric e was found b etwe en I NT pro fits & 
1.2 &8 months 
_ _41NT 
volume before & after regulatory events. 
.......... 
08/11/61 CadyRoberts decision I 
...... ..............  19/04165 Texas Gulf SiAphur indictment 
19/08/66 Texas Gulf Sulphur decision 
. ................... .  
27 Jaffe Info contents. 1962-1968 Transaction's Netnumber Event Study: Insiders possess & exploit special info. But with 
(1974a) stock prices 362 deals size, 1950s, of buyer(sener) CAPM 2% transaction cost only intensive INT have 
200 firms & 19 60 s& 2% month. + CAR. INT publication has irA. But outsiders 
transactions Publication date. could not cam AR after transaction cosst. except 
costs. 8 months. intensive trading portfolio. 
20 Lorie & Niederhoffer Info Contents. 1/50-12/60 No. of same Advance Insiders predict large price 
(1968) Good or 1305 deals type deals Decline (price movements within 6mriths. 
Bad News: 
............ 
105 firms Month of INT changesto 
the market). 
Insiders accuraulation indicates 
stock will outperform market 
Page 4/5 TO BE CONTOIJED 
Note: Literature are listed according to the publication date, per which the most recent ones first I 
71 
Table (3.1/C) Summary Review of Empirical Literature on Insider Trading in the Rest of the World: 
Study Subject Eicunined samqu Control Focused Model Main 
No. (Publication Year) viddx twider 
I J 
No. ofDealo V=Ies Event & Used Results 
& Country & Spec0c 
ý 
, 1%. offir sos Period 
I Anand, Brown Info Content 380 Buys Firm Size FP Measures: Event Study No sig market reaction to directors buys, while 
and Watson INTas SIgnalfor 196 S also Industry Future Earnings strong for sales Thus more into in INT We than 
(2002) PUturePerforynance64 2 Firms Timeliness Dividends buys. Weak direct relation between market 
Australia (FP) Cash Flow per Share reaction and future performance Directors 
buy (sell) after price fall (rise) Large size sales 
are strongly related to FP M small sized firms 
2 Bylo, Miguel Info Content 1/92-12/96__ INT day Event Study Insiders earn Excess profit 
and Perote 88 Firms 
t 
FhArd Period Outsiders mimicking insiders failed in earning AR. 
(2002) ý589 Buys, 406 Soles 
-10 to -1 & +1 to -060 
Spain 499 by Directors 
54 by Large Shereholc 10r8 
3 Hanousek and Extent of Informe(Augto Nov. 1 999 No. ofBuysad Patterns Ilie probability of informed trading is higher in DC 
Podpiera Trading in Zýnergin. 10 Firms_ Sells in a day 
--------- 
At info event probability of informed trading is m( 
(2002) Market of Transwon Best bid-ask than prob ability of uninforme d trading. Thus, 
Czech spread Mead increase and so trachng costs. Informed 
-- - -- 
.......... 
------------- - - ------ traders might trade legal trading or on inside info, 
but the data cannot deffirentiate between these 
4 Eckbo &Smith Info Contents, 1985-1992 Risk factors, No. of buyers Event Study: In conditional event study, net insiders sales 
Conditional 18301 deals info variables, less no. of sellei Seyhun1986 underperform in month 0, but not thereafter. 
Norweg -t performance of 131 firms INT portfolio ' 7 months. 
-ý(MM) 
in constant conditional betas or time-varying 
INT weights & size calculate AR th & regression beta, value & ownership INT portfolio earn not 
January effect. regress to contr AR to each sigrtificant AR. Neitherr INT nor mutual funds 
variables, one b, of control earn superior AR. Thus, INT literature's AR is a 
one. variables. result of event study not form INT itself 
5 Baesel & Stein Info Contents 1968-1972 No INT INT by Event Study. Bank directors & ordinary insiders have +CAR 
(1979) market efficgency580 deals sample Bank directors CAPM over 12months holding period. But CAR of bank 
Canada nm9ng of III firms _, & ordinay directors>insiders of buy portfolio. However, 
performance. _ insiders CAR did not occur fill (month 7th) info becomes 
...... ... .......... From I to 12 public, which contradicts the sermi-strong EMH. 
months holdings. 
ýNote: Literature are listed accordingto the publication date, perwhichthe mostrecent ones first 
Notes on Abbreviations- 
ARi Abnormal Returns. MMI MarketModel. 
(BV/MV): 
, 
Book Value / Market Value of Equities. MV: Mark tValue. 
CAPM: Capital Asset pricing Model. OSJOrdinýShare. 
CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Returns. ....... ... OUT. Outsider Tradings. 
... ............ .  . . 
(CF/P): Cash Flow to Stock Price. P/BV: Market Value/Book Value of Equities. 
DW83: D odd and Warner (1983) P/E: Price/Earnings Ratio. 
EMH: Efficient Market Hypothesis. R&D: Res e arch and Development. 
EIP: Earnings Per Share. SEC: Securities Exchange Commission. 
Executive Share Options. Sig. SiGnificant. I 
INT: Insider Tradings. Sayhunl986: Seyhun(1986). 
LSE: London Stock Exchange. TA: TotalAssets. 
MAR: Market Adjusted Returns. VrUý Wall Street Journal. 
MDA: 
' 
Multi-DiscrimmentAnalysis. 
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(3.4.2.1) The information content of Insider Trading 
In an ideal world of perfect infonnation, it is expected that the value of a firm's security 
would not be affected by anyone's trading, and that the market is strongly efficient. 
Directors and other firm-involved professionals would not be able to detect the 
over/under value of their own firm's securities. Thus, they would not be able to attain 
abnormal returns, because they do not have more information about their firm's current 
status and future perspectives than any other market participants. 
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The academic research reaches a general consensus about the insiders' profitabilitv. 
resulting from their ability to identify the mis-pricing in their own fin-ns and, thus, trade 
on their private and material infori-nation. Hence, the question to be addressed is 
concerning the type of infon-nation revealed by insider trading. Stock returns are a 
function of three sets of information. These are: 
(1) Firm-specific infori-nation [e. g. financial leverage, mix of products, operating 
leverage and business line], 
(2) Industry-related information [e. g. regulation, competition and significant 
technology development], and 
(3) Economy-wide infon-nation [e. g. inflation, interest and exchange rates]. 
Obviously, the first type of information affects the firm itself only, while the second 
influences all the fin-ns in a given industry, and the last shapes the whole economy and, 
thus, affects all firms in that economy. 
The empirical literature, outlined in table (3.1), detects the information content of 
insider trading by using different indicators. Such as: 
(1) Number of transactions [see, for example, Chung and Charoenwong (1998), 
Finnerty (1976a), Hillier and Marshall (2002/a&b), Jaffe (1974a) Kara and 
Denning (1998), Lone and Nirderhoffer (1968), Meulbroek (1992) and Seyhun 
(1988b)], 
(2) Number of insiders [see, for instance, Eckbo and Smith (1998), Gregory et al. 
(1997), Jaffe (I 994b), Lustgarten and Mande (1998), Pettit and Venkatesh (1995), 
Pope et al. (1990), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Seyhun (1986) and Toutkoushian 
(1996)], 
(3) Volume of transactions [see for example Aboody and Lev (2000), Chang and Suk 
(1998), Friederich et al. (2002) and (1999) Gregory et al. (1997) and (1994) and 
Roth and Saporoschenko (1999)], 
Disclosure of insiders' transaction In the publications [see for example Baesel and 
Stein (1979), Chang and Suk (1998), Jaffe (1974a), King and Roell (1988) and 
Roth and Saporoschenko (1999)] and 
(5) Finn's size [see for example Givoly and Palmon (1985), Gregory et al. (199-) 
and (1994), Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Sevhun (1986)]. 
In fact, these indicators are of the signal definition matters. That is the event dct-inition 
in the event studies methodology, which will be discussed in detail in section 0 of 
cbapter 5. 
This section, however, reviews the literature according to the types of nfomiation 
content detected from insider trading. These are fin-n-specific information ii-i the 
subsection (3.4.2.1.1) and economy-wide information in the subsection (3.4.2.1.2). 
(3.4.2.1.1) Firm-Specific Information 
The pioneering researchers, reviewed in section (3.4.1.2), have found that insiders do 
outperforin the market, particularly in the short run. One argument presented, in the 
context of the firm-specific information content, is that abnon-nal returns earned by 
insiders might be realised by subsequent disclosure of specific news about the insiders' 
company, and not from the disclosure of the insider transactions itself. Empirical 
literature, outlined in table (3.1), shows no consensus about this argument. In fact the 
literature provides contradicting evidences. On one hand, Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) 
and Seyhun (1986) found that insiders do buy (sell) before favourable (unfavourable) 
events or performance. This indicates that such transactions might be considered as 
illegal. However, this depends on a block-out period, by which insider trading is 
prohibited within a certain period, i. e. prior to an event (news) date. None of these two 
studies report whether this is the case or not. 
On the other hand, Chang and Suk (1998), Hillier and Marshall (2002/a) and Frelderich 
(2002) and (1999) concluded that insiders' buys (sales) are preceded by unusually poor 
(abnon-nal good) stock performance. This behaviour, in fact, provides an adverse signal 
to the market, which contradicts adverse selection and signal theory discussed in section 
(3.2.4) and (3.3.2) respectively. One explanation for these findings can be detected from 
the sample used, as in Chang and Suk, which is limited to large transactions. Or because 
of the large increases in the directors holdings, as in Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), or 
because of the regulation which bans directors from trading in a certain (close) period 
such that in Hillier and Marshall (2002 b). It is N-cry likely that large transactions easll-.,, 
attract the attention of not only the regulatory body of the stock cxchan(-'C. but also the 
shareholders and outsiders as wcll as the media. Thus, this sort of transaction should be 
cxecuted during a non-suspicious time to avoid illegality. Another interesting matter 
14 
found by Chang and Suk is that there is a leak about large transactions before 
publication. One might expect that this leak be due to the transaction filing in the stock 
exchange. Roth and Saporoschenko (1999) investigate the information content of lar, 
-, 
c 
transactions at the filing date and the date of publishing in the Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ). They found that such leakage is due to private channels. Consistent with Jaffe 
(1974a), both studies find that SEC filing has no information content while %N'SJ 
publication has, and this information content is not temporary. 
On the contrary to the above, Givoly and Palmon (1985), Hillier and Marshall (2002 b) 
and (1998) and lqbal and Shetty (2002/b) addressed this issue and found no tendency 
for insiders' buying (selling) to precede good (bad) news. Using two signals (the insider 
transactions and the company-related published news and classifying all significant 
related news according to the market response to the disclosed news as good, bad or 
neutral), Givoly and Palmon found that the abnormal returns from insider trades are not 
associated with disclosure of specific news about the company. The same result was 
found when taking into account the transaction size. The abnormal returns endure well 
beyond the typical period of market reaction to the disclosure of specific news event. 
Consistent with the signal theory [section (3.3.2)], the above literature provide evidence 
indicating that the insiders' abnormal return is likely to be due to the infori-nation 
revealed through insider trading itself. That is insider trades do reveal special 
information other than that specific news disclosed subsequently about their company. 
In the same direction, Anand et al. (2002) examined the information content of insider 
trading and its relation to the Australian firrn's future financial performance and find 
that only large size director sales are strongly related to future performance of small 
sized firms. 
Another argument is that the firm-specific information contents detected b. v the 
literature are in fact a result of event study methodology not from insider trading itself. 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) advocate this argument by investigatIng the conditional 
performance of Norwegian insider trading. Taking into consideration constant 
conditional ýiiid time-varying betas, they show that insider-trading portfolios. measured 
by either value or volLinie of transactions, could not earn significant abnormal returns 
because thcrc was no inforniation content in such transactions. In fact, the informational 
content of insider trading is a relativc terni, either in terms of disclosure. i. e. fully or 
- ýN 
partially revealing [section (3-3.1)]. or in terms of measure, i. e. the returns [section 
(5.2.1.5)]. So the abnormal returns of insider trading literature are, in fact. relative 
measures not only in terms of which model is used to estimate the expected returils. but 
also in terms of the different samples used in the comparison, i. e. control variables and 
sample. 
Most of the literature that employed event study methodology used a sort of control 
sample for the purpose of companson. For example, Aboody and Le\' (2000), Xvho 
employed the 3-Factor-Model of Fama and French (1993) in an event study, used two 
samples of insider trades, one in firms with Research and Development (R&D) 
expenditures and the other without R&D. They showed that insider trading in R&D 
firms gained more than those in non-R&D firms. They also showed that the information 
content of insider trading in R&D firms was relatively more than in non-R&D firms. 
Another example is presented by Gregory et al. (1994) who compared the perfon-nance 
of insider trading of small and medium firrns with large firms. Controlling for size 
effect, thin trading and overlaps, they found that insider trading of small and medium 
size firrns' portfolios outperforrn those of large finns. Similar frameworks are used by 
multivariate analysis literature. Rozeff and Zaman (1998), for example, compared 
insider-trading intensity in growth and value firms, defined by the ratio of cash flow to 
the market stock pnce. They found that insider trading intensified in value firrns 
compared to growth firms. Furthermore, Kara and Denning (1998) show that 60% of 
insider trading transactions is profitable and that this profitability is subject to 
transaction costs and risk aversion degree. 
Thus, the above examples seem to suggest that as long as both insider trading and 
control samples are identically treated by the same methodology, i. e. event study or 
multlx, ariate analysis, the infon-nation content of insider trading becomes a matter of 
signal definition not a methodological measure. Section (3.4.2.1) above lists indicators 
of the signal used in the literature and section (5.2.1.1) of chapter 5 describes these 
definitions. 
(3.4.2.1.2) Economy-wide Information 
w1lich tNpc of infomiation revcaled by insider trading, is a subject cxamined by Seyhun 
(1988a). Bv analN, sill,, the same sample Lised in Sevhun (1986), lie assumes that a 
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relationship between insider trades and subsequent market returns would exist if there 
were a relationship between insider trading and the economy-wide activity. Hence, the 
information content of insider trading is that of the -%vide conomy. On the other hand, if 
there were a relationship between insider trading and the fin-n-specific information. 
then, there would be no relationship between insider trading and subsequent market 
return. In addition,, Iqbal and Shetty (2002/b) investigates whether insider transactions 
and stock returns have causality relationships at the firm level and find a large negative Z-1 
impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions. This seems to suggest that 
[as in Hillier and Marshall (2002/b] insiders buy after stock price decreases (such as bad 
earnings news) and sell after stock price increases (such as good earnings ne\\-s). 
Using the regression analysis to test these assumptions, Seyhun finds that aggregate 
insider trading activity occurs 2 months before the changes in excess returns on the 
market portfolio. Hence, he concluded, insiders observe the effects of economy-wide 
infori-nation in their firms' activities before the stock exchange does and thus trade on 
these observations. In other words, Seyhun finds that insiders increase their purchasing 
before the stock exchange returns increase, and vice versa. Moreover, this relationship 
is found to be stronger in insiders' firm characterised by higher market risk and larger 
size. 
Another example about this issue can be seen in Baesel and Stein (1979). Although the 
objective of this study did not include detecting the economy-wIde Information content 
of insider trading, the types of insiders in the sample are well representative to the 
Canadian economic directions. Those are bank directors who have superior information 
about the state of the economy than ordinary insiders. That is so because of the 
enon-nous power is concentrated in the hands of bank directors. Such that, 22 directors 
of the Royal Bank are on board of 240 companies, 22 directors of Bank of Commerce 
are on board of 225 companies and 20 directors of Bank of Nova Scotia are on board of 
220 companies. Thus, bank directors' trades can be seen as a signal for the state of the 
economy. Baesel and Stein found positive cumulatl\, e abnormal returns (CAR) of both 
ordinary insiders and bank directors' trades over 12 months. However. CAR of bank 
directors buying is more than that of ordinary insiders. This result supports the notion of 
superior information possessed by bank directors, on one hand, and the econom\--\\ ide 
information content of bank directors trading on the other hand. 
(3.4.2.2) Insider Trading Effects on Stock Prices and Market 
Eff ic 
It becomes apparent that insiders' abnormal returns earned from tradin2 in their own 
companies' shares have become widely acknowledgeabl e. However, the case of 
outsiders' abnormal returns that might be earned by usincy publicly aN-ailable 
infon-nation and by imitating insiders trading constitutes a senous challenge to the 
EMH. 
Friedench et al. (2002) and (1999), Gregory et al. (1997), Hillier and Marshall (2002 a) 
and Pope et al. (1990) in the UK and Kara and Denning (1998), Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) and Seyhun (1986) in USA investigate this issue and refute previous research 
findings [such as those of Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968) and Jaffe (I 974a) in USA and 
King and Roell (1988) in UK]. They all support the notion of the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, i. e. outsiders cannot use publicly available information to earn 
abnormal returns. However, they reach different conclusions concerning the 
profitability of the insiders. 
On one side of the Atlantic, i. e. UK, Pope et al. (1990) found opposite results to those 
of King and Roell (1988). They show positive insignificant abnon-nal returns for buy 
portfolio and negative significant abnormal returns for the sell one and, concluded that, 
LSE is efficient in the strong level sense. In fact, Pope et al. used both MAR and MM in 
an event study and found identical results. Gregory et al. (1997) reconcile both studies 
by showing that the buy portfolio results are consistent with King and Roell, and the sell 
one with Pope et al. They concluded that LSE is semi-strongly efficient. Gregory et al. 
results can be justified by the fact, that proven by Chakravarty and McConnell (1999), 
that the market does not distinguish the pnce effect of insiders' purchases (sales) from 
those of the outsiders'. In the most recent study in the UK, Friederich et al. (2002) 
examine the stock returns around insider trading and find that after transaction cost, no 
positix, c abnormal returns can be earned by outsiders imitating insider trades. 
On the other side of the Atlantic. i. e. USA, Seyhun (1986), using daily returns. supports 
prcvious rcsearch of significant abnon-nal returns. while Rozeff and Zaman (1988), 
Lising monthly data. find insignificant abnomial return and supports the existencc of the 
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strong form of the EMH. In Fact, Seyhun uses 5914S insider transactions for 769 
companies quoted on NYSE and AMEX during the period 1975-1981. and grouped the 
sample by firm size and identity of insiders (officer, director, officer, director, chain-nan 
of the board of directors, and large shareholderS29 ). While Rozeff and Zanian use 698 
insider transactions on the NYSE only, during the period 1973-1982, and grouped them 
by firm size 30 and P/E ratio. Both employed event study methodology and define the 
event by number of insider buyers (sellers) in a given calendar month, and both takc 
into account the transaction costs 31 
Moreover, Baesel and Stein (1979) show evidence on inefficiency of Ontario Stock 
Exchange resulted from the lax of market response to the information content of bank 
directors and other insiders trading, as reported in table (3.1) and reviewed in previous 
section (3.4.2.1.2). While Anand (2002) find no significance market reaction to 
Australian director's purchases and strong reaction to sales, particularly in small sized 
firms. 
It can be argued, however, that the above literature implies that some factors not 
employed by previous research, such as firm size and intensity of inside buyers (sellers), 
can significantly affect the outsiders' abnormal returns earned by replicating insiders' 
transactions. To this end, Toutkoushian (1996) argues that the outsiders' abnormal 
returns, which are due to replicating insiders' trading, depends not only on the insiders' 
private information, but also the extent to which potential abnon-nal returns have already 
been captured by other outsiders receiving information in a more timely manner. This 
leads Toutkoushian to examine the determinants of the outsiders' profitability. In other 
words, he examines whether outsider abnon-nal returns are in fact influenced by the 
intensity of insider trading, measured by the number of insiders, value of tile 
transactions and the proportion of the firm value traded by insider transactions, as well 
as the type of transaction (buy, isell), and the delay with which the Official Summary 
published. Kara and Denning (1998), for example, show that insiders' prot-itability is 
subjcct to transaction costs and risk avci-sion degree. While Toutkoushian's results still 
29 LISA legislation, SEA 1934. defines the insiders as the firm's directors, officers, as vvell as those 
shareholders who own I O"o or more of the firm's equity. 
30 Rozeff and Zanian define the firm size by the market value of its equity. while -SCVIILITI uses the average 
company's equity during the period 1975- 198 1. 
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support the semi-strong fon-n of the EMH, he finds that outsiders' profitabilitY Vanies 
according to specific factors. It is found that the intensity of insiders tradilig. the 
volume, and the delay, with %vhich information is received, hax, e significant effects on 
outsiders' profitability. However, these factors have a varied leý-el of influence on 
outsider profitability according to the type of the insider trading. 
Another issue investigated by literature is the effect of insider trading on bid-ask 
spreads. In theory, market makers set security Prices so that theý, earn zero-profit. 
However, with presence of insider trading, they experience an adverse selection 
problem. Since infon-ned (un-informed) investors trading is (not) related to abnormal 
future price changes, they lose (earn zero-profit) systematically to the informed trading. 
That, they would unpremeditated buy stocks from the informed prior to abnormal stock 
price decreases and sell to the informed prior to abnormal stock price rises. They offset 
this loss by lowering the bid (purchase) price to reflect possible unfavourable 
information and rising the ask (sale) price to reflect possible favourable information. 
Thus, their loss from trading with the informed is offset by their gain from the un- 
inforined investors, which resulted in transferring their loss to the un-informed 
investors. This leads to suggest that (1) there is a positive relation between the insider 
trading intensity and bid-ask spreads and (2) a positive relation between the abnon-nal 
returns of the informed investors and the bid-ask spreads [Seyhun (1986)]. 
Inconsistent with the theory, the majority of empirical literature shows no impact of 
insider trading on bid-ask spreads. Seyhun (1986), for example, indicates that as the 
value of insider trading increases the bid-ask spread widened. However, he admits that 
the value of insider trading is not related to insider inforination and, thus, has no 
infori-nation content. This result ruled-out the theory. Chung and Charoenwong (1998) 
show another example of contradicting results. That bid-ask spread is greater with 
insider trading in cross-sectional data, while the time-senes data shows no evidence on 
the impact of insider trading on the spreads. Based upon Seyhun (1986) general 
conclusion. that insider trading widens the bid-ask spread, Hanousek and Podpiera 
(2002) consider the bid-ask spread as an indicator for non-reported informed trading in 
the Czcch non-regLilated enicr-ging market in transition. Z_7 
31 While Scyliun consider costs between 2.7'o and 5.2%, depending on the firm size, Rozeff and Zaman 
fix costs at -'01ý0. regardless of the firm size. 
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In fact, Ckakravarty and McConnell (1997) are mostlý,, dedicated to examine this matter. 
By studying a law case, viz. Boesky purchases Carnation's stocks prior to an acquisition 
offer,, they find that although Boesky's large purchases increases stock price there Nvere 
no adverse effect on bid-ask spreads. Cornell and Sim (1992) attained the same 
conclusions. 
(3.5) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the conceptual foundation that explains insider trading in the 
context of efficient market hypothesis, the rational expectations equilibrium and tile 
inforinational signalling theories; and reviewed the empirical literature that detects the 
information contents of insider trading and its impact on the stock exchange. 
Empirical literature finds that insider trading contains firm-related and/or economy- 
wide information and insiders do outperform the market, thus the market is not strongly 
efficient; however, outsiders mimicking insiders could not earn abnonnal returns, thus 
the market is semi-strongly efficient. Twentieth century literature argues that insiders' 
abnormal returns are explained by subsequent news. Insiders buy prior to favourable 
news and sell prior to unfavourable news. While Twenty-First century research finds 
that insiders buy after unusual bad stock performance and sell after abnormal good 
stock performance. 
The UK literature on insider trading is lagged behind the USA one, not only in terrns of 
the extent of this literature (depth), but also in terms of the aspects that have not 
investigated yet (breadth). The current level of literature provides an ample field for 
more UK studies on the various aspects of all type of insiders, not only directors, trade. 
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Chapter Four 
Insider Trading and the Managerial Incentive 
Agency Theory and the Empirical Evidence 
(4.1) INTRODUCTION 
The second issue examined in this study is about whether insider trading can be 
considered as a managerial incentive. That is whether the director's expected returns 
from insider trading could be seen as an implicit part of his compensation package. 
While chapter 3 reviews the first issue, i. e. the infori-nation content of insider trading, 
this chapter continues the theme of previous chapter but from a different perspective. 
That is by considering the ways of controlling the behaviour of the relatively infon-ned, 
i. e. firm's directors (insiders), by the less informed, i. e. shareholders (outsiders). 
Chapter one established the foundation of this research, in which section (1.4.2) briefly 
introduced the relevant body of literature. This chapter expands that section by 
reviewing the relevant body of literature, with the aim of providing a theoretical 
foundations of executives pay. In addition, its objective is to identifying the link 
between both issues that are addressed by this research. 
The structure of the chapter will be as follows: section (4.2) introduces the parent 
discipline in relation to the second issue. That is the Agency Theory; firstly in terms of 
the Principal-Agent Model, and secondly in terms of the managerial incentives theory. 
Section (4.3) links the first issue with the second issue of the study. That is the 
immediate relationship between insider trading and Agency Theory, and section (4.4) 
presents the theoretical background and the empirical literature in relation to the role of 
insider trading as a managerial incentive. Finally, section (4.5) concludes the chapter. 
4.2) AGENCY THEORY 
The ultimate theoretical objective of the firrn's directors is to maximize the 
shareholders' wcalth. Corporate law prescribes the fiduciary duty rule so that directors 
should takc decisioi-is, actions that increase the firni's output. However, the fiduciary 
duty rule, naively applied, does not account for the infon-nation and incentive problems 
that can erncrý, c in a corporate fin-ri, where shareholders are unlimited in numbers and ZI 
outsiders to the firrn's decision-making process [see, for instance, Clark (1995) in this 
respect]. In particular, shareholders may have to rely on information about firm's future 
output provided by better-] nfon-ned directors. Moreover. the firrn's future output may 
depend on unobservable managerial inputs (efforts). If shareholders must provide 
incentives for the directors to provide truthfully and give appropriate effort. the 
management may find it optimal to act and produce a quality output than prescribed by 
the fiduciary duty rule. 
To illustrate the relationship between shareholders (owners 
- 
pnncipals) and directors 
(agents), a nsk-neutral shareholders hires risk-averse directors, who are assumed to 
enjoy private benefit from running the firm, reflect a preference for greater perquisite 
consumption and reputation. The directors provide input (efforts) that enhances the 
firrn's output but is costly to them and unverifiable by the owners. Absent an explicit 
incentive scheme, the directors will always wish to report the favourable information to 
demand for higher compensation, while putting forth the minimum amount of effort to 
minimize private costs. Consequently, owners must use a disciplinary device to give the 
directors the incentive to report truthfully and give appropnate effort. 
This issue of controlling the behaviour of the well informed by the less infori-ned has 
come to be known in the literature as Agency Theory [Lambert (2001) reviews agency 
theory and its application to accounting issues]. By definition,, agency theory is 
concerned with studying the contractual relationships resulted in a delegation of certain 
degree of decision-making autonomy by owners of an entity to one or more parties. This 
particular contractual relationship, known as an agency relationship, indicates that one 
party (known as principal) hires another party (known as agent) to act, represent and/or 
conduct certain activities on behalf of the principal [see, for example, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Ross (1973)]. Agency theory is concerned with the asymmetric 
information in the principal-agent relationship, on one hand; and with the contract 
design (compensation) that motivates the agent to act iii the principal's interests, on the 
othei- hand. Section (4.22.1) explains the principal-agent model and rc%-Ie\\'s releN, ant 
literature, while section (4.2-2) discusses the incentive theory in the managerial 
compcrisation contracts. In fact, relevant literature, reviewed below, focuses almost 
eiicy thcot-%-, i.e. principal-agent model. That ciitirely on the norniativc aspects of the ag I 
is oil how to desigii the optimal compensation contracts betweeii the pi-mcipal and the 
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agent to overcome the problems of uncertainty, i. e. as,, Tnmetric inforniation, and 
imperfect monitoring, i. e. conflict of interests, that exist in the agency relationship'. 
(4.2.1) Principal 
-A-qent Model 
The relationship between shareholders (principal) and firm's management (agent) is but 
one example of agency relationship. Other examples include insurer-insured, lelider- 
borrower, landlord-tenants, client-lawyer, patient-doctor and university- lecturer. This 
agency relationship is known as a Principal-Agent Model, or Finance Model, as named 
by Keasey, Thompson and Wright (1997). In the classic agency relation, the owner 
attempts to design a reward contract that will induce the manager to utilise his special 
skills (education, experience and professionalism) and privileged information in the 
owner's best interest [Toms and Wright (2001) present a theoretical synthesis of the 
evolution of Principal-Agent Model in the British business]. 
The principal-agent model was evolved simultaneously to, however independent of, the 
agency theory, mainly by influential works of Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom 
(1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). This body of literature aimed at deriving 
optimal incentive contract for risk-averse agent. In a typical principal-agent model, a 
risk-averse agent makes an unobservable action/effort (e) to produce stochastic output 
[Q(e)], and receives compensation [w(Q)] and utility [u(w, e)]. The optimal contract 
[w*(Q)] is the one that maximizes the nsk-neutral principal's utility [Q-w(Q)] subject to 
(1) The agent chooses actions/efforts to maximize his utility [u(w, e)]. This is referred to 
as incentive compatibility constraint, and 
(2) The expected utility of the optimal contract must exceed the agent's reservation 
utility. This is called participation constraint [Hallock and Murphy (1999a), p. xi]. 
' However, there is another distinct line of agency theory literature, which is concerned almost 
exclusively with the positive aspects of the agency theory [see, for example. Fama (1980). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Strong and Walker (1987)]. That is with explaining why certain types of 
organisational forms tend to dominate certain sectors of the econornIc activities [Higgins and Toms 
(1997) study the relationship between firm structure and performance]; such as the relationship between 
changes in corporate governance and the exploitation of scale and scope econorrues [Toms and Wright 
(2002)] and shareholding companies in the manufacturing sector and propri II in 'etorships and partnersh ps i 
service scctor [Strong and Walker (1987)]. In addition, it is concerned with the determination of the 
equilibrium contractual form characterising most contributors to the organisation, Oz. shareholders and 
creditors [Douglas (2002) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. In other words, the positive agency theory is 
about the firm's ownership structure, capital structure and contractual structures [Fama ( 1980)]. However, 
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ict The principal-agent relationship has tvvo characteristics, uncertainty and confli 
explained as follows: First, uncertainty. The agent has a certain degrec of Independence 
over undertaking certain decision variables that influence the economic value of the 
principal's entity, i. e. principal's wealth. Asymmetric information exists in this 
relationship because the principal does not know what the agent's action is and, "or 
whether that action is appropriate. The agency theory literature identifies tXvo sources of 
infon-nation asymmetries. Firstly, the hidden action or moral hazard, which occurs when 
the agent's choice from different decision variables is not observable by the principal. 
This is restncted to post-contractual unobservable actions. It is a problem of inducing 
agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot bc 
observed directly [see, for example, Guesnerie (1990), Holmstrom (1979 and 1982) and 
Kotowitz (1990)]. Secondly, hidden infon-nation or adverse selection, which occurs 
when the principal does not know the distribution set, used as supplying information to 
the agent's productive inputs. This is restricted to pre-contractual unobservable 
managerial type. Examples of supplying informational set include knowledge of the 
returns, payoff probabilities, management abilities, functional relationship and business 
parameters [see, for instance, Bohlin (1997) and Kotowitz (1990)]. 
The principal-agent model indicates that the agent chooses from among different 
variables an action, which is associated with unobservable random variable that resulted 
in a measurable output, i. e. monetary, payable to the principal. The problem of 
asymmetric infori-nation exists when the agent has access to infori-nation 
- 
related to 
transforming the agent's decision variables into outputs 
- 
that is not available to the 
principal. The output (Q) is a function of the agent's effort (e), that is: 
f (e) 
............................................................. 
This equation implies that the output is positively associated with the effort level. 
Higher effort levels generate more output and lower effort level decreases the output 
produced. In the context of the agency relationship, the agent's efforts, similar to Ili is ID 
actions. are unobscrvablc, 
hoN\-CN'CF, the output can be measured with almost perfect 
accuracy. Rclevant literature [see for example Ross (1913), \Ilrrlees (1970) and 
this line of the agency theory has no direct link with this research hypothesis. For literature re\-Ie\\- of 25 
vears of corporate governance rescarch, scc Denis k2001 ), 
,ý . 7, 
Holmstrom (1979)] concentrates on a situation per which the agent's efforts can neither 
be observed nor be perfectly inferred on the basis of observable variables. Thus, it is 
assumed that output is a function of effort and unobsen, able random variable (0). which 
represents the state of the world [Ross (1973)], that 
f (e, O) 
............................................................. 
(4.22) 
The second characteristic of the Principal-Agent relation is the conflicts. Here both 
parties differ in their choices over alternative decision variables that would result in a 
conflict between their objectives. Rationally, the principal prefers more economic value 
to less regardless of the level of the effort exercised by the agent. Also, the agent prefers 
more economic value to less but gains from the effort exercised and affected by the state 
of the world. Hence, the prMcIpal-agent problem arises whenever one party's action has 
an affect on another party. Relevant literature identifies two main reasons for the 
existence of this problem. These are (1) moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
discussed above, and (2) risk-sharing problem, for example in the landlord-tenant 
relationship [see for example Shavell (1979) and Stiglitz (1974) and (1975)]. 
By assumption, both parties are utility maximising. The principal's utility (Up) depends 
only on wealth, i. e. monetary output (Q), 
UP 
=f (Q) 
...................................................... 
(4.3) 
and substituting (4.2) in (4.3) gives 
Up 
=: f (e, 0) 
...................................................... 
(4.4) 
On the other hand, the agent'sUtlllty (Ua) depends on effort (e) in addition to output, 
(, 
a= 
_f 
(Q. 
...................................................... 
(4.5) 
and, once again substituting (4.2) in (4-5) gives- I 
2 0) 
...................................................... 
(4.6) 
2 Strong and Walker (19 8 7), p. 169 
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This equation clearly shmvs that the agent's utility is associated Nvith his effort more 
than with the output. Thus, this effort might be directed to a different way than that of 
the principal's objectives. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the agent \vIII not alwaý's 
act to the best interests of the pnncipal. In the context of the firm's management, agencv 
problem occurs when there is asymmetric information, either relatinu to what the 
agent's did or what he should do (moral hazard problem). On one hand. the agent's 
actions affect the principal and, on the other hand, these actions are almost unobservable 
by the principal, however, they can be inferred by their output. In fact, even though the 
agent's actions can be observable, the pnncipal still does not know if these actions are 
appropriate, because of the imperfect information he/she has about the state-of-his- 
entity-world (adverse selection problem). Thus, compensation should be based upon the 
observed output rather than the unobserved actions. 
Furthermore, the principal-agent model assumes that the principal is risk-neutral as 
he/she prefers more money for less [equation (4.4)], and the agent is risk-averse as the 
effort has a greater impact on his output [equation (4.6)]. The output, in fact, has to be 
shared between both parties. The agent derives utility from output and dis-utility from 
effort. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the following utility function for the agent 
[Strong and Walker (1987), p. 169] 
Ua 
=Q 
Y2 
-e2...................................................... (4.7) 
The agent's derives utility equals to the square root of the monetary payoff and dis- 
utility equals to square level of effort. Thus, higher effort exerted by the agent 
decreases his utility while increases the principal's utility. This equation shows clearly 
the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. If, for example, the agent has 
a guaranteed monetary payoff regardless of the reallsed output, then it is not reasonable 
to expect him/her to select higher level of effort. Since he is risk-averse, the agent 
maximises his utility by exerting the lowest, i. e. nsk-less, level of effort v, 'hile 
minimises the principal utility by producing the lowest level of output. Agency theory 
literature prescribes a natural remedy to the problem of conflict of interests by designing 
a contract that monitors the agent's actions. That is by relating the agent's compensation 
to tlic entity output. This issue is a stibject of the following section (4.2.2). 
s- 
Although the agent's action might be observable, ýý, -Ith much certainty or inferred with 
much accuracy, the principal-agent problem still occurs because of the difference ill 
rewards each party receives as a result of that action. In addition, an action of one party 
would affect the other party 3. That is, for instance, v,, hen the agent takes less than the 
required care in response to the principal's action. In the context of business ethics. this 
is called the moral-hazard problem 4. Kotowitz (1990) assumes that the moral-hazard 
problem occurs as a result of an incomplete contract between the two parties. Stiglitz 
(1990) states clearly that the principal-agent problem is essentially about the economic 
incentives. Relevant literature identifies six factors that might explain the presence of 
this incompleteness. These are: 
(1) information asymmetry [see, for example, Arrow (1995), Holmstrom (1979) and 
Kotowitz (1990)], 
(2) barriers to contracting [see, for instance, Jensen and Mckling (1976), Kotowitz 
(1990), Posner (1998) and Stiglitz and Weiss (198 1)], 
(3) the enforcement problem [see, for example, Kotowitz (1990)], 
(4) an optimal contract [see, for instance, Holmstrom (1983), Kotowitz (1990), 
Mirrlees (1976), Ross (1973), and Stiglitz (1974) and (1975)], 
(5) market responses [see, for example, Fama (1980) and Kotowitz (1990)] and 
(6) welfare effects [see, for instance, Kotowitz (1990)]. 
In fact, the first three factors are the ones most responsible for the presence of the 
problem, while the last three factors are the ones used to build theories for tackling this 
problem. 
Of the above factors, the market and institutional responses and infori-nation asymmetry, 
is the central concern of this section. The market response to the moral-hazard problem 
takes the fonn of pressure to increase the contract's features that can help in alleviating 
the problem; such as increasing the nsk-sharing aspects of the contract. This may lead 
the risk averse agent to undertake more risky actions. But taking into consideration the 
labour market forces, such assumption might be untypical and unrealistic. Labour 
market forces can take the forrn of "reputation building" [Fama (1980)], or professional 
licensitila and certification [Arrow (1995)], [see section (4.3.1)]. 
3 Agency Theory literature provides three explanations for the ex'stence of the prIncIpal-agent problem: 
insurance. (2) credit and (3) rent. See for example Stiglitz (1990). Zý 
4 This term is firstly used in the insurance literature, and refers to the adverse effects that the insurance 
contract may have on the insured party's behaviour. 
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However, the way in which the principal monitors the agent's action and 1-estraills 
divergence of interests incurs costs. These costs incurred for monitoring the agency 
problem are termed as agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) classify these costs 
into three types. These are, first principal's monitoring expenditures that include 
observing, controlling and measuring the agent's actions through, enter alias, means of 
budget restrictions, compensation policies and operating rules. An example of this sort 
of cost is appointing non-executives in the board of directors, a phenomena, which is 
popular in the today's corporations5. Second, agents bonding expenditures to guarantee 
that the agent will not take certain actions that hann the principal's interests and ensure 
that the principal will be compensated if he/she takes such actions. Examples of this 
type of cost include the professional indemnity cover and the tabour market forces [See 
also section (4.3.1)]. Almost in all agency relationships, the principal's monitoring and 
agent's bonding costs are positively incurred, i. e. insurance policy purchased by 
shareholders. However, there still possible deviation between both parties' interests, 
which would lead to a reduction in the principal's welfare. This deviation might be due 
to imperfect contract, or due to compensate for bonding cost, or dis-equilibrium in the 
tabour market. Thus, the third cost is the monetary value of this reduction in the 
principal's residual cost, i. e. residual loss. 
(4.2.2) Managerial Incentive T 
Corporate control mechanisms are ways to motivate managers to act in the shareholders' 
interest. These include (1) internal mechanisms, such as managerial incentives, 
directors' monitoring by non-executive directors, and the internal labour market, and (2) 
external mechanisms, such as outside shareholders or creditholders monitoring, the 
market for corporate control, competition in the product market, external managerial 
labour market and company and securities laws [Bushman and Smith (2001) review the 
literature on corporate govemance]. This study concerns only with the managerial 
incentive of the internal mechanisms. 
5 Fama and Jensen ( 1983) argue that the appointment ofindependent non-executl\-e directors (NED) is in 
the heart of the effective resolution of the Agency problems. In the UK. Cadbury (1992) recommends the 
appointment of, at least, three NEDs in the British boards, to bring about independent judgment on issues 
of strategy. performance, resources, key appointments and standard of conduct, as \ýell as setting up 
executivcs remunerations [see section (2.7) in chapter twol. Furthermore, Ezzamel and Watson (199-1) 
and Hamill ct al. (2002 b) and Young (2000) reviews the literature and present evidence on some of the 
costs and benefits associated with recent increase in the use of \EDs in the UK listed companies. 
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The incentive problem is the second issue dealt xvith in the agency theory. Relevant 
literature focuses on the different possible methods and contract structures involved in 
motivating the agent to perfon-n for the best interest of the principal, given that the agelit 
has and may use the infori-nation asymmetry to his own interests [see, for example. 
Bohlin (1997), Gjesdal (1982), Holmstrom (1983), Mirrlees (1976), Ross (1973). 
Shavell (1979) and Stiglitz (1974) and (1975)]. The previous section shows clearly the 
monetary implications [equation (4.7)] of the conflict of interest betweeii the prii1cipal 
and the agent. Thus, it is inevitable for the principal to design a contract that provides 
the agent with an incentive to choose a higher level of effort. To be acceptable by the 
agent, however, such a contract should provide him/her with expected utility equals at 
least to his utility under the original no-incentive contract. Since the incentiý, e contract 
effectively forces the agent to choose the effort level specified by the principal, it is 
referred to in literature as enforceable contract [see for example Hart (1990), Kotowitz 
(1990) and Stiglitz (1975)]. In order to adopt the enforceable contract, the agent's effort 
has to be observable by the principal. So that the contract will be designed in such a 
way that the agent will certainly follows the principal's objectives, i. e. desired effort. 
Agency theory literature referred to this contract as a first-best contract, which entails 
optimal risk sharing [see, for instance, Bohlin (1997) and Guesnerie (1990)]. Under 
such a contract where efforts are observable, literature shows that the risk sharing 
between both parties leads to an optimal reward to the agent and optimal output to the 
principal [see, for example, Strong and Walker (1987)]. 
In the real world, however, it may be not possible for the principal to observe the agent's 
effort level. Otherwise, the enforceable contract would be an easy and fair solution to 
the agency problem. In such a situation where the effort is not observable, and where 
infori-nation asymmetry exists between both parties, the incentive scheme of the agent 
must be related to observable factors, such as the monetary output [see, for example, 
Bohlin (1997) and Gjesdal (1982)]. Under such circumstances of uncertainty, the 
principal can solve the agency problem by offering the agent a contract whereby the 
principal recci\, cs a certain level of the output with the agent receiving the residual 
output. This incentive contract is referred to as the second-best contract [see, for 
instance, Bernardo et al. (2001)]. On one hand, the agent's expected rcsidual output 
must be chosen so as to proN-ide the agent with minimurn compensation equals to wliat 
lie she would receive froni the enforceable contract, i. e. first-best contract. On the other 
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hand, the principal would receive an expected output greater than %\-hat he m, 'ould receiN-e 
from the original contract, but less than that from the first-best contract. 
Infori-nation asymmetry in the agency relationship has a cost [Bohlin (1997)]. By 
adopting the incentive contract, the principal in effect transfers some of the risk 
associated with the effort to the agent. Hence, the principal increases his expected 
output whilst maintaining the expected compensation of the agent 6. However, as the 
agent's effort is not observable and as the agent bears greater burden of risk than what 
he/she would have under the optimal level in the first-best contract, the optimality of 
risk sharing and output are broken down in this contract. This issue is referred to as the 
moral hazard problem [see, for example, Bohlin (1997), Mirrlees (1976) and Stiglitz 
(1975)]. 
Almost all shareholding companies have long-terin incentive contracts with their 
management. That is a multi-period contract. The principal-agent model presented so 
far is concerned with a single-period contract. The literature extended the agency model 
to incorporate multi-period contract, based on three main assumptions. These are firstly 
the contract is repeated and accepted by both parties over multi-period. Secondly, the 
effort level in a certain period affects the output in that period. Thirdly, the random 
variable, 1. e. state of the world, which influences the output in a given period, is 
distributed independently over time [see, for instance, Holmstrom (1983) and Webb 
(1992)]. Given these assumptions, Lambert (1983) shows that the optimal reward for 
any period depends on the output realised in the earlier period, and the reward in a 
certain period within the multi-period contract, differs from reward in a single-penod 
contract. Lambert also argues that the expected utility of the principal per period 
increases with the number of repetitions of the contract. 
Once again, all shareholding companies have several directors in their management. 
The pri ncipal 
-agent model presented so far is concerned with a single-agent. Literature 
cxtended the agency model so the agency relationship consists of one principal 
(shareholders) and several agents (firm's directors). Literature extends the principal- 
agent model to incorporate sc%-eral agents. All of which, howcver. agree on the 
interesting numerical illUstration on the impact ol'th' Strom, and Walker [(1987), p. 1-, 01 P'*OvIde an IIII is 
sort of contract on both parties. 
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assumption that the reward of each agent depends firstly on his own absolute 
performance and secondly his relative performance in comparison to agents 
experiencing similar production circumstances. A leading example of this literature can 
be seen in Holmstrom (1982). He shows that an agent's reward is independent of the 
performances of other agents if and only if the random variable, which influences the 
agent's output and uncontrollable and unobservable, is independent of the random 
variables that influence other agents' output. 
(4.3) INSIDER TRADING AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
This section aims at providing theoretical back ound on whether directors (agents) gr C) 
trade on private price-sensitive information is beneficial to shareholders (principals), 
and on what costs, if any [see chapter 2 for the debate on this issue]. An insider trading / 
agency theory aspect that received considerably little analytical attention and few 
empirical investigation. 
This approach was originally advocated by Marine (1966) and supported later by 
Carlton and Fischel (1983). Marine advocated that the ability of an agent to trade on his 
informational advantage could be considered as a part of an explicit or implicit contract 
between the principals and the agent. In a principal-agent context, Carlton and Fischel 
(1983) and Dye (1984) pointed out that agent trades might be socially beneficial as it 
helps the agent to renegotiate contracts when certain conditions change. Furthermore, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that when directors do not receive the marginal 
benefit of their efforts they would be less motivated in the pursuit of new ventures, as 
they are nsk-averse [see section 4.2.1 above]. Therefore, insider trading can be seen as 
part of the managerial incentives but not an agency problem. According to Marine, it 
rectified a problem of agency costs. Easterbrook (1995) argues that both shareholders 
and managers can gain from devices that ameliorate the aligning divergence of interest. 
Marine school views insider trading as a form of contingent residual claim by directors 
per which they could achieve significant returns whenever their efforts produced more 
than expected gains that the stock price would raise. This argumcnt supports the 
direction of this research from different aspects. Firstly, directors would become less 
jects and develop them cfFicientl\, as their cfforts risk-avcrsc in selcctin.,, good proi 
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increased. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) studied the effect of insider trading oil ex 
ante managerial behaviour and found that insider trading leads directors to clioosc 
riskier pr Jects because it enables them to make profitable trading as theý, learn the 0j 
results of such projects before the stock market. SecondlN,, directors would compensýlte 
shareholders by accepting lower base salaries and their trading returns can be seen as 
low-cost incentives for their extra efforts. On the other hand, perrnitting insider trading 
improves the bargaining power of shareholders to provide less-expensive extra effiort 
incentives [see for example Fenn et. al (1991), p. 14]. Thirdly, insider trading increases 
the equilibrium level of output, which in turn improves the shareholders' wealth [Hu and 
Noe (2001)]. Finally, communicating information through insider trading may be of 
value to the firm than through direct disclosure. Carlton and Fischel (1983) provide 
several examples on this argument 7. 
Linking the principal-agent model, the managerial incentives theory, and the above four 
arguments provides the essence of an economic theory for considering insider trading as 
a managerial incentive. The following sub-sections elaborate this argument but from 
three different aspects. These are the agency cost of insider trading [section (4.3.1)], the 
moral hazard [section (4.3.2)], and the adverse selection [section (4.3.3)]. 
(4.3.1) Insider Trading and Agency Costs 
In monitoring the agent's action and containing the divergence of interests, the principal 
has to borne certain (agency) costs, detailed in section (4.2.1). In the context of this 
section, the residual loss of those agency costs is of interest. That is the value of the 
reduction in the principal's welfare due to the divergence of interests. In fact, this type 
of agency costs is due to the imperfect monitoring of the agency problem. It represents 
the residual of all contractual incentive-based agreement. Thus, one way to overcome 
the residual cost is by permitting insider (agent) trading, which is referred hereto as 
residual trading. Insider trading, in this context, called residual trading because it 
represents (1) trading on residual (not yet disclosed, i. e. NN, hat is left) information, (2) the 
agcnt's residual effort (since the insider's main effort is to run the firm not to trade in its 
shares), (3) the agent's residual return (because the main stream of the agent's returns 
should corne ftom the explicit form of the rewarding contract), (4) the agent's residual 
Carlton and Ii sche I( 11) 83), pag cS OS 
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incentives (that is not explicitly contractual), and (5) the pnnc, pal's residual cost (not 
that of the agency cost) if accepting the argument that outsiders loose for insider trading I 
profitability. Reichelstein (2000) establishes that the agency cost is lower under residual 
income based on the relative benefit depreciation schedule than under a perfonnance 
measure based only on realised cash flows. 
The Manne School sees insider buying as a form of contingent residual claim by 
directors, from which they can obtain substantial returns whenever their extra-efforts 
generated more output than what the market expected. Thus, directors \vould be aligned 
with shareholders' interests. Opponents to insider trading would argue that the same 
conclusion would be reached by using contractual incentives 
-based compensation, such 
as bonuses and stock options. Manne argued that such contingent schemes are not as 
beneficial in addressing the agency problem. Stock options, for example, always issued 
at the beginning of the contract and not contingent on previous performance. Thus, they 
do not substantially motivate performance during the period. Bonuses, on the other 
hand, are largely depend on a director's office (CEO, CFO, or a director; large firm or 
small fin-n) and are not so tied with performance. Opponents, once again argue that 
insider trading is also not perfectly tied with performance, as business success 
sometimes results from chances rather than dedicated skills, and the stock prices rise or 
fall accordingly. Admittedly, no compensation scheme is perfect but one can evaluate 
the benefits of one only in relation to the others. Carlton and Fischel (1983) reviewed 
such arguments and supported the one that insider trading is an efficient compensation 
scheme. Insider trading provides returns to those who knew the price-sensitive 
infori-nation first [see Easterbrook (1995), p. 84]. 
Insider selling can be seen as a co . mpensation for non-dIversified agents, compared with 
diversified principal. On one hand, insiders can avoid losses by selling before bad news, 
and thus reduce the cost of being non-diversified. On the other hand, as Easterbrook 
(1995) argue, even with real bad news, the firrn must pay its managers the \vages they 
could earn at other firms, or otherwise they will leave. In fact, insiders \vould never 
produce bad ncws solely in order to trade on such news. In addition, insiders short- 
swing, trading is prohibited. However, when insiders can trade on both sides (buv & sell 
and buy & sell), Noe (1995) argues that. the agent's ex ante utility rilay be increased 
through pernutting insider trading'. Thus, principals can use insider-trading profit to 
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meet the agent's reservation compensation constraint, and this provides an incentive to 
principals to allow agents to trade. 
The agency costs are real as any other cost. However, firm's directors face a number of 
pressures of varying intensity that help align their interests with those of shareholders. 
These include the threat of legal action of violation of fiduciary duties [Starks (1987)], 
the threat of hostile takeover [Marine (1965)], the competition from other potential 
directors is supplied by the managerial labour market [Jensen and Meckling (1976)], the 
threat of removal by dissatisfied shareholders (proxy fight), and the discipline of the 
non-executive directors. 
The market for the director himself in the managerial labour markets, along with other 
sources of pressures, limits agency costs because the competitive market supplies other 
potential directors, thus reducing the cost of obtaining managerial services. However, 
the extent of which the labour market reduces the agency cost depends on various 
factors. Such as, first, the level of managerial skills and knowledge required to running 
the firm. That is how professional, educated and/or skilled should the director, be, to run 
the firm. Spence (1973) considered this as a job signalling to the labour market. Second, 
how easily to evaluate the director's perforinance [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. Third, 
the director market value outside his firm. Spence (1973), once again, considered this as 
a director signalling to the labour market. Finally, the replacement search cost, which is 
dependent on how sophisticated, is the labour market [Noe (1995)]. 
Obviously, when the director's responsibilities require little knowledge and low skills to 
manage the fin-n, when it is easy to evaluate his performance, and when his market 
\, alue outside the firin and the replacement costs are modest, then agency cost \vIII be 
relatively small, and vice versa. 
In addition, agency costs are likely to decline whenever the opportunity cost of hiniiig 
the director is high enough to ensure that his compensation aligns managerial and 
shareholders' interests. Thus, reducing the cost of allowing firm's discretion in setting 
insidcr-trading policy [Noc (1995)]. Fama (1980) argues that there are three conditions 
imposed by the managerial labour market for full control of manage 'al behavi r! iours 
through compensation cliam, es, which resolves the managerial i I incentive problem. Thesc 
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are, firstly, director's talents and his taste for consumption on the job are not known 
with certainty. These however, are likely to change through time and must be ImpLited 
by the labour market at least in part from information about his current and past 
performance. Secondly, inforinational efficient managerial labour market appropriately 
uses current and past information to revise future compensation. Thirdly, the weight of 
the compensation revision process is sufficient to resolve any potential problem NvIth 
managerial incentives. 
Finally, the capital markets, i. e. the market for the firm itself, constrain the agency cost. 
On one hand, when incompetent management depreciates the market value of the fin-n, 
shareholders have the option of selling their fin-n. Also, rival firins may induce 
shareholders to sell their firm in a process of takeover. In either case, agency costs xvill 
be eliminated completely [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. On the other hand, the capital 
market provides directors with an opportunity to invest their inside information in 
insider trading. Noe (1995) shows that this will have a positive effect on director's 
effort, which is in line with the shareholders' interest and thus reducing the agency costs 
at no cost. 
(4.3.2) Insider Trading and Moral Hazard 
Hu and Noe (2001) show that the beneficial effect of insider trading cannot be 
recognised without linking the moral hazard problem in the same model. Therefore, this 
section aims at defining and explains the problem of moral hazard in the principal-agent 
context, as well as identifying the potential devices to reduce the costs associated with 
this problem. 
Moral hazard can be defined, as in Kotowitz (1990), as unobservable actions of agents 
in maximizing their benefit to the detriment of principals, in situations where they do 
not bear (enjoy) the full consequences (benefits) of their actions due to uncertainty and 
incomplete contractS8 
. 
Thus, moral hazard might refer to the problem of inducing agents 
to make proper efforts and supply proper amount of productivc inputs wlien their 
actions cannot be observed and contracted for directly by the principals [see, for 
8 InterestingIV, Chude and Silvers (2002) analyse a principal-agent model with moral hazard. in which the 
principal, not the agent has private information and find that a principal with more information ends up 
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example, Holmstrom (1982)]. So, the source of moral hazard problem is an asvmmetrv 
of infort-nation in the principal-agent relationship, which cannot be contracted for. 
Therefore, moral hazard can be seen as a special case of incompleteness of contracts9, 
which creates the divergence of interest between the agents and the principals. In this 
context, the moral hazard can be addressed as whether a compensation contract can 
reduce that divergence without incurring additional costs exceeding the available 
benefits. The occurrence of additional cost creates a moral hazard problem. Oil one 
hand, whenever the agent can claim residual of the profits of a successful output but the 
principals bear the entire cost of failure, the agent has an incentive to make risk\, 
decision even if it has a lower return than other less-risky options. Empirically, 
however, literature shows that when too much risk is placed on the agent, firm 
performance suffers [see, for instance, Mishra et al. (2000)]. On the othcr hand, ývhen 
the agent's rewards are not related to principal welfare, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) 
identify three types of agent's moral hazard that might occur: First, risk-aversion 
problem, where the agent invested his human capital, livehoods and future, in the 
company. Second, horizon problem, where the managerial contract period is very short 
in comparison with the firm's life, leading to managerial short termism. Third, over- 
retention problem, where managers may like to retain funds, rather than paid them as 
dividends, to ensure their monetary compensations are maintained. 
To reduce these moral hazard costs, Fama (1980) suggests that the optimal 
compensation contract will have to entail fixed, rather than residual, claims, 
supplemented by re-evaluation after performance completed. Holmstrom (1982) 
supported this argument by showing that relative performance evaluation can be helpful 
in reducing moral hazard costs, because it incorporates risk-sharing relation between 
agents and principals. However, as Easterbrook (1995) shows, such a contract depends 
on the timely possession of infonnation by principals, which is not the case, thus ending 
up with an unavoidable moral hazard problem. In fact, as the Agency Theory assumes, 
flic agents are risk-aversc. Thus, it is very possible that agents make too little risky 
ý ess profit than a principal Nvith less information: while earning IIIIIII the agent can end up better off when the 
rincipal has private information. 
Kotowitz (1990) analysed the rcasons behind the incompleteness of contracts such as the coexistence of 
unequal information and risk aversion, costs and legal barriers to contracting and costs of contract 
Clit orcerrient. 
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decisions and accept lower return. And, xvhenever they shift to riskier position, it is not 
necessary that these have lower returns [see, for example, Holmstrom (19S3) and 
Shavell (1979)]. 
A natural remedy to this problem is to monitor the agent's actions by employing a 
forcing contract to achieve a first-best solution, entailing optimal risk sharing. How-cver. 
full complete monitoring of the actions and full observation of information are either 
impossible or costly [see, for example, Holmstrom (1979)]. Recognising moral hazard 
problem of this sort, an indirect remedy might be employed to reflect the asymmetric 
information, on one hand, and to enforce risk taking, on the other hand. That is by 
allowing insider trading. One strain of insider trading literature [see, for example, Dye 
(1984), Hu and Noe (2001) and Noe (1995)] argue that by pennitting insider trading, 
moral hazard problem can be reduced, if not eliminated. In an empirical quarrel, Dye 
(1984) argues that incentives via insider trading are superior to mcentives via 
perfon-nance-contingent methods. In addition, Noe (1995) analysed the relationship 
between moral hazard in the principal-agent agency relation and managerial insider 
trading. The analysis yields that pen-nitting insider trading improves managerial effort 
incentives, thus, reduces the moral hazard problem and increases the output and 
consequently, shareholders' welfare. Hu and Noe (2001) provide two explanations for 
such a conclusion. Firstly, insider trading impounds information about the costs and 
benefits of effort and perks consumption into share prices, which allows nsk-neutral 
shareholders to select more efficient portfolio allocations. Secondly, insider trading can 
induce directors to increase their stake in the firm beyond that level provided by explicit 
form of the contract, e. g. stock options. 
(4.3.3) Insider Trading and Adverse Selection 
As Arrow (1995) shows, the infort-nation cost and monitoring difficulties that create 
moral hazard may also create adverse selection, as well as insider trading. Furthermore, 
insider trading creates an adverse selection problem for the competitive market makers. 
However, as Levine and Smith (22003) show, as long as the number of liquidity traders 
is high relative to number of insiders, the market makers can find break-e\-en (zero) 
trading profit. In the context of ag-ency theory, adverse selection problem arises from an 
agent action that can be obscrved by the principals, but cannot be verified whether the 
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action was the correct one, except by the agent himself [see, for example, Holmstrom 
(1982)]. Adverse selection is restricted to pre-contractual asymmetric information 
[Bohlin (1997)]. Specifically, whene%-er the firrn write contract that cannot be enforced, 
it faces a serious problem of adverse selection. An. example illustrates this problem as 
follows. A dishonest agent will find the contract attracti\-e, as he Nvill get the salary and 
engage in inside trades, so that he will be overcompensated. To aNýoid 
overcompensation, the firm must reduce salaries across the agents. The honest agelits, 
who do not trade on inside information, become underpaid and will leave the firm. To 
increase its management quality, the firrn might voluntary prohibit insider trading, 
assuming that such prohibition is socially beneficial. Howcver, it \\, III not be able to 
distinguish who does and who does not comply with the prohibition. Thus, the firm will 
not capture the gains from prohibition [see, for instance, Easterbrook (1995)]. 
Therefore, the best solution would be a contract-permitting insider trading for all agents 
while reducing the salaries. If the dishonest agent wants to mislead the market by false 
information, the honest agents in his firm, who are now allowed to trade, would revised 
the dishonest signal by communicating true information to the market. Thus, the stock 
price now reflects the true inforination and becomes efficient, on one hand, and the 
good agents drive out the bad ones, thus, increasing the management quality, on the 
other hand. 
The stock price reflects the currently available information and future expectations 
about the outputs of the fin-n. So that unusually good (bad) output, and/or privately held 
infonnation, produce profitable (loss avoidance) insider trading. As risk neutral, 
principals are indifferent between paying the agents their compensation in salary alone 
and equivalently paying them a portion in salary and the rest as a possibility of insider 
trading returns. However, they will choose whichever compensation gives the agent the 
better incentiN, e to take the correct decision and profitable action. On the other hand, tile 
risk-averse agent, as un-diversified, would choose the salary alone. HoweN, er, such a 
compensation package has no incentive and the firm would pay more and the agent 
WOUld receive less under this scheme than under the insider tradirig one. The problem 
NvIth this contract is that the insider trading part of the compensation is set-up in an 
explicit forni. Since expccted returns from insider trading are uncertain pavoff to tile 
risk avcrsc aocilt, lie would choose the salary-alone contract. Thus, to induce the agent 
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to choose the other contract, the expected return from insider tradmiz has to be an 
implicit part of the compensation package but not an altemative to straight salary offer. 
However, there is an adverse selection problem even when insider trading is the optimal 
incentive for agents. Easterbrook (1995) argues that if agents are not free to leaN'C the 
firm, insider-trading possibilities might be optimal incentiý-e tools; but this is not tile 
case, agents are free to leave. A counter argument, however, would refer to the pressure 
exerted from the managerial labour market. So that, even agents are free to lea,,,, e the 
firm, their market value would decline significantly as incompetent directors. In 
addition, Easterbrook's adverse selection argument can be encountered by a signalling 
argument. As in "lemon market" of Akerlof (1970) and "signalling market" of Spence 
(1973), higher quality agents "signal" their quality by choosing a compensation package 
with non-payment component, i. e. insider trading. Since adverse selection is a pre- 
contractual problem, it is costly and/or difficult for the principals to reduce it, i. e. 
identifying the quality of the agent before knowing his input into the firm's output. 
Thus, they design a contract that let agents to identify their quality themselves. Carlton 
and Fischel (1983) argue that such contracts will have contingent payoffs, which only 
the high quality agents will receive. As high quality agents know their private talents, 
they are more certain to receive the contingent payoff than those of less quality. 
(4.4) INSIDER TRADING AS A MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE 
The issue of considering insider trading as a managerial incentive cannot be separated 
frot-n the issue of the agency problems, discussed in the previous section (4.3). This 
section, however, is not about the debate on insider trading as a managerial incentive 
[sections (2.2) and (2.3) in chapter 2 discussed this debate]. Instead, it is about how and 
when insider trading can be considered as a managerial incentive. Thus, the purpose of 
this section is to show the role of insider trading in mitigating the problems of 
uncertainty and imperfect monitoring in the agency relationship between the principal 
and the agent. That is by reviewing the theory [section (4.4.1)] and analysing the 
empirical findings [section (4.4.2)]. 
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(4.4.11 Theoretical Review 
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that it is good to encourage practices that 
increase managerial wealth when share price increaseslo. According to EMH, share 
price is the best proxy for share value and hence for shareholders' welfare. Thus, 
compensation schemes whose return to the manager is favourably influenced by 
increase in share price are more likely to lead to managerial efforts that maximize 
shareholders' wealth. Two mechanisms can be used, mutually or exclusively, to tie 
managerial wealth with shareholders' welfare. These are equity-related compensation, 
e. g. executive share options (ESO)", and/or insider trading. Pay performance literature 
well documented the former mechaniSM12 
, 
which is out of this research boundary. 
While the second mechanism is the subject of insider trading in the agency theory 
context, which is the concern of this section. 
There is a substantial body of literature analysing the economic implications of insider 
trading on the stock exchange [see chapter 3 for literature review]. But little has 
investigated insider-trading role in the optimal contracting approach. This approach, 
originated by Marine (1966) and later by Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Dye (1984), 
advocates that the agent's ability to utilise his informational advantage can be part of an 
implicit, or explicit, contract between the principal and the agent. Here, the agent 
exchanges his productive inputs for compensation that may include, implicitly, expected 
return might be earned from insider trading. Thus, by allowing the agent (manager) to 
profit from appreciation in firrn value, i. e. increasing principal (shareholders) welfare, 
engendered by his efforts, i. e. his contracted for productive inputs, improves the 
alignment of interest between principal and agent. 
'0 These reasons come from a fundamental principle in economics, that people are rational maximizers of 
their own wealth [See, for example, Posner (1998), p. 3]. 
11 Jin's (2002) firidings that the optimal incentive level decreases with firm's specific risk, might implicitly 
indicate that increasing manager's ownership in the firm decreases his optimal incentive level. 
12 Main et al. (1996), for example, examine the relationship between total board remuneration with ESO 
and firm performance in the UK; McKnight and Tomkins (1999) analyse how each type of pay (salary, 
annual bonus and ESO) is related to executive performance in the UK; Skovoroda et al. (2003) examine 
the executive's reward-risk-trade-off in addition to the certainty-equivalent pay-performance sensitivity, 
by using a UK data set to provide some estimates of the size of these effects; Reitman (1993) 
demonstrates the strategic use of stock options as a managerial incentive as well as to curb overly 
aggressive managerial behaviour; and Bruce and Trevor (1997) exarnine the relationship between 
executive rewards, including ESO but not insider trading, and the corporate governance and surveys the 
empirical findings. 
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Two relative questions have been addressed in the literature. The first is about when it is 
beneficial to the manager (agent) and the shareholders (principal) to give the manager 
discretion in the selection of his compensation. While the second is regarding how 
insider trading aligns both parties' interests. In a traditional signalling model. Dý, e 
(1984) addresses these issues by modelling the principal-agent relationship in a stock 
exchange. He demonstrates that the desirability of insider trading depends on the 
distributional relationship among the inside information held by management (such as 
number of insiders, changes in earnings and changes in price-earnings ratio), the 
manager's efforts and the firm's output. Under certain distributional assumptions, Dye 
shows that both the manager and the shareholders may achieve strictly higher utility by 
allowing the manager some distribution over the selection of his compensation scheme 
that they would obtain if the manager was not given such discretion. This discretion 
allows the manager to disseminate his private information to the shareholders. In 
addition, he shows that insider trading is one mean by which such discretion can be 
granted to managers. That is, by considering insider trading as one component of 
compensation, insider trading is one mechanism that might be used by shareholders to 
improve on earnings-contingent contracts. Dye concluded that if the manager is initially 
compensated with earnings-contingent contracts, then his wealth as well as the 
shareholders welfare could be improved by allowing insider trading. 
Hu and Noe (2001) while supporting Dye (1984) conclusion, argue that the beneficial 
effects of insider trading would not be entirely apparent when the informational and 
moral hazard issues for insider trading are modelled separately. By developing a model 
that links moral hazard and information asymmetry aspects of insider trading. They 
show the beneficial effects of insider trading. Hu and Noe argue that shareholders' 
welfare improved through permitting insider trading that leads managers to take 
positions in the firrn's stock. Manager's position would be long when his compensation 
is a small fraction of firm value and short when compensation is a large fraction of the 
firrii value (because he is a risk-averse). Such positions are independent of his priN/atc 
mforniation; however share prices N, ary with his insider-trading signal. Thus, insider 
trading increases the efficiency of the stock prices and subsequently, the shareholders' 
wclfare. When managers extract only small fTaction of firrn value in explicit 
compensation, insider trading also, increases the fraction of the Firm's value captured by 
manaoers. Hu and Noe (2001) conclude that permitting insider trading incrcases both 
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the equilibrium level of output and shareholders' welfare for t', vo reasons. First, insider 
trading impounds information regarding managerial taste for perk consumption into 
asset prices, and this increases shareholders' ability to choose more efficient 
investments. Second, allowing insider trading can induce manacers to increase their 
stake in the firm beyond that obtained through their compensation contract, e. g. ESO. 
This effect leads to reduce managerial perk consumption and/or increased managerial 
efforts. Thus, insider trading provides both low-cost incentives for managerial efforts 
and increases price informativeness, i. e. efficiency. 
The same conclusion is reached by Noe (1995), who also shows that insider trading; 
along with any fixed level of incentive compensation improves managerial incentives. 
Noe argues that insider trading improves the bargaining position of shareholders relative 
to managers, thus reduces the willingness of shareholders to provide expensive effort- 
assuring managerial compensation packages. 
Another literature examines this issue but through the role of insider trading in 
facilitating shareholders' control. Zhang (2001) shows that with proper regulation, 
insider trading mitigates the problem of information asymmetry and subsequently 
allows shareholders to better control their firm. He demonstrated this argument in the 
context of corporate investment, where the manager has inside information about the 
potential investment. When the manager proposes a new project, shareholders do not 
know whether it is a profitable investment or whether it serves the manager's self 
interest, such as to realize personal ambition or to enhance human capital. If the 
manager is allowed to buy the fin-n's stock before taking the investment decision, then 
his trade conveys inforrnation about the expected profitability of the project. So, 
shareholders screen the investment proposal upon the revealed information and act upon 
accordingly, whether to approve the investment decision or otherwise. Zhang recognizes 
that two assumptions have to be held in order for insider trading to act as a mechanism 
to alleviate information asymmetry between the manager and shareholders. These are 
(1) insider trading transactions have to be disclosed publicly, and (2) insiders should not 
be alloxN, cd to sell the purchased shares shortly after purchase. The current levels of 
regulations are, in fact, assures that these two assumptions are in hold. Zhang (2001) 
argucs that his findnilgs are applicable not only on corporate investment context, but 
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also on other situations v., here the managerial decision is significant (such as 
acquisition, restructuiring and divestiture). 
Other researchers have examined the issue from different angle. That is by focusing' on 
how insider trading affects the agent's ex ante behaviour in choosing among various 
levels of quality and risk projects. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994), for example, 
examine how insider-trading affect's the manager's choice among different project's 
risk levels. They show that insider trading leads nsk-averse managers to choose 
desirably riskier projects that would be rejected without insider trading. That is so 
because increased volatility of expected results, i. e. uncertainty of returns, enables them 
to make higher insider trading profit as long as they learn "how uncertainty is resol\, ed" 
in advance of the market. In addition, Bebchuk and Fershtman exhibit that under certain 
conditions, the managerial contract that allow insider-trading leads to a relative increase 
in the degree to which manager's salary depends on the firin perfon-nance. 
Moreover, recent work on the relation between insider trading restrictions and executive 
compensation by Roulstone (2003) shows that insiders will demand compensation for 
their restrictions and that fin-ns will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. In 
addition, Roulstone finds that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total 
compensation relative to finns not restricting insider trading. Also, these finns use more 
incentive-based compensation and their insiders hold more equity incentives relative to 
firms that do not restrict insider trading. 
To sum up, literature established that there are two ways per which insider trading 
might reduce agency costs by improving the managerial incentives. First, there may be a 
shareholders' welfare effect: if the managerial compensation is stock-price related, then 
their obligation to increase their own wealth encourage them to make harder efforts, and 
thus increases the shareholders' welfare. That is to the extent that insider trading 
increases manager's proportional ownership of the firm (by buying under-priced 
shares), insider trading iiiay encourage them to work harder to increase the value (stock 
price) of their holdings. Core and Larcker (2002) find that firms with low managerial 
ownership have lo%N- stock price performance and their accounting and stock returns 
have increased as the managerial ownership increases. However, Jin (20o2) 
demonstrate,,; that the optimal incentive level decreases xvith firm-speciFic risk Second, 
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there may be a shareholders' control effect: to the extent that the insider trading bridges 
the infori-nation gap between managers and shareholders, where finn's decisions are 
controlled by the board and/or shareholders. Maug (2002) shows that \ý-hen large 
shareholders can monitor under-performing firms, managers have an incentive to 21ve 
them early warnings about adverse perfon-nance to induce them to sell their holdiligs 
and refrain from intervention. 
(4.4.2) Empirical Evidence 
Based on the foundations established by the theoretical literature [reviewed in section 
(4.2.1) above], empirical research relates the explicit form of managerial compensation 
with insider trading in the following propositions: On one hand, it assumes that tile total 
compensation consists of an explicit form (salary and annual bonus) and an implicit one 
(expected returns from insider trading). On the other hand, it predicts that as number of 
insiders increases the expected insider trading returns decreases, and hence that in the 
competitive managerial labour market, the explicit compensation form has to be 
increased to offset the decrease in the implicit compensation forill. Thus, it is expected 
that there is a positive relation between number of insiders and the explicit form of 
compensation. Empirical literature' 3 will be reviewed alongside the empirical test in 
chapter 6. 
(4.5) UMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the non-signalling theory behind this research hypothesis. That is 
the Agency Theory and the possibility of considering insider trading as a managerial 
incentive. The chapter has analysed the principal-agent model, the incentive theory, the 
agency problems and costs, and the position of insider trading within these agency 
concepts. In addition, it has reviewed the relevant theoretical literature that backed the 
possible consideration of insider trading as a managerial incentive. 
Literature shows that In the context of principal-agent problem, Insider trading can be 
used as a mechanism to alleviate the conflict of interest bct%\, een the managers and the 
shareholders whilc (1) increasing shareholders' welfare [see, for example, Hu and Noe 
13 That is so because there is only one empirical study located by the researcher. Although every possible, 
available and accessible source of research has been cxhausted during the period 2000-2003. 
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(2001)], (2) improving shareholders' control over their firm [see, for instance, Zhang 
(2001)], (3) concluding an optimal contracting [see, for example, Dye (1984)], i. e. 
increasing managers' efforts level [see, for instance, Bebchuk and Fershtman (1993)], 
and (4) enhancing the investment decision in the firm [see, for example, Bebchuk and 
Fershtman (1994)]. 
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PART III: 
EMPIRICAL TESTS 
10-1 
Chapter 5 
The Information content of Insider 
Trading: Signal Methodology and 
Empirical Results 
(5.1) INTRODUCTION 
The research objectives and hypotheses are drawn in section (1.4). These, in short, are 
first, insider trading has information content, second, it has an impact on stock pnccs 
and market efficiency; and finally, it can be considered as a managerial incentive. The 
theory as well as relevant literature of the first two hypotheses is introduced in chapter 
3. This chapter empirically examines the information content of insider trading 
hypotheses by testing director trading incidence in all FTSE 100 companies 
experiencing directors' trading in their own firm's ordinary shares (OS) and/or Executive 
Security Options (ESO), during the test period 1/5/1999-1/7/2000. The purpose of this 
chapter is to detect the infon-nation content of insider trading by measuring the 
abnormal returns 
, 
if any, of such trading. In addition, it will reflect on the impact of 
such trading on London Stock Exchange (LSE) efficiency. It shall do so by employing 
event study methodology and using different signals definition. 
The importance of this investigation is two fold. Firstly, it provides evidence on the 
inside information content of insider trading. Secondly, it gives indications on the level 
of London Stock Exchange (LSE) efficiency. Moreover, the significance of this study, 
over previous UK literature, reviewed in section (3.4.2.1), stems from seven newly used 
measures. However, these represent marginal contribution to the knowledge in terms of 
the methodology employed in relevant literature. These measures are firstly, it uses 
daily data. Except Friederich et al. (2002), most relevant UK studies used monthly data. 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Friederich et al. (2002) argue that daily data is 4-) 
advantaguous in estimating the market model terms because the joint hypothesis 
problem is less serious in studies with shorter event windows. Also, statistical tests havc 
mucli powci- with daily data. Secondly. it uses the security' return, instead of share 
prices. Thirdly. it uses a new set of data. That is a post-1993 Justice 
., 
\ct of insider 
trading. \\'Iiile the latest data used in literature is 1997 by the latest study of Hillier and 
Marshall (2002). The results of this study provide indications about the latest insider 
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trading regulation in UK, taking into account that fact that the purpose of the Act is to 
regulate rather than prohibiting insider trading. Fourthly. It ernploýýs three different 
definitions of the event itself These are single, multiple, and quantitative si, 
-, 
nal 
definitions. The use of different signal definitions v, 'ill add to the knowledge. based on 
ex ante expectations of their differential infori-nation impact, in the since that additional 
signals complement single signals so that we expect a cumulative (bUt perhaps 
asymptotic) effect in terms of timing and magnitude of market response and that 
alternatively different signal types substitute for one another. Fifthly, this study uses the 
CAPM to estimate the expected returns, instead of the market model, because it takes 
into consideration the market risk premium when producing the abnon-nal returns. 
Sixthly, it reports the results within a shorter event window than used in the literature. 
Surely a shorter event window will prima facie yield less information about director 
trading than a longer one. Finally, it provides, for the first time, empirical evidence on 
the ESO transactions 
, 
in addition to ordinary shares. This might shed light into the 
comparison level of the inforination content of these types of transactions. More 
elaboration about these measures can be found in the following sections. 
Based on the fact that a fin-n's directors, as prime insiders, are more informative about 
their firm's current status and future perspective, it is expected that such trading, if 
based upon private and price-sensitive information, would be more profitable than that 
of outsiders. In such a case, directors' trading can be seen as a "signal". Buying indicates 
good news, and selling indicates bad news. In the context of EMH, the security price 
will adjust to incorporate the new information, as sooner as the higher level of market 
efficiency. 
The time span of security price adjustment to the new information differs according to 
tile type of the signal. In case of a predictable signal, the security price would start to 
adjust well before the signal date itself, but continue after that "event" date. That is if 
and only if the event date is known regardless the nature of the event, 1*. e. good or bad. 
On the other hand. the price adjustment to un-anticipated eveilt may not begin before 
tile event date and WOUld take, relativcly, longer period than predictable signal, to fully 
reflect tile cvcnt's inforniation. 
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A firm produces many signals to the security exchange. Such as dividend and earmligs 
announcements, which disclosed at once; and security split and merger and acquisition 
announcements, which disclosed gradually. The main difference between directors 
dealing signal and other security-specific signals is that the timing of the directors' 
trading is unanticipated, while the timing of the latter is usually predictable. 
Since the research by Fama et al. (1969), event studies have become a common part of 
empirical research in financial economics. Event study analysis is a wel I 
-established 
technique, which uses financial market data, to assess the impact of particular types of 
security-specific events on the value of the security, such as firm-specific, industry- 
related and economic-wide events. Given the efficiency of the market, the impact of an 
event will be reflected in the security price. Thus, the impact of an event can be 
measured by using security prices observed over a relatively short period around or after 
the event date. This technique measures the difference between the observed return on 
the event and the expected one around or after the event date. Any significant difference 
is interpreted as abnormal return or loss. 
This chapter presents an empirical investigation into the incidence of insider trading, by 
employing event study methodology. it is structured as follows. Section (5.2) sets up the 
event study methodology, while section (5.3) reviews relevant empifical methodology 
used in literature, with particular emphasis on the UK. The choice behind deterring the 
empirical methodology used in literature after the methodology section is due to the fact 
that the review will be based mainly on the methodology used in the literature. Thus, it 
becomes easier and more direct to point out to the different models, definitions and 
measures used in the literature; and to highlight the contribution and significance of this 
study over related literature. Nevertheless, section (5.4) describes the market data used, 
while section (5.5) follows the test procedures. Section (5.6) shows and interprets the 
empirical results, while section (5.7) re-run the analysis taking into account various 
side-effects that might alter the results, such as thin trading, confounding events, firm 
size, year-by-ycar analysis and signals definition effect. Finally section (5.8) concludes 
and SLIniniarises the findings. 
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15.2) METHODOLOGY 
The following figure (5.1) represents the timeline of the time inten, als. ten-ns, and 
symbols used throughout this chapter. 
I Figure (5.1) The Timeline 
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-30 0 6 12.. to.. 60 
It can be seen from the figure that t is the centre of this timeline and represents the event 
date. While t+D is assumed to be the disclosure date, per which the event becomes 
known in the market. t+T represents the end date of the test period, as well as the end 
of the event window. In some cases, however, T represents the length of any time 
interval. The estimation period is a past time series of data from t-1-2 to t-Ll, while no 
data will be used during the separation period, i. e. between t-LI and t-S. Finally, the test 
period (t-S to t+T) is the period per which event will be investigated. A complete 
explanation and interpretation will be presented in the following sections. 
(5.2.1) Event Study 
Ever since the original paper by Fama et al. (1969)1, event study has become an integral 
part of empirical research in financial economics, as well as other disciplines. It is used 
to assess the financial impact of an event on the finn's value measured by stock price. 
Given the efficiency of the market, the effects of an event will be reflected sooner in the 
stock prices. Thus, an event's impact can be measured using stock prices observed over 
a relatively short time period around that event. Any significant difference between the 
realised returns and the expected ones is interpreted as abnormal return (loss). 
In addition to measurc an evcM impact; such technique is often used to test the efficient 
I ns. This market hNpothesis, corporate policies. and re1gulatio indicates that cvent study 
' However, NI acKinl ay (11)1)-, ) and Campbe II ct al. (1997) argued that the first pub I ished event stud% is 
traced back to Dollev (19 "1 1). 
can be used concurrently to test the impact of an event and to test the market efficiency. 
at the same time. However, as Toms (2001) argues that "the joint 11ýpothesis problem" 
presents a serious difficulty in event study research. Nevertheless, the significance of 
event study over direct productivity related measures is that the latter requires a longer 
period, months or even years, to observe the impact of the event, while the first can be 
detected over days. Hence, event study has been used in economics and finance, for 
review, see, for instance, MacKinlay (1997); in accounting, see, for example, Toms 
(2001); and in management, see McWilliams and Siegel's (1997) rex, iew. 
Event study involves the following procedures: 
(1) Define the event itself, 
(2) Specify the event date, 
(3) Estimate the expected returns around the event date, i. e. event window, 
(4) Observe the realised returns around the event date, 
(5) Measure the abnormal returns i. e. AR. That is the difference between the expected 
and realised returns, and 
(6) Cumulate the abnon-nal returns over the event window, i. e. CAR. 
These procedures are employed in this study, and detailed in the following sub-sections. 
0 (5.2.1.1) Event Definition 
A key element of the event study is the event definition. Gregory et al. (1997) argue that 
"the method of signal definition chosen has an important impact on some of the 
conclusion drawn' 92 
. 
This study defines the event as an incidence per which a firm's 
director buys or sells his fim-i's ordinary shares (OS) or hold or sell the exercised 
executive share options (ESO). The data set consists of raw transactions. Such that same 
date double transactions by a director as well as different directors' transactions for the 
same firm. Thus, the data has to refine so as to attain a single signal (SS), per which the 
event is defined by the transaction (buy or sell) for each firm on a daily basis. Or to 
cumulate a multiple signal (MS), per which the event is defined by number of a firm's 
director's trade within a calendar month. Or, finally, to quantify the signal to achieve a 
quantitativc signal (QS), per which the event is defined by number of shares, traded by a 
firni's dii-coors on a daily basis. ObvIOUSly, this refining process ends up ý, \-Ith three 
2 Greeory ct al. ( 1997), pa, 
-, 
c 340- 
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different definitions of the event, i. e. single. multiple, and quantitative signals. These are 
detailed in the following sections. 
In fact, this study adopts the single signal definition for the purpose of measuring the 
anbnoi-mal retums, while employs the multiple and quantitative signals to verl ý the 
empirical results. 
(5-2-1.1.1) Single Signal CSS) 
The initial sample has been filtered as to attain a defined event of single-signal for 
equally weighted portfollOS3 
, 
according to the following procedures: 
1. The sample, already, splits directors trading in OS's and those in ESO's. 
2. Multiple, but similar type of, transactions (e. g. buy OS's) of a given director at the 
same day are considered one (buy) transaction in the (Buy OS's) portfolio. However, 
the volumes of each of these transactions are added up. 
3. Multiple, but similar type of, transactions (e. g. sell OS's) by different company's 
directors at the same day are considered one (sell) transaction in the (Sell OS's) 
portfolio. However, the volumes of each of these transactions are added up, and the 
number of directors is reported. 
4. Multiple, but different types of, transactions (e. g. buy and sell) of a given director at 
the same day are considered one transaction. However, the volumes of these 
transactions are subtracted. If the volume of the buy (sell) transactions is more than that 
of sell (buy), then such transaction is considered as a buy (sell) transaction in the Buy 
(Sell) portfolio, and the number of buying directors (selling) is reported. 
(5.2.1.1.2) Multiple Signal (MS) 
A multiple signal is defined in ten-ns of number of a firm's directors traded in their own 
firm's securities within a calendar month (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). The defined 
single signal sample, mentioned above, is used to construct a multiple signal sample, 
according to the following steps: 
(1) For each calcndar month. firins with only one director transaction are excluded from 
the sampic. 
A detined cvent is an event with one signal, c. g. buy, at a given date. 
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(2) All firrn's directors transaction within a calendar month are summed toý. 'ether to 
form a multiple signal for each fin-n-month. 
(3) The number of directors and volume of shares traded for each firm-month multiple 
signal is added up. 
(4) Then, the abnormal returns calculated for each transaction v, 'Ithin the firm-month 
multiple signal is summed and the average is then computed. 
(5.2.1.1.3) Quantitative Signal (QS) 
The quantitative signal can be defined in terms of the number of shares traded or the 
value of the shares traded. A quantitative signal is defined in terms of volume of shares 
traded in each transaction (Kyle, 1985). This signal, in fact, can be defined by the value 
of shares traded. Gregory et al. (1994) employed the net number of shares %\-Ilile 
Gregory et al. (1997) and Friederich et al. (2002) used used net value of shares. 
However, this second definition requires, in addition to number of shares traded, the 
actual price for each share traded, which is not available to this study. However, both 
measures put different weights on the quantitative signal; and both are affected by fin-n- 
size, which will be dealt with in section (5.7.4). 
Once again, the defined single signal sample, mentioned above, is used to construct a 
quantitative signal sample, according to the following procedures: 
(1) Each portfolio is sorted out by the net volume of each transaction. 
(2) The four quartiles for each portfolio are identified according to the volume of shares 
traded per deal. 
(3) Within each portfolio, four sub-portfolios are then constructed. The first-quartile 
portfolio (QSI), the second-quartile portfolio (QS2), the third-quartile portfolio (QS3), 
and the fourth-quartile portfolio (QS4). 
(4) Each sub-portfolio is treated as a stand-alone portfolio. 4 
4 Moreover, the quantitative signal is defined in terms of the median of the volume of shares traded in each 
deal. That is the 50`,, percentile of each portfolio. Since the size of directors trading volume ýý ithin each 
portfolio is highly varied, viz. insignificant arithmetic mean, an altemat've definition is employed to 
overcome the size variance problem. That is the ratio of each transaction-secur1tv volume to the total 
volume traded in that security per day. In other words, the ratio of net N'olume traded by directors per 
sccurity-transaction total VOlume traded of that security per day (NVTV). Then the media-ii of the ratio's 
transaction(s) is (are) identified and considered as a stand alone portfolio for each buv or sell 0.,,,. aild 
exci-cise and hold or sell FSO. 
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It is worth mentioning here that the difference between a single signal portfolio and a 
quantitative one is in tenns of the volume of transactions. The first one consists of all 
deals regardless of their volume, while the latter consists of those deals within certain 
volume ranges, viz. according to the specified quartile. 
(5.2.1.2) Event Date 
Given the puTose of this study, the event date is defined, initially, as the date per \\'hlcll 
a director buys/sells his own firm's OS or ESO. That is the transaction date (W). 
However, the transaction takes up to seven working days after the transaction date to be 
disclosed to the market that is (t6). So 
, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that the market 
re-action to insiders' transaction would not start at the date of transaction, but within the 
following seven days. The reason behind this is that directors' transaction shall be 
reported to the LSE within seven days of the date of the transaction. And that the major 
source of the financial news, i. e. The Financial Times, does not publish such news but 
every Saturday. Thus, the investigation has to be extended beyond the t6, to take into 
account the unknown disclosure date. 
In defining the event date, this study takes into account the true daily market signal. Of 
the UK studies, King and Roell (1988) considered the event date as the end of the 
calendar month of the publication date of the transaction in The Financial Times. Other 
UK literature [e. g. Gregory et al. (1994) and (1997), Hillier and Marshall (2002/a) and 
(Pope et al. (1990)] used the end of the calendar month of the transaction date. King and 
Roell's definition assumes that the disclosure date is the date of The Financial Times' 
publication of the transaction, which is, in fact, not. Thus, ignores the true market 
signal. In addition, most of UK studies ignored the daily market signal by employing 
end of calendar month event date. 
Finally, the event date for single signal and quantitative signal is the same. That is the 
date of the transaction. However, for multiple signal, it is different. It is the date of the 
last transaction in the calendar month. 
II-.; 
(5.2.1.3) Event Window 
The event window is defined as the period from the date of the transaction itself 0) 
through the presumable date of disclosure (t6), to the 13th day (tl2). Since the director 
trading is not a predictable event, there is no need for the event window to include pre- 
transaction period 5. This is in fact consistent with all of UK literature, which started at 
time tO [see column (10) of table (5.1)]. In addition, the disclosure requirement ellforces 
the need for investigating the period not only after the transaction date, but also beyond 
disclosure dates. 
Once again, as the exact disclosure date is unknown, it is not unreasonable to extend the 
event window but to the shortest possible length of time. The database states 
specifically the exact date of each transaction, however, the disclosure date, as Xvith all 
6- UK-relevant literature 
, 
is unknown. By regulations, such trading should be disclosed 
within seven days to the market. So that share price is not expected to start to reflect 
such signal before disclosure. But since the market makers execute such transactions, 
they start to widen the bid/ask spread to reduce their potential risk/loss due to uncertain 
information (private or liquidity reason) implied by directors dealing 7. This process 
would end up with slight adjustments in share prices during the period between the 
transaction date itself and the presumable disclosure date of that transaction. 
By extending the event window beyond the regulator's disclosure date, this study alms 
at, inter alias, identifying, on average, the disclosures date. Moreover, this study will 
follow the shorter possible event windows. That is to avoid the problem encounter the 
longer event windows used in literature. Such those reported in section (5.3.2). 
However, different possible event windows will be used, and the results will be 
reported, but marginally. 
sAlthouph the 1--vent Window is defined as a period of 13 days (from tO to t 12), the results of longer event 
windows are reported in the appendices. as Nvell. These are 77 days (t6 to t 12) 19 days (t-6 to t 12), 5" dalvs 
(t6 to t60), 61 daý s (tO to t60) and 91 days (t-30 and t60). 
6 
, CC, ory ci al. ( 199-), p. 3 17. for example. Greg 
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(5.2.1.4) Expected_ Returns 
There are three different models, used in event study literature. to estimate ex ante 
expected return 8. These are Mean Adjusted Returns9, Market Adjusted Returns 1 0, and 
Market and Risk Adjusted Returns. However, they all agree on one definition of the 
abnormal return. That the abnon-nal return for any firm's security (i) in any time period 
(t) is the difference between its actual expost return and ex ante expected one. 
On one hand, the Mean Adjusted model is, however, consistent v"ith the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM)", it assumes that the return on security i at any point of time is 
a function of the average past time series of returns. This contradicts with the first le\'el 
of efficiency of the EMH, which assumes that current returns are independent of past 
returns. On the Other hand, the Market Adjusted Returns model assumes that all 
securities in the sample are equal in ten-ns of the size and the risk,, v,, hich are not. A 
strong body of literature (e. g. MacKinlay (1997), Gregory et al. (1997) and (1994), 
Pope et al. (1990), and Seyhun (1986)) shows that these two factors affect the estimated 
returns significantly. 
However, Brown and Warner (1985) argue that mean adjusted and market adjusted 
models are as inferior and powerful as Market Model (MM) and CAPM. Also, Beaver 
(1981)12 and Brown and Weinstein (1985) examine the utility of the statistical Factor 
Model 13 of the process of generating stock returns in event tests. They find limited value 
added relative to the use of MM. Nevertheless, due to the subjectivity problem of the 
Mean Adjusted Return, and risk-ignorance of the Market Adjusted Return, in estimating 
' For more information about the association between insider trading and the bid/ask spread, see for 
example Chung and Charoenwong (1998), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) and Seyhun (1986). 8 For more details about these models, see for example MacKinlay (1997) and Brown and Warner (1980) 
and (1985). 
9 It assumes that the cx-ante expected return [E(Rt)] is constant for each security over time, but differs 
across securities, i. e [E(Rit) = !: Ri, \N'here i=1,13- 1]. See, for example Campell et al. (1997), p. 151. 10 It assumes that the ex ante expected returns are constant across securities, but not necessarily constant 
over time for a given security. That is, the ex ante expected returns for any security, at a point of time, 
E(Rt) equals the expected market return at that particular point of time, i. e [E(Rit) = !: Rt, \Nhere t 
L2,3.., T]. See, for example Can-ipell et al. (1997), p. V1 and Pope et al. (1990), p. 366. This model 
assumes a stable linear relationship bet\\ cen the market return and the securit)" return. 
CAPNI assumes that a stock has a constant systematic risk, and that the efficient frontier is stationarý-, 
thus the expected return is constant. 
12 In x iati(ý ( 1993), p. 366. 
13 That is: R, = fld *At + A2 Pik +Ell 
wilere f's are 
_gcTicrated 
froni factoi analysis during a pre% ious period. 
the expected returns, this study follows the majority of the literature and employs the 
third model, i. e. Market and Risk Adjusted Return. 
Market and Risk Adjusted Returns: This model represents the standard and the most 
developed test. It is based upon the market model estimates for each security in the 
sample, and the abnormal return calculations, as follows: 
Sharpe's (1964) simple Market Model (N41q)14 expresses the actual rate of return (R) on 
the security (i) at time (t) as a function of market return (Rm), in the context of past time 
series (t-L2 to t-L I), such that 
I=n 
Ril 
= ai + (JA, * R,,,, ) + Qj 
......................................... 
(1) 
1=1-n 
Where a is the intercept term, A the systematic risk of security i, and Oit is the error term, with Mit = 0. 
This equation indicates that the actual return can be measured by regressing the (t-n) 
lagged, (t+n) leading days or months, and contemporaneous (t) market rate of returns 
(Rm) on observed security returns. 
The validity of the MM depends on satisfying three conditions: 
1. The sum of the residuals should equal to zero, Init = 0, 
2. There is no significant correlation between the residuals (flit) and the market return 
(Rmt), and 
3. The sum of the differences between the average residuals (Ml) and residuals (flit) 
should equal to zero, i. e. DDit = 0. That is 
AQj 
= 
f2j, + (Dil 
(Dil = Anj 
- 
f2i 
..................................................................... 
(2) 
If these conditions satisfied, the MM parameters can be used in the two-factor ex-ante 
CAPM to calculate the expected rate of return [E(Rit)] as 
E(Ril) 
= 
Rfi + AK * (R., 
- 
Rfi) 
....................................... 
(3) 
Wherepik is Dimson's (1979) to deal with thin trading or zero daily returns on share 
prices. That is the sum of Beta's of the lagged, leading, and contemporaneous 
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I+n 
regressions of MM, i. e. Pik 1pit). Then, ex-post CAPM re-stated to calculate the 
expected rate of return [E(Rit)] as 15 
a, Rf, +AK * (R,,, 
- 
Rfl) 
............................... 
In this equation, 0 shall be obtained by summing the slope coefficients from MM 
(equation 1), and cc and P are to be estimated for a given security for the conventional 
prior window. That is 200 trading days from preceding 250 trading days of the test 
period. Since the test period, per which abnormal returns are being measured, should be 
completely separated from the estimation period, the MM parameters used in line with 
events occurring in one period are estimated from data on previous period [Gi\'oly and 
Palmon (1985)]. Specifically, the 50 days exclusion period is used to take into account 
the assumption that insiders may trade following a period of abnormal performance by 
the company [Gregory et al. (1994)]. 
There is one issue, however, arises from employing Market and Risk Adjusted Returns. 
That is the issue of specifying which market model for estimating the expected returns 
is to be used. That is the choice between MM and the ex-post CAPM. Although most of 
the literature used the MM in estimating the expected returns, this study uses the 
CAPM. On one hand, the intercept a of the MM can impound abnormal returns, 
particularly, in the period of the event window [Pope et al. (1990), p. 366]. In such a 
case, the alternative model, i. e. ex-post two-factor CAPM, has to be used. However, it is 
very difficult to generate a zero-beta portfolio (Rf) which is uncorrelated with the 
market portfolio returns (Rm). Also, Roll (1977) 16 argues that the market portfolio 
cannot be observed directly. But, the development and the use of a more sophisticated 
iriformation technology enable market participants to observe the changes in the market 
portfolio spontaneously. On the other hand, the rationale behind the use of CAPM might 
be explained in the context of market risk premium when comparing the computed- 
abnormal returns with the market returns. While the MM produced rav'- abnonnal 
returns that do not take into consideration the market risk premium. However, as Fama 
(1996) argues, iii applications that require estimates of cxpected return, CAPNI is the 
14 Originally su, 
-,, -, 
csted by NI arkoAitz (195-1). 
15 See Pope ct al. 1990). 
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popular choice. Empirically, Pope et a[ (1990) examined the impact of using either MNI 
and CAPM in estimating the expected returns in the event study and found identical 
results. 
(5-2.1-5) Abnormal Retums 
The abnormal rate of return (ARt) is the difference between the actual and expected 
rates of return on the security at time (t). It will be calculated during the period event 
window (tO to t+T). That is so if and only if the event date is unpredictable and there is 
no leakage in information. If it is otherwise, then it is expected that due to the analyst 
forecasts and/or leak of information, the security price would start to change and reflect 
the new information at time (t-S) before the event date (to)17 
. 
That iS18 
ARil 
=, 6i, = Ril 
- 
E(Rj 
.................................................... 
(5) 
The simple arithmetic mean of all signals abnormal returns (ARt) at any point of time 
during the event window is 
N 
AR, 1] ARj 
.................................................... N i=l , 
Where (N) is the number of sample securities who's abnormal return are available at the time (t). 
(5.2.1.6) Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The cumulative abnormal rate of returns (CART), of all securities during the event 
window t+T, is measured as 
t+T 
CART 
= 
JAR, 
.......................................................... 
(7) 
1=0 
Where (t+T) is the length of the event vAndow. 
16 In Brown and Warner (1980), p. 2 10. 
17 In fact, some event study literature used the market model, per which: 
ARj1 
= 
Rj, 
- 
(aj +, BK* R., ) 
Proof of equation 5: E(R) 
- 
Rft =a+0 (R. 
-Rf) + C, solve this for a and multiply both sides by (- 1) wi II 
produce a= E(R) - Rn -0 (Rn, -Rr) - C, as much as the portfolio be larger, a will become so close to zero, 
and 0 to one (Rportfolio=-Rm). Thus, 0= E(R) - Rn -I (RrrRf) - C, that is C= E(R) - FU - (Rn, -R[), and, as 
such, C= E(R) - Rn - R. + Rf, so C= E(R) - Rnu 
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The significance of event period cumulative abnormal returns has to be assessed. The 
null hypothesis is that the CART is equal or less (more) than zero for buy (sell) 
portfolios. Otherwise, it is more than zero, positive, for buy portfolios; or less than zero, 
negative, for sell portfolios. Given the null hypothesis that, Ho: CAR <0 (CAR >- 0) for 
buy (sell) portfolios, then the alternative hypotheses, if HO is rejected, are: H I: 
CART >0 for the "Buy" portfolios, and CART <0 for the "Sell" Portfolios. 
(5-2-2) Test of Tvpe I Error 
It is expected that the empirical results would end up with one of two possibilities: (1) 
Reject Ho, and (2) Fail to reject Ho. However, an accepted hypothesis might be true or 
false. Likewise, a rejected hypothesis might be either true or false. Thus, there are four 
possible outcomes, as summarised in the following diagram. 
I. Empincal Results of Ho True Ho False Ho 
Accept Ho Desirable Type 11 Error 
Reject Ho Type I Error Desirable 
These are (1) Reject a false null hypothesis, (2) Reject a true null hypothesis, usually 
called Type I Error, (3) Fail to reject a false null hypothesis, called Type II Error, and 
(4) Fail to reject a true null hypothesis. The first and the last possibilities are desirable, 
while the middle ones are not. The probability of committing type I error, that is the risk 
level, is called a lpha (a)19, a nd that of type II error is beta (0). The Mest is u sed to 
estimate type I error. While a multivariate model and robustness check can be used to 
estimate type II error. 
Initially, the Mest is the ratio of the mean to its variability, i. e. standardization of the 
average abnormal returns (SAR, t)20 
- 
That is 
SARit : 
-- 
ARil 
SDARi 
............................................................ 
19 In social research, the rule of thumb is to set a, for one-tailed test, at 5%. 
20 The purpose of standardising the mean Is to allow for the portfolio's cross-sectional distribution to be 
compared to a unit normal. More detailed information about t-test can be found in any business statistics 
textbook. See, for example, Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1999), chapter 10; and Daniel and 
Terrell (1992). 
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Event study literature differently standardized the abnormal returns to capture these 
variations. Three major event study literatures have employed different formulas for 
computing the standardized abnormal returns and the t-value, as such. These are Dodd 
and Warner (1983), Brown and Warner (1980) and (1985)21. 
This study follows Dodd and Warner's (1983) t-teSt22 (hereinafter called DWI 983), and 
reports that of Brown and Warner's (1985) (hereinafter called BW1985) as well. This is 
due to the fact that the event, i. e. directors trading, is not predictable. Fama et al. (1969) 
state that the variability in returns predictable and/or timing-known events (forecasted 
and/or leaked information signal) increases substantially in the times closest to the 
event. Thus, it can be suggested that event studies with predictable events should follow 
BW1985's Mest; while those with unpredictable events should follow DW1983's. 
DW1983 standardised the abnormal returns in a similar way to equation (8) above. 
However, they calculate SDi relative to the market portfolio returns, not the sample 
mean. That iS23 
SD AR, 
. 
4z 1* fl (Iý 
-L f 
(Rm, 
-R m)2 
L2) 
- 
(t --Ll)]j t-LI (Rm, 
t=t-L2 
- Rm 2 
)I 
........................... 
Where Si' is the estimated residual variance from MM for security i, Rmt is the return to the market at 
time t, and Rm is the average market return over 250 days (from t-L2 to t-L I) used in the MM. 
Then, for each security (i), SARs are summed over the event window to form a 
standardized cumulative abnormal return 24 
, 
by 
SCARi SARi 
. ............................................... 
(10) 
Where T here is the length of the event window. 
Coutts et al (1995) present an alternative test statistics, and Corrado (1989) develops a non-parametric 
test, i. e. rank test; and Corrado and Zivney (1992) evaluate the sign of the rank test. However, Hamill et 
al. (2002/a) compares the results generated from a range of parametric models and two classes of non- 
parametric models used in event studies and concludes that in computing abnormal returns, rank test 
should be adopted in conjunction with parametric ones. 
" It can be argued that Dodd and Warner (1983) is the first to establish a developed methodology for 
event studies, standardized the abnormal returns relative to the market portfolio vanation, the estimated 
residuals variation from MM for each security, and the length of the estimation period. 
2313odd and Warner (1983), pp. 436-437. 
2' If and only if ARs are normally distributed and independent across t, then SCARi is distributed 
Student-I with [(t+T)-2] degrees of freedom. As long as t+Ti, SCARi is distributed unit normal. 
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Thus, mest can be used to assess the significance of SCAR's, by 
value = SCART *, FN 
............................................ 
Where T is the length of the event window, and N is the number of the securities in the portfolio. 
I And SCARt is the cross-sectional average standardized cumulative abnormal return, 
calculated by 
N 
SCART SCARiT 
*****,, ****-*-*****, 
........................ 
(12) 
BW 19 8 5, on the other hand, calculate SD relative to the sample mean. That iS25 
--AR X AR, 
SD(AR, 
) 
t=t-L2 
- 
LI) 
- 
(t 
- 
L2)] 
-1 
ARt is the mean of t he s ample's ARt at point of time t, and ARi is t he m ean of the 
security i's abnormal returns over the time period t-L2 to t-L I. That is 
1N i-LI 
AR, 
=-* 
(1] ARJ 
.... 
and 
.... 
ARi I ARJ 
............. 
(14) 
N i=, , [(t - LI) - L2)] I=I-L2 
Assuming cross sectional independence, the t-value for any point of time, during the 
event window, is given by 26 
1*N 
value =-=L SARi (15) ýN= t+T 
Where N represents the number of securities in the sample, and t+T is the length of the event window. 
In summary, the above Mest fonnulas produce different values. The main source of the 
difference among them comes from two streams. These are computation of the mean 
and the standardization process either by cross-sectional or time-series. DW1983 
standardized ARs relevant to the market portfolio as well as the residuals of the MM. 
2'5 Brown and Warner (1985), pp. 7-8. 
26 Brown and Warner (1985), p. 28. 
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While BW1985 compute the standard deviation over time for each securiv..., and 
calculate the average cross sectiona, 27 
It can be argued that as many securities included in the sample, as much the difference 
between these formulas becomes close to the zero. That is due to the fact that as much 
the sample represents the market, as much it would have the market's statistical 
measures. 
Although this study reports the computations of the above t-test formulas, i. e. equations 
11 and 15 (DW1983 and BW1985, respectively) accepting or rejecting the iiull 
hypothesis will be based upon the risk level resulted from fon-nula 11, i. e. DWI 983. 
Moreover, the reason behind reporting BW1985 formula, in line xý, ith DW1983, is 
mainly due to the similar methodology used in this research, as well as the frequency of 
the data, i. e. daily data. Also, DW1985 represents the most recent one of the three 
approaches. 
(5.3) REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 3 introduced, inter alias, the relevant literature to the first parent discipline of 
this study. This includes market informational efficiency theory, signalling theory, and 
critical review of insider trading literature. In this section, the empirical literature, with 
emphasis on the UK, will be reviewed in line with the methodology presented in 
previous section. That is in terms of defining the event, measuring the abnon-nal returns 
and the reported findings. 
The EMH proposed that asymmetrically informed economic agents would be able to 
earn abnon-nal returns, and reduce the level of market efficiency. However, it is not the 
abnon-nal return that reduces the efficiency, instead, it is the incomplete iiifon-national 
market. In other words 
, 
infori-nation asymmetry between economic agents presents a 
serious challenge to the strong level of market efficiency. Insiders are the most infomied 
agents. 
27 Brown and Weinstein (1985) compared the analytical computation of analysis of power using 
distributional assumptions with the empirical power, and found the results are Very close to MV1985 
model. 
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In the context of signalling theory, it is not unreasonable to believe that MsIders do haN 0 
inside, i. e. private-price-sensitive, Information. Therefore, trading bý, firm's insiders is 
expected to convey a signal to the market. This signal might incorporate inside 
infori-nation. Such information might be about the current ý'alue of the firm (under/over- 
pricing), the intrinsic future value of the firm (perspectives), and/or the industry as a 
whole. The market perceives the signal's sign, not the contents. Buying,, represents a 
positive (good news) signal, and selling is a negative (bad news). 
However, insider trading might be undertaken for liquidity reasons. Giveil that the 
market knows but cannot differentiate between insider trading purposes, multiple and 
quantitative signals needed to be examined. That is, trading by more insiders aild. or the 
volume of such trading. This chapter empirically investigates these signals as well, and 
relevant literature will be reviewed in this section. 
The primary focus of the early empirical literature was on measuring abnon-nal returns. 
This body of literature has established some well-found facts about the return behaviour 
following insider trades. 
Table (5.1) provides an over-view of prior event studies, on event definition., 
measurement of abnormal returns and results. Another purpose of the table is to 
illustrate the differences between this study and the current LTK literature. The literature 
is listed according to the country of investigation and date of publication, where the 
most recent is listed first. 
Column (1) refers to the country in which the studies were conducted. It can be seen 
that insider-trading issue is less investigated in the UK compared with the other side of 
the Atlantic (USA). Column (2) names the author(s) and the year of the study. Except 
for King and Roell (1988), all of UK studies reported in the table used \'cry old data 
relative to the publication year. For example, Hillier and Marshall (2002,, "a), which is the 
inost recent study, used fivc ý'cars old data (1991-1997). While the data collected for 
this study are concurrent with the writing process (2001). Hence, this study contributes 
to tile currcnt literature in terms of updated data, by covcring un-exarnined period of 
directors trading in the UK. Column (3) indicates the name of the specific market per 
NN-111ch tlic samplc securities Nvere traded. The test period, reported in coluinn (4), 
1-). 7, 
indicates the period of insider trading transactions, over which the abnon-nal returns are 
measured. Column (5) states the type of securities investigated; i. e. ordinary shares (OS) 
and/or executive share options (ESO). Only Gregory et al. (1994) uses ESO in addition 
to the OS. Given that market perceives the signal's sign, not its Issuer, i is not t 
unreasonable to assume that the market does not differentiate between different types of 
firrn's insiders, i. e. directors, officers, advisors, bankers, laxN, vers and auditors. Column 
(6) defines the insiders. That is which individuals of the firm's insiders are inx, csti, 
-'ated. 
Most of the UK insider trading literature used director dealings, as there is no data on 
other type of insider trades [see, for instance, Friederich et al. (2002), Hillier and 
Marshall (2002/a&b), Gregory et al. (1997) and (1994), Pope et al. (1990), and King 
and Roell (1988)]. 
Most importantly is column (7), of which the definition of the event is stated. Such a 
definition is an important factor in conducting the event test. It can be seen, howevcr, 
that there is no consensus among the literature regarding one single definition of the 
insider-trading event. Column (8) reports the number of buy and sell transactions in the 
sample. Given the data availability and the breadth of the market, i. e. number of 
securities listed in the market, it is obvious that the USA literature often uses larger 
number of transactions than their counterparts in the UK. Column (9) indicates the 
frequency of the data used while column (10) states the length of the event window(s). 
Clearly, these two columns are associated with each other. When the frequency of the 
data used is monthly, the length of the event window examined is in monthly terms. 
One exemption of this rule is Givoly and Palmon (1985) who used daily data and 
accumulated it monthly. Column (11) and (12) refer to the methodology/model used in 
computing the expected return and the tests of significance employed to detect type I 
error, respectively. It can be seen that the majority of the literature used the market 
model (MM) to measure the expected return, and Dodd and Warner's (1983) t-test. 
Finally, column (13) reports the empirical results of buy and sell insider-trading 
transactions during the specified event Nvindow(s). 
In an ideal world of perfect inforniation, it is expected that the value of a firm's security 
Nvould not bc affccted by aiiyone's trading. and that the market is strongly efficient. 
Directors and other firrn-involvcd professionals would not be able to detect the 
ovcr/undci- value of their oNN, -n fimi's securities. Thus, they \vould not be able to attam 
126 
abnormal returns, because they do not have 111 irm's current status about their f 
and future perspectives, more than any other market participants do. Numerous body of 
empirical evidence, however, shows that insider trading transactions vield significant 
and persistent abnon-nal returns, as summansed in column 13, table (4.1). across 
different countries (column 1), capital markets (column 3), time intervals (column 4). 
securities under investigation (column 5) and insiders (column 6). The signal (coluint-i 
7) is typically defined in terrns of the dates of insider trading transactions. However, 
such signal might be defined in terms of number of transactions, volume, value, or 
number of insiders traded within the event date. 
The empirical literature typically identified two anomalies in the behaviour of insider 
trading abnormal returns. These are (1) persistency over time [1977 
- 
1997 in the UK, 
and 1950 
- 
1997 in USA], and (2) domination of buy portfolios over sell ones in terms 
of both rate of return and significance of such returns [Aboody and Lev (2000), Chang 
and Sul (1998), Friederich et al. (2002), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Gregory et al. 
(1994), Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), King and Roell (1988), Pettit and Venkatesh 
(1995), Roth and Saporoschenko (1999) and Seyhun (1986)]. Given the various non- 
profit reasons for insider trading, which are almost sell-related reason, e. g. liquidity 
purpose, it is not unreasonable to predict the second anomaly. 
All of UK studies reported that insider trading buy transactions tend to significantly 
outperform the outsiders. Using daily data, Friederich et al. (2002) and (1999) and 
Hillier and Marshall (2002/a) report significant abnon-nal returns (AR) over 8 days after 
the event, while Gregory et al. (1997), using monthly data, document significant 
cumulative abnon-nal returns (CAR) of 3.18%, 3.54%, 4.80%, and 4.80% of buy 
transactions over 3,6,12, and 24 months, respectively. Similarly, Chang and Suk 
(1998), Seyhun (1986) and Givoly and Palmon (1985), of the USA studies, reported 
significant CAR of buy portfolios over 1,2,3 and 12 months. 
Insider trading sell transactions, on the other hand, indicate contradicting results. Of the 
UK literature, Friedcrich et al. (2002) and (1999), Gregory et al. (1997), Hilher and 
Marshall (20011a) and Pope et al. (1990) found significant abnormal losses ovcr 3.6. 
12, and 24 months. While Gregory et al. (1994) provided indistinguishable from zero 
CAR during the transactions' month and insignificant losses thereafter. King, and Roell 
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(1988) found positive but insignificant abnormal returns over a period of up to one year. 
Except for Finnerty (1976b), the USA studies reported similar insignificant losses to 
those of the UK's. 
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Many arguments can be put forward with relation to the most of the existing literature. 
These include (1) the signal definition and date. (2) the length of the event Nvindoxv 
used, and (3) the significance of the results, as explained in the following sub-sections. 
(5.3.1) Signal Definition and Event Date 
In terrns of defining the signal, the literature used one or more of the folloxN'ing three 
definitions. Firstly: net transactions' type (buy or sell) in one trading day. We refer to 
this definition as a single-signal. Here, insider trading, transactions within a day are 
filtered, i. e. deducting selling transactions from buying ones, and report the result as a 
one transaction with a positive (negative) signal if number of buying transactions is 
more (less) than the number of selling ones. Bno et al. (2002), Chang and Suk (1998), 
Friederich et al. (2002), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Hillier and Marshall (2002,1b) and 
Roth and Saporoschenko (1999), used this definition with daily data. 
In fact, with this sort of signal definition, daily data are superior on monthly data. That 
is so because the market does perceive the net transactions within a day, but not \vithin a 
month. The market has no memory. Also, using monthly data in this context indicates 
the loss of many days within the event month, i. e. the difference between each 
transaction's date within the event month and the event date, which is fixed on a certain 
date for all of the month's transactions. Aboody and Lev (2000), Finnerty (I 976b), 
Friederich et al. (2002), Gregory et al. (1997), Hillier and Marshall (2002/b), King and 
Roell (1988), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) and Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) used this 
definition, as well, but with monthly event windows. In fact, Gregory et al. (1997) did 
not report the exact event date, e. g. end of the month or last transaction's date NN'ithin a 
month, and Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) used January of each calendar year to cumulate 
the abnon-nal returns for each security. 
In this study, this definition will be applied on a set of daily data. Hence, the 
significance of this study can be seen, inter alias, in terms of the accuracy of the signal 
definition and the event date over the majority of UK studies which used monthlv data. 
Secondly net transactions' value (or volume) dUrIng a calendar month. We refer to this 
dcfinition as a quantitative-signal. Here, the valuc (or volurne) of insi ing 'der tradi 
- 
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transactions within a calendar month are filtered. That is by deducting the value (or 
volume) of selling transactions within a calendar month from the buYing ones, and 
report the result as a one quantified-signal with a positive (negative) sign if the value (or 
volume) of buying transactions are more (less) than the value (or volurne) of sellim-, 
ones. Fnederich et al. (2002), Gregory et al. (1997) and (1994), Hillier and Marshall 
(2002/b), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), and Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) used this sort 
of signal. The above argument, regarding the use of monthly data, presents a lialitation 
on this definition. That it does not take into account the daily reaction of the rnarket 
towards such signal. When applying this definition, this study overcomes such a 
problem daily, instead of monthly-quantified signals. 
Thirdly: net number of insiders during a calendar month. We refer to this definition as 
multiple-signals. Here, the number of insider trades within a calendar month is filtered, 
i. e. deducting the number of seller insiders within a calendar month from the buyer 
insiders, and report the result as a one multiple-signals with a net number of buyer 
(seller) insiders if the number of buyer (seller) insiders is more (less) than the number of 
seller (buyer) insiders. Eckbo and Smith (1998), Finnerty (1976a), Pope et al. (1990), 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Seyhun (1986) used the enforce signal. The same 
argument regarding the use of monthly data and event windows presents a limitation on 
this definition, as well. However, such limitation can be encountered by computing the 
average daily abnormal returns for each transaction-day during the calendar month. In 
fact, this represents part of the multiple signal definition used in this study. Moreover, it 
can be argued that the second and the third definitions are useful signals to detect t. ipe II 
error, instead of testing the initial null hypothesis, as such. 
(5.3.2) Event Window 
With respect to the length of the event windows used in the literature, it can be seen 
from table I that these ranges from one month to 36 months, for monthly data, and from 
one day to 300 days, for daily data. However, most literature reported sub-\vIndows 
xN, Ithin a wider Nvindow. All of UK literature and most of USA ones used momhly data. 
Surely a shorter cveiit \vindoNv Nvill prinia fiacle yield less infori-nation about insider 
trading than a long evciit Nvindow. But, as McWillianis and Siegel (199-) indicate, 
loil,,,, ci- Nvindoxv is more l1kcly to incorporate other events, and thus rcsulted with 
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confounding effects from other events. Other events include in addition to similar or 
reversal insider trading transactions, the announcement of earnings and dividends, 
merger and acquisition (M&A), research and development (R&D) results, and new 
large contracts. None of the literature has claimed control for such confounding effects. 
Another issue relating to the event window is that literature assumed that the event date, 
which is the centre of the event study, is identified with certainty. That is the publication 
date for some literature. However, it is difficult to identify the exact date per N"'hich the 
market is infon-ned. An example of this is when collecting event dates from the 
Saturdays section of the Financial Times [e. g. King and Roell (1988)], LSE's Official 
Weekly Intelligence [e. g. Pope et al. (1990)], from the Insider Trading Spotlight weekly 
section of the Wall Street Journal [e. g. Roth and Saporoschenko (1999)] and Chang and 
Suk (1998)], or from the SECs Official Summary [e. g. Jaffe (I 974a)]. In such cases, one 
cannot be certain if the market inforined prior to the disclosure. 
Similarly, when considering the transaction date, last transaction date in a calendar 
month or last day of a calendar month, by other literature, such as in Aboody and Lev 
(2000), Finnerty (1976b), Friederich et al. (2002), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Gregory 
et al. (1997) and (1994), Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), Pettit and Venkatesh (1995), 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Seyhun (1986). In fact, it's an event date for the insider, 
but not the market, unless the market is inforn-led promptly with such transaction, which 
is not the case. The issue here is, once again, when the market is informed. 
The common approach to handle the matter of uncertain event date is to expand the 
event window, with controlling for other event effects, which has not been investigated 
by currently available UK literature. 
(5.3.31 Test of Significance 
Finally, with respect to the significance test of the empirical results, it can be seen from 
column 12 of table (5.1) that there is no general agreement on the t-test formula. 
Hoxvevcr, Dodd and Warner's (1983) t-test formula is the most used one [e. g. Brio et al 
(2002). Chang and Suk (1998), Gregory et al. (1997) and (1994). Seyhun (1986) aild 
Yermack (1997)]. While Brown and Wamer's (1985) is used by txvo study [Friedench et 
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al (2002) and Roth and Saporoschenko (1999)] and Brown and Warner's (1980) is used 
by one UK study [Pope et al. (1990)]. As shown in the previous section, the difference 
between these fon-nulas is due to the standardisation process employed. Brown and 
Warner's (1980), in particular, has many limitations, such that it uses the average of the 
sample securities standard deviations, while the sample consists of firms with different 
sizes, various industries, and varied time series of returns, i. e. non-synchronisation. This 
study follows Dodd and Warner's (1983) Mest, and report Brown and Warrier's (1985), 
as well. 
(5.4) THE DATA 
This study employs all of the FTSE 100 company's transactions expenencing directors' Zý 
trading in their own firrns'ordinary shares (OS) and/or Executive Share Options (ESO). 
As with all of UK literature, insider-trading transactions are collected personally. That is 
to say there is no institutional agency to record, update and maintain such transactions 
in the UK, such as the USA's Centre for Research on Securi(i, Prices (CRSP). 
FTSE100 companies' directors' trading covering the period 1/5/1999-1/7/2000 
(hereafter called as the sample period) has been collected from Hemscott. NET's 
website 28 
. 
Similar type of data source is used by Gregory et al. (1997), who collected 
the data from Directus Ltd. Other UK studies extracted data from the publications. King 
and Roell (1988) used the weekly "Share Stakes" section of the Financial Times; Pope 
et al. (1990) used LSE Weekly Official Intelligence; and Gregory et al. (1994) used 
LSE Companies' Information Fiche Service. 
Nevertheless, the initial sample consists of 1200 director trades (96,245,713 shares). Of 
which, 285 transactions (31,029,571 shares) for directors exercised their executive share 
options (BEO), and 152 transactions (23,619,348 shares) for directors sold their 
executive share options (SSO). In addition, there are 508 transactions (13,683,912 
shares) of which directors bought their own firm's ordinary share (Buy), and 157 
transactions (19,842,685 shares) for selling ordinary share (Sell). Morcover, 98 
transactions (8,070,197 shares) are excluded because these are non-markets and non- 
executive share options transactions, such as those resulted froin inheritance. inarriage, 
28 
'A public shareholdings investment company 
listed in LSE. with a URL: wwiv. hemsc, ),, t. com. 
I -;, 
divorce, and gifts. In fact, ESO are included in the sample following literature findings 
that directors might use their pnvate information to timing the exercises of their ESO 
[see, for instance, Carpenter and Remmers (2001), Hillier and Marshall (-1002'c) and 
Yen-nack (1997)]. 
All securities of the FTSE100, with continuous market daily trading, have been chosen 
to implement the event test methodology mentioned above. Of 101 securities ývlth 
directors' dealing, only 96 securities satisfy this condition. Market-based data, for eacil 
firrn during the period I/l/1997-1/l/2001, collected ftom Datastream. These are: 
(1) Daily share's return (RI), [see section (5.4.2) for the justification behind using 
this RI not the share price]. 
(2) Daily FT all shares return (FTALLSH), 
(3) Daily UK Treasury Bond Benchmark (UKTB). 
(4) Daily volume traded in each FTSE 100 securities. 
FT all shares return (FTALLSH) is used as the market portfolio's retum, despite the fact 
that all the sample's securities are of the FTSE 100 and despite the availability of this 
index return. The main reason behind this decision is that securities in FTSE 100 are not 
constant. It is found that many securities have been removed from the FTSE100 and 
others are entered the group during the period 1997-2000. So, FTSE100 does not 
represent the whole securities in the sample at many points of time. FTALLSH, 
however, does. Moreover, the UK Treasury Bond (UKTB) return index is considered as 
a risk-free security. 
(5.4.1) Descriptive Statistics of the Market Data 
As this study uses daily data and the relevant UK literature uses monthly data, it's not 
possible to compare the statistics of this study with the UK studies. Table (5.2) shows 
that, on average, the daily return indices (RI's) of 96 securities of FTSEIOO during the 
MM estimation period (16/6/1998-23/3/1999) is 0.11%, with standard deviation of 
0.0286. While that of the FTALLSH return index, i. e. market portfolio return, is IoNNI, er 
(0.03"o) Nvith IoNver (0.0130) standard deviation, as This is consistent \\ýith the 
Tficory of Finance that more risk is associated with more return. Appendix (A5.1), 
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however, provides descnpti%, e statistics for each security's daily return during the ININI 
estimation period. 
Also, table (5.2) indicates that, on average, the range of security return indices is a 
dramatic one with a minimum RI's of 
-9.75% and a maximum of 11.411o. compared 
with 
-3.18% and 3.87% of the market return (Rrn), respectively. The distribution of the 
average RI's has a skewness of 0.3 and kurtosis of 3.4. The percentile figures are not 
affected by the observed skewness of return index distribution. These provide further 
evidence on the RI's. The median, for example, shows average RI's of 
-0.02.0, 
compared with 0.00% of Rm. 
On the other hand, the overall statistical properties for each of securities return indices 
(RI's) and market return (Rm) during the test period (1/4/1999-31/8/2000) provide 
similar picture as that during the estimation period, i. e. reported in appendix (A5.1). A 
detailed descriptive statistics for each security's return during the abnon-nal returns test 
period is shown in appendix (A5.2). 
On average, the daily RI's of 96 securities of FTSE100 during the estimation period is 
very close to that of the estimation period (0.10%), with similar standard deviation 
(0.0290), as well. However, that of the Rm is higher slightly than that of the estimation 
period (0.04%) with lower (0.0100) standard deviation. Once again, the returns of this 
period are consistent with the Theory of Finance. 
In addition, the range, on average of RI's, is a dramatic one with a minimum RI's of 
- 
10.95% and a maximum of 14.09%, compared with 
-3.18% and 2.30% of the market 
return Rni, respectively. The distribution of the average RI's has a skewness of 0.4 and 
kurtosis of 4.0. The percentile figures are not affected by the observed skewness of 
return distribution. These provide further evidence on the Rls. The median, for 
example, shows average RI's similar to that of previous period (-0.02%). compared v. 'Ith 
a higher Rm median (0.06%). 
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(5.4.2) Normalitv of the Market Data 
Brown and Warner (1985) argue that using daily share pnces in the event studies haN-c 
many problems. For example, it departs from normality and thus it ends up %ýIth 
incorrect test statistics inference. In addition, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) states that 
t-test is sensitive to outliers. Moreover, non-non-nality produces a biased and 
inconsistent market-model-parameters estimated from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Sharpe (1970) suggested that stock returns should be used instead of stock prices in 
whatever model used. In fact, there are two reasons for this study to use securities 
returns instead of share prices. Firstly, security returns are complete and scale-free 
summary of the investment opportunity. Secondly, security returns have more attractive 
statistical properties than prices, such as stationarity [Campbell et al. (1997) p. 9]. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the Datastream's security return indices, used in this 
study, are computationally more efficient than share prices. The distribution of the 
indices' time-series is a Student-t, uniforrn, but not necessarily is a normal distribution. 
Testing of the underlying assumption of non-nality, or uniform, of the indices' time- 
series distribution is conducted by SPSS's one-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov (Lilliefors 
significance correction) (K-S) teSt29 
. 
Appendix (A5.3) reports the shape of distribution 
and test of normality of all securities returns and the market return for the purpose of 
estimating the MM parameters, i. e. during the estimation period, as well as testing the 
abnon-nal returns, i. e. during the test period. Obviously, all RI's have a positive, but less 
than one, skewness statistics, with average kurtosis statistics of 3.4 during the 
estimation period and 4.0 during the test period. The average (K-S) statistics during the 
estimation period is 1.190 and that during the test period is 1.496. Both of which are 
insignificant at 5% (p-value < 0.05) or less, thus the non-normality hypothesis is 
rejected, and Rls are normally distributed. Figure (5.2a) shows the distribution of the 
average RI's during the estimation period. On the other hand, the market return shows 
negative skewness, although less than one, during both periods, i. e. -0.0037 and - 
0.2445. Also, the kurtosis statistics are less than one, during both periods. as well. i. e. 
0.4078 and 0.252-5. However, the K-S statistics during the two periods are 1.614 
29 it compares the observed cumulative distribution function for a variable vv1th a specified theoretical 
distribution. If the index distributions found to be departed statistically significant from normalitv, then 
suitable data transformation has to be employed to correct the shape of the distribution. 
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[significant at less than 5% (p-value < 0.050)] and 0.735 [not significant at less than 5% 
(p-value < 0.050)], respectively. Figure (5.2b) shoxvs the uniform distnbution of the 
average RI's during the estimation and test periods. 
(5.4.3) Independence of the Market Data 
The bivariate Pearson's correlation is calculated to measure the association bemeen 
each security's return (RI) and the market return (Rm) during the estimation period and 
the test period. Appendix (A5.4) shows statistically significant strong association 
between FTSEIOO security returns indices and market return during both perliods. On 
average, the correlation during the estimation period (46.22%) is slightly more than that 
during the test period (31.92%). 
These results, somehow, justify the use of MM for estimating each security's alpha and 
beta. In other words, the underlying assumption of the MM that there is a linear 
relationship between the security's and the market returns is satisfied. However, since 
the market return does not fully and comprehensively explain the security's return, it is 
expected that the MM would have small level of R-Square Adjusted (RI). Based on 
this phenomenon, this study uses the CAPM to estimate the security's expected return. 
The later model captures other factors that explain the security's return. Such these are 
the risk-free portfolio (Rf) and market risk premium (Rm 
- 
Rf). 
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Figure (5.2) The Distribution of the Average Returns of FTSEIOO 
(a) During the Estimation Period (16/6/1998 
- 
23/3/1999) 
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(5.5) TEST PROCEDURES 
The methodology of event study stated in section (5.2) is employed using the data sets 
described in section (5.4), and the test procedures are performed, and the results are 
detailed in the following sections 
(5-5-11 Construction of Porffollo Signals 
Section (5.2.1.1) introduced the event definitions. The procedures of producing single 
signal definition (section 5.2.1.1.1) resulted in with a filtered sample Xvith 562 signals 
(54,622,027 shares) in four portfolios; Hold ESO's called (BEO), Sell ESO's called 
(SSO), Buy OS's (Buy) and Sell OS's (Sell). Of which the BEO portfolio consists of 
110 signals (8,306,886 share options exercised), SSO portfolio xvith 62 (14,369,233 
share options sold), Buy portfolio consists of 295 signals (13,430,629 ordinary shares), 
and Sell portfolio with 95 signals (18,515,279 ordinary shares). 
All of the securities in the portfolios are of the Financial Times largest 100 companies. 
This indicates 
, 
in somehow, that the firms' size is consistent within and across the 
portfolios. 
Also, the multiple signal definition (section 5.2.1.1.2) resulted in a sample with 185 
transactions in four portfolios. Of which the BEO portfolio consists of 32 signals, SSO 
portfolio with 16 signals, Buy portfolio consists of 103 signals, and Sell portfolio with 
34 signals. 
Finally, the quartile quantified signal procedures 30 (section 5.2.1.1.3) resulted in 
sixteenth sub-portfolios with 562 signals, allocated as follows: 
(1) The first quartile BEO portfolio (BEO-QSI) consists of 28 signals, of which the 
volume of signals ranges between 5 to 3710 shares per deal. 
30 In addition, the median of the volume signal definition (Footnote 4 above) resulted in four semi- 
portfolios with 13 signals, allocated as follows: Eight signals in the buy portfolio, One signal in the sell 
portfolio, two signals in the exercised and hold ESO portfolio, and two signals in the sell of ESO 
portfolio. Finally, the median of the ratio N\', T\' signal definition (footnote 4 above) resulted in four 
semi-portfolios with 14 signals, allocated as follows: Nine signals in the buy portfolio, one signal in the 
sell portfolio, two sionals in the exercised and hold ESO portfolio, and two signals in the sell of ESO 
portfolio. 
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(2) The second quartile BEO portfolio (BEO-QS2) vvith 28 signals and volume ranges I 
between 4073 to I 1184 shares. 
(3) The third quartile BEO portfolio (BEO-QS3) with 27 signals ranges between 12366 
to 69520 shares. 
(4) The fourth quartile BEO portfolio (BEO-QS4) with 27 signals ranges between 
70000 to 1000504 shares. 
(5) The first quartile SSO portfolio (SSO-QSI) consists of 16 signals, of which the 
volume of signals ranges between 4000 to 21332 shares per deal. 
(6) The second quartile SSO portfolio (SSO-QS2) with 15 signals and volume ranges 
between 23563 to 60000 shares. 
(7) The third quartile SSO portfolio (SSO-QS3) with 15 signals ranges between 7-5000 
to 165504 shares. 
(8) The fourth quartile SSO portfolio (SSO-QS4) with 16 signals ranges between 
179340 to 2500000 shares. 
(9) The first quartile Buy portfolio (Buy-QS 1) consists of 74 signals, of which the 
volume of signals ranges between 60 to 1524 shares per deal. 
(10) The second quartile Buy portfolio (Buy-QS2) with 73 signals and volume ranges 
between 1593 to 3884 shares. 
(11) The third quartile Buy portfolio (Buy-QS3) with 74 signals ranges between 4000 
to I 1000 shares. 
(12) The fourth quartile Buy portfolio (Buy-QS4) with 74 signals ranges between 
11850 to 8546456 shares. 
(13) The first quartile Sell portfolio (Sell-QSI) consists of 24 signals, of which the 
volume of signals ranges between 5 and 7000 shares per deal. 
(14) The second quartile Sell portfolio (Sell-QS2) with 24 signals and volume ranges 
between 7076 and 20179 shares. 
(15) The third quartile Sell portfolio (Sell-QS3) with 24 signals ranges between 
20689 to 100000 shares. 
(16) The fourth quartile Sell portfolio (Sell-QS4) with 24 signals ranges between 
106000 to 3300000 shares. 
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(5.5.2) The Returns 
For the purpose of this study, daily percentage changes of security's return are 
calculated for sample's securities, FTALLSH return index, and UKTB benchmark, 
during the period 
-250 day to -50 days of the sample period. That is from 16 6/1998 to 
23/3/1999 (hereafter called the estimation period). Of the FTSE 100,96 securities have 
had a continuous return index time series. Statistically, the sample average daily rate of 
return of the sample is 0.11% with 0.00286 standard deviation, i. e. the risk. The mean 
studentized range of the returns is 0.2123 for the 99% fractile, NN'hich indicates that tile 
sample is normally distributed. Other indicators, such as the average time-series 
skewness (0.2983) and kurtosis (3.3904), support this conclusion. The above results are 
consistent with the empirical findings of Xing and Howe (2003), who examined the 
relationship between risk and returns in the LSE and find significant positive association 
between them. 
(5.5.2.11 The Market Model 
The simple Market Model (MM), equation (1), is used to estimate the intercept term a 
and systematic risk P of a security, by regressing the market return at time t, to the 
security's return during the estimation period 31 
. 
Since the test period, per which 
abnon-nal returns are being measured, should be completely separated from the 
estimation period, the MM parameters used in line with events occurring in one year are 
estimated from data on previous year [Givoly and Palmon (1985)]. Specifically, the 50 
days exclusion period is used to take into account the assumption that insiders may trade 
following a period of abnormal perfon-nance by the company [Gregory et al. (1994)]. 
Appendix (A5.5) details the results. It shows that, of 96 securities' P, 94 ones are 
significant at 5% degree of significance or less. While there are only 4 securities' a are 
significant at 5%, and one security at 10%. However, with the weakness of, but very 
much accepted R' Adjusted, i. e. 23.5% on average, the general conclusion is consistent 
with the market model assumption. That, security's return is subject to other factors, not 
31 For a sub-sample, each of the market return at time -15, -7,0, +7, +15 days is regressed solely to the 
security's return at time t. Then the coefficients of variatioii from each regression equation are summed 
tip. The result then is compared with the initial regression coefficient. The findings are almost the same, 
and the difference is very slightly. However, the Adjusted R-Square of the initial re, ression MM has 
improved significantly. The sample securities are correlated weakly. but significantly, with FTALLSH at 
, 
nificant at time 
-7 and +15 time 0. However. this becomes rather weakly but negatively insiv 
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only market return, such as the return on a risk-free security and the security's risk 
premium, i. e. [pi*(Frn 
- 
Rf)]. 
The return on a security and the return on the market portfolio are each measured over 
the same trading interval. Thus, OLS estimates of MM parameters are, initially, 
unbiased and consistent. Otherwise, alternative techniques for parameter estimation 
have to be considered 32 
. 
Most importantly is the error terms, i. e. residuals, resulted from the MM. Empirical 
investigation of the residuals shows that: 
(1) The sum of the residuals of each security in the sample equals to zero (0.0000), 
(2) The mean residuals of the whole sample equals to zero (0.0000), with a significant 
standard error (0.00 18) at 5 %, 
(3) The sum of the differences between the average residuals (AU) and the residuals 
(Ut), equation 4, of each security in the sample equals to zero (0.00000). 
(4) There is no significant correlation between the market return (Rmt) and each 
security's residuals (Oit). 
(5) Thus, the data are hetroscedasticity-free and the error ten-n is unit normally 
distributed. 
The m ain statistical indicators of t he MMr esiduals, s urnmarised in appendix (A5.5), 
support the validity of the MM parameters. Figure (5.3) shows the shape of the 
distribution of the average 96 securities residuals. 
32 For non-synchronous trading and MM parameter estimation, see, for example, Campbell et al. (1997), 
p. 84, and p. 128-129. 
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Figure (5-3) The Distribution of the Average Residuals of 96 Securities of 
FTSEIOO During the Estimation Period (6/1998 
- 
3/1999) 
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(5.5.2.2) The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Std. Dev = 
. 
01 
Wan = 
. 
0010 
N= 370.00 
The ex-post CAPM, equation (4), is used to calculate the expected return on a security 
(i) at time (t) during the test period 1/4/1999 to 31/8/2000. On average, the expected 
return on FTSEIOO is 0.12% compared with 0.05% on risk-free security and 0.04% on 
market portfolio. These figures are consistent with the Theory of Finance. Table (5.2) 
summarises te main statistical properties of these computations. 
(5.5.2.3) Standardised Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return (ARit), equation (5), is calculated for the test period 1/4/1999 to 
31/8/2000. Table (5.2) reports the statistics, as well. One general conclusion can be 
drawn from the table. That, there is at best only weak evidence that securities have 
positive abnormal returns. The average ART for FTSE100 (96 securities) is 
-0.02% with 
0.0301 standard deviation, 0.4497 skewness and 3.4939 kurtosis, compared \vIth 
+0.05% average return on Rf and +0.04% on Rm during the same period. These results 
are consistent with relevant literature, such as Fama et al. (1969). 
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Table (5.2) Main Statistical Properties of IFTSE 100 
Securities' Parameters Used in the Event Test 
Item No. Range Min Max Mean Mean Std. Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
(Period) Of Std Deviation Stat. Std Stat. StJ 
Firms Error Error Error 
Return 96 0.2123 
-0.0978 0.1145 0.0011 0.0021 0.0287 0.0009 0.298 0.178 3.390 0.3 53 (16/6/98- 
23/3/99) 
1 
Beta 96 0.7290 0.0710 0.8000 0.4623 0.0164 0.1607 0.0258 
-0.15 0.246 -0.53 0.488 (16/6/98- 
23/3/99) 1 
Alpha 96 0.0177 
-0.0036 0.0141 0.0008 0.0002 0.0022 0.0000 2.93 0.246 14.42 0-4S8 (16/6/98- 
1 
23/3/99) 
F-Value 96 352.56 1.0000 353.56 72.854 6.4964 63.651 4051-52 1.54 0.246 3.09 0.488 
(16/6/98- 
1 
23/3/99) 
DW 96 1.4190 1.2910 2.7100 1.8954 0.0221 0.2163 0.0468 0.55 0.246 2.49 0.488 
(16/6/98- 
1 
23/3/99) 
R-Square 96 0.6380 0.0000 0.6380 0.2351 0.0152 0.1485 0.0220 0.55 0.246 
-0.48 0.488 Adjusted 
(16/6/98- 
23/3/99) 1 
NIM 96 0.1833 
-0.0831 0.1002 0.0000 0.0018 0.0242 0.0006 0.334 0.172 3.541 0.342 Residuals 
(16/6/98- 
1 
23/3/99) 1 
E(R) = 96 0.0428 
-0.0198 0.0230 0.0012 0.0004 0.0075 0.0001 0.022 0.127 0.033 0.2-51 
CAPM 
(1/4/1999- 
31/8/2000) 1 
Return 96 0.2483 
-0.1087 0.1396 0.0010 0.0015 0.0288 0.0009 0.416 0.127 3.971 0.253 (1/4/1999- 
1 
31/8/2000) 
1 
Abnormal 96 0.2548 
-0.1119 0.1429 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0301 0.0010 0.450 0.127 3.494 0.253 
Return 
(1/4/1999- 
131/8/2000) 
In addition, a cross-sectional dependence of each portfolio's securities abnon-nal returns 
is investigated. That is by measuring the correlation coefficient between subsequent 
abnonnal returns during the event window, viz. tO to t+12, as well as other windows, as 
reported below. Appendix (A5.6) reports the correlation during different event 
windows. The average correlation of cross-sectional AR's of BEO's portfolio during the 
period from tO to t+12 is -1-98%. And -0.13% of SSO's portfolio, +0.12% of Buy 
portfolio, and +7-61% of Sell portfolio. All of which are, obviously, have weak 
correlation. Of the UK studies, King and Roell (1988) report "sorne signs of 
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autocorrelation among weekly excess retums. but %vith first order autocorrelation 
coefficients all well within the band of 10%,, 
33 
It can be seen clearly that all of the reported correlation is weak. Thus, there are no 
overlaps exist in the successive abnormal returns Nvithin the event windoNN's. Tills, ill 
fact, is a result of the weak level of market efficiency, per \\'hich the securitv returns 
over-time and across-securities are independent. That the security returns represents a 
Random Walk. 
The abnormal returns for each single (SS), multiple (MS), and quantitative (QS) sigiial 
is computed according to equation (5) 34 
. 
Then the average for each signal-portfolio is 
calculated following equation (6). Table (5.3) shows the results. 
Moreover, to examine the statistical significance of the mean standardized AR dLiring 
the event period, the test statistics are computed according to DWI 983 equation (11), 
and BW 1985, equation (15 )35 
. 
Following the literature, the significance level is set to be 
at 5%. Since the alternative hypotheses have one-way directions, 1'1*-7. positive for buy 
portfolios and negative for sell portfolios, then the test used is a one-sided test. Table 
(5.3) reports the test statistics during the event window, as well. The abnon-nal return, 
standard deviation, and test-statistics for longer event windows are reported in the 
appendix (A5.8). 
Except for Friederich et al. (2002) and King and Roell (1988), none of UK studies 
report the rates of abnormal return during the event window. In addition, King and 
Roell, used monthly data, have not reported the rates of return at the ev'ent (publication) 
date itself However, they found significantly positive AR after 1,3, and 12 months of 
event date, for buy portfolio, and insignificantly positive AR for sell portfolio during the 
same periods. The same results are found when relating the AR to the market return and 
to the risk-adjusted benchmark. 
King and Roell (1988), see the note underneath table 2, p. 179, 
34 
-ell as the signal defined by the median of the transaction's volume and that of the ratio of 
, 
xN 
as explained in footnote 4, and the results are reported in appendix (. -\5 ý7 
'5 Also, Brovrn and Warner's (1980) t-test (BNN'1980) has been employed. The results. reportcd in the 
appendix (A5.7), show clearlv that BNN'1980's produces different t-values than that of BW1985 
oles used for computation the variations, standardization Obviou, sly. till is due to the different methodolo.., s 
(ilon-standardization) of the abnormal return in B\\*19S,, (in MV1980). and the t-tests, as well. 
14 77 
In this section, the results in table (5.3) will be reviewed in terrns of the outcomes of 
employing different signal definition. While section (5.6) interprets the empirical 
findings in terms of the research hypothesis, section (5.7) examines the robustness of 
the results. 
It can be seen from table (5.3) and appendix (A5.9) that different signal definition 
produced different aspects of abnormal returns. It seems that none of the signal 
definition (MS, QSI, QS2, QS3, or QS4)36 produced more significant results thaii those 
of the primary single signal (SS) definition used in this study. However, several points 
can be drawn, with the single signal (SS) definition is being as the benchmark, froni 
employing different signal definition. These include firstly in terms of the sign of the 
ARs, secondly in terms of the magnitude, and thirdly in tenns of the significance of 
these results, as follows: 
(1) The Sign of the Abnormal Returns: It seems that employing more sophisticated 
signal definition improves the abnormal returns' (AR) sign. For example, there are 9(10) 
positive ARs resulted from the QS I (QS3) of the buy portfolio, compared with 8 in the 
benchmark. In the sell portfolio, on the other hand, MS produced 9 negative ARs as the 
benchmark, while QS4 produced 11. This picture becomes clearer when moving to the 
ESO portfolios. MS, QS1, and QS4 of the BEO portfolio resulted in more positive ARs 
(8,9, and 7 respectively) than the benchmark, which has 6 positive ARs. The figures of 
SSO portfolio confirm this conclusion. MS, QS1, QS2, and QS3 produced 8,10,6, and 
6 negative ARs respectively, while SS has only 5. 
36 In addition to the median of the volume of transactions, and the median of the ratio of as 
explained in footnote 4 above. 
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(2) The Magnitude of the Abnormal Returns: An im-estigation into the AR's sign of 
certain days within the event window shows varied results. At the eN-ent day (tO). for 
example, the AR signs (rates of return) of buy portfolio resulted from QS 1. and QS4 are 
similar (higher) to that of SS, which has a negative sign. While all signals definition of 
sell portfolio produced similar positive signs, with vaned results. On the other hand, 
only QS2 and QS4 of BEO portfolio produced similar negative sign as that of the 
benchmark, with varied rates. While all signals definition, except QS3, of SSO portfolio 
resulted in with the same negative AR's sign of SS, with varied rates of return. 
The picture at the assumed day of disclosure (t6) is much better. All signals definition of 
the buy (BEO) portfolio has produced similar positive (negative) signs as of the SS. As 
for the rates of the abnormal return, MS, QS3 and QS4 (NIS, QS2 and QS4) produced 
higher rates than SS of the buy (BEO) portfolio. Of the sell portfolio, all signals, except 
QS3 produced similar signs as of the SS, while the rates are higher. The AR's sign and 
rates of SSO portfolio improved with all signals, except QS2. 
Finally, the last day of the event window (tl2) shows various results. The rate of the buy 
portfolio's AR has increased and the sign improved. That of the sell portfolio has mixed 
results. While the sign not changed, except in QS2, the rate increased by MS, QS3, and 
QS4. Of the BEO portfolio, the sign (rate) improved (increased) from negative (0.00 13) 
in the benchmark to positive (0.0027 and 0.0024) by employing MS and QS4 
respectively. QSI, QS2, and QS4 produced similar sign as of the SS, with higher rates 
of ARs in QS I and QS2. 
(3) The Significance of the Results: No clear conclusion in this regard can be reached 
by employing different signals definition. For example, the SS of buy portfolio has 3 
significantly positive ARs at t5, t6, and t7. While that of MS (QS4) has 2 at t6 and t8 (t8 
and 02). Interestingly, QS2 produced 2 significantly positive ARs at tl and t5. and 2 
negativc ARs at t9 and 02. Only I significant AR resulted from QS3, wlille none from 
QS1. 
Consistent with this study expectation, the benchmark (SS) of the sell portfolio has 
sigillificantly poslitilvc AR at tO, and 
-3) negative at t2, tl 1. and tl 2. While each of MS, 
QS2 and QS4 prodUced 2 si (,, ni ficam ly negative ARs at (t I and t-'), (t8 and tII). and (t I 
15 1 
and tI 1) respectively; QS3 has 2, as well, but positive ARs (tO and tl). QS I has 4 
signi icantly negative ARs at tl, t5,00, and tI 1. 
On the other hand, ESO portfolios have, relatively, better results. For example, MS and 
QSI of BEO portfolio have more significantly positive ARs. While the SS and MS of 
the SSO portfolio have no significant ARs at all. However, QS 1, QS2 and QS4 have 4, 
3, and I significantly negative ARs, respectively. QS3 has 2 significant ARs but with 
positive signs. Appendix (A5.9) summarises the above results. 
(5.5.3.4) Standardised Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Finally, the average abnormal returns for each single (SS), multiple (MS), and 
quantitative (QS) signal-portfolio, at time t, are accumulated, from (to) to (t 12), 
according to equation (11). Moreover, following Dodd and Warner (1983), the AR is 
standardized and compounded over the event window to yield standardized cumulative 
abnormal return (SCAR), i. e. equation (10). The average (SCARt) is calculated 
according to equation (12). Then, the test of significance of the S'CARt, according to 
equation (11), is computed. Table (5.4) states the results for each signal_portfolio37. 
It can be seen from the table that it is until the 6hday the single signal CARO (+0.83%) 
of buy OS portfolio becomes significant at 10% and on the 8th day (CARt8 = +1.29%) 
and thereafter at 5% or less. While that of sell OS becomes significant on the II th and 
12 th day at 5% or less (CAR= 
-1.44% and -2.16%, respectively). 
On the other hand, holding exercised ESO portfolio shows negative single signal CAR 
throughout the event window, with only two significant CARs (CARt6 at 10% level of 
significance, and CAR17 at 5%). Similarly, the sell ESO shows negative CAR 
throughout the event window, but none of which is significant. 
Since these results are of daily measurements, it is not possible to make an appropriate 
comparison with relevant literature, which used monthly data, with different length of 
event windows. 
37 Although the Event Window 1s defined as a period of 12 d ays ( from tO to t+ 12), a ppendix (A5.10) 
reports the result of longer event windows, as well. These are 7 days (t6 to t 12), 18 days (t-6 to t 12), 55 
days (t6 to t60), 60 days (tO to t60) and 90 days (t-30 and t60). 
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In terms of this study hypothesis, the explanation of the significance of these findings 
shall be discussed in the interpretation section below. As for the significance of different 
signal definitions used, it can be seen from table (5.4) above that the significance or 
CAR for each portfolio differs as with the signal definition. Appendix (A5.1 1) 
summarises these results, firstly in terms of the sign of CAR, and secondly in terms of 
the significance of CARs according to each signal definition. For example, CAR of SS 
buy portfolio was significant during the sub-period t8 to t 12; while no significance CAR 
resulted from MS, QS1, and QS4 during that period. Four significant CARs N\-cl-c found 
in QS2 (t6 to t9), and three in QS3 (t8 to t9). 
As for the magnitude of CAR resulted from each signal definition, appendix (A5.12) 
includes the figures that represent CAR for each portfolio according to different signals. 
At t6, for example, QS2 (QS4) of the buy portfolio produced the highest (lowest) CAR 
of all signals, while at 02, QS4 (QSI) produced the highest (lowest) CAR. The SS 
maintains its position, the third highest CAR, throughout the event window. The same 
results produced in the sell portfolio. Of which, however, QSI produced the lowest 
CAR, while SS maintains its fourth lowest CAR. 
On the other hand, the shape of ESO's CARs was consistent with those of OS's. For 
example, MS of BEO portfolio has a negative CAR at t6 and increased sharply to the 
highest position CAR at t12. Likewise, QS4 upwards from the lowest negative CAR at 
t6 to the second highest positive CAR at t 12. 
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The shape of SSO's CAR is expected to be negatively downgrading one by the end of 
the event window. Of all signals, only NIS and QS1 produced this expected shape. 
However, QS3 has such a line, but with positive CAR throughout the event window. In 
addition, QS2 has an up warding CAR, from negative at tO to almost zero at t6 to the 
highest positive CAR at t12. QS4, however, produced the same CAR as of QS2, but 
CAR was always positive. 
It seems that moving from simple signal definition, viz. SS, to more sophisticated ones, 
viz. MS and QS, significant CARs become closer to the event date. CARs of different 
signals of sell portfolios, for example, present a clear picture to this conclusion. CAR of 
SS was significant at tl I and 02, but that of MS, it becomes significant at t7 and t8, and 
that of QS1 at t6. For the purpose of this study hypothesis, these findings shall be 
elaborated more in the following section. Appendix (A5.12) summarises the above 
results and section (5.7.5) examines the signals definition effect on CARs.. 
5.6) Empirical Findiqgs 
As the samples indicate, the empirical results will be interpreted by each type of 
directors trading portfolios. These are buy and sell ordinary share (OS) portfolios and 
those of holding and selling the exercised executive share options (ESO) portfolios. The 
logic behind this separation is, as Seyhun (1988/b) states, that it is expected that 
insiders' open market transactions are more likely to represent action taken as a result of 
private price-sensitive and inside information. On the other hand, ESO transactions can 
be seen differently. As these shares are already granted by the firm to its directors, then 
trading in these shares are more likely to be seen as an action taken for different reasons 
than those of OS transactions. Such as for ownership purposes (exercising and keep 
holding ESO) or liquidity (selling ESO) matters. However, there still inside information 
can be detected from such transactions. Literature shows that the timing of these 
transactions can be seen as an indicator on the current market share price, viz. over-or- 
undervalued [see, for example, Carpenter and Remmers (200 1) and Yermack (1997)]. 
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis is the same for all. That is, directors trading in their 
own company's securities are not profitable. That is the test of Ho: CAR <0 (CAR > 0), 
or alternatively Hi: CAR >0 for the "Buy" portfolios, and CAR <0 for "Sell" 
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portfolios, respectively. at a one-tailed significance level of 50o. Tables (5.3) and (5-4) 
above report ARs and CARs, respectively, over 12 days after the event date and their 
significance. Examination of portfolio performance "-III folloNv 
Taking into consideration the empirical findings presented in previous sections (5.5.3-3) 
and (5.5.3.4), it is not unreasonable to assume that none of other signals definition (MS 
or any of QSs) has shown a significantly consistent result with those reported in 
previous literature [section (5.3)], and in comparison xvith the primary signal definition 
used in this study, i. e. SS. Thus, none of which can be considered as an alternatiVc 
signal definition to that of SS. Therefore, the empirical findings Nvill be explained 
mainly by SS's results. However, other signals shall be reported, xý, 'here applicable, in 
line with SS. 
(5.6.1) Directors Tradim 
Based upon previous literature, 
portfolio is an up-warding (a do 
shows that CARs of buy and 
expectationS38. 
i in Ordinarv Shares (OS) 
it is not unreasonable to expect that CAR of buy (sell) 
wn-warding) line during the event window. Figure (5.4) 
sell ordinary shares portfolios are in line with such 
(5.6.1.1) Buving Ordinarv Shares Porffolio (Buv) 
The empirical result shown in table (5.4) shows that CAR of directors buying their own 
firm's ordinary shares is significantly positive at the end of the assumed day of 
disclosure (t6 = 0.83%) as well as at the end of the event window (02 = 1.02%). A 
combination of t-values of CAR (DW1983) and AR (BW1985) shows that all of the 
returns during the period (t5 to 02) are significant. This leads to conclude that the null 
hypothesis of zero or negative CAR is rejected, and accept the alternative one. 
38 CARs produced by others Ig na Is, reported in appendix (. 
-\5-12 a), show similar trend. 
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However, none of the returns is distinguishable from zero dunng the first five days (tO 
to t4). This finding is consistent with this research event definition. In other %ýords, the 
market recognises the directors trading, and reflects the signal as soon as it has been 
disclosed. Since it was not possible to specify the exact date of the disclosure for each 
transaction. The results indicate that it takes, on average, seven working days to disclose 
the directors trading, i. e. at which the market significantly reflects the new information. 
More investigation into these findings shows that: 
(1) Strategically, a longer window is recommended for this type of portfolio. CARs for 
longer event windows are calculated, and higher values are found. For example, 
CAR after 20 days of the transaction date (tO to 09) is 2.29% significant 39 
. 
And 
that for 50 days (tO to t49) is 3.21% significant4O 
. 
Also, CAR for 60 days is 3.5 7" o 
significant4l 
, 
as shown in appendix (A5.13a). 
(2) Initially, the insignificant findings during the first ffi, e days of the event window 
would suggest that the event window have to start from the sixth days, instead of 
the date of the transaction. This would be a wise decision, if and only If the exact 
disclosure date is known for each transaction in the portfolio. However, it is not. 
Nevertheless, as these transactions executed in the market, the event window has to 
start from the date of transaction (tO) to incorporate the market makers reactions. 
(3) Taking the presumable disclosure date as the event date, appendix (A5.13a) shows 
that the null hypothesis is still rejectable, and that the level of CAR is magnified up 
until day 60. 
(4) It is not unreasonable to assume that insiders might have disclosed their price- 
sensitive, inside, information privately, i. e. to friends and/or relatives. That and 
most importantly are the timing of their trading. Chakravarty and McConnell 
(1999) and (1997) and Meulbroek (1992), for example, investigated illegal insider 
trading, per which insiders revealed their private information to others (tippee). 
This issue is investigated by extending the event windoNv to include six days before 
the event date. The empirical results state that such an assumption does not hold for 
FTSEIOO directors dealing. On one hand, the ARs during the pre-event date (t-6 to 
t-1) are all negativc, with significant returns on day 
-3 and -1. On the other hand, 
39 By DW1983 and BW1980 at I qo, and by BNV19,85 at 10%. 
40 Bv DW I QS3 at I% and BNN'1980 at 5'o. 
41 
ordim, to IINVII)S 
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the CAR for this event window (t-6 to 02) is negative, as well, with significant 
returns during the period t-2 to t5. Appendix (A5.13a) shows the results. 
(5) The results of other signal definitions, reported in table (5.4), show that, on one 
hand, the level of CARs resulted from multiple signals (NIS) and fli-st-quartile 
quantitative signal (QS1) are much below that of single signal (SS). On the other 
hand, there were no significant CARs produced by NIS and QSI during the evei-it 
window. However, table (5.3) shows that AR at t6 and t8 resulted from NIS are 
significant. The same can be said about QS4, except for CAR at t1 I and 02, %N'Illch 
are higher, but still insignificant. QS2 and QS3, however, are consistent, to a 
certain degree, with SS. The returns are much higher than those of SS all through 
the event window up until tl 1. ARs and CARs of QS2 are significant at t6, t7, t8 
and t9, while ARs and CARs of QS3 are significant at t9 and GO. This leads to 
conclude that using different signal definitions does not much alter the results. 
Appendix (A5.12a) shows CAR of different signal definitions of buy ordinary 
shares portfolio during the event window. 
(6) The percentiles of 295 CARs of buying ordinary shares portfolio are calculated. All 
the percentiles 1%, 5%, 10% and 90%, 95% and 99% depart significantly more and 
more from the CAR as the accumulation process continues. By the end of the event 
window, the 95% (90%) percentile takes a value of 14.90% (12.54%) and the 5% 
(10%) percentile takes a value of 
-13.61% (-9.49%). The same picture is shown 
when using different event windows. These results are consistent with Brown and 
Warner (198 0)42 
. 
That is so because of the frequency of the data used, i. e. daily 
transactions. 
(5.6.1.2) Sellinq Ordinary Shares Porffollo (Se! U 
CAR of directors selling their own firm's ordinary shares at presumable day of 
disclosure (t6) is 
-0.71%, however, insignificant; and that at the end of the event 
window (02) is 
-2.16% significant. Moreover, CAR at tlI and 02 are the only 
significant returns. These findings lead to reject the null hypothesis of zero or positive 
CAR, and thus accept the altemative one with negatiN, e CAR. 
Howcvcr, a further inN-cstigation into these findings shows that: 
42 Sec Figurc 2 In BNV1980. 
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(1) A shorter window is recommended for this type of portfolio. There were no 
significant CARs around the event day or the presumed disclosure day. AR. 
however, on the event day (tO) and (t2) are significant. 
(2) As these transactions executed in the market, the event window has to start from the 
event date (tO) to incorporate the market makers reactions. 
(3) As the regulation prohibits the directors from trading on private and price-sensitiN, e 
infori-nation within 60 days, it is not expected to see any fin-n-specific event or key 
announcement before at least sixty days of the transaction date. Thus, an 
investigation into longer windows is necessary to seek evidence on the information 
content, viz. bad news, of directors selling. Appendix (A5.13b) graphs CAR during 
the period 
-30 days up to +60 days after the transaction date. 
(4) Therefore, CARs during longer event windows are examined and found to be 
significantly and negatively big enough to indicate that directors avoid abrionnal 
losses by selling their shares. For example, CARs for the event windows (tO to t 19), 
(tO to t49), and (tO to t59) are 
-3.06%, -3.42%, and -9.13% respectively. As longer 
the event window as CAR becomes increasingly negative. Likewise, CARs during 
the event windows (tO to t+21, t+22, and t+60) are all significant at 1%. Appendix 
(A5.13b) graphs CAR during these event windows. 
(5) One might, however, argue that directors' selling might be made upon for reasons 
other than price-sensitive information. Such that for liquidity reason. Such clear 
indicators have to be verified, or otherwise, by relevant measures. 
(6) It can be seen from table (5.4) that MS and QS1 produced more significant CARs 
that SS, particularly around the assumed disclosure date. CAR resulted from QS I at 
t6 is 
-3.21% significant, and that of MS at t7 is 2.81% significant. None of the 
CARs produced by QS2 and QS4 is significant. In addition, the level of significant 
CAR produced by each of QSI, QS4 and MS is much higher (-4.75%, 
-3.55% and - 
3.45%, respectively) than that of SS (-2.16%). Appendix (A5.12b) graphs CAR 
resulted from different signal definition during the event window. 
(7) Once again, the percentiles of 95 CARs of selling ordinary shares portfolio were 
selected. All the percentiles 1%, 5%, 10% and 90%, 95% and 99% depart 
significantly more and more from the CAR as the accumulation process continues. 
By the end of the event window, the 95% (90', o') percentile takes a value of 18.90% 
(15.21%) and the 5% (10%) takes a value of 
-25.22"o (-18.44()()). The same 
161 
conclusion can be reached by using different event windows, particularly t-0 to 
t+60. 
(5.6.2) Directors Trading in Executive Share Options (ESO) 
The executive share options portfolios have shown a completely different picture than 
that presented by ordinary share portfolios. Figure (5.5) sho\\ýs that CARs for holding 
(BEO) and selling (SSO) exercised executive share options portfolios are not in line 
with this research expectation. 
Three reasons might explain such diversion. The first lies in the special features of these 
shares. On one hand, ESO represents a reward for long term performance. So that they 
are tied with various measures of firm's performance. Such these are productivity, 
financial and/or structural (merger and acquisition) measures. So that it is not 
unreasonable to expect that directors exercise and liquidate (sell) their ESO, as part of 
their compensation. On the other hand, the timing of both exercising and selling these 
ESO. The first one (the timing of exercising ESO) has less informational content, as it 
is, almost, a contractual matter. While the second one (the timing of selling ESO) might 
be considered as a signal. 
The second reason has to do with, firstly, the length of the event window, and 
consequently, the frequency of the data used. As these ESO are of long terin, using 
monthly data with longer event window can be of fundamental importance in the event 
study outcomes. 
The third reason that might explain the unexpected results is due to sample size. 
Holding the exercised ESO portfolio consists of I 10 signals compared with 295 of the 
buy OS portfolio. Also, selling the exercised ESO portfolio consists of 62 signals, 
compared with 95 of the sell OS portfolio. These results are, in fact, consistent with 
literature such as Carpenter and Remmers (2001). 
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U5.6.2.1) Holding Exercised Executive Share Options Porffollo (BEP 
. -I 
A test of the expected hypothesis, H1, that CAR of BEO portfolio is significantly 
43 positive shows that CAR at t6 is 
-1.34%, but v,, eakly significant 
. 
In addition, CAR at 
the end of the event window is 
-0.30% insignificant. Throughout the event window, 
only CAR at t7 is significant, however, negative. This leads to conclude that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The reasons put forward in the introduction of this 
section (5.6.2) might explain this result. 
However, when taking into consideration the type of these transactions, one should 
consider the following explanations: 
(1) As this type of transactions is not executed in the market, the market makers do 
have no infonnation about these transactions during the pre-disclosure period (tO to 
t6). 
(2) Even within the event window, the portfolio's perfortnance starts to adjust, however 
slightly, as after t7 per which CAR increased from 
-1.60% significant to -1.00%, - 
0.85%ý 
-0.62% and -0.17% significant at t8, t9, tIO and t115 respectively. AR 
figures in table (5.3) confirrn this result. 
(3) As the fin-n discloses these transactions, it is expected that the market will start to 
reflect the signal derived from these transactions after the disclosure date. This 
implies that the market makers have not received and reflected upon the signal until 
the disclosure date. 
(4) So, if the event window is to start from t6, instead of tO, then the portfolio 
perforinance would start to adjust and CAR would become positive as from tIO 
onward. Appendix (A5. I Oc) reports CAR and appendix (A5.13c) shows the graphs 
during different event windows. 
(5) Thus, it is obvious that the market starts to reflect the signal, resulted from 
director's decision to exercise and hold their ESOs, Immediately after disclosure. 
(6) A wise investment strategy indicates that significant abnormal returns can be 
achieved by taking longer position in this sort of portfolio. A longer event window 
is investigated, appendix (A5.13c), and found no abnon-nal returns. This might be 
explained by insignificant volume, or insignificant number of firm's directors 
involvcd in such transactions. 
43 
. 
%t 10"o according to (DW1983) and AR at 5% according to (MV1985) 
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(7) Other signals definition investigated this issue, the results are reported in table (5-4), 
summarised in appendix (A5.1 I c) and graphed in appendix (A5.12c). It can be seen 
that none of these signals produced significant CAR at any time durim-, the eN, cnt 
window. However, MS and QS1 produced positive CAR from tS to the end of the 
event window, per which CAR is 1.47% and 0.95%, respectively. In addition, C. 
-\R 
of QS4 is 0.91%. This leads to accept the null hypothesis. 
(8) On the other hand, table (5.3) shows that MS produced significantl,,, positive ARs at 
t4ý t8, and t1 I; while those of QS1 are at t4, t5, and t1 I. QS2 has no significantly 
positive AR, while QS3 has only one at t1, and QS4 has two at C and tIO. In 
contrast with point (7) above, SS and MS can reject the null hypothesis at t1 and t8, 
at t4 by employing NIS and QS 1, at tII by S S, MS and QS 1. 
(9) Once again, selected percentiles of 110 CARs of BEO's portfolio were computed. 
All the percentiles 1%, 5%, 10% and 90%, 95% and 99% depart significantly more 
and more from the ACAR as the accumulation process continues. By the end of the 
day 12th, the 95% (90%) percentile takes a value of 14.11% (11.27%) and the 5% 
(10%) takes a value of 
-19.01% (-12.89%). The same conclusion can be reached by 
using different event windows, particularly t6 to t60. Here, a 95% (90%) percentile 
of CAR takes a value of 39.95% (30.44%) at day 60th, and a value of 
-31.93% 
28.75%) at 5% (10%) percentile. 
(5.6.2.2) Selling Executive Share Options Porffolio (SSQ) 
Unsurprisingly, a test of the null hypothesis that CAR of SSO portfolio is s1grilficantly 
zero or positive cannot be rejected. CAR of directors selling their executive share 
options portfolio during the sub-window (tO to t6) is 
-0.19% with insignificant t- 
statistics, and that during the event window (tO to 02) is insignificantly positive 0.04%. 
These insignificant results indicate that the research expectations are not consistent with 
the empirical findings. HoNve\'er, the following points would help in understanding the 
behaviour of this portfolio: 
(1) The Nvise investment strategy indicates that significant abnon-nal returns can be 
achieved by taking shorter position in directors-selling their ESO portfolios. 
Howcvcr, none of the various signals definitions reported in table (5.4) produced 
significantly negativc CAR at any time durin the event window. Ho"ve -er, QSI, It) - I= 9N 
QS--' and QS4 havc significamly negative ARs. tabic (5.3), at t2. tl, and t4 
respectivcly. 
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(2) Evidently, the portfolio's perfon-nance starts to adjust, hoxN, e%-er insignificantly 
slightly, from as early as the beginning of the eN, ent Nx. -Indow. That is from tO to t-2, 
per which CARs are 
-0.25%, -0.22%, and -0.42% respectively. None of %\ hich is 
significant. 
(3) This implies that the market makers have got the signal ý-ery early. But the 
magnitude of their reaction, viz. bid/ask spread is minor, and that of the market 
participants is insignificant. Once again, this is because of either insignificant 
volume of shares traded 
, 
insignificant number of firm's directors involved in such 
transactions, or the small size of the sample, i. e. N=62. However, N represents the 
whole FTSE 100 securities during the test period. 
(4) These sorts of transaction are of course executed in the market. Thus, the event 
window has to start from tO, although there is no disclosure but until t6. 
(5) Different signal definition investigated these insignificant findings, but without any 
alteration to the conclusion reached by SS. 
(6) An extended event windows, for example, (tO to t60), (t6 to 02) and (t6 to t60), 
have been examined and found that none of these windows' CARs is significant. 
However, a 5% significant level of AR is found at 04 (-0.33%), t26 (-0.82%), t31 
(-2.34%), and at t60 (-2.74%). 
(7) Based on an assumption that the directors might have seen the market share price 
over a certain perio o time is overvalued. Rationally, they decided to sell their 
holdings of ESOs to gain from this arbitrage period. If this assumption is true, it is 
expected that in an event window of (t-30 to t60), the AR's be positive until the 
disclosure date (t6) and a reversal action would take place after that date. 
(8) An investigation into the validity of this assumption shows, interestingly, that, on 
one hand, the average AR during the pre-d'sclosure period (t-7 to t6) is positive at 
0.23%, with 69% daily positive ARs. While that during the post-disclosure period 
(t6 to t60) is negative at 
-0.05%, with 54% negative ARs. On the other hand, CAR 
is significant at 5% or less for each day during the period (t-2 to t60). Appendix 
(A5.10d) shows CAR during different event N-vindows, and appendix (A5.13d') 
graphs these CARs. 
(9) Atiother im-cstigation for different event window shows similar results. That the 
avci-agc AR durnig the pi-c-disclosure period (t-30 to t6) is positive at 0.2-330o, with 
81()() positiN-c 
. 
-\Rs. While that during the post-disclosure period (t6 to t60) is 
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negative at 
-0.05%. with 54% negative 
. 
-%Rs. Also, SCAR is significant at 50o or 
less for each day during the period (t- 14 to t60). 
(10) Once again, different percentiles of 62 CARs of SSO's portfolio xvere selected. All 
the percentiles 1%, 5%, 10% and 90%, 95% and 99% depart more and more from 
the ACAR as the accumulation process continues. By the end of the day 12th. the 
95% (90%) percentile takes a value of 16.00% (11.50%) and the 5% (101/, 0) 
percentile takes a value of 
-13.68% (-12.43%). Similar results can be reached by 
using different event windows. 
5.7) ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
It seems that the analysis in previous section (5.6) is based upon five implicit 
assumptions. These are (1) there is no liquidity problem in the sample securities, (2) 
there is no confounding events, so that the abnormal returns of directors was not a result 
of other events occurring during the same period of director trades, (3) the same 
abnormal returns patterns from director trading is persistent through every year in the 
sample, (4) there is no significant variations in the size of the sample firms, and (5) 
various signals definition produce various level of information, i. e. CAR. 
This section is aimed at relaxing these assumptions and re-runs the analysis, taking into 
consideration the thin trading, confounding events, year-by-year analysis, firm size and 
various signals definition as analysed in the following subsections. 
(5.7.1) Thin Tr 
Infrequent trading in some securities results in a number of zero returns in the data. 
Thus, causing a problem of liquidity, bias the estimated beta and thus the abnormal 
return measures, and increases autocorrelation and could pose a problem in significance 
testing [Friederich et al. (2002)]. 
Section (5.4) shows that, of FTSElOO securities in the sample firms. there \\ere 5 
securities Nvith non-continuous market daily trading and thus, excluded from the sample. 
The remainitio 96 securities with fi-equent trading have been used i ZN clý in the analysis. Thus, 
44 there is no thin tradnig, problem iii the sample and thus, no need for adjustment 
. 
44 Howevcr, for thin trading adjustment. see Scholes and Williams ( 197,7). 
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(5-7-2) Confoundinq Events 
Event study results are always criticized by an argument that the abnormal returns Nvas a 
result of other events occurred in the same event window under investicyation. Thus. it 
could be argued that the abnormal return of directors dealing was a result of, say annual 
or interim earnings announcements. Such investigation is particularly necessar, 
-y given 
the restrictions under the Model Code on the timing of director dealings 60 daý-s prior to 
key firm announcement/event [see section (2.8)]. Hillier and Marshall (1998) examined 
the propensity of the UK directors to trade around earnings announcements and found 
45 that they time their trade along with earnings announcement date 
In order to test whether directors trading abnon-nal return was a result of other key firm 
events, each of the buy and sell portfolios has been partitioned into two according to 
whether or not a director traded in the 13 days (the length of the event windows) after 
any key firin announcement (such as interim or annual earnings announcement, first or 
third quarter results or primary or annual reSUItS)46 
. 
This resulted in four portfolios: 
(1) Directors buying within 13 days of key firin announcement, with 27 transactions. 
(2) Directors buying after 13 days of key firm announcement, with 268 transactions. 
(3) Directors selling within 13 days of key firm announcement, with 5 transactions. 
(4) Directors selling after 13 days of key firrn announcement, with 90 transactions. 
On one hand, only very small number of director dealings is within 13 days of other key 
firm events, 9% of the total directors buying transactions and 5% of the total directors 
selling deals. On the other hand, the average volume of these transactions (8820 shares 
for buying and 168446 shares for selling) is much less than those after 13 days of other 
events (17369 shares for buying and 196367 shares for selling). Table (5.5) presents the 
cumulative abnormal returns during different event windows for director buying and 
selling within and after 13 days of key firm announcement/event. It can be seen from 
the table that almost the same pattern of CAR is consistent with those of table (5.4) and 
appendix (A5.10) during most evei-it Nvindows. For example, ]'- (60) days CAR of 
directors buying after I') days of kcy firm announcement [table (5.5)] and that of single 
sigiial foi- all directors buying [table (5.4)] is 1% (3%) significant. Similarlv, 12 (60) l-- 
45 Sivakurnar and Waymire (1994) provided evidence on the L'S insider tradim-, around earrinigs 
announcements. 
I OS 
days CAR of directors selling after 13 days of key firm announcement [table (5-5)] and 
that of single signal for all directors buying [table (5.4)] is 2.4", (9'o) significant. 
'Table (5.5) Cumulative Abnormal Returns During Different Event Windows 
'For Buy & Sell Portfolios Within and After 13 Days of Key Firm Announcernel 
lConfounding Effects T 
CAR During Buy Portfolios 
Event Windows Within (N=27) After (N=2M) 
-30 to 0 days 
T-Statistic 
-4.43% 
-0.985 
-4.11% 
-2S791*** 
-6 to + 12 days 
T-Statistic 
1.24% 
0.6015 
-0.74% 
-1.1398 
0 to +12 days 
'1'-Statistic 
1.81% 
1.0625 
0.94% 
1.7471 ** 
0 to +60 days 
T-Statistic 
7.03% 
1.9 090 
3.20% 
2.7345*** 
+6 to + 12 days 
T-Statistic 
-0.01% 
-0,0103 
0.60% 
1.6299 
+6 to +60 days 5.21% 2.85% 
T-Statistic 1 1.4905* 2.5687*** 
Sell Portfolios 
Within After 
3.56% 6.89% 
0.3402 2.7"-2*** 
10.75% 
-1.47% 
21, SM** 
-1.3043* 
2.44% 
-2.42% 
0.6166 
-2 
-59-53* ** 
-7.43/o -9.23% 
-0.8685 
-4-5738*** 
-10.52% -1.41% 
-3.92 12* ** 21211 ** 
-20.39% -8.21% 
-2 
-50 %* * -4.2887* ** 
Note: (***) Significant at 1% or less, (**) Sign if icant at 5% and(*) Significant at 10% or less. 
T-test statistic is computed according to DW 1983 equations 8-15 above 
The results of this analysis lead to support the argument that the abnormal returns 
earned by FTSEIOO directors is due only to the inforination content of their trades but 
not to occurrence of other events. 
(5.7.3) Year By Year Analysis 
Table (5.6) shows CAR of director dealings for each year (1999 and 2000) of the 
sample. The same pattern of director dealing profitability is persistent through the years. 
Directors consistently timed their trades, they buy their own firm shares ývhen they are 
at their lowest and sell when their perfon-nance peaked. For instance, CAR (t-30 to tO) 
of directors buying in 1999 is 
-6.29% significant and of director selling in 2000 was 
14.19"() significant, NvI-iile those of buying in 2000 and selling in 1999 are not 
significant. Howcvcj-, the level of director dealing returns is varied from Ycai- to year. 
The table clearly shows that directors \N, ho buy in 2000 seemed to be particulafly 
4o Of the UK literature, Hillier and Marshall (2002 a) used 5 days after an interim or annual earnings 
announcement onl). 
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successful with 12 days and 60 days post event significant CAR of 2.08% and 9.48%, 
respectively, in comparison with insignificant CAR of 0.151 and 
-1.290,, . -Cly. 10, o respectiN 
- 
This result is consistent with Hillier and Marshall (2002/a) who find that director 
dealings profitability in certain years seems to dominate other years. 
Table (5.6) Cumulative Abnormal Returns During Different Event Windows 
For Buv & Sell Portfolios During 1999 and 20C10 
Year By Year Analysis 
CAP During Buy Portfolios 
Event Windows 1999 (N=162) 1 2000 (N=132) 
-30 to 0 days 
-6.29% -1.52% 
T-Statistic 
-3.4250*** -0.7478 
-6 to + 12 days 2.15% 1.37% 
T-Statistic 
-2.5600* 1.4728* 
0 to + 12 days 0.15% 2.08% 
T-Statistic 0.2216 2.7039*** 
0 to +60 days 
-1.29% 9.48% 
T-Statistic 
-0.8601 5.6907*** 
+6 to + 12 days 
-0.23% 1.4 9% 
T-Statistic 
-0.4976 2.8475*** 
+6 to +60 days 
-1.68% 8.89% 
T-Statistic 
-1.1779 5.6190*** 
Sell Portfolios 
1999 2000 N=4.5 
-0.02% 14.19% 
-0.0049 4.0716*** 
-3.11% 1.72% 
-2.0617** 1.082 
-3.33% -0.85% 
-2.6689* ** -0.64 74 
-6.57% -12.07% 
2.4285*** 
-4.2304* ** 
-239% -1.32% 
-2 SI 72* -1.4726* 
-5.63% -12.53% 
-2.19M- ** 4.6268*** 
Notc: (***) Significant at I% or less, (**) Significant at 5% and (*) Significant at 10% or less. 
T-test statistic is computed accordingto DW1983 equations 8-15 above 
Year by year analysis shows that, in general, directors' abnormal returns from buying 
transactions were more successful and significant in 2000 than in 1999. However, 1999 
was a significant selling year for FTSEIOO directors. 
(5.7.4) Firm Size Effect 
Literature often suggests that small firms consistently outperformed the market [see, for 
example, Gregory et al. (1994) and (1997) and Hillier and Marshall (2002,, "a)]. That 
most of the abnormal returns earned by director dealings might in fact be due to the firm 
size effect, where infori-nation in small firins would be at a premium as the disseminate 
of information is less frequent. 
Dinison and Marsh (1986) Nvcrc aniong the first who addresses the issue of firrn size 
cft-cct in cvcnt study methodologies. Based upon an extended CAPM. the abnon-nal 
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return on a size and beta adjusted basis is computed by allowing for the returns on the 
size control portfolio which a firm belongs to. Gregory et al. (1997) argue that one 
problem with Dimson and Marsh (1986) size control is that pre-event data is required to 
estimate the model parameters, where the size of the firrn might be different from that 
one during the event study. They recommend a simplier model that does not require pre- 
estimation data. That is Lakonishok et al. (1994) model per \vhich the abnormal return 
is computed as: 
AR, 
---:: 
RI, 
- 
.................................................... 
Where [ Rj(, ), I is the group control portfolio, defined as follows: Firstly the market 
capitalisation group at the end of previous year is identified for each firm/stock in the 
sample. Then the firms in the sample-year (1999 and 2000) are splitted into two: those 
firms with market capitallsation below the average market capitalisation (72 firins in 
1999 and 74 firms in 2000 in group GI) and those above the average market 
capitalisation (24 fim-is in 1999 and 22 firms in 2000 in G2). The average market 
capitalisation of the firms in the sample was flO, 439 million at the end of 1998 and 
f 12,934 million at the end of 1999. The average for GI in 1999 (2000) was L4,444 
million (f28,426 million) and for G2 was f5,696 million (07,279 million), 
respectively. 
There are two size control portfolios used. Each of which consists of equally weighted 
group to which firm (i) belongs at the beginning of each year. This process ends up with 
6 portfolios: 
(1) Group I buy portfolio, 
(2) Group 2 buy portfolio, 
(3) All transactions buy portfolio, 
(4) Group I sell portfolio, 
(5) Group 2 sell portfolio, 
(6) All transactions sell portfolio, 
Here, all-buy-transactions or sell portfolio is not similar to that of single signal buy or 
sell portfolio bccause of different benchmarks used to Compute the abnormal returns. 
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The overall mean of the abnormal returns of group 1. computed according to equation 
16 above 
, 
is 0.01% (0.06% in 1999 and 0.00% in 2000) and that of group 2 is 0.00% 
(0.00% in 1999 and 0.00% in 2000). These figures support the earlier findings that the I'D 
abnormal returns earned from director trades are not due to market movements but from 
the information content of their trades. 
Following Gregory et al. (1997), and for the purpose of estimating Dodd and Warrier 
(1983) test statistic, the variance of (ARJ is calculated on post-signal data. After 
identifying and excluding the extreme abnormal return transactions, the Mest statistic is 
then computed according to equations (8) to (15) above. The results of CAR defined by 
the simple size adjusted return from Lakonishok et al. (1994) are presented in table 
(5.7), which summarizes the complete set of CARs and t-statistics reported in appendix 
(A5.14). 
Table (5.7) Cumulative Abnormal Returns During Different 
For Buy & Sell Size-Adjusted Portfolios During 1999 and 2000 
Accordingto Lakonishok et al. (1994) Size Control Model After Deleting the Outliers 
CAR During Buy Portfolios 
Event Windows GI N=189 G2 N=102 All N=291 
-30 to 60 days 2.68 0.14 1.60 
T-Statistic 1.3740 0.0610 1.2303 
-6 to+li days 2.15 1.07 1.70 
T- Stit 1 st ic 2.3246*** 1.0391 2.7572*** 
0 to +12 days 3.65 1.74 2.84 
T-St at ist ic 4.7562*** 2.0381** 5.5787*** 
0 to +60 days 8.63 1.94 5.80 
T-St al ist ic 5.2435*** 1.0471 5.2903*** 
+6 to +12 days 2.27 1.34 1.88 
T-St at ist ic 4.3640*** 3.9173*** 5.4266' 
+6 to +60 days 7.26 1.5 4 4* 84 
T-St Ed ist ic 4.6511 2 7 0.872 4.6516' 
Sell Portfolios 
GI N=68 G2 N=25 All N=93 
6.25 
2.2063* * 
-0 S 874 
1.70 
0,7501 
-0.3598 -1.7007 -0.9088 
-2.85771 -2.816 P' -3.4414* 
-2.090** -2.6568* * -3.8624* 
-5.0047* ** -2.1342* * -5.0384* 
-2.4647* **1 -2.1338* * -4.0586k 
Note ý (***)Significant at 1% or less, (**) Significant a 5% and(*) Significant at 10016 or less. 
T-test statistic is computed according to modified DWI 983 equat: ions 8-15 above 
It can be seen from the table that director dealings in small firms (GI) outperform their 
counterparts in larger firms (G2). In particular, director buying in GI earned 
significantly more abnormal returns than directors buying in G2 through out various 
short and long cvcM window's. For example, a small firm CAR at the end of event 
window (TO to T 12) is 3.650 o in comparison with 1.7411 o in larger firms. Similarly, GI's 
C, 
-ý R at J6 to T I-') is in comparison \vI I-II ith 1.34% in G". In addition, GI's CAR 
at the end of longer c\, cnt windows still dominates that of G2. For itistance, GI C. 
-%Rs 
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(TO to T60) and (T6 to T60) are 8.63% and 7.26%, respectively. are much higher and 
significant than those insignificant 1.94% and 1.540, ' in G2, respectively. Ho'%vever, G' 01- 
CARs are 3.3 1% and 3.20% significant at (TO to T35) and (T6 to T34), respectively. 
On the other hand, director dealings in small firms still avoid significant losses during 
post-event period, but at a lower rate than their counterparts in larger firms. For 
instance, GI CAR at (TO to T12) is 
-3.06% less than G2 CAR 
-4.86"o at the same 
event window. However, small firms' CAR after disclosing director dealings to the 
market J6 to T12) is 
-3.64% more than larger firms CAR 
-2.15%%. This indicates 
that, firstly, small firrn directors avoid larger loss in a very short event period than their 
counterparts in larger fin-ns at the same event period. Secondly, it seems that the market 
perceives the information content of small firm's director dealing at a premium and 
reacts on small firm director selling faster than their buying and than those of larger 
firms. 
On the overall buying (selling) portfolio, which consists of both groups' transactions, 
the results of the firm-size model [All Buy (Sell) portfolio in table (5.7)] support the 
single signal market-model in section (5.6) reported in table (5.4) and appendix (A5.10), 
particularly in terms of the sign and significance. However, they are varied in terrns of 
the level of abnormal return (loss) earned (avoided). Such variation, however, is 
expectedly due to the firm size, which supports the hypothesis of the fin-n-size model. 
For example, CAR of All-Buy (Sell) finn-size portfolio at (TO to T60) is significantly 
positive (negative) 5.80% (-8.46%) more than 1.02% (-2.16%) of the single signal 
market-model. Also, that of firm-size portfolio at J6 to T60) is 4.84% (-8.36%) more 
than 0.54% (-1.89%) of single signal market-model. 
In conclusion, group I of buy (sell) portfolios outperforms group 2, thus, supports the 
argument that directors of small firms earned (avoided) significantly more returns 
(losses) than their counterparts in larger firms, particularly in the long-term (short-ten-n) 
c\-ciit windows. The cmpirical findings reported above support the current body of the 
literature in this respect [see, for example, Friederich et al. (2002), Gregory et al. ( 1997) 
and Hillier and Marsliall (2002 a)]. 
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(5.7.5) Signals Definition Effect 
Based on EMH, it can be argued that different signals definition would ha"'e different 
level of information content, thus produce different level of CARs. For example, when a 
director buys his finn's shares, the market recognizes this signal and the finn's share 
price changes accordingly to reflect the new information contained in such trading. If 
another director from the same firm does the same, the market would not consider this 
new trade as a new signal. Instead, it would be considered as an enforcement signal, 
which confirms the first signal. Overall, the share price changes as a result of two or 
more subsequent signals would be more than that of one signal. Likewise, share price 
changes due to a director trading in a relatively large volume of shares would be more 
than that if his trading volume is smaller. That is to say that the information content of 
MS or large QS is more than that of SS. Therefore, CAR of SS would be less than CAR 
of MS or large QS. 
This section examines the signals definition effect on CAR produced. That is by testing 
whether the average CAR produced by SS is significantly different than that of MS, 
QSI, QS2, QS3 and QS4. Here, the null hypotheresis is that there is no difference 
between CAR of SS and any other signals definition at any point of time during the 
event window. Parametric and non-parametric tests are used to test this hypothesis. The 
first one is a parametric test. The test is performed, using SPSS 
- 
independent sample 
tests, by calculating the appropriate standard error as 
StdError 
= 
(n, 
- 
I)Sl' + (n, 
- 
I)S2' 
n, +n2 
-2 n, n2 
Where S, is the standard deviation of SS CAR, S2 is the standard deviation of CAR produced by NIS, 
QSI, QS2, QS3 or QS4, and ni is the sample size of SS CARs (i. e. the number of SS transactions in the 
portfolio), and n2 is the sample size of the other signal CARs (i. e. the number of MS. QSI, QS2, QS3 or 
QS4 transactions in the portfolio). 
Then, the t-value as 
T 
CA Rtls 
- 
SidError ...................................... 
(18) 
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Table (5.8) reports the results, where panel (a) concerns the buy portfolios and panel (b) 
concerns the sell ones. It can be seen from the table that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, even at 10%, at any point of time during the event window, for NIS. QS-'. and 
QS4 of buy portfolios, and for QS I and QS2 of sell portfolios. However. in a ver", few 
points within the event window, the mean of CAR of SS is significantlý, different from 
that of QS1 (at t3, t4 and t5) and of QS3 (at 02) of the buy portfolios. In the sell 
portfolios, the null hypothesis is rejected for NIS at (t1 and t2), QS3 at (t4 and t7) and 
QS4 (at t5). Overall, the mean CAR defined by SS equals to 61 (60) out of 65 CARs 
defined by various signals in the buy (sell) portfolios. 
One reason that might help explaining the unexpected results of table (5.8) is the fact 
that the sample suffers from high level of means standard errors [see Appendix 
(A5.15)]. Thus, transforming the data might help overcome that problem and alter the 
results. Appendix (A5.16) reports the results of LnCARs. The null hypothesis is rejected 
only in 5 points of time in the buy portfolios and in 8 points in the sell portfolios. It 
seems that the transformation has improved the distribution but not the test results. 
Almost similar to table (5.8), the overall results show that the average CAR defined by 
SS is not different to 60 (57) out of 65 CARs defined by various signals in the buy (sell) 
portfolios. 
The second is a non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. The test is employed, 
using SPSS, and the results reported in Appendix (A5.17). The empirical findings show 
that of the buy portfolios, only CARs of Q2 are significantly more than CARs of SS 
throughout the event window, while those of Q3 are significant at (t7 to 02) and those 
of Q4 at (00 to 02). However, none of the NIS and Q1 CARs are significant at any 
point of time in the event window, even at 10%. On the sell side, only CARs of Q3 are 
significantly more than CARs of SS but not throughout the event window (only at t6 to 
t 12). 
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The findings of the three tests, outlined above, might lead to suggest that whIle the 
magnitude of CARs across various signals (NIS, QSI, QS2, QS3 and QS4) is identical, 
the time when these CARs becomes significant is varied. CARs of compounded signals 
(MS and QSs) are significant at earlier days in the event NvindoNv, while those of single 
signal (SS) arc significant at later days in the c\ ent window. 
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I. J5.8) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the short-ten-n profitability of FTSE 100 directors trading in 
their own fin-n's ordinary shares and executive shares options, over recent years (1999 to 
2000), employing event study methodology to measure cumulative abnormal returns 
and taking into account different signals definition. Using the simple MM's parameters 
in the CAPM, the results of ordinary share portfolios are similar to those obtained by 
previous literature used the same methodology. Namely, directors' trading in their own 
firrn's ordinary shares is significantly profitable. This finding does strongly SUPPOrt the 
view that, on one hand, corporate directors do have inside price-sensiti\ýe information 
that the market does not have, and that they earn significant statistically cumulatIVe 
abnormal returns from directly trading on this information in the stock exchange. On the 
other hand, the market does perceive directors trading as a signal. Directors' buying 
indicates good news and, hence, the market appreciates the share prices. As directors' 
selling represents a bad news, the market depreciates the share prices. The market, in 
fact, reacts to this news as soon as it is disclosed. 
As for executive share options portfolios, the results are different in that, directors 
holding or selling the exercised ESO is not profitable, in the short term, to the extent 
that there appears to be no significant market reaction around the director trading' 
disclosure. Three reasons are expected to explain these findings. The first is due to the 
contractual nature of the kind of shares. The second is due to the long-term nature of 
ESO, which needs to be investigated in the long-term sense. Finally, the small number 
of transactions in each ESO portfolio might have driven the results away from a 
representative, significant statistically, mean of the abnormal returns. 
Two important conclusions are suggested by employing different signal methodologies. 
These are first, that different signal definition produces different results, not only in 
terms of the level and sign of CAR, but also in terms of the significance of the statistical 
results. On one hand, multiple and quantitative signals produced significant CARs at 
earlier days than single signal. This leads to suggest that the market reacts significantly 
sooner to successive signals than to a sini-fle signal. On the other hand none of the other 
signals produce significantly results that r Z7 eject (accept) what has been accepted 
(rejected) hy the single signal. However. the robustness analysis provides evidence that 
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there were no significant differences between the average CAR of SS and any of the 
compound signals (MS and QSs). 
Second, each signal definition requires certain data frequency. Single signal produces 
robust results when daily data are used, while those of multiple and quantitative signals 
are mixed. Monthly data is recommended with multiple signals, whereas both monthly 
and daily data can be used with quantitative signal. 
It seems that employing single signal definition with daily data produces not only 
significant results, but also higher level of rates of return. The empirical results of this 
study, along with most recent studies [Friederich et al. (2002) and Hillier and Marshall 
(2002/a)] shows, in general, that annual CARs of directors trading are significantly 
much greater than those of old UK literature, a shown in the following figure (5.6). 
Figure (5.6) shows that, on one hand, directors buying ordinary shares portfolio earn an 
annual rate of CAR of 22.10%, 25.48% in Friederich et al. (2002) and 25.05% in Hillier 
and Marshall (2002/a)47, compared with 18.38% in King and Roell (1988)48,9.23% in 
Gregory et al. (1994), 5.8 0%49 in Pope et al. (1990) and 4.92% in Gregory et al. (1997). 
On the other hand, directors selling ordinary shares avoid them an annual loss of 
- 
48.80%, compared with 
-18.98% in Friederich et al. (2002), 
-14.86% in Hillier and 
Marshall (2002/a), 
-13.38% in Pope et al. (1990), and 
-5.75 %50 in King and Roell 
(1988)1-4.51% in Gregoryetal. (1994) and-0.72%5 I in Gregory et al. (1997). 
47 The annual CAR is computed by multiplying CAR at the end of the event window with the number of 
inten, als (event windows) within a working days-year (260 days). That is: CAR*(-"60'1 2). 48 
S; reported 1n Gregory et al. ( 1994), Table 8, page 5 1. 49 Insig 'fi 
, 
ni icant. 
nificant (at 100, ) according to (DWI 9S SO Insh., 3) and AR at 5 ", according to (B \VI 985), 
Insignificant. 
1-18 
Figure (5.6) 
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It is understood that the above are approximates since that, firstly, this study cumulates 
daily data while others cumulate monthly. Secondly, annual CAR calculation is based 
on an assumption that the same CAR level will be repeated 22 52 times yearly, while 
other UK literature cumulate the abnormal returns for 12 m onths, e xcept P ope et a 1. 
(1990) for 6 months. However, the above presentation suggests that the empirical 
findings of this study are consistent with UK literature, as well as with those of USA. 
The results of this study have been checked on by re-running the analysis taking into 
account thin trading, confounding events, year-by-year analysis, and firm size. The 
"' That is: total number of working days per year divided by the length of the event window, i. e. r 
260/12=22. 
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robustness check analysis shows that there is no thin trading problem in the sample 
securities. There is no firm key event'announcement co-occurred with the director 
dealing transactions, thus the director dealing abnormal returns are not a result of other 
events. In addition, the robustness analysis provides evidence that smaller firms 
outperfon-n larger ones, particularly in the longer event xvindows of buying transactions. 
It seems that the market reacts faster to small firm's director selling than to their buying 
or to their counterparts in larger finns. This might lead to support the argument that the 
information content of director dealings in small firms is at a higher level of premium 
than in larger firrns. Finally, the robustness check indicates that directors buying in the 
year 2000 outperforrn those in 1999. However, the year 1999 was a successful selling 
year for FTSElOO directors. In conclusion, the robustness analysis supports the 
empirical findings of the single signal market-model, particularly in terms of the sign 
and significance of the abnon-nal returns. However, the level of the returns may vary. 
In the context of EMH, insider trading presents a challenging issue. On one hand, tile 
empirical results of this study, in addition to other UK literature, shows clearly that the 
stock exchange is significantly inefficient in terrns of the strong level of market 
efficiency. Namely, some market participants, i. e. insiders, are more informed about the 
current or future market value of the firill than others, i. e. outsiders. This is in contrast 
with the strong level of efficiency, which indicates that the current market price fairly 
reflects all information about the past, current and future perspective of the firm, which 
are available to all market participantS53 
. 
And, thus, trading upon such information is not 
profitable. 
On the other hand, the evidence advocating the insignificant semi-strong level of market 
efficiency is rather weak. The availability of abnormal returns to outsiders following the 
publicly known infori-nation, viz. insiders' transactions can be seen as a direct test to the 
senii-strong level of market efficiency. The empirical results, reported in section (5.6), 
indicate that abnormal returns can be earned by outsiders' imitating insiders' 
transactions. However, taking into account the transaction cost, such returns would end 
up with zero, if not negative returns. For example, significantly 0.46% AR of buy 
portfolio at t8 becomes nc(_)atiN, c when deducting 2% transaction cost [e. g. Friederich et 
At a certai .n cost, which is lower than the abnormal returns if such information is not publicly avallable. 
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al. (2002), Gregory et al. (1997), Jaffe (1974), Pope et al. (1990), Rozeff and Zarnan 
(1988) and Seyhun (1986)]. Moreover, the bid-ask spread represents another cost to be 
taking into account when considering such an active trading strategy [Seylluii (1986)]. 
In conclusion, except for the executive share options (BEO and SSO) portfolios, the 
empirical results clearly and significantly reject the null hypothesis that directors trading 
in their own company's securities are not profitable. Instead they suggest the altemative I 
hypotheses that directors buying portfolios achieve positive abnormal return and those 
of selling ones avoid negative abnormal returns. These findings of ordinary share 
portfolios are consistent with UK literature. However, the magnitude may vary. 
A by-product implication of using a new set of data in this study, i. e. a post- 1993 Justice 
Act of insider trading, is that the 1993 Justice Act has not deter the directors from 
trading on their private information. An investigation into the legality of the directors 
dealing employed in the analysis shows that almost all trades were legal and occurred 
outside the "close-period" specified by the law. However, the information content of 
directors dealing might not be related to recent key firm's event/announcement. On the 
other hand, the empirical findings of this study, as well as those of pre- 1993 Justice Act 
reported in the literature, might suggest that relevant regulation, including 1993 Justice 
Act, is not about prohibiting, but it is about regulating the timing of insider trading. 
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Chapter 6 
The Managerial Incentive of Insider- 
Trading by Directors: Model and 
Empirical Evidence 
(6.1) INTRODUCTION 
The literature reviewed in chapter four suggests that insider-trading by directors can be 
seen as an implicit part of the managen I is 'al reward contract. The purpose of this chapter i 
to empirically investigate whether insider trading by directors can be considered as an 
implicit part of the managerial incentive package. The third and last hypothesis of this 
research is about this assumption, i. e. the managerial incentive of insider trading by 
directors [see chapter 1, section (1.4)]. The theory as well as relevant literature of this 
hypothesis is introduced in chapter four. This chapter empirically examines this 
hypothesis by investigating the remuneration packages of FTSE 100 directors, namely 
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), during the period (1999 and 2001). The 
importance of this investigation is two-fold. Firstly, it relates empirically two separate 
disciplines, i. e. managerial incentives (Management) and insider trading by directors 
(Finance). Secondly, it provides evidence for the first time on the managerial aspects of 
insider trading by directors in the UK. 
This chapter explains the model used and presents the results of the data analysis and 
their relevance to the research question and hypothesis explained in chapter four. Data 
analysis involves multivariate techniques. In addition, this chapter draws general 
conclusions and compares the results with the existing literature and discusses the 
findings within the context of other research. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section (6.2) constructs the model used to testing 
and assessing the theory behind considering insider trading by directors as a managerial 
incentivc. The data used will be presented in section (6.3). and %vIII be assessed and 
analysed for multivariate (multiple regression) in section (6.4). Section (6.5) estimates 
and assesses the proposed model and considers the overall fitness of the model results, 
whilc section (0.6) introduccs the pancl data model and reports the empirical Findings. 
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Finally, section (6.7) concludes the chapter by interpreting the results and summarisim-, 
the findings. 
U6.2) THE MODEL 
This section links the theories discussed in chapter three (insider-tradilig) and chapter 
four (managerial incentives) with the subsequent empirical sections in this chapter. That 
is by empirically linking insider-trading theories [chapter 3, section (3.3)], i. e. Rational 
Expectation Theory [section (3.3.1)] and Informational Signalling Theory [section 
(3.3.2)], with Agency Theory [chapter 4, section (4.2)]. The Model NN-111 be constructed 
upon the conceptual principles of these theories. 
The literature, reviewed In chapter 4, shows that on one hand a complete reward 
contract is nonexistent and not possible to structure due to moral hazard (uncertainty) 
and adverse selection (asymmetric inforination) problems. Thus, by pennitting directors 
to trade in their own finn's shares on personal accounts the output level can be increased 
and shareholders' welfare can be improved [see, for instance, Hu and Noe (2001)]. On 
the other hand, as shareholders start recently to realise that their interests are not well 
served by directors and that performance-based compensation contracts alone are not 
adequate in aligning the conflict of interests between the two parties. Hence, permitting 
insider trading by directors mitigates the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection [see, for example, Zhang (2001)]. Based on these arguments, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that insider trading by directors can be seen as an implicit part 
of the reward contract and, thus, considered as a managerial incentive. 
In his managerial incentives and investment bias, Bohlin (1997) concludes that the 
potential scope of agency theory, in both empirical and managerial aspects, can hardly 
be realized by trying to apply specific models to managerial problems, but rather by 
using theory as a general framework in x, ý, ýhich economic trade-off and information 
asymmetries in organizational structure and processes are illuminated. This implies two 
guildclines that might help in modelling insider trading as a managerial incentive. First, C) 
it is rather difficult to empirical],,, model an agency problem such as insider trading. 
Second, modelling such a problem has to be indirect but backed hy theorctical 
framework. Thereforc. niodelling insider-tradnig by dirmors as a rnanagcrial incenti%-c 
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can be derived from a combination of an insider-trading model. such that of Laffont and 
Maskin (1989) [see section (3.3.1)], Dye (1984), Kyle (1985) [see section (3.3.2)] or 
Roulstone (2003) [see section (4.4.1)] and a managerial incentive model. such that of 
Bernardo et al. (2001), Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) or Gjesdal (1982) [see section 
(4.2.2)]. The cornerstone for such a model is that, the expected profit of director from 
insider trading is an implicitform of the managerial compensation provided by the firm 
to its directors. For the theory of implicit contracts, see, for instance. Azariadis (1990) 
and Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983). Where as the explicit part consists of salary and 
bonuses [see, for instance, Hebner and Kato (1997)]. Dye (1984) shows that the 
director's explicit compensation is independent of his private infortnation or his insider 
trading activities. In addition, Noe (1995) concludes that shareholders can use insider- 
trading returns to meet directors' reservation compensation constraint. Therefore, the 
total compensation (Cdit) consists of two independent forms: (1) the salary and bonuses 
paid(Wdit) and (2) the director's expected return from insider trading (ýt, ). That is: 
Total Compensation 
= Explicit Paid + Implicit Fonn 
Cdit: 
-- 
Wdit + [tit 
Where (Cdit) is the director's (d) total compensation in the firm (i) at time (t), (Wdit) is the director's (d) salary and 
bonuses in the firm (i) at time (t), and where (ýtit) is the Insiders' signal, i. e. returns, In the firm (1). 
Thus, for a certain total compensation level, any change in one form has to be offset by 
the other form. Hu and Noe (2001) and Roulstone (2003) found that if insider trading is 
prohibited then, shareholders have to offer the directors with larger portion of the output 
to compensate for the zero expected insider trading returns. 
However, as the number of insiders at the company rises, the competition to use their 
private infon-nation and consequently release their signal increases [see, for example, 
Levine and Smith (2003)]. As a result, insider-trading volume and the informatk, eness 
of tile stock price increase. Consequently, as the number of insiders at the firrn 
increases, the expected trading profit of each insider decreases due to more disclosure 
[as shown by Bainian and Verrecchia (1996)]. Thus, the expected trading profit of 
insiders is a function of, itacr alias, the number of insiders in the firni, 
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E(Wit) =f (N'lt) (2) 
Where (ýtdit) is the director's (d) trading returns from firm (1) at time (t). and (Nit) is the number of insiders in that firm at that time. 
This function indicates a negative correlation bem, een the two variables. As (N) 
increases, (g) decreases. However, there are other factors affecting the stock returns. 
Hebner and Kato (1997) categorise these into four firrn 
-parameters. In addition to the 
number of insiders, the other parameters are (1) the variance of innovations affecting the 
stock price, (2) the variance of un-informed trading and (3) the variance of the error in 
the insiders' signal. It is reasonable to assume that all market participants (informed and 
uninformed investors and market makers) know these parameters, as they are public 
knowledge. 
Moreover, the explicit fonn of directors' compensation should be increased to offset the 
diluted insider-trading returns. As the stock returns parameters are of public knowledge, 
the firm's remuneration committee knows the expected trading profit of insiders, and 
knows that as the number of insiders increases, the trading profit of each insider 
decreases. Thus, the remuneration committee has to take it into consideration when 
determining the explicit form of the compensation package for each director. This 
argument is, in fact, backed, however indirect, by Noe (1995). He argues that by 
pen-nitting insider trading, shareholders are less willing to provide expensive effort- 
assuring incentives. This indicates that shareholders are willing to offset changes in 
insider trading expected returns to a certain level. 
Consequently, as the number of insiders increases, the explicit fon-n of the 
compensation for each director increases. Thus, the director's total compensation is a 
function of, inter alias, the number of insiders in the firin, 
Wdit : --f (Nit) (3) 
Whcrc (NNdit) is thc dircctor's c\p licit form of compensation in the firm (i) at time (t), and (Nit) is the number ofinsiders in that 
firm at that time. 
This function indicates a positivc con-clation between the two variables. As (. N i) 
imcascs. (Cdit) increascs. In celain cases, howevck there is a possibihty that direct 
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compensation is negatively related to number of directors. Such that when the firm has a 
limited or restricted budget for management remuneration. For example, when the firm 
or a regulatory body set-up a certain level/ratio where the total direct compensation to 
all directors should not exceed it. In this case, as the number of directors increases. the 
direct compensation for each one decreases. Obviously, this possibility inight occur in 
small-size firms as well as in public-corporations, both of which are not the subject of 
the current investigation, which is about the largest 100 firrns in the UK. 
As Noe (1995) argues, for any fixed level of incentive, allowing insider trading never 
diminishes, and sometimes improves, director's incentives. This casual function is the 
cornerstone for the model of assessing insider trading by directors as a managerial 
incentive. Thus, 
Cdit: 
--:: Wdit + ýLit (Nit) (4) 
In a competitive labour market for each director [see section (4.3)], (Cdit)will be equal 
to its market equilibrium value [C* (Zda)], which varies according to each director's 
personal and job characteristics (Zdit). These characteristics are, in fact, the inputs 
supplied by the director in exchange for his compensation, which might include 
director's creative thinking aimed at developing new products and services and 
organisational and managerial efforts intended to expand physical output, reduce 
operating cots and improve employee morale as well as other observable and 
contractible inputs [see, for example, Demski and Sappington (1999) and Ryan and 
Wiggins 111 (2001)]. Thus 
Cdit:: 
-- 
C* (Zdit) 
Compensate equation 4 in 5, gives 
C* (Zdit) ::::::: Wdit + ýUit (Nit) 
Re-arrange for (NN'dit). Igives 
NN'dit 
- (Li 10- ýL ,t (N, t) (7) 
IS() 
This forinula signifies that the relation between the compensation paid and the director's 
expected returns from insider trading is opposite In direction. As insider-trading returns 
decreases, the compensation paid has to be increased. However, glx-cn the positive 
relation between the number of insiders (N) and the compensation paid (W) [equation 
3], equation 7 can be re-written to reflect such relations as folloNvs: 
C* (Zdit)+ (Nit) 
- 
ýLit (8) 
Given the boldness effect on (N) on the compensation level, and the dilution of insider- 
trading returns, which is subject to Hebner and Kato (1997) four-parameters, it is not 
unreasonable to expect significantly positive correlation between explicit compensation 
(W) and number of insiders (N) and insignificantly and indifferent correlation between 
(W) and insider trading returns (ýL). Using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to 
estimate a log linear version of this casual relation, gives 
ln(Wdit) : --ý Ri +p ln(Zdit) +7 In(Nit) + 7rit (9) 
Where (Xi is the is the intercept term, P is the coefficients on the director's personal and job characteristics, and 7 is the coefficient 
on Nit, and R is the error term, which is almost identical to insiders' signal that might be measured by insider-trading returns. 
Kato and Rockel (1992) provide systematic evidence on the relationship between CEOs 
compensation and their personal characteristics such as internal experience as CEO and 
educational and professional credentials. In addition, Milbourn (2003) models the 
optimal contract for a CEO whose reputation (proxied by tenure, number of business- 
related articles containing his name and being appointed from outside the firm) evolves 
as a signal of his ability is observed by shareholders. Empirically, he finds a positive 
and economically significant relation between CEO reputation and performance-based- 
pay sensitivity. Given that personal and job characteristics are among the variables used 
in a competitive labour market to determine the market equilibriuni for director's 
compensation level [see, for example, Spence (1973)]. It is expected that such 
inforniation can be utilised as proxies for (Zit) in the model. ThLIS. (Zd1t) can be broken 
down into director's personal characteristics (Pdit) and director's job characteristics (Jdr). 
Wlicrcas (Rio) can be represented by the director's experience and education attributes, 
detailed in section (6.3.3), and (Jdit) by director's firm size and performance, per which 
' Pav-Perforniance literature estimates [Wit =C*(Zit)] only. 
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section (6.3.4) discusses the theoretical basis for using these measures. Equation 9 has 
to be extended to represent these variables. Therefore, the managerial incentive of 
insider-trading model, the Model, can be expressed as 
ln(Wdit) 
-Ui+p ln(Pdit) +6 ln(Jdit) +y In(Nit) + 71 i 
Where CL is the intercept term, P is the coefficients on the director's personal character' st] c s. 6 is the coefficients on thc director's 
job characteristics, and y is the coefficient on Nit. 
This Model assumes that the explicit form of CEO's compensation level (Wdit) is 
subject to three groups of variables. These are his personal attributes (Pdit), his job 
characteristics Qdit) and the number of insiders in his firin (Nit). In other words, the 
Model suggests that CEO's insider-trading indicator, represented by number of insiders 
in his firm, can explain inter alias, his compensation level. Thus, insider-trading by 
director can be considered as an explicit part of his compensation package, hence can be 
seen as a managerial incentive. 
In equation 10, the sign and significance of y indicates whether or not insider-trading by 
directors is an implicit part of the managerial incentives. If the empirical evidence 
supports equation 10, then one would expect that 7 is significantly more than zero (y > 
0). Thus, the null hypothesis is that, there is no relationship between the number of 
insiders in the firm and the compensation paid to the directors. In other words, the 
variations in (Wdit) cannot be explained by the variations in (Nit). That is, 
HO: 7=0, 
And the alternative hypothesis is that as the number of insiders increases, the 
compensation paid to any director increases to offset his insider-trading profit reduction. 
That is, (Nit) variations explain and specify (Wdit) variations. That is, 
HI: 7>0. 
Lik-exvisc. the sign and significance of P and 6 indicate xvhether or not director's 
personal skills and job characteristics. respectively. represent the market equilibrium 
value of the director's compensations. If the empirical evidence supports equation In, 
iss 
then one would expect that each of P and 6 are significantly positively more than zero 
(P >0 and 6> 0). 
(6.3)1 1 HE DATA 
This section provides statistical description of the data used to examine the proposed 
Model, equation 10, outlined in the previous section. 
The data set was collected from the Corporate Register for the period (1999 and 2001), 
which is prepared and updated annually by PriceWaterHouseCoopers 2. The Corporate 
Register provides yearly information on the total compensation and personal and job 
characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in each company listed in London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Since the population element of interest in this research is 
FTSE 100, the data base is constructed so as to confom-1 the following four criteria: 
(1) Availability of firrn's number of executive directors in 1999 and 2001. 
(2) The CEO's compensations are available in 1999 and 2001. 
(3) There is enough information about CEOs personal characteristics. 
(4) Data availability about the CEOs job characteristics, such as his firm's size 
[measured by total number of employees and/or market capitalisation] and 
performance [represented by earnings per share (EPS) and/or price-earnings ratio 
(P/E)] and industrial category. 
(5) The Company was in FTSE100 index and included in the insider-trading database 
[see section (5.4) of chapter 5]. A list of company names is provided in appendix 
(A5.1). 
It is obvious that these requirements are, firstly, to satisfy the application of the Model 
outlined in section (6.2). The total number of executives is to serve as a proxy for 
number of insiders, persoiial and job characteristics are attributes for CEO's market 
equilibrium value and iiisider-trading data is for director's expected returns from insider- 
trading 3. Secondly. to scrN, e as pre-conditions for other purposes. One rationale behind 
2 Published quarterly by HS Financial PubliShing, London, 
in fact, the Corporate Rep pster reports information not onlv on CEO, but also on Chairmen and Finance 
Directors. However, there where no definite information about the finance director's compensations, thus 
it has been dropped from the sample. In addition, of FTSE 100, there were 50 chairmen being 
, 
executives 
in 1999 and 41111 n '1001, and by definition, those chairmen are alreadv included 'n the CEOs sample 
employed in this study. Thus, the chairmen are declined from the sample under analysl'- 
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such requirements for example is that FTSE100 firms represent about 80% of LSE 
market capitalisation, and thus the index considered as a leading example for the other 
1500 corporations listed in LSE. Consequently, any conclusion made from FTSE100 
corporations can be generalised in the markets, either directors labour market or stock 
exchange market. Another rationale is that the time period under ilivestigation (1999 
and 2001) coincided with our insider trading by directors data base penod (1999 and 
2001). Fuirthen-nore, the rationale behind using two-year data is that cross-section 
analysis might be subject to a possible significant omitted variables problem caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity. A standard solution proposed by the literature [see, for 
example, Mandela (1987)] to account for this problem is to extend the single-year cross- 
section data to panel data, which allows to difference out all time invariant unobserved 
variables [see section (6.6)]. This is necessary to satisfy the assumption that the firm's 
director contracts are of long-term basis. Taking the time of conducting this research 
(2002), it is reasonable to have a four-year period ending with the most recent data 
(2001) available. Finally, the other vanables, firrn size and profitability, can be used to 
serve not only as proxies for CEO job charactenstics, but also as control vanables in the 
multivariate regression of the model. Although FTSE100 index represents the largest 
100 firms in the LSE, in terms of market capitalisation, the size and profitability among 
these firrns are varied sharply. For example, market capitalisation within FTSE100 
varied from as minimum of f129 million to as maximum as f131 billion [see table 
6.2/B]. Thus 
, 
it is not unreasonable to control for such vanations among the sample. 
The assigned causal model, equation 10, provides six main categones of vanables in 
explaining and predicting the explicit part of the CEO's compensation. These are 
detailed in the following sub-sections. 
(6.3.11Total Compensation Paid (Explicit Forml 
Managerial compensation is typically multidimensional [Demski and Sappington 
(1999), p. 281. It includes many forins; financial packages, personal insurance, medical 
covcrs and other services. Each forin has many components. Financial compensation, 
for example. has niany components. such as salary. stocks, stock options and pension 
contributions. Baron (1988). Stafford and Cohen (1974) and Triplett (1983) analvse kcv 
no-ii-financial components of compensation: and Gibbons and \1L11-pl1V (1992), 
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Holmstrom and Ricar i Costa (1986) discuss career concerns. Non-financial components 
might include personal (health. life and disability) insurance and the associated tax 
benefits. In addition, other fonns might include dental and medical services, auto 
maintenance and veterinary insurance. However, as Antle and Smith (1985), Bushman 
et al. (1996) and Demski and Sappington (1999) argue, most of the compensation forms 
are difficult if not possible to measure precisely. Thus, it is not unreasonable for this 
study to use only the financial form of the compensation. 
The Corporate Register provides information about the total compensation paid by each 
firm annually. Total compensation paid includes all salaries, fees, bonuses, benefits and 
other normal remuneration, and company pension contribution. But does not include 
gains from exercising ESO and similar incentives, nor the value of ESO granted. 
Among these information is the Highest Paid Director (HPD) compensation. This figure 
represents the total compensation paid by the firm to the highest paid director (without 
the cost of pension)4. It is not unreasonable to assume that HPD represents the total 
compensation usually paid to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Thus, this figure will 
be used as the dependent vanable in the multivanate Model. Barron and Waddell (2003) 
empirically find that the compensation incentives based are proportionally associated 
with executive ranking. That is a higher rank executive has a greater proportion of 
incentive-based compensation in general, and equity-based in particular, than a lower 
rank executive. Thus, eliminating other directors from the study sample would control 
for such variations. 
Table (6.1) reports the statistical descriptive of CEO compensations paid in FTSE100 
firm during 1999 and 200 1, while appendix (A6.1) details the data for each company in 
the sample. It can be seen from the table that, on average, FTSE100 CEOs received 
salary and bonus without pensions costs of about f 781,133 in 1999 increased b-.,! 16% in 
2001. In addition, the table reports that while the minimum compensation paid 
decreased from f 25,027 in 1999 to f 17,200 in 2001 and the maximum compensation 
decreased considerably from f6,807,000 in 1999 to 0,805,000 in 2001. In fact, the 
tabic cxhibits that the lc\, cl of compensation paid in 1999 was the higlicst. As the CEO 
41 des information about HPD with pens' 
. 
\1thouA the Coiliorate Register pro\ iII ion costs (liPDP), and these 
data are available in the database of the study. it has been excluded from the analysis because there were 
10 FTS1100 firnis in 1999 and 13 firnis in 2001 with no data on pension costs. 
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total compensation is linked vvith perfonnance, it can be assumed that FTSElOO 
perfon-ned very well in 1999 than in 2001. 
(6.3.2) Number of Insiders 
The Corporate Register provides list of names of the finn's executive directors. 
Therefore, one can easily count the total number of executive directors in the fin-n-Year. 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that this number, compared with number of non- 
executive directors or total number of executives and non-executlN, c directors, is the 
most obvious, and might be the most accurate, proxy for the number of insiders in tile 
Model. With the dependent variable is the CEO compensation; it is identical to use the 
total number of executive directors as a proxy for the number of insiders, i. c. 
independent variable. The justification for this is simply that the firm's executives know 
the operations and day-to-day functions and decisions of their firm. They are involved 
in depth in their finu and have comprehensive knowledge of the current status and 
future perspectives of their firm. An alternative proxy might be the total number of non- 
executive. Those directors obtain inside inforination during the board meetings, when 
important and strategic decisions are considered. However, their involvement with the 
firm is frivolous relative to the involvement of executive directors. In addition, all inside 
information obtained by the non-executives come from the executives, usually the CEO. 
Table (6.1) shows the statistical descriptive of the total number of executives in each 
FTElOO firin for 1999 and 2001, while the full set of data is detailed in appendix 
(A6.1). It can be seen from the table that the average number of executive directors in 
FTSElOO firms has not changed. The average was 5 directors in 1999 and in 2001. 
However, the numbers of executives within FTSElOO firins are varied from I to 11 
executive directors. 
(6.3.3) CEO's Personal Characteristics 
Human capital models [see, for example, Anderson (1980)] argue that the rate of return 
on human capital is subject to education and experience. CEO's years in the post and his 
educational degree represent the CEO internal expenence and privilege knowledge 
along Nvith his educational and professional credentials. respectivcly. Vore recenflv, 
Roulstone (2003) uses exccutivc's temire as a proxy for the executive's planning 
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horizon and accumulated wealth5. Following Kato and Rockel's (1992) findings and 
Spence's (1973) signalling interpretation of credentials, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that these two variables would be among the variables that determine the CEO's level of 
compensation. 
FTSE100 CEOs' personal charactenstics are gathered from the Corporate Register. The 
database collected consists of many detailed data about the personal characteristics of 
the CEOs. These are: 
(1) CEO's year of appointment in the current post, 
(2) The specified educational degrees held (Bachelor, Master, Master in Business 
Administration and Ph. D. ), 
(3) Which subject is the educational degree held (Medicine, Engineering, Business, 
etc. ), 
(4) From which university is the educational degree held (namely Oxford, Cambridgc, 
Imperial in the UK, and Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 
USA)q 
(5) Professional memberships (such as Association of Chartered Accountant, 
Association of Certified Accountant, Institute of Chemical Engineers, Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, etc. ), 
(6) The titles held (examples include Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 
Distinguished Service Cross, Knight Commander Order of the British Empire, etc. ), 
(7) Whether the CEO held the same position in previous year-data (such that whether 
the CEO in 2001 held the same position in 1999). 
Table (6.1) summarizes the main personal charactenstics of FTSE100 CEOs dunn(-, 
1999 and 2001 and appendix (A6.2) provides the whole set of data for each company in 
the sample. On one hand, the average number of years CEO held in the position was 6 
years in 1999 and 2001. On the other hand, CEOs education level is represented by 
many attributes. On average, most but not all of the CEOs have a Bachelor degree. Of 
100 CEOs, 59 ones have a bachelor degree in 1999 and 62 out of 97 in 200 1. 
5 While Dednian and Lin (2002) examines share price behaviour effects ol' CFO departures in the UK. 
and find that nlanv firms choose not to announce CEO departure, and when thev do annou nce It. the 
market reacts negatively. 
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(6.3.4) CEO's Job Characteristics 
Agency Theory literature examined the relationship between the managerial 
compensation and the firrn's financial, economic and market performance, i. e. pay- 
performance [see sub-section (4.4.1) in chapter 4]. It predicts a positive relation 
between managerial pay and some variables that measure the shareholders' Nk-c1fare. 
These variables might serve not only as measures for performance but also as indicators 
for managerial outputs, i. e. job produce. 
The data collected for this study allows to employ two alternative finn's performance 
indicators (1) shareholders' returns, represented by Earnings Per Share (EPS) ratio, as in 
Roulstone (2003), and (2) market-based returns, measured by Price to Earnings (P/'E) 
ratio. Table (6.1) reports the descriptive statistics of these measures for FTSE 100 during 
1999 and 2001, and appendix (A6.2) details these ratios for each fin-n in the sample. 
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Another measure used in the literature for CEO's job charactenstic is the size of his 
firm. Since Simon (1957)6, the classical literature of Organisation Theory has 
documented that the level of executive directors' pay is more strongly related to the size 
of their fin-n than to the shareholders' welfare [see, for instance, Kato and Hebner (1992) 
and Rosen (1999)]. More recently, relevant literature indicates that the ability of the 
executive is matched with his fin-n size. Larger firms have more able executIN-es and 
thus require more pay. That is so because the job characteristics of CEO in larger firms 
require more human capital than in smaller ones. Such that coordinating \-arious 
divisions within the firrn and communicating various business relations with other firms 
[see, for example, Roulstone (2003)]. Two attributes of fin-n size measures for each 
FTSE100 firm during 1999 and 2001 are considered in the multivariate model: (1) 
market capitalisation, as in Roulstone (2003), and (2) total number of employees 7, as in 
Hu and Noe (2001). 
To avoid duplication in the director's firrn size and perforinance measures employed in 
the Model, whenever the market capitalisation used as firin size attribute, EPS is used as 
a firin perfon-nance attribute. Likewise, whenever the total number of employees 
represents the firm's size, P/E is used as a performance measure. That is to avoid using 
P/E (performance measure) with market capitalisation (size measure) as the stock price 
represents the numerator in both measures. 
In fact, both attributes can be seen as control variables in the Model. Although the 
population sample of this research includes the largest 100 firms in LSE, there still 
significant size differences within the sample. A simple visual analysis of the data in 
table (6.1) shows clearly such variations. For example, the firm size, represented by 
total number of employees, is varied in FTSE 100 between 94 and 267,000 employees in 
1999 and between 520 and 261,000 employees in 2001; and when it's measured by 
market capitalisation, its vaned between f292 million to f117 billion in 1999 and 
between E129 million and E113 billion in 2001. Similarly, the firm perfon-nance is 
varied significantly, either represented by EPS, minimum f-0.28 to a maximum of 
6 Kato and Rockel ( 1992), page 3 8. 
7 Another 
* 
measure of firm size might be used Is the sales. Howevei-, there are man%, limitations with usin-g 
measure in this swdy. SLich that FTSElOO consists of firms from various industries, where the sales 
figures do not represent the same accountim, measures. For example, there is no sales figure in the 
banking and financial institutions. 
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f 39.64 in 1999, and from (f 
-2.07) and maximum f 16.42: or by PtE ratio, from a 
minimum of less than I to more than 70 times in 1999 and 227 times in 21001. Table 
(6.1) provides the descriptive statistics for this information. 
(6.3.5) Insider-Tradinq bv Directors 
While most of the Principal-Agent empirical literature focused on the financial 
accounting, economic and market performance as determinants of executIN, c directors 
pay, no attempt has been made to examine the executives' expected returns from 
insider-trading. The Model employed in this study indicates that the director's returns 
from insider-trading are considered as an integral part of his total compensation. 
Empirically, this can be represented in the Model explicitly by insider-trading 
profitability [ýtd, as in equation 8, [detailed in section (6.3.5.1)], or implicitly by the 
director's capacity to trade [7r(Nit)], as in equation 10 [discussed in section (6.3.5.2)]. 
Both variables are mutually exclusively used in the Model. That is, using one excludes 
the necessity for using the other one. Since this research is employing the combinatorial 
approach for selecting the regression model [see section (6.5.1)], the analysis involves 
using either one to achieve the maximum explanatory power of the model. 
(6.3.5.1) Director's Returns from Insider-Tradinq 
This variable presents insider-trading returns for FTSEIOO directors. Chapter five [see 
section (5.5.2.3)] computed the abnormal returns for each director-transaction [see 
Appendix (A5.10)]. For the purpose of this analysis, the abnormal returns (AR) for 
each director-finn for thirty days (ARi, AR2,. 
. ., 
ARM) are cumulated to produce 
monthly CAR. Then, the average CARs for each company during 1999 and 2001 are 
calculated. Finally, CAR for each company is multiplied by 12 to produce annual CAR 
for company-portfolio [buy ordinary shares (Buy), sell ordinary shares (Sell). holding 
exercised executivc share option (BEO) and selling exercised executive share option 
(SSO)]. 
Statistics, surnmarised in table (6.1) and detailed in appendix (A6.2), show that in 2001, 
the average annual CAP, for Buy portfolio was 78.00()o, and 
--50.43% for Sell portfolio. 
On the other hand, BEO's CAR was -4.93% and that of SSO was -17.6"0. Tile ordinary 
shares portfolio, which combines buys and sells portfolios, has a positivc CAR at 
lg-, 7 
36.66%, while that of ESO v,, as negative at 
-13.32%. The overall portfolio. which 
consists of all transactions, has a positive CAR at an annual average of 11.90%. 
In addition, Pearson's correlations between director's compensation and CAR portfolios 
are examined. The results are reported in table (6.3). The Model assumes negatiN'e or 
insignificant association between both variables. That is so because, on one hand, as the 
number-of-insiders increases, the profitability of director from insider-trading decreases. 
On the other hand, as the numb er-o f-insiders increases, the compensation increases. 
Thus, as insider-trading profitability decreases the compensation increases. Howcver, 
since the number of insiders has adverse association with the compensation, the 
relationship between insider-trading profitability and the compensation becomes 
ambiguous. 
Table (6.3) shows that in 1999 there was no significant correlation between any CAR 
portfolio and CEO's compensation measures. Howeverg 2001 data shows some 
statistically significant correlation with sell portfolio. For instance, the bivariate 
correlation of sell portfolio with CEO compensation (HPD) shows significantly high 
correlation (p 55%, p-value < 0.01). The implications of such results will be discussed 
along with the model analysis in section (6.5). 
(6.3.5.2) Director's Capacity for Insider-Tradina 
Another indicator for insider-trading in the Model is the director's capacity to trade. 
That is the volume of shareholdings of ordinary shares, i. e. bought from the open 
market, and of executive share options (ESO), i. e. holding exercised ESO. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that a director with large shareholdings has more capacity to 
trade, in general, and to sell in particular. While that with less quantity has more 
capacity to buy his firm's own shares. 
Table (6.1) reports the average number of ordinary and incentive shares held by CEOs 
in FTE 100 firms during 1999 and 2001, and appendix (A6.2) reports the details for each 
firni in the sarnpic. These data can serve as a proxy for the director's capacity to trade in 
his firm's shares. In most cases, it shows that, on average, FTSE100 CEOs increased 
their ordinary shareholdings from 334,945 shares in 1999 to 863.960 shares in 2001. 
Howc\-cr, the casc is different in terms of incentive shares held. Here the CEOs liave 
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more holdings. In fact, this is due to the level of incentives given to CEOs. In 1999, the 
CEO held, on average, more than 685,596 incentive shares and doubled the volume in 
2001 to reach more than 1.4 million incentive shares. 
It seems that such increase in CEOs ordinary shares, which are bought from the open 
market, can suggest that they intentionally wanted to increase their capacity to trade ill 
their firm's shares and, thus, to increase their insider-trading returns. This assumption is 
supported by Pearson's correlation between ordinary and incentive shareholdings. It has 
been found significantly positive (58% in 1999 and 21% in 2001) [see table (6.3)]. The 
implications of these results will be interpreted along with the model analysis in section 
(6.5). 
(6.3.6) Industry Sector 
Industry sector is employed in the Model to control for two possible effects [see, for 
example, Kato and Rockel (1992)]. Firstly, if substantial portion of executive directors' 
human capital is industry- sp eci fi c, then industry-wide directors labour market will 
develop. Thus, inter-industry compensation differentials may persist. Secondly, as 
shown in Deckop (1988), there are some potential institutional causes of the 
fragmentation of the director's labour market along with industry sectors. 
This study uses the industrial classification dummy variable where the service sector is 
the reference sector. That is, firms in the service sector have been given one, and zero 
for firms in other sectors. Table (6.1) and appendix (A6.2) reports this re-classification 
for FTE 100 firms, where it is obvious that most of them are in the service sector, 66 out 
of 100 firms in 1999 and 63 out of 97 firms in 200 1. 
(6.4) ATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this section is to assess the individual variables, outlined in section (6.3), 
for the multivariate model, equation 10 in section (6.2). The reason for employing the 
multiple rcgrcssion technique in this study is to explain and predict the relationship 
between the CEO's explicit form of compensation, i. e. the dependent vanable. and the 
number of insiders, the CEO's personal and job characteristics and other independent 
\'ariabics. The multiple regression technique assesses the degree and character of 
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relationship between the independent and the dependent variables as modelled in 
equation 10. In addition, this technique allows for examining (1) the contribution of 
each independent variable to the variate, (2) the direction of the relationship between 
each independent variable and the variate, (3) the significance of each independent 
variable to the variate and (4) the inter-relationship among the independent N'ariables 
employed in the model. However,, in order for the result of the multiple regression 
technique to be valid, three assumptions have to be considered regarding the data 8. 
Investigated in the following sub-sections, these are: normality, Independence and 
linearity. 
(6-4.11 Norm 
This assumption indicates that the data being analysed are normally distributed. 
Although this is not a prerequisite for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), non-normality 
might produce invalid statistical tests, such as t and F-tests, of the multiple regression. 
In such case, however, data transformation has to be used to correct the non-normality 
of the variables. Testing for normality of the data is assessed by the SPSS modification 
of the Kolmogorov-Smirriov (K-S) test (Lilliefors significance correction). Table (6.2) 
reports the shape of the distribution and norinality test (K-S) for each variable before 
and after the transformation. Obviously, the K-S test rejected normality for all variables 
at the 5% level of significance. Thus, data transformation is conducted by the logarithm 
[Ine (X)j and the logarithm of the absolute value [Ine (IXI)] for the variables with 
negative values. The transformation, however, is not possible for two variables because 
of zero values. These are "CEO education level" (CeEdu) and "Industry sector of the 
finn" (IndstDum) which are (0, l) variables. After logarithmic trans forination, K-S test 
statistic could not reject the normality of 2 out of 9 transfon-ned variables. One variable 
in 1999, i. e. CEO years in post (LnCePs), and one variable in 2001, i. e. CEO' finn 
Earnings Pcr Share (LnEPS). The test has rejected the normality of the rest of the 
transfori-ned variables, however, a marginal improvement is resulted in the shape of the 
distribution for each of those transfori-ned variable. Table (6.2) details these statistics. 
Anotlicr aspect of the data has to be investigated under this assumption is the 
homoscedasticity, of the variate. This assumption is violated by the presence of unequal 
8 ýýCC, for cxample, chapter 9 In Greene (1997) and chapter 12 ln Webster ( 1992). 
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variances, i. e. skewed distribution, and can be assessed by SPSS Levene Test for 
homogeneity of variance9. If hetroscedasticity is present, data transformation can be 
used to adjust the skewed distributionlo. However, test of homogeneity of variances 
(Levene Test) cannot be performed by SPSS because there are too many groups. Only 
50 groups are allowed in the SPSS (version 10,1999). Alternatively, STATA regression 
with robust standard errors" is used to assess the independent variables and test the 
overall fitness of the model taking into consideration the hetroscedasticity, if present. 
The results will be reported when estimating and assessing the regression models in 
section (6.5). 
(6.4.2) Independence 
Ideally, the explanatory variables should to some extent be independent from each other 
in their movements and from residuals of the regression. That, there should be no high 
correlation between the independent variables. This so because the purpose of 
employing each independent variable in the model is to contribute proportionally in 
explaining and predicting the dependent variable. Significantly high correlation (usually 
more than 60%) between two independent variables means that their effects on the 
dependent variable would be identical. Statistically, this known as a multicollinearity 
problem. Multicollinearity exists if one of the independent variables is linearly related 
to any of the others. It represents the extent to which a variable can be explained by 
another variable among the explanatory variables. That is the degree to which any 
variable's effect can be predicted by another variable in the analysis. As 
multicollinearity increases, the ability to define any variable's effect is diminished [see 
Hair et al. (1998), p. 2 and p. 24; and Webster (1992), p. 664]. Thus using one of them 
would suffice of using the other 
12 
. 
9 Chapter 12 in Greene (1997) explains the major tests and remedies for hetroscedasticity. 
10 Manning and Mullahy (2001), for example, examines how well the alternative estimators behave 
economically in terms of bias and precision when the data are skewed or have other common data 
problem (e. g. hetroscedasticity, heavy tails) and conclude that no single alternative is best under all 
conditions. More specifically, McCuen et aL (1990) examine the problems with logarithmic 
transformations in regression. 
" See, for instance, Ai and Norton (2000) for calculating the standard errors for the transformation 
rroblern with hetroscedasticity. 
2 Literature suggests that highly correlated independent variables can be used when regression employed 
for predictive but not for explaining purposes [see for instance, Hair et al. (1998)). 
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Table (6.2) Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality and Remedies for 
FTSE100 CEOs' Pay Measures and Independent & Control Varlables 
Independent 1999 N=100 2001 N=97 
Control Shape of Distribution Test of Normality 
-- - 
Shape of Distnbution Test of Normality 
Variables Ske%vness K-S statistic I p-\ alue 7- 7k,. - eý ness I Kurtois K-S statistic p-N a1u; 
HPD ! 5.010 34.701 0.256 0.000 2.173 5.7 36 0.15 8 0.000 
LnHPD 
-0.041 4.013 0.110 0.005 -1 2,5 5 827 0.098 022 
NoExec 0,342 
-0.021 0.127 0.000 0.322 0.0- 0.168 0.000 
LnNoExec 
-0.918 1.406 0.165 0.000 -1.3302 3.047 0.210 0.000 
CeYPst 2.776 13.919 0.198 0.000 2.476 9.402 0.205 0.000 
LnCeYPst 0.020 
-1.107 0.128 0.198 -0,003 -1.041 0,165 0.012 
CeEdu 
-0.372 -1.900 0.390 0.000 -0,589 -1.689 0.412 0.000 
CeOSh 4.510 21.277 0.356 0.000 6.456 47.065 0.391 0.000 
LnCeOSh 0.003 0.250 0.173 0.016 
-0,897 3.773 0.166 0.012 
CeISh 3.483 12.465 0.303 0.000 4.125 20.881 0.279 0.000 
LnISh 
-0.769 0.326 0.164 0.028 -1.174 2.448 0.1 ý30.029 
Emply 2,331 6.178 0.213 0.000 2.138 5.422 0.192 0.000 
LnEmply 
-1.042 1.247 0.102 0.013 -0.062 0.013 
1 
0.096 0.028 
CAP 3.446 13.536 0.320 0.000 3.303 10.986 0.326 0,000 
LnCAP 0.274 1.372 0.108 0.006 0.100 1.371 Oý095 0.030 
EPS 9.460 92.294 0.433 0.000 5.700 38.997 0.321 0 000 
LnEPS 
-0.628 7.190 0.116 0.002 0.219 0.601 
1 
0.054 0 200 
1 
PE 9.682 95.607 0.405 0.000 6.740 47.756 0.377 0.000 
LnPE 0.506 5.543 0.113 0.003 0.338 2,721 0.102 0.015 
INDSTDUM 1-0.686 
-1.1ý61 10.426 0.000 1-0.636 -1.629 1 0.417 0.000 The Preffex Two Letters (LN) is for the Ine(X) of the Variable 
HPD CEO Pay Without Penion Cost 
NoExec No. of Executives in the Company Cel'Pst CEO Years in Post 
Emply Total No. of Employees in the Companl CeEdu CEO Education (Dummy I University Degree, 0, Withmil) 
CAP Market Capitaliation CeOSh No. of Ordinary Shares Held by CEO 
EPS Earnings Per Share CeISh No. of Incentive Shares Held by CEO 
PE Price / Earnings Ratio INDSTDIAl Indutry Group (Durnmy: 1: Services, 0 Non-Services) 
Independence of the explanatory variables is investigated by using the bivariate 
Pearson's correlation. Table (6.3) reports the correlation matrix among the independent 
variables. It shows that there is a significantly high correlation between the total number 
of employees and market capitalisation (both representing the firm size) [p = 34% in 
1999 and 30% in 2001] as well as between the EPS and P/E (both representing the fin-n 
performance) [p = 99% in 1999 and 92% in 2001]. However, this has no impact on the 
regression variate as both pairs are used alternatively. In addition, table (6.3) shows 
significantly positive correlation between number of insiders and total number of 
employees [p = '13%, p-value = I% in 1999, and p= '220%, p-value = 5'o in 2001 ]. This 
conclusion confin-ned by the correlation between number of insiders and market 
capitalisation. Tlicsc Mo variables are correlated insignificantlý' vcrý- Nveak [p =I I% in 
1999 and p= 
-00'o in 
-1001]. Other relations between independent N'ariables are verý' 
weak and the table in this context is self-explanatory. Howcver. the results will be 
"02 
interpreted in details in conjunction with the regression variate and its results [section 
(6.5)]. 
(6.4.3) Linead 
The second assumption for the multivariate regression variables is that there should be a 
degree to which the changes in the CEO's compensation, i. e. dependent variable, are 
associated 
, 
in a linear or curvilinear relation, with each of number of insiders, CEO's 
personal and job characteristics and other independent variables. Linear relationship can 
be examined by correlation, whereas partial regression plots can detect curve-linearity 
relation. 
Pearson's correlations between CEO compensation paid and the independent variables 
are reported in Table (6.3). It shows that 2 relations, out of 20 13 
, 
are correlated 
significantly, one each year. These are CEO's education level in 1999 (p 20%, p-N, alue 
< 0.05) and market capitalisation in 2001 (p 22%, p-value < 0.05). The other relations 
are not only insignificant but also very weak. For example, the correlation between 
CEO compensation paid and number of insiders is 7% in 1999 and 6% in 2001. 
However, these results might be influenced by some extreme observations in the 
sample, which is investigated in the previous section (6.4.1). 
In fact, Pearson's correlation measures the linear relationship between two variables. 
However, the relation between the variables might be non-linear as those reported 111 the 
table. It might be curvilinear. In the context of the Model used in this study, such 
relation better measured by partial regression plot. This has investigated for each 
independent variable employed in the Model, after transforming the data [see section 
(6.4.1)]; the results confin-ned the reliability of using these variables in the Model. 
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Table (6.3) Pearson's Correlation Among the Multivariate Regression Variables 
CEO N= 100 Independent Variables for Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading (1999) 
1999 HPD99 Axec'), )J Empk 91ý I CAP99 I EPS" I PE99 1 1\DD( \1 1(_, ý P,! ', , iCeEdul), ) F 7111 TT elSh99 NoExec99 0.07 1.00 1 
Emply99 0.13 0.33*** 170 
CAP99 0.10 0.11 0.34' 1.00- 
EPS99 0.04 
-0.02 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
PE99 0.00 
-0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.99*** 1 
_00 
INDDUM 0.03 
-0.12 1 -0.09 -0.12 0.06 0.08 1.00 
CeYPst99 
-0.03 0.02 1 0.11 -0.05 1 0.06 0.07 0.19** 1.00 
1 
CeEdu99 0.20** 0.08 
-0.13 -0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.18 1.00 
CeOSh99 0.03 
-0.13 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.26** 0.08 1.00 
CelSh99 0.09 
-0.18 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.35' -0.02 0.58*** 1.00 
CAR-Buy Pordoho 
-0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.13 0.12 0.13 0.28** 0.06 -0.26** 0.34' 0.21 
CAR-Sell Portfolio 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.25 -0.30 -0.33 0.09 0.08 -0.23 -0.10 0.15 0.10 
CAR-Ordinary Shares Pc 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.17 0.09 0.11 0.18 -0.09 -0.18 0.24** 1 0.15 
CAR-Held Exercised ES 0.07 
-0.16 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.02 0.22 0.05 -0.29 0.35** 0,38** 
CAR-Sold Exercised ES 
-0.17 -0.28 -0.33 0.01 -0.22 0.09 0.18 -0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.13 
CAR-Executive Share 0 
j 
-0.10 -0.14 -0.18 0.08 1 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.13 0.25 0.29 
CAR-All Shares Portfoli 
-0.08 1 -0.10 -0.10 1 -0.06 1 0.02 0.05 0.15 -0.05 -0.15 0.24** 0.22 
CEO N= 97 Independent Variables for Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading (2001) 
2001 HPD01 NoExecOl Empl\, 01 CAP01 EPS01 I PE01 J INDDUNI CeYNOI Cclduwl CeOShol (cNh(ll 
NoExec01 0.06 1.00 
Emply0l 0.20 0.20** 1.00 
CAP01 0.22** 
-0.06 0.30*** 1.00 
EPS01 
-0V 
. 
1=8 0.10 0.06 
, 
1.00 
PE01 
-0.06 -0.19 1 0.00 0.08 0.92*** 1 1.00 
INDDUM 0.08 0.05 
-0.05 -0.17 0.04 
_ 0.06 1.00 
CeYPst01 0.02 0.18 0.07 
-0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 17 
CeEdu01 0.19 
-0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.19 0.24** 1.00 
CeOSh01 
-0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.21 ** 0.11 1.00 
CelShOl 0.18 
-0.09 1 0.08 0,29*** -0ý09 1 -0.10 0.12 0.24** -0.03 0.33*** 1.00 
CAR-Buy- Pord'olio 
-0.00 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0,06 0.05 -0.07 -0.20 -0.27 -0.13 -0.18 
CAR-Sell 111pi-tiblio 0.55*** 
-0.05 0.12 0.38 0.16 0.15 -0.43** 0.35 0.08 0.21 0.50** 
CAR-Ordinar), Shares Pc OA6 
-0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.17 -0.15 1 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
CAIZ-1 leld F. \crcised FS 0.21 
-0.01 0.44** 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.26 -0.17 -0.31 -0.31 0.26 
CAR-Sold [-`xet-clsed IS 0.31 
-0.02 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.37 -0.08 -0.07 -0.38 -0.63*** -0.03 
, 
CA R-1ý'XCCLItlý C Share 0 0.26 1 
L 
0,00 1 0.37*** 1 0.13 0.19 0.20 013 -0.12 -0.29 -0.36** 0.02 
JCAIý-All Sliarcs Portfol I 0.22 1 
-0.02 1 0.19 1 0.08 0.09 
1 
0.05 
, -0.01 , -0.13 -0.19 -0.20 -0.02 
*** Correlation is sianificant at the 0.01 le\, el (2-tailed). ** Correlation issignificant at the 0,05 leiv/ (2-faded). 
The Suffex Number (Two Digits) is for the Year of the Data 
NoExec No. of Executives in the Company F 'NIPLN No. of Employee inhe Company 
Ce), Pst CEO Years in Post CA P Market Capitaliation 
CeEduOl CEO Education (Durniny: 1: Bachelor Degree, 0, Without, EPS Earnings Per Share 
Ce0sh No. of Ordinarv Shares Held bý CEO PF Price / Earnings Ratio 
Celsh No. ol' Incentive Shares Held bv CEO HPD CEO Compensation 
INDS FD( INI inclutry Group (Durn, rny: 1: Services, 0 Non-Services) 
13 There are 10 independent variables each year, excluding insider-trading portfolios. Thus, table (6.3) 
reports 20 correlations. 
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16.5) TI HE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Having identified and analysed the data for the multiple regression. the next step in the 
analysis is to estimate and assess the model itself. That is by selectIng, and estimating 
the regression model and assessing the overall fitness of the assumed model. using 
STATA 14. This ended-up with two main categories of regression models. The first one 
employs insider trading returns indicator, i. e. number-of-insiders, only [section (6.5.1)]; 
while the second category incorporates the actual returns and the director's capacit\, to 
trade [section (6.5.2)], as analysed below. 
(6.5.1) The Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading Returns 
Indicator Models 
The full sample of FTSE 100 CEOs compensation data of 1999 and 2001 is employed in 
an empirical version of the Model, articulated in the following regression equation 
(model 1): 
ln(Wdit) 
--": a +, y ln(Ni, ) +bI ln(CeYPSdil)+b2(CeEdudi, ) +W ln(CelShdit) 
61 In(Emplyi) + 82 ln(CAPi, ) + 63 ln(EPSi, ) +cI (IndDum) +7ri, (II) 
The dependent variable in the regression IS (Wdit) the CEO's annual compensation paid, 
measured by his salary and ex-ante monetary measured bonuses, which represents the 
explicit forin of his reward contract. The independent variables include five main 
categories. Firstly, a proxy for the implicit forrns of CEO reward contract, represented 
by (M) the number of insiders, i. e. executives, in his firm. Secondly, proxies for CEO 
personal characteristics designated by (CeYPSdi, ) his internal experience as CEO and 
(CeEdUdk) a dummy variable of his education level (one if hold a bachelor degree at least. 
and zero if otherwise). Thirdly, proxies for CEO job characteristics, defined by his fin-n 
size and profitability, which are measured by (Emplyi, ) the total number of employees in 
his firm and (CAP,, ) the finn's market capitalisation, and (EPS,, ) eamings per share, 
respectivcIv. Fourthly, CEO 's number of incentive shares held (CelShd. ). another form. 
howc\, ci- not direct, of CEO personal characteristic, to represent another part of CEO 
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explicit form of his compensation., not included in the dependent variable. The reason 
behind inclusion this variable in the regession vanate is to account for alniost-all 
possible parts of the explicit fon-ns of CEO compensations paid. The eillpirical 
application of the Model, equation 11. indicates that the dependent variable is 
represented by the ex ante monetary measured pay, and does not include the share 
options exercised, which are ex post measured pay, an infori-nation not available in the 
database employed in this research. Conyon et al. (2000) find that the current ESO 
awards for CEOs in the UK are only a fraction of total pay. This finding is based upon 
15 the widely used Black-Scholes (1973) Option Pricing Model 
. 
In fact, The inclusion of 
this variable in the model is novel in this context and has not been tested in the 
literature. Finally, a control variable is introduced to account for the industry sector of 
the CEO's firm (Inffiurno). This is a dummy variable with reference to the service sector, 
where firms in the service sector are given one, and zero for those who are not. In 
equation 11,71 is the error term, a is the intercept, y is the coefficient on number of 
insiders, b's (b I, b2 and b3) are the coefficients on CEO personal characteristics, 6's (61 ý 
62 and 63) are the coefficients on CEO job characteristics, and cI is the coefficient on 
the firm's industry sector. In fact, y, Us, 6's and cl represent partial regression 
coefficients. The data set presenting all the variables included in the regression vanate is 
presented in section (6.3). 
The evidence presented in this section uses STATA (version 7) regression with robust 
standard errors analysis 16 to examine the relation between the explicit form of CEO 
compensation and the implicit form of his reward contract, i. e. expected returns from 
insider trading. For each year-model, various specifications are considered and 
discussed below. For each year, model I represents the regression vanate of all 
14 In addition, SPSS is used. However, due to the presence of hetroscedasticity problem that is not 
accounted for by SPSS regression, the results are not reported. For how to account for hetroscedasticity, 
see, for instance, Manning (1998) and Wallentin and Agren (2002). 
The Black-Scholes Option Valuation Model calculates the market value of an European call option as 
-rr In(S / A') + (, 
_ 
+ 072 / 2)' CS A' (d Xe N(dý) follows: where d, V 
and d, (7vr ,S= is the price of the underlying security, X is the exercise price; T is the time to 
expiration; r is the short-term interest rate \N-hich is continuous and constant throuoh time.. (3- is the 
variance rate of return for the underlynig security, - _N(di) is the cumulative normal density function 
evaluated at di. and di is the length of time interval. 
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independent variables in equation 11. while model 2 represents the new version of the 
regression after dropping those insignificant variables resulted from model 1. If y is 
significantly positive, then the research assumption that insider trading is part, howe\ cr 
implicit, of the total compensation in the reward contract is held. 
Table (6.4) reports the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of STATA robust 
standard errors of equation 11 applied on 1999 and 2001 data set. It can be seen from 
model 1-1999 that 6 out of 8 independent variable coefficients are significantly positl\'c 
at 5% level of significance or less. The research assumption that the coefficient of 
numb er-o f- insiders (y) is significantly more than zero is held. In addition, model 1- 1999 
shows that the CEO personal characteristic estimates, i. e. P2 and P3 for CEO education- 
level and incentive- shareho I ding, respectively; as well as the coefficients (61,62 and 
63) of the CEO job characteristics, 1*. e. number-of-employees, market capitalisation and 
EPS, are significantly more than zero. However, the insignificant estimates are those of 
CEO years in post, which is positive and the industry- sector, which is negative. 
On the other hand, the results from 2001 data show less significant estimates. Here, only 
2 out of 8 estimates are significant at 5% level (CEO's incentive-shareholdings and his 
fin-n market- capital is ation), and 3 at 10% level (numb er-o f- insiders, CEO education- 
level and total 
-numb er-o f-emp loyees in his fin-n). However, there are 3 insignificant 
estimates (CEO year-in-post, EPS and industry). Nevertheless, the model hypothesis (y 
> 0) is still held but at lower confidence interval (90%) than in 1999 data. 
" To control for hetroscedasticity, if aný- See Webster (1992) p. 722, f6i White's (1980) test for 
lie i rosccclastic ity, and for how to use STATA fo r robust regression, see 
"\\, \\ \v. stala. coni, support faqs stat". 
'l 0" 
Table (6.4) The Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading Model 
Chief Executive Officer's Compensation and Number of Insiders: Model 1 and 2 Evidence From FTSE100 During 1999 and 2001, Using STATA Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
ln(W, m) =a+y ln(N6) + P1 ln(CeYPSdo) + P2 (CeEduda) + P3 ln(CelSh. ) + 61 ln(Emply-) + 52 ln(CAP4) + 63 1n(EPS-, ) + cl (IndDury-s. ) +Trn 
Depetwfetrt Indap9nd9nt VarIab19a Model Significarwe 
Variable 
t 
INo. ofInsidw CEO Personal Characteristics I CEO Job Characteristics Statistwes 
- 
I F-vakbe 
HOOD C.. ftnt I LnNoExec LnC*YPst CeEdu nC4dSh I LnEnip4y LnCap LnEPS I INOTMOM N R2 I Pwakw 
Model 1- 1999 8.797 0.536 0.056 0.277 0.115 0.099 0.145 0.134 
-0.1 ý11) 8') 16.231) t-value 14.49*** 2.28** Oý96 2. -2*** 3.50*** 1.99.. 2.81*** 7-99*** 
-1 0.00(XI... 
Model 2- 1999 8.617 0.5% 0.309 0.118 0.107 0.142 0.127 89 ;, )1/0 19.110 
t-value 13.12*** 2.29** 2. %*** 3.36*** 2.19** 2.66*** 2.64... 0.0000 **I 
Model 1- 2001 8.137 0.647 
_0. w 0.291 0.145 0.100 0.153 0,019 0.0-11 92 15% 8.810 t-value 7.36*** 
_1.73 
* 
_o0j) 1.89* 2.58**- 1.85* L26** 0.28 4 0.0000- 
Model 2- 2001 
t-value 
8.129 0.587 0.237 0.139 
7.49*** 1.73* 1.74* 175*** 
0.101 0.155 
1.88* 2.28** 
0.015 
0.230 
92 35% 10.9,50 
The t 
-ratios, giv (-) Significant at 
en beneath the coefficient values, are based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard-errors of White (1980). 
1% or Less, (-) at 5% or Less, and (*) at 10% or Less. 
Abbreviations: 
HPD 
NoExec 
CeYPst 
CeEdu 
CelSh 
CEO Compensation Mhout Pension Cost. 
Total No. of Executive Directors 
CEO Years in Post 
CEO Educafion (Dummy, 1: University Degree, 0: Without) 
No. of Incentive Shares Held by CEO 
Emply 
CAP 
EPS 
fNDSTDU%I 
No. of Employee inhe Company 
Market Capitaliation 
Earnings Per Share 
Indutry Group (1: Services, 0 Non-Ser%ices) 
Furthermore, the coefficient of determination 17 (R 2) indicates that 60% (35 %)18 of the 
variation in CEO ex ante monetary-measured compensation can be explained by the 
independent variables included in model 1-1999 (2001). Moreover, Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) table examines the significance of the overall fitness of the model. 
ANOVA null hypothesis is that there is no linear relationship exists in the population of 
interest between the CEO compensation (the dependent variable) and the independent 
variables, and that the regression coefficients and the coefficient of deten-nination are 
equal to zero. 
The test of ANOVA null hypothesis is based on the F-ratio'9. Table (6.4) shows that F- 
ratio for the regression vanate of model 1-1999 (2001) is 16.230 (8.810). When 
compared with the F-statistics at (8,81) [(8,84)], the result leads to reject the null 
hypotheses at less than 1% level of significance. This indicates that with 89 (92) CEOs 
17 The coefficient of determination (R') equals to Sum of Squares Regression divided by Total Sum of Squares, and Adjusted-R' =I- (I 
- 
R')*[(n 
- 
1) / (n 
-k- 1)], where n is the number of observations and k 
is the number of independent variables. 
18 STATA (version 7) reports R' only but not Adjusted-R 2, because it needs only R' for the purpose of 
21 testing heti, osccclasticity according to White's (1980) test. However, since R is verv sensitive to the 
number of independent variables in the regression, i. e. more independent variables lead to higher R2. 
Adjusted-RI is calculated based on equation in th footnote above and found 
-56% for model 1-1999 and 21)",, for 2001. 
19 F-ratio is calculated as follows: Firstly, calculate the Mean Square Regression by dividing the Sum of 
Squares Rcgn-cssion to the regi-ession Degree of Freedom (No, of Independent Variables). Then calculate 
the Mean ", qtiare Residuals by dividing the Sum of Squares Residuals to the residuals' Degrce ot'Freedom 
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pay observed by model 1-1999 (2001), the regression variate explains 16.210 (8.810) 
times more variation in the level of CEO pay than by using the average of the 
independent variables, and this is not likely to occur by pure chance alone. Thus. the 
research assumption that the coefficient of number-of-insiders (y) is sigiiificantlv more 
than zero is confin-ned by the overall fitness of the model. 
However, when dropping those insignificant variables from model I (year-m-post and 
industry sector), the results of the new model 2, reported in table (6.4), show that all the 
remaining independent variables are significantly positive in 1999 (except EPS in 
2001). In addition, the overall fitness of the model, tested by F-ratio, increased to a 
highly significant 19.110 (10.950) in 1999 (2001), while the explanatory power of the 
regression variate (R 2) remains high at 59% (35%) in 1999 (2001). Furthermore, when 
dropping the EPS from model 2-2001, F-ratio increased to 12.240 while maintaining R2 
at 35%. But dropping EPS from model 2-1999 reduces the F-ratio tol. 8.940 and R2 to 
55%. Appendix (A6.3) reports various specifications derived from equation 11, for 1999 
and 2001. 
The insignificant coefficient of the industry-sector might suggest that when setting-up 
the c. v ante CEO pay, the remuneration committees in FTSE 100 structure the contract in 
reference to each others in the index rather than to their rivals in their industry sector. 
Pearson's correlation between industry-sector and CEO pay supports such suggestion 
by a weak correlation of 3% (8%) in 1999 (2001). Moreover, as the empirical results 
show, the CEO years-in-post coefficient is insignificant in explaining the CEO pay 
level. It is not un-reasonable to assume that as longer the CEO held the post in his firm, 
as a class [see, for example, Noe (1995)], as he would be less demanding for his cx ante 
forrn of compensations. Once again, Pearson's correlation between CEO years in post 
and his pay shows negative and weak value of 
-2.6% (1.6%) in 1999 (2001). The 
insignificance of the firm's profitability measure (EPS) estimate might be explained by 
the fact that CEO contract is of a long-ten-n basis while EPS is of a one fiscal year 
result. Thus, the accurate substitute for this figure WOUld be the actual returns gained by 
the shareholders during the whole tenn of the CEO contract, which is, unfortunately, not 
available to this study. In addition, one micht argue that as a profitability measurc. EPS 
(No. of Observations No. of Independent Variables). Finally, F-ratio is given by dividing Mean Square 
Regression to Mean Square Residuals. 
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is a diluted figure to represents a standard measure for FTSElOO profitability as these 
firms come from different industries and thus subject to vaned tax levels 20 
The empirical results of model I are consistent with rele%ýant literature, particularlý- in 
terrns of the main research hypothesis. However, only one relevant study is identified by 
this research. That is of Hebner and Kato (1997), which will be analysed in the context 
of the research findings. They find that, regardless of the definition of insiders, i. C. 
officers or directors in the USA finns and Yakuin with or without statutory auditors 
and/or outsider Yakuln in the Japanese corporations, the coefficients of number-of- 
insiders in 1986 USA data and 1985 Japanese data are significantly more than zero. In 
addition, they find the same results for CEO job characteristics, represented by sales or 
employment (as measures of firrn size) and shareholder returns (as a measure of firm 
profitability). However, the UK results of CEO personal characteristics, reported in 
table (6.4), are in contrast with those of USA and Japan. Hebner and Kato find 
significantly positive estimates for US and Japanese CEO year-in-post and 
insignificantly negative (positive) estimates for US (Japanese) CEO education- level. 
To sum up, the research main model leads to suggest that the CEO explicit 
compensation is dependent, among other things, on the number of insiders in his firin. 
In other words, an increase in the CEO ex ante pay level is associated with inter alias an 
increase in the number of executives in his firm. Thus 
, 
it is not unreasonable to suggest, 
based on the empirical findings, that insider trading can be seen as in integral, however 
implicit, part of the reward contract of the firm's management, However, there might be 
an alternative explanation for this finding. A research area that need more investigation. 
(6.5.21 The Managerial Incentive of Insider Tradinq Realized 
Returns Models 
The model represented in equation 11, employs number-of-insiders as an iinplicit 
indicator for insider trading returns. One might argue that, if insider trading is to be 
considered as an integral part of director's total compensation Then. in a competitivc 
Iab0Ur market for directors, the realized returns from director's trades should havc a 
Othermeasures are considered by this research, such as earnings from operations before intereýt and 
tax, and found the sarne source of dilution is present, vc. varied industries and different measures for 
revcnues and earnings. 
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significantly negative association with directoes explicit form of compensation, as 
indicative by equation 121. In addition, since the director is not allowed to take position 
in short selling, one would expect that the director's ordinary shareholdings, 
accumulated over time through open market operations, would represent his capacity to 
trade and thus, be relevant to his insider trading returns. On the other hand, as Hayes 
and Schaefer (2000) concluded, compensation should be more positively associated 
with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting. Here 
insider trading returns, particularly from all-transactions portfolio, can be seen as an 
indication for future performance. Subsequently, the new version, model 3, would be 
read as follows: 
ln(Wdit) 
' 
': -: a+y ln(Ni, ) +bI (CeEdufi, ) + b2 ln(CelShdi, ) +61 ln(Emplyi) + 62 ln(CAPi, ) 
83 ln(EPSi) + dl (OShdi) + d2 (CAR,, ) + ni, (12) 
The dependent and independent variables in equation 12 are the same as those in 
equation 11. However, two new independent variables are introduced. These are (OShdi, ) 
the CEO ordinary shareholdings [explained in section (6.3.5.2)] and (CAR., ) the 
Cumulated Abnon-nal Returns from insider trading in his firm's shares for all- 
transactions portfolio22 [explained in section (6.3.5.1)]. And, dI and d2 are the partial 
regression coefficients on (OShdi) and (CAR,, ), respectively. 
The research hypothesis here is identical to what can be derived from equation 1. That, 
as the director's capacity to trade increases, his insider trading returns increases and his 
explicit compensation decreases. Likewise, as the director's realized return (CAR) 
increases, his explicit compensation decreases. Thus, the new model assumes 
economically significant negative coefficients (dI and d2) of these two new independent 
variables (OShdi, and CAPU). 
21 Theoretically, the error term (n) in equation 9, in section (6.2), is identical to insider-trading signal. 
Chapter 5 uses these signals and computed insider-trading returns. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 
substitute those returns for that signal, i. e. the error term, in the model. 
22 Appendix (A6.4) shows that Model 3 has 7 specifications/portfolios. Each of which represents insider- 
trading CAR from the type of shares traded. These portfolios are buy ordinary shares (Buy portfolio), sell 
ordinary shares (Sell portfolio), all ordinary shares (OS portfolio), holding exercised executive share 
options (BEO portfolio), selling exercised executive share options (SSO portfolio), all exercised 
executive share options (ESO portfolio) and all-transactions (All portfolio). 
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Table (6.5) reports the empirical results of model 3-1999 and Appendix (A6.4) reports 
the results of each portfolio/specification. It shows that CAR estimate is significantly 
positive, and while maintaining the main hypothesis of the model, regarding the 
number-of-insiders, valid, the model failed in term of its economic concept. However, 
one might argue that the results of this specification of model 3 might be diluted by the 
portfolio definition. That, it includes ordinary and incentive shares that have different 
features [such as pricing, quantity and timing) and, thus represents different indications 
in this context (trading for profitability or other motives to trade mentioned in section 
(2.4)]. This argument is investigated and the results of each same-type of 
transactions/shares portfolio (Buy, Sell, all OS, BEO, SSO or ESO), reported in 
Appendix (A6.4), show that none of these portfolios is significantly less or more than 
zero 23 
. 
In fact, model 3 includes three measures for insider trading: An indicator (number of 
insiders), realized returns (CAR portfolios) and capacity to trade (ordinary 
shareholdings). On one hand, the relationship between number of insiders and CAR is 
an adverse one, i. e. as the former increases, the later decreases and vice versa, and table 
(6.3) shows negative Pearson correlation between these two variables in 1999. 
Expectedly, the same sort of relation is exhibited between number of insiders and CEO's 
ordinary shareholdings. On the other hand, the relation between CARs and CEOs 
ordinary shareholdings is significantly positive as indicated in table (6.3). Thus, the 
problem of multicollinearity might exist in model 3 and the impact of the new 2 
variables introduced in the model (CAR and OSh) on the dependent variable (CEO pay) 
is, in effect, diminished. Thus, the new version, model 4, consists all independent 
variables in model 3 except number of insiders and CEO ordinary shareholdings. Table 
(6.5) shows the empirical findings of model 4-1999 with CAR portfol, 024. Model 4 
23 Appendix (A6.4) shows that only in 3 out of 7 specifications (Buy, OSh and All transactions 
portfolios), the main hypothesis, i. e.. the coefficient of number-of-insiders (y) is significantly more than 
zero is still valid and is confirmed by the overall fitness of the model. In addition, the model completely 
failed when considering SSO portfolio (F-ratio = 2.850, p=0.1557), which might be due to the limited 
degree of freedom (df = 5). 
24 Appendix (A6.4) shows that Model 3 has 7 specifications/portfolios. Each of which represents insider- 
trading CAR from the type of shares traded. These portfolios are buy ordinary shares (Buy portfolio), sell 
ordinary shares (Sell portfolio), all ordinary shares (OS portfolio), holding exercised executive share 
options (BEO portfolio), selling exercised executive share options (SSO portfolio), all exercised 
executive share options (ESO portfolio) and all-transactions (All portfolio). 
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produces no difference CAR coefficient from that in model 3 25 
. 
However, the 
significance level of CAR estimate decreased to 10% while the employment coefficient 
becomes significant, making all the independent variables in the model significantly 
positive and resulting in improved overall fitness of the model. Therefore, model 4 
confirms, to some extent, model 3 findings that the partial regression coefficient of 
CAR portfolio is significant in explaining the CEO pay. In other words, the director's 
pay increases along with his realized insider trades returns. 
In fact, model 3 and model 4 test, inter alias, whether the ex post insider trading actual 
returns along with their capacity to trade can, jointly with other independent variables, 
explain the CEO ex ante compensation paid. Thus, it suffers from the problem of 
insynchronisation. That, it tries to explain the known and certain ex ante CEO pay by 
the unknown and uncertain ex post monetary results. As Lambert (1983) shows, the 
optimal reward for any period depends on the output realised in the earlier period [for 
more about this argument, see section (4.2.2)]. To control for this problem, lagged 
insider trading actual returns are used in model 4. The new version, model 5, would 
replace the instant CARs with lagged ones. 
Table (6.5) reports the empirical findings of the new version, model 5, while appendix 
(A6.5) shows the results of various specifications of model 6. In comparison with model 
4. the model 5 failed in terms of CAR coefficient26. On one hand, the lagged CAR 
coefficient is still positive, in contrast with the research hypothesis. On the other hand, 
the significance level of other independent variables estimates decreased, as well as the 
coefficient of determination and the fitness of the regression. 
25 Appendix (A6.4) shows that, in comparison with model 3, BEO portfolio becomes significant at 10% 
level, and the significance level of all-transactions portfolio decreased to 10%. However, most of other 
independent variables have become significant: 26 of 35 (74%) of the estimates in model 4 are significant 
compared with 23 of 42 (55%) in model 3. In addition, the overall fitness of the 7 specifications of model 
4 improved and all become significant at less than 1% level. 
26 Appendix (A6.5) shows that, in comparison with model 4, none of lagged CAR coefficients is 
significant. On the other hand, only 17 out of 42 (40%) independent variable estimates are significant, 
compared with 28 (67%) estimates in model 4. However, the coefficient of determination as well as the 
fitness of the regression increased for 4 and 6 of 7 specifications, respectively. 
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It can be argued that any conclusion about CAR portfolio estimates is obscured by the 
fact that CAR represents all fin-n-directors not only CEO insider trading returns. Thus, 
CAR reflects, on one hand, the effects of both the number of insiders and their capacity 
to trade. On the other hand, CAR incorporates the partial level of CEO's satisfaction 
from the explicit part of his compensation. The empirical findings of equation 12 (tested 
in model 3,4 and 5) lead to suggest that the main assumption behind the model, 1*. e. the 
labour market for top directors is competitive, might not be held. The model aimed at 
looking for compensation differential explained by insider trading realized returns, 
among FTSE100 top management, but failed. The results show that as CEO's CAR 
increases, his compensation increases, as well. This might suggest that the labour 
market for top management high class firms is uncompetitive. 
(6.61 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
One might argue that the Model, represented by equation 10, does not capture all 
relcvaiit variables that might explain the director's pay. Such omitted variables, for 
example director's IntUltIve capability, might not be available in this study data set. 
Hence. its rcsult might be suffered from an omitted variables bias. Therefore. the model 
has to bc re-written to account for such a bias. 
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Literature [for review, see Maddala (1987)] accounts for the bias by using panel data. 
That is by extending single year cross-section data to second year cross-sectlon data as 
described below. Panel data set allows to perfon-n more sophisticated statistical analvsis 
and to improve the likelihood that valid conclusion regarding found association between 
CEO pay and number of insiders are drawn. In addition, it allows for greater flexibility 
in modelling differences in between across individuals or fin-ns. That is, for example, 
panel analysis takes account of unobserved heterogeneity across fin-ns in the sample by 
applying Chamberlain (1980) fixed effect model or Balestra and Nerlo\ýc (1966) random 
effect mode, 27. 
While cross-section estimates of CEO pay determinants are likely to suffer from the 
problem of omitted variable bias, panel data provides a solution to the problem of 
controlling for hidden additive individual effects. Many CEO pay levels, his personal 
and job characteristics might tend not to vary over short period of time. In addition, 
certain CEO specific qualitative attributes are simply undetectable in a cross-sectional 
data set but nonetheless are likely to influence the CEO pay and therefore to be 
correlated with observable personal and or job characteristics. 
In fact, CEO pay is a multidimensional contract. It is a reward contract based on 
qualitative personal attributes and quantitative job characteristics to do a managerial 
role and governed by financial performance. The unobserved qualitative individual 
attributes might include, inter alias, CEO's innate ability [Hebner and Kato (1997)] or 
his family background [Maddala (1987)]. It is likely that the unobserved individual 
effect is associated with CEO's pay, which is not measured in this study. Thus, panel 
data set may be more robust to incomplete model specifications. This study bases the 
panel analysis upon the fixed effect estimators from which inference is drawn v"ith 
respect to the effects that lie within the sample. However, the random-effects models are 
applied and the results are reported in the footnotes and the tables in the appendices 
alongside the main findings of fixed-effects models. 
27 Chapter 14 in Greene (1997) describes several techniques that ha\c been applied in single equation 
models. 
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To illustrate, the constant terms (W) in equation 10 captures the effects of i-th firm- 
specific unobserved variables and are time invanant. Two main approaches for 
modelling those unobserved heterogeneity across fin-ns are a fixed effects and a random 
effects models. The fixed effects specifies that (w) is a group specific constant term. 
and assumes that (njt) is independent and identically distributed over individual CEOs 
and time with zero mean and ((7'7r) variance. On the other hand, the random effects 
consider (w) differently. It assumes the constant can be treated as a random variable, 
similar to (7rit). However, the essential assumption of this model is that the constant is 
independent of the explanatory variables and is randomly distributed over cross- 
sectional units. Thus, the error-term consists of two mutually independent components, 
i. e. (w) time invariant and the reminder of (7rit), which are randomly distributed and 
uncorrelated over time. 
This study employs the fixed effects approach because the distribution of (C(i) plays no 
role. The importance of this assumption to this study lies in the fact that the sampled 
firms (FTSEIOO) are "one of a kind" and cannot be seen as a random draw from the 
population of all LSE listed companies (about 1650 listed finns). While the random 
effects model would be appropriate if the sampled finns are randomly drawn from the 
population of interest, so that the model assumption about the random distribution of 
(ai) would be held. In fact, Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that fixed effects estimators 
should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firrn perfon-nance, and Zhou (2001) questions this argument and finds them 
indifference. 
Accordingly, the managerial incentive of insider-trading model, equation 10, can be re- 
\vritten as follows: 
In(Wdit) 
= Cti +ß In(Pdit) +8 In(1, ) +y In(Nit) + r- X, + 7r 
wherc Xi is the Fixed effects to be estimated and represents the vector of omitted 
variables that are time-invariant, and F, is the coefficient on these omitted \ariablcs, 
ObviOLISIV, if equation 13 represents the correct model, then the rcgession estimatcs of 
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equation 10 are biased. To account for this bias, the single-year cross-section data has to 
be extended to second-year cross section data and re-estimate a fixed effects model, 
similar to that of Hebner and Kato (1997), as follows: 
ln(Wdit+l) 
=M+p ln(Pdit+l) +6 ln(Jdit+l) +y In(-N'i, +, ) +c Xi +7r it+ , (14) 
Then, subtracting equation 13 from equation 14 gives: 
ln(Wdit+l) 
- 
ln(Wdit) 7- p [ln(Pdit+l) 
- 
ln(Pdit)] +6 [ln(Jdit+l) 
- 
ln(Jdit)] 
ln(N,, )] + F, [Xi 
- 
Xil + [7r it+i 
- 
7r it] (15) 
Finally, by differencing out the omitted variables vector [Xi 
- 
Xi], the 11cw model wifl be 
expressed as follows: 
ln(Wdit+]) 
- 
ln(Wdit) p [ln(Pdit+l) 
- 
ln(Pdit)] +6 [ln(Jdit+1) 
- 
ln(Jdit)] 
[ln(Nit+, ) 
- 
In(Nit)] + [7[ it, i- 7E it] 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that the manageri al- incentive of insider-trading 
panel-model, equation (16), is free now from the omitted variables. 
STATA is used to estimate the CILS coefficients of the fixed-effects panel model -)8 
, 
equation (16). The empirical versions of the panel, models 6 and 7, include the same 
independent variables in equation 11 and 12, respectively. However, the sampled data 
covers two-single periods (1999 and 2001). Table (6.6) reports the empirical findings of 
models 6 and 7 specifications which are identical, in terins of the independent variables 
included, to model 2 and 4, respectively. While appendix (A6.6) presents other panel 
speci fii cations. 
28'rhe panel random-effects models Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generallsed Least Squares, (GLS) 
t-(), 
- 
testing for panel-level hetroscedasticity show similar results, in terms of both the coefficient values 
and significance level. as reported in the Appendix (A0.7) and (A6.8), respectivelý. 
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Table (6.6) The Managerial Incentive of Ir-sder Trading Panel Model 
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dmd-err m of Wuite (1980) 
. 
As shown in the table, the new estimates of y (number of insiders). b2 (CEO's education 
level) and 61 and 62 (his firm's size measures: total number of employees and market 
capitalisation, respectively) remain, similar to model 2 
-1999, positively significant at 
5% confidence level or lesS29. In comparison with Hebner and Kato (1997) findings on 
1986 US data 30 
, 
this study reports robust results, particularly in terms of the main 
hypothesis of the model, i. e. number of insiders, in addition to CEO job characteristic 
measure o size. 
On the other hand, when the insider trading measure is proxied by the actual returns, as 
in equation 12, instead of number of insiders, the panel model 7, reported in table (6.6), 
shows that the significance level of most of the independent variables decreased slightly 
and the market capitalisation estimates becomes insignificant. While the significance of 
the coefficient of CAR increased to 5% level3l 
. 
By definition, this portfolio, however, 
compromises all type of shares (ordinary as well as ESO) and positions (buy, sell and 
exercise) transactions. Thus, as a mis-concepted portfolio, its result mIght not be 
indicative. Overall, model 7 confirms the findings of model 4, that director's realized 
return from insider trades is significantly positively associated with his compensation 
paid. This, along with model 6 results, lead to support the research hypothesis that 
Appendix (A0-0) shows that, in comparison \vIth models 2 and 4, CEO's Internal experience coeffici 1 ient 
bl (years-in-post) and his firm's industry sector cl remain insignificant, but their signs are diverted. 
llowever, the correlation coefficients of the CEO incentive-shareholdings (with positive si I uns) and EPS 
(with nc, 
-, 
atl\, e signs) become insignificant in explaining the CEO's pay for all specifications. 
30 f lebrier and Kato ( 1997) have not reported panel model for Japanese data. 
31 The panel randorn-effects models OLS and GLS show similar results, in terms of both the coefficient 
value., and significaricc level, as reported in the Appendix (Ab. -") and (A6.8). respectively. Ho%-, -C\, er, Buv 
, 
nificant in both OPS, and GLS models. portfolio is siv 
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insider trading, proxied by number of insiders. is an integral part, however implicit. of 
the CEO compensation packages. 
(6.7) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the second part of the empirical results of this study. It began 
with introducing a model for how to consider insider trading as a managerial IncentiVe. 
The model assumes that as the number of insiders in the firm increases, competition to 
insider trading increases and each insider's expected returns decreases. On the other 
band, as number of insiders' increases, the explicit form of director's compensation 
should increase to offset his insider trading returns decreases. This concept, fon-nulated 
in section (6.2), leads to an empirically testable assumption that the director's expected 
compensation has two forms, (1) an explicit form (salary, bonuses, perks and other ex 
ante measurable incentives) which is predicted to be positively correlated with the 
number of insiders; and (2) an implicit form (his expected insider trading returns) which 
is predicted to be negatively correlated with the number of insiders in his firm. 
The empirical prediction, presented in a multivariate model, was tested using FTSE 100 
CEOs data. The data and the justification behind using each and every dependent and 
independent variable in the test are discussed. Also, the variables for the regression 
model, which is used to explain the relationship between the CEO explicit forrn of 
compensation (dependent variable) and the number of insiders in his firm, as well as his 
personal and job characteristics (independent variables), are analysed and assessed. 
The empirical tests of this research were made more infon-native and powerful by 
variable selection resulted in 7 models. The use of univariate analysis and inultiple 
regression analysis has shown the explanatory power of the model fon-nulated in this 
study. 
The results were very much in favour of the model. The positive relation between the 
explicit fornis of CEO compensation and the number of insiders in the ý'K FTSE100 
firms was found to be quite robust. That is, the significant relation does not depend on 
(1) whether the model accounts for CEO internal experience and industry sector (this is 
the diffci-ciicc between model I and model 2), (n) whether the model accounts for 
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CEO's capacity to trade and his actual insider trading returns (model 3 and 4). and (111) 
whether an omitted variables problem is accounted for by using panel data (model 6 and 
7). This leads to conclude that insider trading is an integral part of the director's total 
compensation package, and thus, can be considered as a managerial incenti%"c. 
Model specifications used in this study are novel, however, the empirical results of this 
study are consistent with those of currently available empirical literature, such that of 
Hebner and Kato (1997) on the 1985 Japanese and 1986 US CEOs data. In fact, this 
study finds robust results than those reported by Hebner and Kato, particularly when 
using the panel data analysis. 
This empirical conclusion supports the theoretical framework of, for example, Bebuck 
and Fershtman (1994) who shows that insider trading can be part of the optimal 
compensation scheme; Starks (1987) who finds that the s ymm etni c 
-contracts (contracts 
allowing insider trading) dominates the bonus-contracts (contracts not allowing insider 
trading) in aligning the director's interest with those of investors; and Roultone (2003) 
who demonstrates the adverse relation between directors'pay and insider trading. 
A by-product finding from the analysis indicates that there is an indication that the 
labour market for top management in FTSElOO might not be competitive. This 
conclusion is brought about by the positive association found between director's pay 
and his realized insider trading returns. However, this conclusion is subject to the 
definition of CAR used in the analysis. 
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PART IV: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
2-11 
Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusion and Implications 
(7.1) INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises this study and concludes its findings. It falls in five sections: 
Section one is the introduction. Section two summanses the theoretical backgrounds 
pertaining to the issues covered throughout this research and the findings of the 
previous literature regarding both research issues, 1. e. the information contents and 
managerial incentive of insider trading. The third section highlights the empirical 
findings of this study, while section four presents the implications of the findings and 
the generalisation of the research outcomes in terms of financial (investment strategies), 
managerial (corporate governance) and regulatory aspects (regulating the directors 
dealing and disclosure). Section five provides the limitations of this study and section 
six presents the recommendations for further research. 
(7.2) THEORETICAL SUMMARY 
In its economic essence 
, 
insider trading represents on one hand a signal of new 
information (to be) reflected in the stock price [section (3.3)]. On the other hand, it 
represents a challenge to the strong form of the EMH [section (3.2)]. Insiders can earn 
abnormal returns, or avoid abnon-nal loss, when they trade on their private information. 
In the context of the financial ethics, this privilege over other players in the market has 
been seen as ruling out the fairness of the game's rules. In addition, insider trading is 
also seen, from ethical viewpoint, as a misappropriation of the firm's infon-nation, 
harming outsiders and eroding the market confidence [section (2.3)]. These, in fact, 
ideological views but not practical ones. Hence, it is rather difficult to have a crystal 
clear support or otherwise oppose such views. 
If insider trading is a crime then it is a victimless one. That's why the legal theories 
behind the regulation of insider trading have been changed o\, er timc, either in the t-'K 
and USA, or in contincrital Europe. It was the equal access theory behind the regulation. 
ýind then changcd to the fiduciary duty and finally the misappropriation in t. 'K and USA. 
While that in Europe it was about protecting the coinpaiiy. then the market and finafl\, 
the information itself [scction (2.4)]. 
Insider trading regulation developed over time [section (2.5)]. In the UK, it started in 
1980, while in the USA it started in 1933. The latest CJA (1993) was enacted to 
implement the 89/592/EEC DIrectIve. In comparison NN-1th European counterparts 
[appendix (A2. I)], the UK's CJA (1993) is the most sophisticated act, not only in terms 
of its way of dealing with the incidence, but also in terms of its coverage of the various 
aspects relating to the issue [section (2.6)]. 
In addition, this study provides some institutional background on corporate governance 
issues that are related to the research hypothesis. These are the board remuneration 
[section (2.7)] and financial information disclosure [section (2.8)]. It shows that 
Cadbury report (1992) is the most influential document in corporate governance aspects 
of the British companies, such as board remuneration, structure, control, practice and 
monitoring. Other committees formed and reports were published to re-enforce Cadbury 
committee's recommendations, such as Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998). Two 
main conclusions can be drawn from these reports, which are related to this research, 
are: Firstly, managerial remunerations have to be decided by independent non-executive 
directors, and secondly the boards have to disclose not only the components of the 
compensation for each director, but also to justify and explain the measures of those 
performance-related components. However, none of these reports have come cross the 
concept of insider trading and its place in the corporate governance, as an implicit 
incentive component of the managerial compensation. 
Empirical literature [section (3.4)] finds that insider trading contains firm-related and/or 
economy-wide information and insiders do outperform the market, thus the market is 
not strongly efficient; however, outsiders mimicking insiders could not earn abnon-nal 
returns, thus the market is semi-strongly efficient. Twentieth century literature argues 
that insiders' abnormal returns are explained by subsequent news. Insiders buy prior to 
faN, ourable news and sell prior to unfavourable news. While Twenty-First centur%ý 
research finds that insiders buy after unusual bad stock perfon-nance and sell after 
abnormal good stock performance. 
The UK literaturc on insider trading is lagged behind the USA oi-ie, not onl-v in terms of 
tile extent of this literature, but also in terms of the aspccts that havc been inx, -cstigated 
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till now. The current level of literature provides an ample field for more UK studies on 
the various aspects of all type of insiders, not only directors' trade. 
This research discussed the non-signalling theory behind the research hypothesis. That 
is the Agency Theory [section (4.2)] and the possibility of considenng insider trading as 
a managerial incentive. The research has analysed the principal-agent model [section 
(4.2.1)], the incentive theory [section (4.2.2)], the agency problems and costs, and the 
position of insider trading within these agency concepts. In addition, it has rc\-ie\\. ed the 
relevant theoretical literature that backed the possible consideration of insider trading as 
a managerial incentive. 
Literature shows that in the context of prmcipal-agent problem, insider trading can be 
used as a mechanism to alleviate the conflict of interest between the managers and the 
shareholders while (1) increasing shareholders' welfare, (2) improving shareholders' 
control over their finn, (3) concluding an optimal contracting, i. e. increasing managers' 
efforts level, and (4) enhancing the investment decision in the firm. 
(7.3) EMPIRICAL FINDINGS CONCLUSION, 
This research has examined the short-term profitability of FTSE 100 directors trading in 
their own firm's ordinary shares and executive shares options, over recent years (1999 to 
2000), employing event study methodology to measure cumulative abnormal returns 
and taking into account different signals definition. Using the simple MM's parameters 
in the CAPM, the results of ordinary share portfolios are similar to those obtained by 
previous literature used the same methodology. Namely, directors' trading in their own 
firrn's ordinary shares is significantly profitable. This finding does strongly support the 
view that, on one hand, corporate directors do have inside price-sensitive infort-nation 
that the market does not have, and that they earn significant statistically cumulative 
abnormal returns from directly trading on this information in the stock exchange. On the 
other hand, the market does perceive directors trading as a signal. Directors' buying 
indicates good news and, hence, the market appreciates the share prices. As directors' 
selling represents a bad neN\'s, the market depreciates the share priccs. The market, in 
fact, reacts to this news as soon as it is disclosed. 
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As for executive share options portfolios. the results are different in that, directors 
holding or selling the exercised ESO is not profitable, in the short tenn. to the extent 
that there appears to be no significant market reaction around the director tradings' 
disclosure. Three reasons are expected to explain these findings. The first is due to the 
contractual nature of the kind of shares. The second is due to the long-term nature of 
ESO, which needs to be investigated in the long-term sense. Finally, the small number 
of transactions in each ESO portfolio might have driven the results away from a 
representative, significant statistically, mean of the abnon-nal returns. 
Two important conclusions are suggested by employing different signal methodologies. 
These are first, different signal definitions produce different results, not only in terms of 
the level and sign of CAR, but also in terrns of the significance of the statistical results. 
On one hand, multiple and quantitative signals produced significant CARs at earlier 
days than single signal. This leads to suggest that the market reacts significantly sooner 
to successive signals than to a single signal. On the other hand, none of the other signals 
produce significantly results that reject (accept) what has been accepted (rejected) by 
the single signal. The results of three tests, parametric and non-parametric, about the 
equality of the means of CARs of SS and of MS, QSI, QS2, QS3 and QS4 might lead to 
suggest that while the magnitude of CARs across various signals is identical, the time 
when these CARs becomes significant is varied. CARs of compounded signals (MS and 
QSs) are significant at earlier days in the event window, while those of single signal 
(SS) are significant at later days in the event window. 
Second, each signal definition requires certain data frequency. Single signal produces 
robust results when daily data are used, while those of multiple and quantitative signals 
are mixed. Monthly data is recommended with multiple signals, whereas both monthly 
and daily data can be used with quantitative signal. 
It seems that employing single signal definition with daily data produces not only 
significant results, but also higher level of rates of return. The empirical results of this 
study, along with most recent studies [Friedench et al. (2002) and Hillier and Marshall 
(2002/a)] shows. in general, that annual CARs of directors trading are sI, InIficantIN- 
much areater than those of old UK literature. On one hand. directors bu-. \,, Ing ordinary 0 
shares portfolio earn an annual rate of CAR of 22.10%. 25.48"o in Friederich ct al. 
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(2002) and 25.05% in Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), compared with IS. "Slo in Ki Iý, I ing 
and Roefl (1988), 9.23% in Gregory et al. (1994), 5.80% in Pope et al. (1990) and 
4.92% in Gregory et al. (1997). On the other hand, directors selling ordinary shares 
avoid them an annual loss of 
-48.80%, compared with -18.98% in Friederich et al. 
(2002)ý 
-14.86% in Hillier and Marshall (2002/a), 
-13.38% in Pope et al. (1990), and 
- 
5.75% in King and Roell (1988), 
-4.51% in Gregory et al. (1994) and 
-0.72% in 
Gregory et al. (1997). 
It is understood that the above are approximates since that, firstly, this study cumulates 
daily data while others cumulate monthly. Secondly, annual CAR calculation is based 
on an assumption that the same CAR level will be repeated 22 times yearly, while other 
UK literature cumulate the abnormal returns for 12 months, except Pope et al. (1990) 
for 6 months. However, the above presentation suggests that the empirical findings of 
this study are consistent with UK literature, as well as with those of USA. 
The results of this study have been checked on by re-running the analysis taking into 
account thin trading, confounding events, year-by-year analysis, and firin size. The 
robustness check analysis shows that there is no thin trading problem in the sample 
securities. There is no finn key event/announcement co-occurred with the director 
dealing transactions, thus the director dealing abnorrnal returns are not a result of other 
events. In addition, the robustness analysis provides evidence that smaller firrns 
outperfon-n larger ones, particularly in the longer event windows of buying transactions. 
It seems that the market reacts faster to small fin-n's director selling than to their buying 
or to their counterparts in larger firins. This might lead to support the argument that the 
information contents of director dealings in small finns is at a higher level of premium 
than in larger firins. Finally, the robustness check indicates that directors' buying in the 
year 2000 outperfonns those in 1999. However, the year 1999 was a successful selling 
year for FTSE 100 directors. In conclusion, the robustness analysis supports the 
empirical findings of the single signal market-model, particularly in terms of the sign 
and significance of the abnormal returns. However, the level of the returns may \, ary. 
In the contcxt of ENIH, insider trading presents a challenging issue. On one hand, the 
empirical results of this study, in addition to other L-K Ii iterature shows clear]-v that the 
stock cxchanoc is significantly inefficient in terms of the strong levc] of market 
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efficiency. Namely, some market participants, i. e. insiders. are more informed about the 
current or future market value of the firm than others, i. e. outsiders. This is in contrast 
with the strong level of efficiency, v, 'hich indicates that the current market price fairly 
reflects all infori-nation about the past, current and future perspective of the firm, which 
are available to all market participants. And, thus, trading upon such information is not 
profitable. 
On the other hand, the evidence advocating the insignificant semi-strong level of market 
efficiency is rather weak. The availability of abnon-nal returns to outsiders following the 
publicly known infori-nation, viz. insiders' transactions can be seen as a direct test to the 
semi-strong level of market efficiency. The empirical results, reported in section (5.6), 
indicate that abnormal returns can be earned by outsiders' imitating insiders' 
transactions. However, taking into account the transaction cost, such returns \vould end 
up with zero, if not negative returns. For example, significantly 0.46% AR of buy 
portfolio at t8 becomes negative when deducting 2% transaction cost [e. g. Friederich el 
al. (2002), Gregory et al. (1997), Jaffe (1974), Pope et al. (1990), Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) and Seyhun (1986)]. Moreover, the bid-ask spread represents another cost to be 
taking into account when considering such an active trading strategy [Seyhun (1986)]. 
In conclusion, except for the executive share options (BEO and SSO) portfolios, the 
empirical results clearly and significantly reject the null hypothesis that directors trading 
in their own company's securities are not profitable. Instead they suggest the alternative 
hypotheses that directors buying portfolios achieve positive abnormal return and those 
of selling ones avoid negative abnormal returns. 
This research presented the second part of the empirical results of this study. It began 
Nvith introducing the managenal incentive of insider trading model such that as the 
number of insiders in the finn increases, competition to insider trading increases and 
each insider's expected returns decreases. On the other hand, as number of insiders' 
increases, the explicit form of director's compensation should increase to offset his 
insider trading returns decreases. This concept. forinulated in section (6.2). leads to an 
empirically testable assumption that the director's expected compensation has two 
forms, (1) an explicit forin (salary, bonuses, perks and other e. ýV ante measurable 
Incel-itivc, s) which is predicted to be positi\-ely correlated with the number of insiders, 
" 
and (2) an implicit form (his expected insider trading returns) which Is predicted to be 
negatively correlated with the number of insiders in his firm. 
The empirical prediction, presented in a multivariate model, was tested using FTSE 100 
CEOs data. The data and the justification behind using each and every dependent and 
independent variable in the test are discussed. Also, the variables for the regression I 
model, which is used to explain the relationship between the CEO explicit forni of 
compensation (dependent variable) and the number of insiders in his finn, as well as his 
personal and job characteristics (independent variables), are analysed and assessed. 
The empirical tests of the conceptual framework were made more informative and 
powerful by vanable selection resulted in 7 models. The use of univariate analysis and 
multiple regression analysis has shown the explanatory power of the model fon-nulated 
in this study. 
The results were very much in favour of the model. The positive relation between the 
explicit forms of CEO compensation and the number of insiders in the UK FTSE 100 
firms was found to be quite robust. That is, the significant relation does not depend on 
(1) whether the model accounts for CEO internal experience and industry sector, (11) 
whether the model accounts for CEO's capacity to trade and his actual insider trading 
returns, and (Iii) whether an omitted variables problem is accounted for by using panel 
data. This leads to conclude that insider trading is an integral part of the director's total 
compensation package, and thus, can be considered as a managerial incentive. 
Model specifications used in this study are novel, however, the empirical results of this 
Study are consistent with those of currently available empirical literature, such that of 
Hebiier and Kato (1997) on the 1985 Japanese and 1986 US CEOs data. In fact. this 
study finds robust results than those reported by Hebner and Kato, particularly when 
using the panel data analysis. 
This empirical conclusion supports the theoretical framework of, for example. Bebuck 
and Fershtrnan (1994) who show that insider trading can be part of the optimal 
compensation scheme, Starks (1987) who finds that the s\-ni metric 
-contracts (contracts 
allo\\, in,,,, insider trading) dominates the bonus-contracts (contracts not allowino 
trading) in aligning the director's interest with those of investors: and Oilstone (20W 
who demonstrates the adverse relation between directors'pay and insider trading, 
A by-product finding from the analysis indicates that there is an indication that the 
labour market for top management in FTSE 100 might not be competitiN. C. This 
conclusion is brought about by the positiý,, e association found between director's pay 
and his realized insider trading returns. However, this conclusion is subject to the 
definition of CAR used in the analysis. 
(7.4) IMPLICATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main implications of the findings of this research can be extracted from its 
contribution, such that the empirical results show that the level, sigriificance and 
direction of the abnormal return (loss) earned (avoided) by director dealing is subject to 
signal definition. 
Another implication comes about from the data used, daily security' return index, 
instead of share prices. In fact, there are two reasons for using securities returns instead 
of share prices. Firstly, security returns are complete and scale-free summary of the 
investment opportunity. Secondly, security returns have more attractive statistical 
properties than prices, such as stationarity. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
Datastream's security return indices, used in this study, are computationally more 
efficient than share prices. The distribution of the indices' time-series is a Student-t, 
uniflon-n, but not necessarily is a normal distribution. 
A third implication is brought about by the new set of data used in this study. That is a 
post-1993 Justice Act of insider trading. On hand, an investigation into the legality of 
the directors dealing employed in the analysis shows that almost all trades were legal 
and occurred outside the "close-period" specified by the law. Hovvever, there is a need 
to investigate other types of insider trades, such as firm's bankers, auditors and ]a,, \-\, ers. 
On the other hand, the empirical findings of director dealing analysis might su,,,, cst that 
relevant re. L. 1
,, 
Ulation, including 19931 Justice Act, is not about prohibiting, but it is about 
rcgulating the timing of insider trading. Also, the 1993 Justicc Act has not deter the D 
-), )g 
directors from trading on their pnvate infori-nation, however this information miaht not 1. 
be related to recent key firrn's event/announcement. 
In terms of the managerial incentive of insider trading, an important implication of this 
research is that the fin-n's remuneration committee has to take directors dealing into 
consideration when setting the management compensation package. 
Moreover, a by-product finding from the analysis implied that there is an indicatioll that 
the labour market for top management in FTSE 100 might not be competitive. This 
conclusion is brought about by the positive association found between director's paý, 
and his realized insider trading returns. 
Finally, all the corporate governance reports admitted the importance of ESO as a 
mechanism to align the divergence of interests between management and shareholders, 
none, however, has come across the terminology of insider trading as another 
mechanism to align interests or as a managerial incentive. 
7. MITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Insider trading can be researched from different angels, mentioned below, than those 
formulated in this thesis. That a boundary has to be established to control for the 
conceptual structure formulated in this study. This boundary maintains the focus on the 
conceptual framework of detecting the infon-nation contents of insider trading by 
measuring the short-term profitability, and examining insider trading by directors as a 
managerial incentive by considering the long-term incentives. 
This study is placed on a major concept in formulating the framework: the information 
asymmetry, xN! hich is a well-establi shed paradigm in finance (e. g. signal theory) and 
management (e. g. agency theory) sciences, and widely empirically examined in the 
literature. This emphasis, however, does not undermine other issues existing in insider 
trading literature, such as: 
(1) Insider trading behaviour around specific firm-related events 
(i) Earnings/dividends announcements. 
o (11) Mcr-cr and acquisition. 
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Oll) Leverage buyout and self-tender offering. 
(v) Equity offering. 
(iv) Stock split. 
(vi) Corporate bankruptcy. 
(vil) Market listing/delisting. 
(2) The roles, measures and effectiveness of relevant regulations. 
(3) Insider trading effects on bid/ask spreads. 
(4) Insider trading timing, seasonal pattern and distribution. 
(5) Insider trading in stock market flotation, i. e. initial public offerings (IPO) and 
unseasoned equity offerings (UEO). 
(6) Ethical views of insider trading. 
Moreover, this research is limited to those companies listed on the secondary market 
and ordinary shares, either through open market operations or executive share options. 
The main reason behind the intuition for not addressing these issues empirically is the 
lack of publicly available precise data. This is a technical problem related to the 
availability of sufficient data for cross-sectional and time-series calculations, and for 
accurate and timely data regarding directors' compensation and dealing. 
(7.6) DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research reviewed the current literature to help future research in recogmsIng the 
different aspects, issues and methods addressed in the literature. Heuristically, one 
might detect a new way to investigate this subject. This study, as well as all relevant 
literature follows the positivism approach. A broader view of the issue might help in 
establishing not only a different way to address the issue, i. e. phenomenological 
approach, but also a different methodology to analyse insider-trading aspects, i. e. 
qualitative techniques. 
The UK literature on insider trading is lagged behind the USA one, not only in terrns of 
the extent of this literature, but also in terms of the aspects that have been invcstigated 
vct. The current level of literature provides an ample field for more UK studies on the 
various aspects of all type of insiders. not only directors, trade. such as: 
(1) Insider trading behavIOLir around specific firm-related evcnts, such as: 
Levcrýioc buyout and self-tender offenng, 
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(11) Equity offering. 
(111) Stock split. 
Ov) Corporate bankruptcy. 
(v) Market Ii sting/del i sting. 
(2) The roles, measures and effectiveness of relevant regulations. 
(3) Insider trading effects on bid/ask spreads. 
(4) Insider trading in stock market flotation, i. e. initial public offerincy's (IPO) and 
unseasoned equity offerings (UEO). 
Most importantly is that more research is needed to investigate the equality of means of 
CARs produced by various signals definition. Also, an interesting research would 
examine the incremental changes in the share prices due to two or more subsequent 
signals. Such investigation, in fact, might be considered as a test of whether the market 
has a memory. 
The empirical findings of this study in terins of the managerial incentive of insider 
trading, might suggest that the weak relation between management pay and their firm 
performance found in the most empirical pay-perforinance literature might be due to the 
ignorance of the implicit part of the managerial pay, i. e. insider trading. Thus, insider 
trading would be among the explanatory variables in the pay-performance model that 
might explain that relationship assumed by the Agency Theory. 
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APPENDIX (A2.1) 
INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN MAJOR 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
This appendix reviews the development of insider trading regulations in the main European countries. The EEC Directive referred to be the EEC Directive 89 592/ EEC, 
which is outlined in section (2.6) of chapter 2. 
The first Irish legislative prohibition of insider trading was provided in Part V of the CA 1990. Previously, insider-trading regulations had followed the English legislation'. 
On the French side of the English Channel, the Ordinance of 28/9/1967, particularly Article 10-1, was the first governing regulation-prohibiting insider trading in France. In 
1970, the new Law of 23/12/1970 was enacted to amend the above Ordinance. 
However, it was remained without application until 1975, it had had major changes by Law No. 83-1 of 3/1/1983, Law No. 88-70 of 22/1/1988, and Law No. 89-531 of 2/8/198 92 
. 
The later amendment gave the governmental securities exchanges authority; Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), the power to impose sanctions for 
violations of the regulations it may issue. Based upon the EEC Directive, COB issued Regulation No. 90-08 of 17/7/1990 on the use of inside infon-nation3 
, 
and amended it by 
Regulation No. 92-03 of 10/6/1992. In short, insider trading in France is governed by 
two sets of rules: the judiciary regulations, i. e. the 1967 Ordinance, and the 
administrative regulations, i. e. COB Regulations4. 
Surprisingly Germany has had no statutory regulations governing insider trading. 
However, there were "Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines", which came intoforce at 
the end of 1971, "Rules for Traders and Advisers", and "Rules of Procedures". 
Following the EEC Directive, the Gennan Governinent adopted a Draft Code on insider 5 trading, which was enacted in June 1994 
. 
Likewise, Italy had no legislation on insider trading before the EEC Directive. However 
Law No. 216 of 7/6/1974,, Article 17 in particular, is the only general rule related 
somehow to the use of privileged infon-nation. It is merely a disclosure provision,, 
requiring that listed firms should inform the Italian Commission for Companies and 
Stock Exchange, Coininissione Nationale per la Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB), of the 
amount of shares directly or indirectly owned by the listed firm's directors, auditors, 
Dudley and Casey (1994), p. 145 
I ýnless completely replaced, the reference in the French Law is alwavs be to the original lav-,. even 
though it has many amendments. 
In order to prepare the COB Regulations in accordance with the EEC Directive, the French Finance 
Minister established a commission on ethics in the securities exchanges (CoInInission de Deontologie 
Bow-sicrc), commonly known as Coininission", for preparing vanous proposals in this regard. 
" For the current status and development of the French insider trading regulations, see Borde ( 1994). and 
WN-111cer"ch (1991). 
For the current status and development of the German insider trading regulations, see Assmann (1994), 
Heins itis ( 1994). and Schwarze ( 199 1 ). 
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and managerS6 
. 
The implementation of the EEC Directive has come through the 
enforcement of Law No. 157 of 17/5/1991, and in CONSOB Regulation No. 5 553 of 
14/1 1/19917. 
Switzerland did not recognised the unethical and criminal aspects of illegal insider 
trading until 1988 when insider trading became punishable through introducing Article 8 161 of the Swiss Criminal Code 
In Spain, Stock Market Law No. 24/1988 of 28/7/1988 sometimes referred to as the 
Capital Market Act (CMA), was the first regulation dealing generally \N'Ith the issue of 9 
insider trading 
. 
Following the EEC Directive, the CMA was modified by Law No. 
9/1991 of 27/3/1991 to incorporate the Directive's guidelineslo. 
In the Netherlands, the provisions relating to insider trading were introduced in 
Articles 335 and 336a of the Dutch Criminal Code in 16/2/1989. These Articles were 
moved to the Securities Transactions Supervision Act (STSA), Wet Tbeziclit 
Effectenverkeer, in 1/7/1992. However, the Model Code 1986 on insider trading, 
promulgated by the Stock Exchange Association, Vereniging Voor de Effectenhandel, 
as well as the European Options Exchange Association 1978, Vereniging European, and 
the Regulations for Members of the Association 1991, Lendenreglement, each contain 
some administrative rules relating to insider trading 
The Danish Act on the Stock Exchange has included a sanction against insider trading 
since 1987. Before that, different but separate provisions dealing with insider trading 
were found in various acts, such as the Act on Contract, the Criminal Code, and the Act 
on Limited Companies. By adoption of the EEC Directive, Act No. 343 of 6/6/1991 has 
been introduced to incorporate the Directive's provisions' 2. 
Last, but not least, Articles 14-1 and 14-2 of the Internal Rules of the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange, issued by the Ministerial Decree of 20/11/1987, were the first 
provisions to deal with insider trading. The 3/5/1991 Law was then enacted which 13 
closely follows the EEC Directive 
6 Alessi (1991), p. 160. 
7 Solimena (1994), p. 79. 
8 I'aver-mer (1994). p. 91. 
9 In Fact, Article 12 of the Roval Decree No. 1848 of 5 9'1980, which was fully included in the new 
Royal Decree of 241111984. was the first Spanish regulation dealt directly with one forms of the insider 
trading. That is the take-over bids. It required that all persons knowing of a forthcoming take-over bid to 
kccp it secret until its disclosure, and to refrain from carrying out anY transactions oil terms other than 
those of the actual take-overbid. [See Zurita (1991), p. 187]. 
'0 Prol ( 1994), p. 180. 
" Serier (I 9Q4), p. 109. 
12 Christensen ( 1994), p. I', 
II Bi\-cr (I QQ4), P. I -, I- 
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Appendix (A5.1) Statistical Descriptive of F17SEIOO Securities Daily Return 
Ind 
- - 
ices and Market Index During th Estima tion Perio d 16/6/1998 
- 
23//3/1999 
R 
= 201 d Company's 
Mean 
Standard 
erial # Name Stat. I StdError Min Max Deviation Skewnss Kurtosis I 
Rm FTALLSH RI 0.03% 0.0009 
-3.18% 3.87% 0.0130 -0-0037 0.4078 
4 3j Group 0.00% 0.0015 
-8.48% 10.67% 0. () 
-1 1 ý, ()4119 40IS22 9 Abbey National 0.15% 0.0018 
-8-13% 7.12",, 
. 0.0 25 6 OIRR 0.8797 
64 J Allied Dornecq 
-0.07% 0.0017 - 13-64`0 10.40010 0,02 17 6.9995 
67 j Allied Zurich (ZURN) 0.05% 0.0028 
-11.41% 12.82",, ) 0.0338 0ý2003 2.2428 
79 AMVESCAP 0.07% 0.0028 
- 
13.2 6 11'o 18.93% 0.0404 0,40-18 2.7040 
85 Anglo American 0.08% 0.0019 
-7.97% 10.50% 0.0276 0.602- 2.1393 
101 ARM Holdings 0.66% 0.0028 
-15-50% 20.96% 0.0399 0. ý,, 1) () 
-1 ý*;, 5 140 
114 Associated British Foods 
-0-09% 0.0022 -9.38% 8.98% 0.0309 0.15 o. 4982 
117 j AstraZeneca 0.04% 0.0015 
-5.43% 7.59% 0.0213 0.2493 wý, -117 
137 J BAA 0.00% 0.0012 
-5-56% 5.81% 0.0171 0.1822 0.9501 
139 J BAE Systems 
-0.03% 0.0024 -13.78% 11.05% 0.0341 0,091/0 1.7826 
147 l Baltimore Technologies 0.49% 0.0033 
-12.83% 30.10% 0.0469 1.6667 
150 j Barclays 0.08% 0.0022 
-8.28% 9.60% 0.0316 0.1496 0.336(. ) 
157 j Bass 
-0.02% 0.0020 -11.80% 7.96% 0.0288 -0.21-40 1.9011 
185 J BG Group 0.08% 0.0015 
-8.24% 7.70% 0.0219 -0-0028 1.6143 
186 j Billiton 0.14% 0.0023 
-8.48", (') 15.35% 0.0328 1.3402 3.6868 
201 I Blue Circle Industries 0.04% 0.0020 
- 
16.8 8 8.82% 0.0286 
-0.7002 6.0754 
203 J BOC Group 0.02% 0.0015 
-5.68% 8.441', ý 0.0216 0.3429 0.7037 
211 I The Boot Company 
-0.05% 0.0014 -6.06% 9.47% 0.0203 0.4572 2.0513 
217 JBP Amoco 0.11% 0.0014 
-4.89% 9.90% 0.0202 0.7095 2.4489 
236 jBritish Airways 
-0.20% 0.0020 -8.62% 7.60% 0.0289 -0.1419 0.1352 
237 British American Tobacco 0.34% 0.0027 
-6.19% 38.07% 0.0383 
_5.0790 
47.4835 
246 British Sky Broadcasting 
Group 
0.13% 0.0017 
-9.24% 14.60% 0.0243 0.7299 7.5931 
249 British 
Telecommunications 
0.25% 0.0018 
-5.41% 11.18% 0.0252 0.4591 0.9990 
280 Cable & Wireless 0.12% 0.0023 
-10.22% 9.92% 0.0329 -0.0117 1.3387 
281 Cadbury Schweppes 0.04% 0.0015 
-4.77% 7.28% 0.0214 0.6015 0.8530 
309 Capita Group (The) 0.18% 0.0019 
-13.23% 8.64% 0.0270 -0.7780 -18028 
324 Carlton Communications 0.07% 0.0019 
-8.23% 8.92% 0.0272 0.4158 0.8656 
331 Celltech Group 0.11% 0.0020 
-11.16% 13.92% 0.0287 1.3041 7.1902 
336 Centrica 0.07% 0.0015 
-6.46% 9.33% 0.0220 0.5842 2.2963 
338 CGNU 
-0.01% 0.0022 -9.38% 12.77% 0.0315 0.2865 1.5421 
376 CMG 0.09% 0.0027 
-28.46% 11.61% 0.0390 -1.8869 14.8513 
386 1COLT Telecom Group 0.40% 0.0033 
-17.89% 14.49% 0.0467 -0.1832 0.9982 
402 lCorus Group 0.03% 0.0020 
-7.21% 13.92% 0.0280 0.7093 3.0964 
423 Daily Mail and General 
Trust 
0.14% 0.0017 
-7.58% 8.01% 0.0239 0.2232 1.8605 
403 Dixon GrOLIP 0.51% 0.0020 
-7.64% 13.72% 0.0277 0.6937 2.8970 
523 EMAP 0.10% 0.0017 
-7.62% 5.77% 0.0241 -0.4980 1.1944 
525 EM I Group 
-0.02% 0.0022 -15.41% 16.84% 0.0308 0.2210 6.9258 
526 Energis 0.43% 0.0029 
-14.19% 15.62% 0.0418 0.2966 1.7179 
553 1 Exel 0.11% 0.0014 
-5.76% 7.42% 0.0195 0.1276 2.2707 
657 JGKN 0.15% 0.0021 
-7.78% 9.41% 0.0297 0.3382 0.7202 
688 jGlaxo Wellcome 0.07% 0.001 
-1; -6.83% 10.15% 
0.0216 0.62-47 3.4363 
710 lGranada Group 0.08% 0.0019 
-8.57% 1,0.51% 0.0264 0 3620 1.5323 
713 lGreat Universal Stores 
-0.01% 0.0019 -8.31% 12.69% 0.0265 0.7482 2 -583 
731 111alifax group 0.01% 0.0015 -5.22",, o 6.5,1 0.0217 0.2064 0.2156 
73Q Ilianson 0.21% 0.0016 
-6.02% 12.70"o 0.0229 0.8349 40318 
751 11lays 0.1611o 0.0024 
-10.089/0 12.27',, 0.0333 0.131-0 1 246 
,9 
78S 1 1-lilton Group 
-0.040o 0.0023 -9. ý9, /() 1(). 4, ý, ) 0.0322 0.9303 35 136 
799 11AS13C Holdinýs 0.2 2 1',, 0.0021 
-7.191 0.0305 0.4725 1 1.1906 
813 Imperial Chernical 
Industries 
-0.231)o 0.0022 -14.38"', 110. ý, Q, )O 0.0319 0.0695 2 , '-o)4 
831 lfl\ C11SN S O-Oloo (W026 -12.97 13.020,, 0.0371 0.1961 1.8-'. ', 5 
8 
,, 
()9 glisher King 0,240o 0.0020 -8.00"', 11.23",, 
W02-8 (1 -; 186 1.1 -4 1 
911 1-and Sccurities 
-0,00"', 0.0011 -400"(, 0.0154 0.4398 0112 
Q23 1 era] Group 
-egal &, 
Gen 0.10% 0.0022 
-12.01 . 12.07",, 0.0314 -1 ý1 1ý C 
Q44 1 lo\ ds TSB GrOL111 0.090/0 O. Oo22 
-8.6911 11.75(/u 
--- 
0.0312 0 s'. 44(o 1 
-1551 
Q4() 1 OýIcli 0.3-4% -- -15-ol",, -1 -0.9 
3 -ý, 1. ý 0.11% () ()() 1 -o -8 -420, ) 11.97% -1 11 1 1) ()-"- (-, _; I, -) 
1 
Z. 
-I - 
084 %jal-K, 
. 
11id SI)cii,, cr t)U 17 -13-06"o 1 5.17% (1(), 41) -1 3L', 4 5.5 8 
200 
1040 Misys 0. () 7 0.0031 
-25,5 8 'ý, o 17.20,,, 0.044,, -0.9300 7 
1082 National Gnid Group 0.08% 0.0013 
-6.06,,, ý 4 0.0 1"ý 0.0-1-o 0 
1083 International Power 
-0.07% 0.0014 -6 00", 5.73% 0.0196 0.1111 402,; 
1120 Nycomed Amersham 0.14% 0.0021 
-8.000/0 8.13"o 0.029-' O_OK",  0.0()-, -, 
1159 Pearson 0.11% 0.0017 
-8.06% 7,59% -0.01-7 , f) Iq 94 1161 Peninsular &Oriental 
Steam Navigation Co. 
0.06% 0.0019 
-7-68% 13.96% 0 (12 ("1 0.8500 4 o2-'7 
1220 Prudential 0.06% 0.0018 
-11.36% 6.11% 0,02ý, o - 
1222 Psion 0.92% 0.0044 
-12.14% 50.44" 
- 
0 062ýý 4.1183 27.7290 
1247 Railtrack Group 0.13% 0.0016 
-5.20(, 10.07% 0.6705 2.2-414 
1254 l Reckitt Benckiser 
-0.24% 0.0016 - 14.29"/(, 87 8' " OJ)225 -0 18544 
1261 l Reed Intemational 0.03% 0.0018 
-6.22% 8,42(ý __ 0.0260 0.9W2 
1270 l Rentokil Initial 0.02% 0.0021 
-10.70% 7.64'!, ý 0.0296 0.3121 
1272 1 Reuters Group 0.15% 0.0023 
- 
11.5 4 11,28(ýo 0.032, 0.17 25 1.6714 
1279 l Rio Tinto 0.15% 0.0015 
-5.23% 5.48% 0.0214 0.1443 0.007" 
1288 ] Rolls-Royce 0.04% 0.0018 
-8.16% 9.650"0 0,02 55 0.3572 2.091 ,- 
1296 l Royal & Sun Alliance 
Insurance Group 
0.01% 0.0023 
-11.69% 911 1 
-71 
0 0.0319 0.0781 1.1308 
1297 l Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group 
0.13% 0.0021 
-8.06% 8.400() 0.0297 0.0 0 ý, ' 0 03699 
1311 1 Sage Group (I 269m) 0.24% 0.0023 
-12.16% 10.84% 0.0320 -0.3800 2,8714 
1312 I Sainsbury (J) 
-0.11% 0.0015 -8.39% 5.80% 0.0207 -o. ý"78 1.5706 
1327 I Schroders (226m) 
-0,01% 0.0026 -11.56% 12.32% 0.0368 0.0516 O. Q36ý, 
1332 I Scottish & Newcastle 
-0.06% 0.0016 -6.39% 9.141ý, o 0.02 
, 
26 0.3511 1.3 5 28 
1333 Scottish & Southern 
Energy 
0.07% 0.0013 
-7.68% 9.11% 0.0178 0.4971 4.6623 
1340 Scottish Power 0.04% 0.0014 
-9.77% 11 931, 'o 0.0205 0.7319 7 
1357 Sema 0.11% 0.0031 
-22-64% 14 83()() 0.0435 -0.4706 4.3404 
1372 Shefl Transport and 
. 
Trading Co 
0.02% 0.0017 
-6.93% 9.551!, 0 0.0248 0.7299 1.9884 
1402 ISmithkline Beecham 0.10% 0.0017 
-5.89% 8.09% 0.0241 0.2508 0.3352 
1403 ISmith Group 0.07% 0.0020 
-10.05% 11.64% 0.0278 0.1721 2.4 551 
1407 ISouth African Breweries 1.41% 0.0074 
-1.92% 9.54% 0.0307 1.1369 1.5932 
1425 IStandard Chartered 0.25% 0.0027 
-13.63% 13-62% 0.0381 0.0895 1.1733 
1442 ISun Life and Provincial 
Holdings 
0.16% 0.0020 
-9.36% 11-11% 0.0288 0.0784 0.8943 
1475 ITelewest Communication 0.43% - 0.0030 
-9.94% 22-41% 0.0420 0.7734 3.48-40 
1484 Tesco 
-0.02% 0.0017 -7.83% 5.94% 0.0240 0.0564 0.2746 
1545 Unilever 
-0.06% 0.0018 -7.63% 9.24% 0.0249 0.4743 1.4393 
1550 United Business Media 
-0.14% 
. 
0.0018 
-7.69% 7, 
. 
26% 0.0253 0.1552 0.3129 
1552 United Utilities ($) 
-0.01% 0.0013 -10.96% 10.21% 0.0181 -0.2718 11.2910 
1573 Vodafone Group 0.24% 0.0022 
-11.04% 14.69% 0.0318 0.4654 3.7171 
1621) Woolwich 0.11% 0.0014 
-5.51% 7.03% 0.0192 0.2642 1.2109 
1632 JWPP Group 0.19% 0.0024 
-15.30% 13.97% 0.0339 -0.0490 3,0570 
Average 96 securities 0.11% 0.0021 
-9.75% 11.41% 0.0286 0.2983 3.3861 
Percentile 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 
Rl's 
-0.0023 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0008 0.0015 0.0044 0.0094 
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Appendix (A5.2) Statistical Descriptive of FTSEIOO Security Return Indices and 
FFALLSH I ndex During t e Test Period 1/4/1999 
- 
31/8/2_0_00 
N=370 days Company's Mean Standard 
Serial# Name statistic StdEror Minimum Maximum Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Rm FTALLSH RI 0.04% 0.0005 
-3.18% 2.30% 0.0100 -0.2445 0.2525 
4 3i Group 0.31% 0.0014 
-9.01% 18.05% 1 0.0263 0.7358 6.0642 9 Abbey National 
-0.06% 0.0014 -8.54% 11.00% 0.0269 0.4596 1.7749 64 Allied Dornecq 0.09% 0.0014 
-9.35% 15.34% 0.0269 0.9981 1 4.8897 67 Allied Zurich (ZURN) 0.04% 0.0011 
-7.62% 12.88% 0.0215 0.5720 4.1885 
79 AMVESCAP 0.26% 0.0015 
-8.05% 12.64% 0.0293 0.3552 1.8939 85 Anglo American 0.20% 0.0013 
-8.78% 9.50% 0.0245 0.2049 1.7586 
101 ARM Holdings 0.61% 0.0026 
-14,03% 20.71% 0.0496 0.6373 2.0847 
114 Associated British Foods 0.05% 0.0015 
-9.22% 17.85% 0.0282 1.1122 5.4343 
117 AstraZeneca 0.04% 0.0011 
-10.06% 9.89% 0.0209 0.0110 1 2.9385 
137 BAA 
-0.02% 0.0012 -17.48% 16.05% 0.0225 -0.0811 1 17.1811 
139 BAE Systems 0.05% 0.0013 
-7.78% 11.83% 0.0259 0.2802 2.3741 
147 Baltimore Technologies 0.78% 0.0029 
-24.42% 24.09% 0.0553 0.1524 2.4836 
150 Barclays 0.03% 0.0013 
-7.62% 9.19% 0.0251 0.3859 0.8080 
157 Bass 
-0.02% 0.0011 -6.52% 6.78% 0.0218 0.1727 0.5698 
185 BG Group 0.09% 0.0013 
-9.07% 10.40% 0.0251 0.4316 1.4496 
186 Billiton 0.22% 0.0017 
-11.00% 17.84% 0.0327 0.6694 3.5393 
201 Blue Circle Industries 0.09% 0.0014 
-19.79% 20.52% 0.0263 0.5163 18.5898 
203 BOC Group 0.08% 0.0010 
-12.38% 10.33% 0.0183 -0.6945 12.6370 
211 The Boot Company 
-0.10% 0.0012 -9.05% 12.18% 0.0233 0.8362 4.3574 
217 BP Amoco 0.09% 0.0011 
-5.95% 9.69% 0.0211 0.3771 1.4518 
236 British Airways 
-0.02% 0.0012 -7.13% 9.79% 0.0240 0.4055 1.1685 
237 British American Tobaco 0.04% 0.0017 
-11.49% 12.55% 0.0326 0.5519 1.6107 
246 British Sky Broadcasting 
Group 
0.29% 0.0020 
-11.76% 18.59% 
1 
0.0387 0.6658 2.8656 
249 British Telecorrin-i-tions 0.01% 0.0016 
-17.98% 12.30% 1 0.0307 -0.1658 3.9206 
280 Cable & Wireless 0.19% 0.0018 
-8.63% 17.28% 0.0349 0.7854 2.2735 
281 Cadbury Schweppes 0.00% 0.0012 
-8.82% 10.23% 0.0223 0.4983 2.8314 
309 Capita Group (The) 0.25% 0.0017 
-14.97% 18.08% 0.0323 0.8717 6.5419 
324 Carlton Corni-nunications 0.10% 0.0015 
-8.54% 15.28% 0.0284 0.6759 3.0770 
331 Celltech Group 0.41% 0.0019 
-13.58% 17.45% 0.0368 0.0896 3.9906 
336 Centrica 0.27% 0.0014 
-7.74% 16.60% 0.0264 0.8791 4.6989 
338 CGNU 0.07% 0.0012 
-7.10% 11.49% 0.0229 0.4998 2.3326 
376 CMG 0.37% 0.0020 
-19.51% 27.80% 0.0393 1 1.0213 9.4693 
386 COLT Telecom Group 0.24% 0.0021 
-10.56% 16.28% 0.0410 0.4363 0.9326 
402 Corus Group 
-0.04% 0.0017 -9.17% 20.90% 0.0329 0.9983 4.9526 
423 Daily Mail & General Tr 0.13% 0.0015 
-9.15% 11.27% 0.0288 0.3317 1.5332 
463 Dixon Group 
-0.01% 0.0021 -20.68% 17.37% 0.0399 -0.1877 3.3470 
523 EMAP 0.04% 0.0016 
-12.21% 14.70% 0.0304 0.5426 3.9195 
525 EM I Group 0.15% 0.0016 
-9.12% 1 15.26% 0.0316 0.6431 2.6525 
526 Energis 0.21% 0.0021 
-16.18% 14.30% 0.0410 -0.1983 1.4763 
553 Exel 0.09% 0.0012 
-7.05% 17.77% 0.0238 1.1785 9.2002 
657 GKN 0.00% 0.0011 
-7.75% 8.21% 0.0205 0.4459 1.5715 
688 Glaxo Wellcome 
-0.01% 0.0012 -9.90% 9.69% 0.0230 0.1416 1.8287 
710 Granada Group - 0.03% 0.0014 
-7.69% 9.61% 0.0276 0.2597 
'0.6995 713 Great Universal Stores 
-0.02% 0.0016 -19.88% 12.14% 0.0299 -0.4957 5.9857 
731 1 lali fax group 
-0.03% 0.0015 -9.41% 21.92% 0.0283 1.3471 10.6249 
739 1 lanson 
-0.03% 0.0014 -8.16% 17.40% 0.0272 0.7196 4.4423 
753 flays 0.10% 0.0015 
-11.84% 10.01% 0.0297 -0.3105 2.2314 
785 Hilton Group 
-0.01% 0.0016 -16.32% 16.75% 0.0308 0.7992 5.4505 
799 HSBC Holdings 0.14% 0.0010 
-5.54% 7.22% 0.0199 0.1887 1.0204 
813 Iniperial Chemical 
Industries 
0.01% 0.0014 
-6.98% 10.63% 0.0261 0.5597 1.1909 
831 Invensys 0.06% 0.0016 
-13.37% 14.43% 0.0306 0.1137 2.5242 
899 Kingfisher 
-0.08% 0.0014 -14.33% 10.66% 0.0276 -0.1070 2.5953 
911 1 and SCCUrities 0.03% 0.0008 -4.45% 5.17% 0.0145 0.0925 0.7250 
923 1 e, -al & General Group 0.03% 0.0013 -6.15% 10.01% 0.0255 0.3911 0.9524 
944 Lloyds TSB Group 
-0.05% 0.0014 -8,82% 12.60% 0.0270 0.5780 1.6738 
946 Logic 1 0.41% 0.0023 -15.05% 24.58% 0.0437 0.6950 3.8676 
983 Marconi 0.32% 0.0018 
-12.71% 12.23% 0.0348 0.3990 1.3372 
984 MaT-ks and Spericcr -0.12% 0.0015 -8.98% 18.12% 0.0291 1.3292 6.7606 
1040 Nfis\s 0.14% 0.0020 -9.84% 15.98% 0.0386 0.5887 1.547-) 
1082 National Grid Group 0.09% 1 0.0010 
-8.55% 10.30% 0.0200 0.2594 3.0425 
1083 InterriTti-onal Po\\-er 
1 
0.06% 1 0.0013 
-7.35"o 14.80% 0.0250 0.5907 3.4223 
1120 I Nycorned 0.11% 1 0.0019 1 
-1 1.030c 32.39% 0.0366 2.8133 20.7148 
11 
-0- 
11 5-9-] [P-earson 0.17% 0.0018 
-11.43% 15.34% 0.0341 0.2935 2.9670 1161 Peninsular &Oriental 
Steam Navigation Co. -0.06% 
0.0012 
-11.23% 15.53% 0.0238 0.3988 5.8539 
1120 Prudential 0.08% 0.0013 
-7.68% 11.10% 0.0252 0.2051 1.6630 1222 _ Psion 0.57% 0.0030 
-22.60% 21.89' 
- 
0.0570 0.2656 2.9568 
1247 Railtrack Group 
-0.05% 0.0014 -8.17% 12.8 3, c 0.0266 0.7525 2.5728 
1254 Reckitt Benckiser 0.11% 0.0016 
-17.80% 18.40'ý'c 0.0304 0.3470 7.1348 
1261 Reed international 0,08% 0.0015 
-9.42% 20.54% 0.0287 1.5668 9.6035 
1270 Rentokil Initial 
-0.18% 0.0015 -19.50% 10.41% 0.0291 -0.8995 1 7.4706 
1272 Reuters Group 0.19% 0.0021 
-14.94% 23.04% 0.0402 0.8322 4.9656 
1279 Rio Tinto 0.13% 0.0014 
-7.01% 10.24% 0.0276 0.4782 1.4297 
1288 Rolls-Royce 
-0.04% 0.0013 -22.43% 15.57% 0.0259 -1.0973 18.0412 
1296 Royal & Sun Alliance 
Insurance Group 
0.00% 0.0013 
-6.79% 
1 
10.84% 0.0260 0.3014 0.8938 
1297 Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group 
0.05% 0,0014 
-14.15% 11.22% 0.0275 0.2266 3.3083 
1311 Sage Group (I 269m) 0.35% 0.0020 
-10.50% 16.99% 0.0394 0.5502 1.8850 
1312 Sainsbury (J) 0.04% 0.0014 
-10.82% 10.53% 0,0274 0.2277 2.5788 
1327 Schroders (226m) 0.13% 0.0015 
-10.29% 16.57% 0.0287 0.6985 3.8256 
1332 Scottish & Newcastle 
-0,04% 0.0013 -7.39% 10.36% 0.0250 0.3711 1.0141 
1333 Scottish & Southern 
Energy 
0.04% 0.0012 
-6.76% 9.37% 0.0222 0.4230 1.2221 
1340 Scottish Power 0.04% 0.0011 
-8.86% 7.66% 0.0210 0.0562 1.5210 
1357 Sema 0.24% 0.0020 
-14.92% 25.65% 0.0376 0.7602 6.5007 
1372 Shell Transport and 
Trading Co 
0.14% 0.0011 
-6.07% 7.90% 0.0213 0.3514 0.6558 
1402 Smithkline Beecham 0.03% 0.0013 
-11.76% 8.11% 0.0241 -0.2929 1.5278 
1403 Smith Group 0.03% 0.0012 
-11.19% 11.06% 0.0233 -0.0186 2.9173 
1407 South African Breweries 0.02% 0.0014 
-10.91% 9.80% 0.0277 -0.1260 1.3619 
1425 Standard Chartered 0.09% 0.0016 
-10.32% 11.42% 0.0303 0.2482 0.8346 
1442 Sun Life and Provincial 
Holdings 
0.11% 0.0010 
-5.52% 9.26% 0.0196 0.3099 1.3674 
1475 Telewest 
Communi . cations 
-0.07% 0.0022 -13.69% 17.50% 0.0424 0.3255 1.3636 
1484 Tesco 0.11% 0.0012 
-7.46% 8.52% 0.0222 0.4213 1.6559 
1545 Unilever 0.01% 0.0013 
-13.77% 11.16% 0.0254 -0.3288 4.2564 
1550 United Business Media 0.13% 0.0012 
-12.17% 8.62% 0.0239 -0.1558 2.4308 
1552 United Utilities ($) 
-0.01% 0.0011 -6.52% 10.72% 0.0214 0.5406 4.1205 
1573 Vodafone Group 0.10% 0.0016 
-8.58% 10.79% 0.0317 0.2203 0.3686 
1629 lWoolwich 0.03% 0.0015 
-8.30% 26.79% 0.0293 2.5028 19.7354 
1632 JWPP Group 0.19% 0.0015 
-10.83% 9.61% 0.0294 -0.1802 1.4097 
Average 96 Securities 0.10% 1 0.0015 
-10.95% 14.09% 0.0290 0.4232 4.0092 
Percentile 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 
Securities' R1 -0.0013 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 1 0.0014 0.0038 0.0062 
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Appendix (A5.3) Testing For Normality of FTSE100 Security Return Indices and 
FTALLSH Index During the Estimation Period 16/6/1998-23/3/1999 and Test 
Period 1/4/1999 
- 
31/8/2000 
N=20]daxs Estimation Period Test Period 
Company Shape of Distribtion Normality Test Shape of Distribtion Normality Test 
Serial # Skewnss I Kurtosis K-S Stat. p-value Skewnss Kurtosis K-S Stat. p-value 
Rm 
-0.0037 1 0.4078 1.614 0.011 -0.2445 0.2525 0.686 0.735 a 
4 0.4119 4.0822 1.340 0.055 a 0.7358 6.0642 1.186 0.120 a 
9 0.0388 0.8797 0.944 0.336 a 0.4596 1.7749 1.170 0.129 a 
64 
-0.6984 6.9995 1.410 0.037 0.9981 4.8897 1.692 0.007 
67 0.2003 2.2428 0.739 0.645 a 0.5720 4.1885 1.482 0.025 
79 0.4078 2.7040 1.169 0.130 a 0.3552 1.8939 1.189 0.119 a 
85 0.6622 2.1393 1.602 0.012 0.2049 1.7586 1.183 0.122 a 
101 0.5902 5.5340 2.347 0.000 0.6373 2.0847 1.782 0.00 
114 0.1578 0.4982 0.719 0.680 a 1.1122 5.4343 1.797 0.003 
117 0.2493 0.5417 0.926 0.358 a 0.0110 2.9385 1.051 0.219 a 
137 0.1822 0.9501 1.098 0.179 a 
-0.0811 17.1811 1.671 0.008 
139 0.0970 1.7826 0.720 0.678 a 0.2802 2.3741 1.071 0.201 a 
147 1.6667 9.0505 2.819 0.000 0.1524 2.4836 1.805 0.003 
150 0.1496 0.3366 1,193 0.160 a 0.3859 0.8080 1.249 0.088 a 
157 
-0.2140 1.9011 1.004 0.266 a 0.1727 0.5698 1.085 0.190 a 
185 
-0.0028 1 1.6143 0.791 0.559 a 0.4316 1.4496 1.318 0.062 a 
186 1.3402 3.6868 1.600 0.012 0.6694 3.5393 1.246 0.096 a 
201 
-0.7002 6.0754 1.202 0.111 a 0.5163 18.5898 2.920 0.000 
203 0.3429 0.7037 0.790 0.561 a 
-0.6945 12.6370 2.596 0.000 
211 0.4572 2.0513 1.009 0.260 a 0.8362 4.3574 1.625 0.010 a 
217 0.7095 1 2.4489 1.128 0.157 a 0.3771 1.4518 1.065 0.207 a 
236 
-0.1419 0.1352 0.700 0.711 a 0.4055 1.1685 1.246 0.090 a 
237 5.0790 47.4835 1.769 0.004 0.5519 1.6107 1.621 0.010 a 
246 0.7299 7.5931 1.254 0.086 a 0.6658 2.8656 2.430 0.000 
249 0.4591 0.9990 0.524 0.947 a 
-0.1658 3.9206 1.322 0.061 a 
280 1 
-0.0117 1.3387 1.135 0.152 a 0.7854 2.2735 1.624 0.010 a 
281 0.6015 0.8530 1.044 0.226 a 0.4983 2.8314 1.617 0.011 
309 
-0.7780 4.8028 1.776 0.004 0.8717 6.5419 2.632 0.000 
324 0.4158 0.8656 1.054 0.217 a 0.6759 3.0770 1.636 0.009 
331 1.3041 7.1902 2.655 0.000 0.0896 3.9906 2.914 0.000 
336 0.5842 2.2963 0.888 0.410 a 0.8791 4.6989 1.535 0.018 
338 0.2865 1.5421 1.173 0.128 a 0.4998 2.3326 1.312 0.064 a 
376 
-1.8869 14.8513 1.652 0.009 1.0213 9.4693 2.041 0.000 
386 
-0.1832 0.9982 0.644 0.802 a 0.4363 0.9326 1.036 0.234 a 
402 0.7093 3.0964 1.318 0.062 a 0.9983 4.9526 2.214 0.000 
423 0.2232 1.8605 1.699 0.006 0.3317 1.5332 1.596 0.012 
463 0.6937 2.8976 1.057 0.214 a 
-0.1877 3.3470 1.151 0.141 a 
523 
-0.4980 1.1944 1.272 0.079 a 0.5426 3.9195 2.373 0.000 
525 0.2210 6.9258 1.596 0.012 0.6431 2.6525 1.465 0.027 
526 0.2966 1.7179 1.776 0.004 
-0.1983 1.4763 1.057 0.213 a 
553 0.1276 2.2707 1.921 0.001 1.1785 9.2002 1.847 0.002 
657 0.3382 0.7202 1.026 0.243 a 0.4459 1.5715 1.280 0.057 a 
688 0.6247 3.4363 0.813 0.523 a 0.1416 1.8287 1.091 0.185 a- 
710 0.3620 1.5323 1.233 0.095 a 0.2597 0.6995 0.893 0.402 a 
713 0.7482 2.7583 1.391 0.042 
-0.4957 5.9857 1.430 0.033 
731 0.2664 0.2156 0.989 0.282 a 1.3471 10.6249 1.148 0.143 a 
739 0.8349 4.0318 1.445 0.031 0.7196 4.4423 1.529 0.019 
753 0.1376 1.2469 0.621 0.836 a 
-0-3105 2.2314 1.125 0.159 a 
785 0.9303 3.5136 1.398 0.040 0.7992 5.4505 1.643 0.009 
799 0.4725 1.1906 1.073 0.200 a 0.1887 1.0204 1.399 0.040 
813 0.0695 2.8804 1.195 0.115 a 0.5597 1.1909 1.403 0.039 
831 0.1961 1.8485 1.237 0.094 a 0.1137 2.5242 1.348 0.053 
899 0.5186 1.1741 1.108 0.171 a 
-0.1070 2.5953 1.042 0.228 a 
911 0.4398 0.6212 1.226 0.099 a 0.0925 0.7250 1.346 0.053 
923 0.0692 2.5285 0.864 0.445 a 0.3911 0.9524 0.932 0.351 a 
944 0.5449 1.3551 0.858 0.453 a 0.5780 1.6738 1.263 0.082 a- 
946 
-0,9657 3.6935 1.345 0.054 0.6950 3.8676 1.797 
0.003 
-- 
983 0.4432 2.1751 1.044 0.226 a 0.3990 1.3372 1.280 0.075 a 
984 
-1.3134 5.5658 1.270 1 0.079 a 1.3292 6.7606 1.919 
0.001 
1040 
-0.9300 7.5126 1.337 
1 0,056 a 0.5887 1.5472 1.291 1 0.072 a 
1082 0.0476 
. 
4946 1.211 1 0.106 a 0.2594 3.0425 1.071 1 0.201 a 
'04 
1083 0.1111 0.4025 0.675 0.752 a 0.5907 3.4223 0.900 0.393 a 
1120 0.0858 0.0033 0.832 0.494 a 2.8133 20.7148 2.625 0.000 
1159 
-0.0177 0.5945 0.580 0.890 a 0.2935 2.9670 1.799 0.003 
1161 0.8500 4.0227 1.147 0.144 a 0.3988 5.8539 1.085 0.190 a 
1120 
-0.5575 2.5111 0.704 0.705 a 0.2051 1.6630 1.361 0.049 
1222 4.1183 27.7296 2,685 0.000 0.2656 2.9568 2.255 0.000 
1247 0.6705 2.2414 1.220 0.102 a 0.7525 2.5728 2.025 0.001 
1254 
-0.8544 9.0474 1.491 0.023 0.3470 7.1348 1.641 0.009 
1261 1 0.5245 0.9602 1.452 0.029 1.5668 9.6035 1.880 0.002 
1270 0.0032 0.3121 0.636 0.814 a 
-0.8995 7.4706 1.727 0.005 
1272 0.3725 1.6714 1.175 0.127 a 0.8322 4.9656 1.800 0.003 
1279 0.1443 0.0070 0.813 0.522 a 0.4782 1.4297 1.197 0.114 a 
1288 0.3572 2.0917 1.111 0.169 a 
-1.0973 18.0412 1.534 0.018 
1296 1 0.0781 1.1308 0.926 0.358 a 0.3014 0.8938 0.845 0.473 a 
1297 0.0650 0.3699 1.042 0.227 a 0.2266 3.3083 1.317 0.062 a 
1311 
-0.3866 2.8714 1.720 0.005 0.5502 1.8850 1.611 0.011 
1312 
-0.5278 1.5706 1.103 0.176 a 0.2277 2.5788 1.530 0.019 
1327 0.0516 0.9365 0.820 0.513 a 0.6985 3.8256 1.228 0.098 a 
1332 0.3511 1.3528 0.757 0.615 a 0.3711 1.0141 1.524 0.019 
1333 0.4971 4.6623 1.546 0.017 0.4230 1.2221 1.336 0.056 a- 
1340 0.7319 7.3804 1.178 0.125 a 0.0562 1.5210 0.985 0.287 a 
1357 
-0.4706 4.3404 1.482 0.025 0.7602 6.5007 1.299 0.068 a 
1372 0.7299 1.9884 1.165 0.132 a 0.3514 0.6558 1.223 0.100 a 
1402 0.2508 0.3352 0.658 0.779 a 
-0.2929 1.5278 0.781 0.576 a 
1403 0.1721 2.4553 1.243 0.091 a 
-0.0186 2.9173 1.094 0.182 a_ 
1407 1.1369 1.5932 0.573 0.898 a 
-0.1260 1.3619 1.205 0.110 a 
1425 0.0895 1.1733 0.854 0.460 a 0.2482 0.8346 1.357 0.050 
1442 0.0784 0.8943 0.943 0.337 a 0.3099 1.3674 0.768 0.598 a 
1475 0.7734 3.4840 1.245 0.090 a 0.3255 1.3636 1.299 0.068 a 
1484 0.0564 0.2746 0.783 0.572 a 0.4213 1.6559 1.431 0.033 
1545 0.4743 1.4393 1.030 0.239 a 
-0.3288 4.2564 1.299 0.068 a 
1550 0.1552 0.3129 1.211 0.106 a 
-0.1558 2.4308 1.316 0.062 a 
1552 
-0.2718 11.2910 2.227 0.000 0.5406 4.1205 2.721 0.000 
1573 0.4654 3.7171 1.150 0.142 a 0.2203 0.3686 0.861 0.449 a 
1629 0.2642 1.2109 1.112 0.169 a 2,5028 19.7354 2.454 0.000 
1632 
-0.0490 3.0570 0.847 0.470 a -0.1802 1.4097 1.232 0.096 a 
Average 
96 
iSecurities 
0.2983 
i 
3.3861 
I 
1.195 
I 
0.256 0.4232 4.0092 1.488 0.100 
Notes: (a) denotes the distribution is significantly normal at 5% level or less. 
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Table (A5.4) Pearson's Correlation Between FTSE100 Security Return Indices and 
Market Return Index During the Estimation Period 16/6/1998-23/3/1999 and Test 
Period 1/4/1999 
- 
31/8/2000 
Security Estimation Period 
6/98- 3/1999 
Test Period 
(4/1999- 8/2000) 
Serial # Rm Sig. 2-tailed N Rm Sig. 2-tailed N 
4 59.57% a 0.000 201 43.75% a 0.000 370 
9 61.62% a 0.000 201 40.76% a 0.000 370 
64 43.25% a 0.000 201 13.13% b 0.012 370 
67 76.2% a 0.000 141 38.94% a 0.000 370 
79 66.37% a 0.000 201 50.60% a 0.000 370 
85 29.93% a 0.000 201 31.20% a 0.000 370 
101 38.57% a 0.000 201 42.74% a 0.000 370 
114 48.95% a 0.000 201 25.32% a 0.000 370 
117 56.78% a 0.000 201 40.44% a 0.000 370 
137 49.53% a 0.000 201 15.78% a 0.002 370 
139 47.77% a 0.000 201 21.23% a 0.000 370 
147 21.29% a 0.002 201 35.40% a 0.002 370 
150 70.84% a 0.000 201 46.92% a 0.000 370 
157 40.84% a 0.000 201 22.33% a 0.000 370 
185 29.60% a 0.000 201 20.77% a 0.000 370 
186 41.85% a 0.000 201 21-26% a 0.000 370 
201 35.86% a 0.000 201 4.73% 0.365 370 
203 46.26% a 0.000 201 19.81% a 0.000 370 
211 24.15% a 0.000 201 13.91% a 0.007 370 
217 56.20% a 0.000 201 29.63% a 0.000 370 
236 62.12% a 0.000 201 24.81% a 0.000 370 
237 21.34% a 0.000 201 17.05% a 0.000 370 
246 33.86% a 0.000 201 41-23% a 0.000 370 
249 64.66% a 0.000 201 52.41% a 0.000 370 
280 66.39% a 0.000 201 49.45% a 0.000 370 
281 42.92% a 0.000 201 22.63% a 0.000 370 
309 33.69% a 0.000 201 31.56% a 0.000 370 
324 44.95% a 0.000 201 38.84% a 0.000 370 
331 23.70% a 0.000 201 36.44% a 0.000 370 
336 8.43% a 0.000 201 22.49% a 0.000 370 
338 70.38% a 0.000 201 43.98% a 0.000 370 
376 47.64% a 0.000 201 38.34% a 0.000 370 
386 63.59% a 0.000 201 50.72% a 0.000 370 
402 37.67% a 0.000 201 16.99% a 0.000 370 
423 33.12% a 0.000 201 36.85% a 0.000 370 
463 22.97% a 0.000 201 42.41% a 0.000 370 
523 34.37% a 0.000 201 19.95% a 0.000 370 
525 36.67% a 0.000 201 42.25% a 0.000 370 
526 48.36% a 0.000 201 49.49% a 0.000 370 
553 25.86% a 0.000 201 6.50% a 0.000 370 
657 53.64% a 0.000 201 19.81% a 0.000 370 
688 40.14% a 0.000 _ 201 26.97% a 0.000 370 
710 54.65% a 0.000 201 33.80% a 0.000 370 
713 34.24% a 0.000 201 28.85% a 0.000 370 
731 51.82% a 0.000 201 36.93% a 0.000 370 
739 23.47% a 0.000 201 29.28% a 0.000 370 
753 57.95% a 0.000 201 35.13% a 0.000 370 
785 39.53% a 0.000 201 31.12% a 0.000 370 
799 74.02% a 0.000 201 59.72% a 0.000 370 
813 35.27% a 0.000 201 20.88% a 0.000 370 
831 59.83% a 0.000 201 23.06% a 0.000 370 
899 36.461, 'o a 0.000 201 25.09% a 0.000 370 
911 _ 31.35% a 0.000 201 26.00% a 0.000 370 
923 68.96% a 0.000 201 42.83% a 0.000 370 
944 80.10% a 0.000 201 45.13% a 0.000 370 
946 44.57% a 0.000 201 40.71% a 0.000 370 
983 49.30% a 0.000 201 55.29% a 0.000 370 
984 33.01% a 0.000 201 2-5.08% a 0.000 370 
1040 51.82% a 0.000 201 46.29% a 0.000 370 
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1082 45.03% a 0.000 201 44.85% a 0.000 370 
1083 27.00% a 0.000 201 12.86% a 0.013 370 
1120 38.00% a 0.000 201 26.89% a 0.000 370 
1159 58.01% a 0.000 201 38.93% a 0.000 370 
1161 52.56% a 0.000 201 27.63% a 0.000 370 
1120 68.88% a 0.000 201 48.51% a 0.000 370 
1222 17.15% a 0.000 201 34.81% a 0.000 370 
1247 23.38% a 0.000 201 15.37% a 0.003 370 
1254 33.08% a 0.000 201 18.65% a 0.000 370 
1261 42.13% a 0.000 201 26.89% a 0.000 370 
1270 48.47% a 0.000 201 13.27% b 0.011 370 
1272 55.93% a 0.000 201 46.82% a 0.000 370 
1279 47.00% a 0.000 201 25-01% a 0.000 370 
1288 57.02% a 0.000 201 18.87% a 0.000 370 
1296 69.12% a 0.000 201 34.07% a 0.000 370 
1297 63.75% a 0.000 201 40.08% a 0.000 370 
1311 44.39% a 0.000 201 44.52% a 0.000 370 
1312 31.79% a 0.000 201 14.97% a 0.004 370 
1327 56.45% a 0.000 201 36.84% a 0.000 370 
1332 50.01% a 0.000 201 7.85% 0.132 370 
1333 14.08% a 0.000 201 22.35% a 0.000 370 
1340 32.13% a 0.000 201 27.91% a 0.000 370 
1357 54.47% a 0.000 201 38.65% a 0.000 370 
1372 52.28% a 0.000 201 31.09% a 0.000 370 
1402 65.10% a 0.000 201 41.40% a 0.000 370 
1403 42.22% a 0.000 201 20.09% a 0.000 370 
1407 58.44% b 0.011 17 46.38% b 0.011 370 
1425 70.23% a 0.000 201 52.73% a 0.000 370 
1442 68.43% a 0.000 201 38.86% a 0.000 370 
1475 39.12% a 0.000 201 47.63% a 0.000 370 
1484 36.66% a 0.000 201 19-54% a 0.000 370 
1545 68.21% a 0.000 201 25.64% a 0.000 370 
1550 42.74% a 0.000 201 34.59% a 0.000 370 
1552 7.26% a 0.000 201 7.90% 0.129 370 
1573 64.83% a 0.000 201 57.76% a 0.000 370 
1629 51.33% a 0.000 201 37.84% a 0.000 370 
1632 51.76% a 0.000 201 48.50% a 0.000 370 
Average 
96 
Securities 46.22% a I 0.000 I 198 31.92% a I 0.007 I 370 
Notes: (a) Denotes the Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed) level of 
significance or less. 
(b) Denotes the Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed) level of 
significance. 
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Table (A5.5) SMM Parameters and Residuals Statistics of F1rSEIOO Securities 
During the Estimation Period 16/6/1998-23/3/1999 
Securitý SMM Parameters Tests Resul 
and ts 
S. Nl. 'Nl Residuals 
No. Beta Alpha F- 
Value 
DW R2 
Adj 
Mean'! Std 
Error 
Nlin Nlax iance 
4 0.596 a 
-0-00356 109.48 a 2.360 a 35.2% -0.00000 0.0012 70% 9.67% 0.0003 
9 0.616 a 0.00113 121.83 a 2.010 a 37.7% 0.00000 0.0014 
-9.32", ) o 4- , 0.000-4 
64 0.432 a 
-0.00096 45.78 a 1.871 a 18.3% -0.00000 0.0015 - 12.99" 9.14,11, 0-000 
67 0.760 a 
-0.00159 190.57 a 1.852 a 57.5% -0.00000 0.0018 -6.17o 7.97", 0.0005 
79 0.664 a 
-0.00000 156.68 a 1.867 a 43.8% -0.00000 0.0021 -IL81% 14-39% 0.0009 
85 0.299 a 0.00062 19.58 a 1.628 a 8.5% 
-0.00000 0.0019 -7.36% 10.73% 0.0007 
101 0.386 a 0.00622 a 34.78 a 2.069 a 14.5% 0.00000 0.0026 1 3.85"o 1 7., ý ý, 11 , 0.0014 
114 1 0.489 a 
-0.00126 62.71 a 2.151 a 23.6% 1 0.00000 0.0019 -7.99,, o 7.90'1'. 0,0007 
117 0.568 a 0.00014 94.66 a 1.866 a 31.9% 0.00000 1 0.0012 
-7.03'ý. 6.830o 0.0003 
137 0.495 a 
-0.00023 64.70 a 1.874 a 24.2% 0.00000 0.0010 -3.67% 4 () ,I NO 0.0002 
139 0.478 a 
-0.00068 58.84 a 1.922 a 22.4% 0.00000 0.0021 1 -12.00% 12.81% 0.0009 
147 0.213 a 0.00466 9.45 a 1.420 a 4.1% 
-0.00000 0.0032 -12.47% 30.68(o 0.0021 
150 0.708 a 0.00027 200.40 a 1.654 a 49.9% 0.00000 0.0016 
-8.00% 6.69% 0.0005 
157 0.408 a 
-0.00050 39.84 a 1.883 a 16.3% -0.00000 0.0019 -12.00% 6.68% n 
185 0.296 a 0.00063 19.10 a 2.120 a 8.3% 0.00000 0.0015 
-8.7P o 7.850/(, (ý 
186 0.418 a 0.00107 42.25 a 2.008 a 17.1% 0.00000 0.0021 
-6.21% 13.77" 0.0009 
201 0.359 a 0.00012 29.37 a 1.948 a 12.4% 
-0.00000 0.0019 10.19(,, ý, 0.0007 
203 0.463 a 
-0.00006 54.30 a 2.160 a 21.0% -0.00000 0,0013 -s. 22",, 
_ 
6.9 5 (ý 0 0.0004 
211 1 0.243 a 
-0.00061 12.52 a 1.733 a 5.4% 1 0.00000 0.001-4 
--5.84% 
10.3 0. ()()Oj 
217 1 0.561 a 0.00083 91.40 a 1.851 a 31.1% 
-0.00000 0.0012 -4.17% 8.51('o 0. ()()()-" 
236 0.619 a 
-0-00242 123.93 a 1.939 a 38.1% 0.00000 0.0016 -5.97% 6.02% 0. ()()()5 
237 0.214 a 0.00319 9.54 a 1.872 a 4.1% 0.00000 0.0026 
-7.03% 37.63% 0.0014 
246 0.339 a 0.00107 25.88 a 1.889 a 11.1% 0.00000 1 0.0016 
-9.61% 14.020N, 0.0005 
249 0.648 a 0.00209 144.07 a 1.842 a 41.7% 
-0.00000 0.0014 -4.90% ýS,. 78% 0.0004 
280 0.666 a 0.00063 158.27 a 1.998 a 44.0% 
-0.00000 0.0017 -7.94% 7.60% 0.0006 
281 0.431 a 0.00022 45.38 a 2.036 a 18.2% 
-0.00000 0.0014 -4.84% 7.10% 0.0004 
309 0.338 a 0.00154 25.59 a 1.465 1 10.9% 0.00000 0.0018 
-12.04% 8.52% 0.0006 
324 0.449 a 0.00041 50.34 a 1.868 a 19.8% 
-0.00000 0.0017 -5.84% 6.79% 0.0006 
331 0.237 a 0.00096 1.1.89 a 1.523 a 5.2% 0.00000 0.0020 
-9.66% 13.28% 0.0008 
336 0.084 0.00063 1.40 2.066 a 0.2% 
-0.00000 0.0015 -6.27% 9.66% 0.0005 
338 0.702 a 
-0.00065 193.30 a 1.975 a 49.0% -0.00000 0.0016 -7.69% 6.52% 0.0005 
376 1 0.478 a 0.00047 58.82 a 1.952 a 1 22.4% 
-0.00000 0.0024 80"ý -24. 10.38% 0.0012 
386 1 0.636 a 0.00331 135.42 a 1.646 a 40.2% 
-0.00000 0.0025 
- 
-13.83% 9.141ý/o 0.0013 
402 0.374 a 0.00009 32.28 a 1.796 a 13.5% 1 0.00000 0.0018 
-7.87% 13.041)1,, 0.0007 
423 0.328 a 0.00119 23.94 a 2.169 a 10.3% 
-0.00000 0.0016 -7.63% 8.46"0 0 0005 
463 0.230 a 0.00490 a 11.13 a 1.672 a 4.8% 0.00000 0.0019 -7.91% 13-17% 0.0007 
523 0.341 a 0.00085 26.27 a 1.683 a 11.2% 
-0.00000 1 0.0016 -8.27% 5.57% 
_0.0005 52S 0.364 a 
-0.00045 30.43 a 1.974 a 12.8% -0.00000 
1 0.0020 
-14.22% 15,40% 0.0008 
520 0.483 a 0.00377 60.60 a 1.895 a 23.0% 
-0.00000 0.0026 -11.58% 14.80% 0.0013 
S53 0.257 a 0.00102 14.12 a 1.569 a 6.2% 0.00000 0.0013 -5.72% 6.93% 0.0004 
057 0.538 a 0.00113 80.85 a 1.992 a 28.5% 0.00000 0.0018 -8.10% 7.421)ý, O 0.0006 
088 0.401 a 0.00053 38.19 a 2.597 a 1-5.7% -0.00000 0.0014 -6.88% 10.26,, ý) 0.0004 
710 0.546 a 0.00047 84.58 a 1.798 a 2 9. 
-5% 0.00000 0.0016 -6.48% 
8.91% 0.0005 
713 0.341 a 
-0.00036 26.24 a 1.745 a 11.2% 0.00000 0.0018 -7.93% 11.61% 0.0006 
731 0.520 a 0.00020 73.87 a 2.074 a 26.7'! o 0.00000 0.0013 --5.64% 5.650,, 0,0003 
731) 0.235 a 0.00195 11.59 a 1.834 a 5.0'/'o -0.00000 0.0016 -5.0 5% 12.4411 0.0005 
751 0.580 a 0.00109 100.91 a 2.044 a 33.3% -0.00000 1 0.0019 -7.06% 9.13,,,, 0.000-1 
785 0.394 a 
-0.00071 36.62 a 2.214 a 15.1% 0.00000 
1 0.0021 16.79",, 0.00w) 
799 0.739 a 0.00102 239.51 a 2.109 a 54.4% -0.00000 0.001-4 1 v) 7.94111, 0000-4 
813 0.353 a 
-0.00260 28.30 a 1.657 a 12.0% -0.00000 0.0021 -13.71% 
11.25" (, 
831 1 0.599 a 
-0.00025 111.44 a 1.768 a 3 5.6'), o -0-00000 0.0021 -9-570,,, 9-ý, 4,,,, O. O(YJ9 
899 0.366 a 000213 30.73 a 2.004 a 12.9('(, -0-00000 0.0018 -8,9-1111 10,3811ý, 0.10007 
911 0.314 a 
-o. ()()o--4 21.81 a 1.658 a 9.41), -0.00000 0.0010 -3,791)o 4.0-"',, (1 1)ý 1(12 
Q21 0.689 a 0.00040 180.16 a 2.137 a -0.00000 0.0016 -9.99,10 5.60% (1 ()oO 
144 0.800 a 0.00020 353.56 a 1.885 a 63.811o -0-00000 0.0013 6.991/. 
94o 0.444 a 000.10, 48.81 a 1 1.651 a 19.30(1) -0-00000 00021 -1 LO', 8.99",, 
() %, "3 0.492 a 0.00089 03.53 a 1 1.695 a 23 8"o 0.00000 ()0017 - ý, 910/1, 11.191)(1 0.00, (, 
984 0.334 a 
-0.00155 24.93 a 2.051 a 10.1011 0.00000 1 () 0016 -13 25". 6.39",, 0.00 1-ý 
1040 1 O. r, 192 0.00017 73.35 a 1.790 a 26.0'),, -0-00000 ()0()2- -20ý36- 17AKW -, 0.00"" 
1082 0.450 a 0()()()o4 50.59 a 1.872 a 19.91", -0.00000 0.0012 
. 
-491% O. O(IM 
101, 
-0 0.271 a 
_-O. 
OoO8I 1 15.79 a 1.858 a 6., ),,,, 0.00000 
- 
0.0013 
-6.11% 1''1-4 
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1120 0.380 a 0.00117 33.66 a 2.065 a 14 O'ý 0.00000 0.01)11) 91, 
- 
z I 
1159 0.579 a 0.00075 100.59 a 1.881 a 33.21, 
-0.00000 ODU 14 -6 
.2 5'' ý. 4, 0 -ov 1161 0.525 a 0.00023 75.92 a 1.801 a 27.21,, 
-0.00000 0.0016 --ý-Io% 11-84, 0 
122() 0.688 a 0.00016 179.18 a 1.661 a 47.1% 0,00000 0.0013 -7.11% qS, 0. 
1222 1 0.171 a 0.00890 a 5.97 a 1.291 2 4% 1 
-0.00000 0.0044 -12,87% 2 3, "46 0.0038 
1247 1 0.235 a 0.00113 11.62 a 1.854 a 5.0% 0.00000 0.0016 
-6.88% 10.03% 0 Doo 
-15- 
1254 0.327 a 
-0.00263 b 23.89 a 1.890 a 10.3% 0.00000 0.00 15 -1-4 11% 8.961' (, 0.0005 
1261 0.420 a 0.00004 42.74 a 1.794 a 17.3% 0.00000 0.001, 
-6 90('o 10-09"', 0.0006 
1270 0.486 a 
-0.00013 61.65 a 2.146 a1 23.3% -0.00000 0.0018 - 1 0.741ý,. 
_9.121o 
O. OW7 
1272 0.560 a 0.00110 90.93 a 1.677 a 31.0% 0.00000 0.0019 - 
-7.89% 9.60" o I- 
1279 0.470 a 0.00129 56.38 a 1.894 a 21.7% 
-0.00000 0.0013 -5-36% 5.28% 14 
1288 0.572 a 0.00008 96.89 a 1.809 a 32.4% 
-0.00000 0.0015 -6.4 7/ '. 7.91% 0()1)()4 
1296 0.689 a 
-0.00048 180.09 a 2.024 a 47.2% 0.00000 0.0016 -6.92,, ý o4l% O. ou() 
1297 0.637 a 0.00087 135.80 a 1.694 a 40.3', "f) 
-0.00000 0.0016 -5.8 1 'In 6.96% 0.0005 
1311 0.442 a 0.00204 48.27 a 1.805 a 19.1% 
-0.00000 0.0020 -1 (). 27 (1 , 10.21% 0.0008 
1312 0.320 a 
-0.00129 22.73 a 1.957 a 9.8% 0.00000 0.0014 -7-66% 6.42% 
1327 0.567 a 
-0-00061 94.16 a 2.246 a 31.8% 0.00000 1 0.0021 -7.95"o 12.60% 0.0009 
1332 0.501 a 
-0.00090 66.79 a 1.919 a 24.8% -0.000001 0.0014 -6.54('(, 6.68% 0.0004 
1333 0.141 a 0.00061 4.010 a 1.559 a 1.5% 
-0.00000 0.0012 -7.74% 8.90% 0.0003 
1340 0.320 a 0.00025 22.70 a 1.755 a 9.8% 0.00000 0.0014 
-9.78% 11.80% 0.0004 
1357 0.542 a 0.00056 82.85 a 1.734 a 29.0% 0.00000 0.0026 
- 
17.2 9(',, 10.231ýt', 00013 
1372 0.521 a 
-0.00010 74.12 a 1.945 a 26.8% -0.00000 0.00 15 -6.37% 8.781ý/o 0.0004 
1402 0.652 a 0.00064 146.99 a 1.957 a 42.2% 
-0.00000 0.0013 -5.71% 5.0 5"ý, 0.0003 
1403 0.423 a 0.00046 43.33 a 2.008 a 17.5% 
-0.00000 0.0018 -9-29"'. 10. SS(, (, 0.0006 
1407 0.598 a 0.01412 a 8.350 a 2.710 a 31.5% 
-0-00000 0.0060 -3.31% -4.901'o 0.0006 
1425 0.703 a 0.00187 194.02 a 1.889 a 49.1% 0.00000 0.0019 
-8.03'o 11.73% 0.0007 
1442 0.684 a 0.00111 174.96 a 1.750 a 46.5% 
-0.00000 0.0015 -6.7 5% 6.27% 0.0004 
1475 0.391 a 0.00386 35.86 a 1.871 a 14.8% 
-0-00000 0.0027 -9.85"/o 21.53% (), ()()1 s 
1484 0.370 a 
-0.00042 31.48 a 2.054 a 13.2% 0.00000 0.0016 -7.35% 6.5 8" 0 0.000ý 
1545 0.684 a 
-0.00101 175.41 a 1.756 a 46.6% 0.00000 0.0013 -4.18% 7.04,,. 0.0003 
1550 0.428 a 
-0.00163 44.74 a 2.097 a 17.9% -0.00000 0.0016 -6.77% 7.26% 0.0005 
1552 0.071 
-0.00018 1.00 2.013 a 0.0% -0.00000 0.0013 -10.95% 10.17% 0.0003 
1573 0.650 a 0.00188 145.60 a 2.007 a 42.0% 
-0.00000 0.0017 -8-17% 10.30% 0.0006 
1629 0.514 a 0.00087 71.52 a 1.942 a 26.1% 
-0.00000 1 0.0012 -5.03% 6.27% 0.0003 
1632 0.520 a 0.00147 73.60 a 1.996 a 26.6% 
-0.00000 0.0020 -12.88% 11.19% 0.0008 
Average 0.462 a 1 0.00076 
1 
72.85 
,a 
1.895 
a 
23.5% 
-0-00000 0.0018 
-8.31% 10.02% 
I 
0.0006 
Notes: (a) denotes significant at the 5% level of significance, and 
(b) denotes significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix (A5.6) Pearson's Correlation of Successive Cross-Sectional FTSEIOO 
Abnormal Returns During Different Event Windows For Each Signal Definition 
a) ingi : m i wgnai 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Buy OS Sell OS 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr Corr 
T-30 to T+60 0.0093 0.0317 0.0182 0.0334 
TO to T+6 
-O. 0212 0.0564 0.0099 0.0746 
. TO to T+12 
-0-0198 -0.0013 0.0021 0.0761 
T+6 to T+12 0.0037 
-0.0598 -0.0085 0.0678 
+0 to T+60 0.00121 0.0178 1 0.0144 0.0366 E 
T+6 to T+60 
1 
0-00651 0.0125 10.0143 1 0.0312 
(b) Multivle SiLynal 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Sell OS I 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr Corr I 
T-30 to T+60 
-0.0055 0.1649 0.0335 0.0915 
TO to T+6 
-0.0244 0.1004 -0.0082 0.2074 
TO to T+12 
-0.0604 0.0560 -0.0155 0.1937 
T+6 to T+12 
-0.0184 0.1359 0.0279 0.0970 
T+O to T+60 
-0.07361 -0.00521 -0.01971 0.1848 
T+6 to T+60 
1 
-0.0 1551 0.1368 1 0.0321 0.0853 
(c) Quantitative Signal 
(1) First Ouartile 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Buy OS Sell OS 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr Corr 
T-30 to T+60 
-0.0403 0.0069 0.0190 -0.0138 
TO to T+6 
-0.0918 
1 
-0.00731 -0.0283 0.0829 
TO to T+12 
-0.1031 -0-0855 -0.0446 0.1320 
T+6 to T+12 
-0.0414 0.0020 0.0048 -0.0113 
T+O to T+60 
-0.1036 -0.1247 -0.0698 0.2412 
' T+6 to T+60 
-0.0 347 0.0066 1 0.0070 1-0.0130 1 
(c) Quantitative Signal 
(2) Second Ouartile 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Buy OS Sell OS_ 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr Corr 
T-30 to T+60 
-0.0206 0.0512 0.0133 0.0286 
TO to T+6 0.0772 0.1025 1 
-0.0099 0.1490 
_ TO to T+12 0.0027 0.0638 
1 
-0.0042 0.0750 
T+6 to T+12 
-0.0138 0.0546 0.0187 0.0225 
T+O o T+60 
-0.0280 -0-0049 -0.02841 0.0009 
T+6 to T+60 1 
-0.01951 0.0449 0.0181 [-0.0074 
Notes: Each number in the tables represents the average correlation of 
subsequent abnormal returns withIn a specified event window. 
(c) Quantitative Signal 
(3) Third Quartile 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Buy OS §ell qý] j 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr Corr 
T-30 to T+60 0.0386 0.0026 0.0201 
-0.0082 
TO to T+6 
-0.1309 0.0498 0.0123 -0.0837 
TO to T+12 
-0.0130 0.0039 0.0257 -0.0692 
T+6 to T+12 0.0378 
-0.0487 0.0183 -0.0242 
T+O to T+60 0.1894 
-0.0393 0.0631 -0.1056 
T+6 to T+60 10.0630 1-0.0599 10.02231 
-0.0239 
(c) Quantitative Signal 
(1) Fourth Quartile 
AR During Selected BEO SSO Buy OS Sell OS 
Event Windows Corr Corr Corr 
_ Corr 
T-30 to T+60 0.0020 0.0563 0.0156 0.0622 
TO to T+6 0.0292 0.0323 1 0.0570 0.1931 
TO to T+12 
-0.0419 0.0190 
1 
0.0382 0.1522 
T+6 to T+ 12 
-0.0219 0.0487 0.0111 0.0792 
T+O to T+60 
-0.1030 -0.0386 
1 
0.029 1 0.0981 
T+6 to T+60 
1 
-0.0275 0.0446 0.0071 0.0643 
Notes: Each number in the table represents the average correlation of 
successive abnon-nal returns within a specified event window. 
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Appendix (AS. 7) 
FTSE100 Abnormal Returns and T-test Defined by the Median of 
the Net Volume Per Transaction and the Median of the Ratio of W/TV 
The Median of the Net Volume Per Transaction 
Day BUY SELL BEO Sso 
ARt 
BW1 985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value 
TO 
-0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0264 -&0011 -0.0056 -0.0003 -0.0433 -0.0008 
T1 0.0039 0.0002 0.0241 0.0010 
-0,0001 -0.0001 0.0998 0.0053 
T2 
-0,0078 -0.0005 -0.0650 -0.0027 0.0009 0.0002 0.0493 0.0092 
T3 0.0017 0.0002 0.0468 0.0020 0.0066 0.0016 0.0391 0.0035 
T4 0.0031 0.0002 0.0086 0.0004 0.0083 0.0022 0.0009 0.0002 
T5 0.0038 0.0004 
-0.0119 -0.0005 -0.0091 -0.0004 0.0122 0.0001 
T6 
-0.0093 -0,0006 -0.0204 -0.0009 -0,0207 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0007 
T7 
-0.0053 -0.0005 -0.0039 -0.0002 0.0026 0.0001 -0,0156 -0.0002 
T8 
-0.0046 -0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0001 0.0148 0.0000 -0.0111 -0.0003 
T9 
-0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0205 -0.0009 0.0306 0.0006 0.0356 0.0010 
T1 0 
-0.0169 -0.0012 -0.0647 -0.0027 0.0036 0.0004 -0.0077 0.0000 
T1 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0086 0.0004 
-0.0285 -0.0005 0.0042 0.0003 
T12 1 0.0056 1 0.0004 
-0.0561 1 -0,0023 1 0.0119 
-1 
0.0005 1 
-0-0293 1 -0-0012 
ý, ource: 
The Median of the Ratio of NV/TV 
Day BUY SELL BEO SSO 
ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value ARt 
BW1985 
T-Value 
TO 
-0.0044 -0.0005 0.1034 0.0040 0.0094 0.0010 0.0132 0.0007 
Tl 
-0.0045 -0.0004 0.0288 0.0011 -0.0323 0.0000 0.0258 0.0000 
T2 
-0.0050 -0,0004 0.0609 0.0024 -0.0092 -0.0002 0.0036 0.0002 
T3 
-0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0286 -0.0011 -0.0150 -0.0002 -0.0172 -0.0002 
T4 
-0.0070 -0.0005 0.0160 0.0006 0.0105 0.0004 0.0098 0.0003 
T5 0.0026 0.0002 0.0628 0.0024 0.0012 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 
T6 
-0,0135 -0.0008 -0.0734 -0.0028 -0.0137 -0.0001 -0.0091 -0-0005 
T7 
-&0130 -OM10 -0.0484 -0.0019 -0.0127 -0,0002 0.0283 0.0002 
T8 0.0178 0.0014 
-0.0389 -0.0015 0.0222 0.0004 -0.0139 -0.0003 
T9 
-0.0005 -0,0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0194 0.0006 -0.0065 -0.0025 
T10 0.0045 0.0002 
-0.0047 -0.0002 0.0189 0.0005 0.0116 0.0011 
Tl 1 0.0069 0.0005 
-0.0085 -0.0003 -0.0109 -0.0003 -0.0273 -0.0001 
T12 
-0.0122 -0.0008 -0.0237 -0.0009 0.0038 0.0001 0.0094 0.0009 
So1IICL': FL SI: 1OOQSignaJ(NV1\ \tcclian). XIs 
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Conthwe A ndix (A 5 
.8 BUY (N=295) SELL (N=95) EO (N=I 10) SSO (N=62 )
Day BW1985 
T-Value 
BW1980 
T-Value ARI 
BW1985 
T-Value 
BW1980 
T-Value ARt 
BW19851 
T-Value 
BW1980 
T-Value ARI 
BW1985 
T-Value 
BW1980 
T-Value 
T31 0,0018 1 0.8515 0.6364 
-0.0043 -1,3270 -1.5305 -0.0036 -0.7631 -1.2831 -0.0074 -1.9994 -2.6321 T32 
-0.0002 -0.3887 -0.0867 -0.0009 -0.0740 -0-3176 -0.0042 -1.0468 -1-5043 -0.0024 -&2546 -0.8345 T33 0.0034 2.6889 1.2005 0.0041 1.0523 1.4464 0.0020 0.6661 0.7125 
-0.0006 -0.4648 -0.2122 T34 0.0012 0.196B 0.4172 
-0.0051 -1.4450 -1.8096 0.0006 -0.1716 0.2303 0.0018 0,4698 0.6400 T35 
-0.0024 -1.7135 -0.8366 -0.0066 -1.9663 -2.3329 0.0022 0.7078 0.7863 -O. oo3i -1.0624 -1 1004 T36 
-0.0013 -0.7734 -0.4509 0.0003 0,1516 0.1109 0.0058 1.6"0 2.0440 0.0006 0.0118 0.2030 T37 0.0000 0.0277 
-0.0094 0.0005 -0.7047 0.1898 -0,0011 0.0704 -0.3888 0.0024 0.7955 0.8648 T38 0.0006 0.1682 0.2222 0.0048 0.7363 1.6976 0.0003 
-0.0172 01126 0.0121 3.8972 4.3005 T39 
-0-0019 -1.2169 -0.6695 -0.0058 -2.1595 -2.0488 0.0026 1.4306 0.9116 0.0037 1.3022 1.3166 T40 0,0033 2.2364 1.1759 
-0.0028 -1.2710 -0.9774 0.0009 0.2627 0.3361 0.0030 1.1379 1.0621 T41 0.0011 0.9731 0.3978 0.0039 0.7668 1.3920 
-0.0051 -2.3336 -1.7968 0,0065 1.8686 2.2924 T42 
-0.0041 1 -2.9370 -1.4409 -0.0077 -2.7093 -2.7475 -0.0034 -1.5325 -1.2184 -0.0010 -0.0897 -0.3649 T43 
-0-0006 -0.3125 _ 
-0-1981 -0.0022 -1.0602 -0.7817 -0.0039 -1.1943 -1.3703 0.0003 0.3750 0.1127 T44 
-0.0001 -0.0766 -0.0264 -0.0032 -1.2143 -1.1298 -0.0005 -0.0077 -0.1854 -0.0004 0.5181 -0.1253 
T45 
-0.0002 0.0388 
-0.0733 0.0016 -0.1597 0.5568 0.0037 1.3666 1.3182 -0.0056 -1.5220 -2.0007 
T46 
-0.0010 -0.5101 -0.3474 0.0043 0.8817 1.5131 0.0042 1.4942 1.4877 0.0067 1.6240 2.3610 
T47 0.0014 1.1526 0.4926 0.0001 1 0.1916 0.0272 -0.0012 -0.7070 -0.4278 -0.0056 -2.0572 -1.9732 
T48 
-0.0017 -1.6787 -0.6067 -0.0023 -0.6212 -0.7994 -0.0027 -1.2222 -0.9718 -0.0015 -0.0550 -0.5394 
T49 0.0047 3.2539 1.6638 
-0.0040 -1,3048 -1.4094 0.0002 -0.2615 0.0566 0.0004 0.4987 0.1287 
T50 0.0003 0.5439 0.1209 
-0.0057 -2.1039 -2.03i3 0,0044 1.4530 1.5577 0.0050 1.3703 1.7730 
T51 
-0.0030 -1.7195 -1.0608 -OM05 -0.0604 -0.1841 -0.0036 -1.3194 -1.2916 -0.0090 -2.7859 -3.1949 
T52 
-0.0032 -2.3415 -1-1307 -0.0015 -1.2311 -0.5481 0.0027 0.9267 0.9519 -0.0021 -0.7250 -0.7481 
T53 0.0012 0.4742 0.4316 
-0.0049 -1.0441 -1.7387 0.0016 0.4734 0.5511 -0.0054 -1.6942 1 -1.9269 
T54 
-0.0008 -0.5130 -0.2908 1 -0.0078 -2.4480 -2.7648 -0.0021 -0.5982 1 -0.7466 -0.0023 -0.7980 1 -0.8087 
T55 
-0.0008 -0.8732 -0.2773 0.0017 1.0637 0.6093 0.0013 0.1233 0.4610 0.0017 0.5183 0.6177 
T56 
-0.0003 0.1265 -0.0890 -0.0020 -0.4865 -0.7005 -0.0016 -0.3945 -0.5791 0.0023 0.4659 0.8185 
T57 0.0035 2.3315 1.2474 
-0.0008 0.0488 -0.2663 -0.0041 -1.4932 -1.4458 -0.0038 -1.3338 -1.3435 
T58 0.0044 3.0397 1,5758 
-0.0029 -1.0003 -1.0408 -0.0025 -0.4376 -0.8921 -0.0012 -0.3111 -0.4335 
T59 0.0023 1 1.7121 0.8225 
-0.0006 0.2188 1 -0.1984 -0.0052 -1.8722 -1.8293 1 -0.0013 -0,6604 -0.4518 
T60 
-0.0002 1 -0.2097 1 -0.0846 1 0.0029 1 1.1680 1 1.0223 1 0.0004 -0.2781 1 0.1523 -0.0052 1_ -1.9038 -1.8583 
Note: Bold numbers are significant at 5% level of significance or less. 
OUrce F-T, 1; F, 100Ttpst(1985), )Qs 
FTS E: I OOTIPýA (1980) As 
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Appendix (A5.9) 
Summary Tables of AR of Different Signal Definition in terms of the Sign and 
the Significance, During the Event Window (TO to T1 2) for Each Portfolio 
AR-BUY SS MS I QS1 QS2 QS3 QS4 AR-SEL4 SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 
to to + + 
. 
ti + ti ++ 
Q Q 
t3 t3 
t4 t4 
t5 ++ ++ t 
t6 ++ ++ t6 
t7 + t7 
t8 + ++ + t8 
t9 t9 
tio tio 
ti 1 ti 1 
t12 ++ H2 
, +'('++') : Indicates that AR at this particular day is Positively Sign if icant at 1% (5%) level 
i Indicates that the A Rat this particular day is Negatively Sign if icant at 1% (5%) level 
I- 
AR-BEO SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 AR-SSO SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 
to to + 
ti ++ ++ ti ++ 
Q Q 
t3 t3 
t4 ++ ++ t4 
t5 ++ t5 
t6 t6 
t7 ++ ++ t 
t8 ++ + t8 
t9 t9 
tio ++ tio 
ti 1 + + + ti 1 ++ ++ 
02 
: Indicates that AR at this particular day is Positively Sign if icant at 1% (5%) level 
Indicates that the AR at this particular day is Negatively Significant at 1% (5%) level Ch5(A5.9). XJs 
-T- 
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Continue Appendix (A5.9) 
Summary of Abnormal Returns (AR) of Different Signal Definitions 
Durinci the Event Window (TO to T12) 
#ARof HO ss ms Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 
Buy 5 5 4 5 3 5 
Sell 4 4 5 6 7 2 
BEO 7 5 4 7 7 6 
sso 8 5 3 7 7 8 
Each Num be r Represents the No. of AR That are Consistent VVith HO 
For Example: BuySS (1) Indicates that there is 1 Negative or Zero AR__ 
TO ss ms Qsi QS2 QS3 QS4 
Buy + + 
Sell + + + + + + 
BEO + + + 
sso 
Each Sign Represents the Sign of AR at TO 
T6 SS ms QS1 QS2 QS3 QS4 
Buy ++++++ 
Sell + 
BEO 
I 
SSO ++I-+I- 
Each Sign Represents the Sign of the AR at T6 
T12 ss ms Qsi QS2 QS3 QS4 
Buy + + + 
Sell 
BEO I + + 
SSO 
- 
Each Sign Represents the Sign of the AR at TI 2 unb(Ab., ' XJ S 
276 
Appendix (A5.10) 
FrSEIOO Cumulative A bnormal Returns and T-test (at SO/o Level of Significance) 
According to DW1983 During Different Event Windows 
(a) BUY Portfolio 
Day CA Rt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt J DW1983 CAF-T D-W1983 CA P *, DA 1983 C'ý R, t 1983 
T-30 to T60 T-Value T-6 to T 12 T-Value TOtoT60 I T-Value TOtotl2 T-Value T6to-ý- '-Vaiue r6toTI-I a 
-e 
T-30 0.0011 0.0818 
T-29 0,0002 0.0121 
T-28 
-0.0011 -0.0844 
T-27 
-0.0068 -0.4993 .........  
T-26 
-0.0071 -0.5244 
T-25 
-0.0115 -0.8483 
-- -- --------- 
T-24 
-0.0100 -0.7361 
T-23 
-0.0102 -0.7518 
T-22 
-0.0108 -0.7941 
T-21 
-0.0119 -0.8776 
T-20 
-0.0094 -0 
. 
6924 i 
T- 19 
-0.0066 -0.4871 
T-18 
-0.0054 -0.3%2 
T-17 
-0.0084 -0,6173 
T- 16 
-0.0096 -0.7025 
T-15 
-0.0108 -0.7944 
T- 14 
-0.0098 -0.7209 
T- 13 
-0.0107 -0.7881 
T-12 
-0.0124 -0.9111 
T-1 1 
-0.0156 -1.1455 
T-10 
-0.0186 -1.3671 
T-9 
-0.0192 -1.4098 
T-8 
-0.0213 -1.5678 
T-7 
-0.0254 -1.8701- 
T-6 
-0.0260 -1.9089 -0.0005 -0.0849 
T-5 
-0.0262 -1.9236 -0.0007 -0.1170 
T-4 
-0.0273 -2.0058 -0.0018 -0.2970 
T-3 
-0.0343 -2.5234 -0.0089 -1.4297 
T-2 
-0.0363 -2.6681 -0.0109 -1.7465 
T-1 
-0.0413 -3.0342 -0.0158 -2.5477 
TO 
-0.0414 -3.0421 -0.0159 -2.5650 -0.0001 -0.0096 -0.0001 -0.0209 
1 
TI 
-0.0398 -2.9257 -0,0144 -2.3102 0.0015 0.1325 0.0015 0.2871 
T2 
-0.0393 -2.8899 -0.0139 -2.2319 0.0020 0.1762 0.0020 0.3818 1 
T3 
-0.0387 -2.8413 -0.0132 -2.1254 0.0026 0.2357 0.0026 0.5105 
T4 
-0.0398 -2.9215 -0.0143 -2.3009 0.0015 0.1377 0.0015 0.2984 
T5 
-0.0365 -2.6815 -0.0110 -1.7757 0.0048 0.4309 0.0048 0.9334 
T6 
-0.0330 -2.4243 -0.0075 -1.2129 0.0083 0.7449 0.0083 1.6137 0.0035 0.3308 0.0035 1,0014 
T7 
-0.0330 -2,4218 -0.0075 -1.2074 0.0083 0.7480 0.0083 1.6203 0.0035 0.3340 0.0035 1.0112 
T8 
-0,0284 -2.0853 -0.0029 -0.4709 0.0129 1.1591 0.0129 2.5108 0.0081 0.7669 0.0081 2.3219 
T9 
-0.0298 -2.1910 -0.0044 -0.7024 0.0115 1.0299 0.0115 2.2309 0.0067 0.6308 0.0067 1.9100 
TIO 
-0.0290 -2.1311 -0.0036 -0.5712 0.0123 1.1031 0.0123 2.3895 0.0075 0.7079 0.0075 2.1434 
TH 
-0.0309 -2.2706 -0.0055 -0.8766 0.0104 0.9326 0,0104 2.0203 0.0056 0.5284 0.0056 l. "999 
T12 
-0.0311 -2.2834 -0.0056 -0.9044 0.0102 0.9171 0.0102 1.9867 0.0054 0.5121 0.0054 1.5504 
T13 
-0.0270 -1.9857 0.0143 1.2806 0.0095 0.8949 
T14 
-0.0250 -1.8371 0.0163 1.4622 0.0115 1.0861 
T 15 
-0.0253 -1.8598 0.0160 L4345 0.0112 1.0570 
T 16 
-0.0253 -1.8595 0.0160 1.4348 0.0112 1.0572 
T 17 
-0.0254 -1.8635 
........ . .. 0.0159 1.4300 0.0111 1.0522 
T 18 
-0.02S3 -1.8589 
-- --- ----- 0.0160 1.4355 0.0112 1.0580 
T 19 
-0.0184 -1,3524 0,0229 2.0542 0.0181 1.7096 
T20 
-0.0179 -1.3151 
.... ....... 0.0234 2.0997 0.0186 1.7575 
1'21 
-0.0153 -1.1227 
..... ..... - 0.0260 2-3348 0.0212 2.0051 
1-22 
-0.0137 -1.0095 0.0276 2.4730 
............. T 0.0228 2.1506 
T23 
-0.0)54 -1.1310 0.0259 2.3246 0.0211 1.9944 
T24 
-0.0183 -1.3428 0.0230 2.0659 0.0182 1.7219 
T25 
-0.0176 -1.21), 3 0.0237 2.1264 
- 
0.0189 1.7856 
T26 
-0.0147 -1.0822 
... 0.0266 2.3842 -- ---- 0.0218 2.0571 
T27 
-0.0147 -1.0775 0.0266 2.3899 0.0218 2.0631 
1,28 
-0.0124 -0,9129 
------- -------- -- 0.0289 2.5910 0.0241 2.2749 
T21) 
-0.0136 -019985 2.4865 0.0229 2.1648 
T30 
-00135 -0 Q89--, 1 
1 0.0278 2.4977 Oý0230 2.1766 
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Continu (a) BUY Portfolio 
Day CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 
T-30 to T6C T-Value T-6toTt2j T-Value TOtoT60 T-Value To to t 12-T T-Value T6 to T60 T-Value T6toTI2 T-Value 
T31 
-0.0117 -0.8574 0.0296 2.6589 0.0248 2.3463 
T32 
-0.0119 -0,8754 0.0294 2.6368 OD246 2.3232 
T33 
-0.0085 -0.6266 0.0328 2.9407 0.0280 2.6432 
T34 
-0,0073 -0.5401 0.0339 3.0463 0.0291 2.7544 
T35 
-0.0097 -0.7135 0.0316 2.8345 0.0268 2.5314 
T36 
-0.0110 -0.9069 0.0303 2.7204 0.0255 2.4112 
T37 
-0.0110 -0.8089 Oý0303 2.7180 0.0255 2.4087 
T38 
-0.0104 -0.7628 0.0309 2.7743 0.0261 2.4679 
T39 
-0.0123 -0.9016 0.0290 2.6048 0.0241 2.2894 
T40 
-0.0090 -0.6579 0.0323 2.9024 0,0275 2.6029 
T41 
-0.0078 -0.5755 0.0335 3.0031 0.0287 2.7089 
T42 
-0.0119 -0.8741 0-0294 2.6384 0.0246 2-3248 
T43 
-0.0125 -0.9151 0.0288 2.5883 0.0240 2.2720 
T44 
-0.0125 -0.9206 0.0288 2.5816 0.0240 2.2650 
T45 
-0.0127 -0.9358 0.0286 2.5630 1 0.0238 2.2454 
T46 
-0.0137 1 -1.0078 0.0276 2.4751 0.0228 2.1528 
T47 
-0.0123 -0.9057 
............  ... .. ..........  
0.0290 2.5998 0.0242 2.2842 
T48 
-0.0140 -1.0314 
........ .....  . 
  
.. 
0.0273 2.4462 0.0225 2.1224 
T49 
-0.0093 -0.6866   0.0319 2.8674 0.0271 2.5659 
T50 
-0.0m -0.6616 0.0323 2.8979 0.0275 2.5982 
T51 
-0.0120 -0.8814 0.0293 2.6294 0.0245 2.3154 
T52 
-0.0152 1 -1.1157 0.0261 2.3432 0.0213 2.0140 
T53 
-0.0140 -1.0263 0.0273 2.4525 0.0225 2.1290 
T54 
-0.0148 -1.0866 0.0265 2.3789 0.0217 2.0515 
T55 
-0.0156 -1.1440 0.0257 2.3087 0.0209 1.9776 
T56 
-0.0158 -1.1625 0.0255 2.2862 0.0207 1.9539 
T57 
-0.0123 49040 0.0290 2.6019 0.0242 21864 
T58 
-0.0079 -0.5774 0.0334 1 3.0008 0.0286 2.7064 
T59 
-0.0055 -0.4069 0.0358 3.2090 0.0310 2.9257 
T60 
-0.0058 -0.4245 0.0355 3.1876 0.0307 2.9032 
! Note: Bold numbers are significant at 5% level of significance or less. 
iýource:. ftýlfi66ýARby[Deay. As i -11-1. 
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F- Continue (A5.1 01 (b) SELL Portfolio 
CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CAR I DW1 CAR IDW19B3 
T-30 to T60 T-Value T-6toT121 T- alue TOtoT60 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value T6toT60 T-Value T6toTI2 T-Value 
T-30 
-0.0050 -0.2092 
T-29 
-0.0115 -0.4789 
T-28 
-0.0086 -0,3568 
T-27 
-0.0058 -0.2412 1 
T-26 
-0.0014 -0.0579 
T-25 0.0007 0.0303 
T-24 0.0080 0.3355 
T-23 0.0125 0.5221 
T-22 0,0096 0.3995 
T-21 0.0143 0.5960 
T-20 0.0116 0.4949 
T-19 0.0056 0.2354 
T- 18 0.0066 0.2761 
T- 17 0.0056 0.2344 
T-16 0.0072 0.3014 
T- 15 0.0099 0.4148 
T- 14 0.0196 0.8167 
T-13 0.0199 0.8281 
T-12 0.0229 0.9551 
T-1 1 0,0237 0.9904 
T-10 0.0275 1.1452 ----------- - ----- 
T-9 0.0315 1.3135 
T-8 0.0344 1.4362 
T-7 0.0447 1.8642 
T-6 0.0432 1.8027 
-0.0015 -0.1346 
.......... 
. 
.................. 
.. 
 .............. 
T-5 0.0430 1.7918 
-0.0017 -0.1583 
...... ..   ... 
.. 
... .... - .... .. 
.. .. .. T-4 0.0461 1.9228 0.0014 0.1284 ... . .. ..... .. ... .... .. ....... .... - ...
T-3 0.0528 2.2034 0.0081 0.7424 
T-2 0.0575 2.3963 0.0128 1.1646 
T-1 0.0581 2.4212 0.0134 1.2191 
TO 0.0671 1 2.7987 0.0224 2.0453 0.0091 0.4611 0.0091 0.9987 
T1 0.0665 2.7749 0.0218 1.9931 0.0085 0.4319 0.0085 0.9357 
T2 0.0581 2.4233 0.0134 1.2237 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0055 
......  ... T3 0.0566 2.3617 0.0119 1.0890 
-0.0014 -0.0727 -0.0014 -0.1574 
...  .  . .. 
T4 0.0586 2.4419 0.0139 1.2644 0.0005 0.0253 0.0005 0.0547 
- - - ----- T5 0.0553 2.3060 0.0106 0.9671 
-0.0028 -0.1407 -0.0028 
:ý 3048 
T6 0.0510 2.1264 0.0063 0.5738 
-0.0071 -0.3601 -0.0071 -0.7801 -0.0043 -0.2311 -0.0043 . 0.6997 
T7 0.0509 2.1233 0.0062 0.5672 
-0.0071 -0.3638 -0.0071 -0.7882 -0.0044 -0.2350 -0.0044 -0.7115 
T8 0.0516 2.1531 0.0069 0.6323 
-0.0064 -0.3275 -0.0064 -0.7094 -0.0037 -0.1967 -0.0037 -0.5956 
T9 0.0541 2.2549 0.0094 0.8552 
-0.0040 1 -0.2031 -0.0040 -0.4400 -0.0012 -0.0658 -0.0012 -0.1991 
TIO 0.0503 2.0959 0.0056 0.5072 
-0.0078 -0.3973 -0.0078 -0.8607 -0.0050 -0.2703 -0.0050 -0.8183 
Tll 0,0436 1.8192 
-0.0011 -0.0983 -0.0144 -0.7353 -0.0144 -1.5927 -0.0117 -0.6262 -0.0117 -1.8958 
T12 0.0364 1.5192 
-0.0083 -0.7550 -0.0216 -1.1018 -0.0216 -2.3867 -0.0189 -1.0122 -0.0189 -3.0645 
T13 0.0368 1.5344 
-0.0213 -1.0832 -0.0185 -0.9926 
T14 0.0357 1.4892 
-0.0223 -1.1384 
. 
-0.0196 -1.0507 
T15 0.0350 1.4614 
-0.0230 -1.1723 
.... ... .. ... ........ 
-0.0203 -1.0865 
T16 0.0372 1.5519 
-0.0208 -1.0619 -0.0181 -0.9701 
T17 0.0377 1.5734 
-0.0203 -1.0355 -0.0176 -0.9424 
T18 0.0341 1.4212 
-0.0240 -1.2214 -0.0212 -1.1381 
T19 0.0328 1.3678 
-0.0253 -1.2866 -0.0225 -1.2068 
T20 0.0309 1.2875 
-0.0272 -1.3848 -0.0244 -1.3102 
T21 0.0274 1.1442 
-0.0306 -1.5598 -0.0279 -1.4945 
T22 0.0239 0.9956 
-0.0342 -1.7413 -0.0314 -1.6857 
T23 0.0227 0.9481 
-0.0353 -1.7993 -0.0326 -1.7467 
T24 0.0240 1.0005 
-0.0341 -1.7352 -0.0313 -1.6793 
T25 0,0218 0.9075 
-0.0363 -1.8488 -0.0335 -1.7989 
T26 0.0157 0.6550 
-0.0424 -2.1573 -0.0396 -2.1238 
T27 0.0224 0.9350 
-0.0356 -1.8153 -0.0329 -1.7636 
T28 0.0213 T886-5 
-0.0368 -1.8745 -0.0340 -1.8259 
T29 0.0147 0.6142 
-0.0433 -21071 -0.0406 -2.1762 
T30 0.0141 0.5869 F7ý 
-2.2405 -0.0412 -21114 
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Continue (b) SELL Portfolio 
Day CARt I DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 
T-30 to T61 T-Value T-6toT12 1 T-VWue TOtoT60 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value T6toT60 T-Value T6 to T12 T-Value 
T31 0.0098 0.4069 
-0.0483 -2.4603 -0.0455 -2.4429 
T32 0,0089 0.3695 
-0.0492 -2.5060 -0.0464 -2.4909 
T33 0.0129 0.5396 
-0.0451 -2.2982 -0,0424 -2.2721 
T34 0.0078 0.3268 
-0.0502 -2.5581 -0.0475 -2.5459 
T35 0.0013 0.0524 
-0-0568 -2.8932 -0.0540 -2.8988 
T36 0.0016 0.0655 
-0.0565 -2.8773 -0.0537 -2.8820 
T37 0.0021 0.0878 
-0.0560 -2.8501 -0.0532 -2.8533 
T38 0.0069 0.2874 
-0,0512 -2.6062 -0.0494 -2.5965 
T39 0.0011 0.0465 
-0.0569 -2.9005 -0.0542 -2: 9065 
T40 
-0.0016 -0.0685 -0.0597 -3.0409 -0.0569 -3.0543 
T41 0.0023 0.0952 
-0.0558 -2.8410 -0.0530 -2.8437 
T42 
-0.0055 -0.2279 -0.0635 -3.2356 -0.0608 -3.2594 
T43 
-0.0077 -0.3198 -0.0657 -3-3479 -0.0630 -3.3776 
T44 
-0.0109 -0.4527 -0.0689 -3.5102 -0.0662 -3.5485 
T45 
-0.0093 -0.3872 -0.0673 -3.4302 -0.0646 -3.4643 
T46 
-0,0050 -0.2092 -0.0631 -3.2128 -0.0603 -3.2354 
T47 
-0.0049 -0.2060 1 -0.0630 -3.2089 -0.0602 -3.2313 
T48 
-0.0072 -0.3001 -0.0653 1 -3.3238 -0.0625 -33522 
- ------ -- T49 
-0.0112 -0.4658 j -0.0692 -3.5262 -0.0665 -3.5654 - - 
T50 
-0.0169 -0.7049 -0.0750 -3.8183 -0.0722 -3.8730 
T51 
-0.0174 -0.7266 
----------  
-0.0755 -3A447 -0.0727 -3.9008 
T52 
-0.0190 -0.7911 - -0.0770 -3.9235 -0.0743 -3.9838 
T53 
-0.0239 -0.9955 -0.0819 -4.1732 -0.0792 4.2468 
T54 
-0.0317 -1.3207 -0.0897 -4.5704 -0.0870 4.6650 
T55 
-0.0300 -1.2490 0.0880 4.4828 -0.0852 4.5729 
T56 
-0.0319 -1.3314 -0.0900 -4.5835 -0.0872 4.6788 
T57 
-0.0327 -1.3627 -0.0907 -4.6217 -0.0880 4.7191 
T58 
-0.0356 -1.4852 4.7712 -0.0909 4.8766 
T59 
-0.0362 -1.5085 
. 
79 97 : 
ý  ý J 
-0.0915 4.906 
T60 T 
-0.0333 -1.3883 
_ 
-4.65 2 9 -0.0886 
ý 
9 4.7519 
Iýplldl numbers are significant at 5% level of significance or less. 
Sourceý FTSE100CARbyDeay, Ms 
FTýPIOPTtest(DW1983), As 
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Continue (A5.10) (c) BEO Portfolio 
Day CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CAN J OW1983 CARt I DW190 
T-30 to T6C T-Value T-6toT121 T-VWue TOtoT60 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value mow T-Vaks T6 to T 12 
T-30 
-0.0016 -0.0738 
T-29 0.0040 0.1815 
T-28 0.0103 04632 
T-27 0.0090 0.4022 
T-26 0.0047 0.2116 
T-25 0.0052 0.2347 
T-24 0.0054 0.2436 
T-23 0.0030 0,1328 
T-22 
T-21 
T-20 
T-19 
T-18 
0.0051 
0.0014 
-0.0001 
0.0051 
0.0036 
02307 
0.0614 
-0.0064 
0.2298 
0.1599 
T-17 
-0.0002 -0.0095 
T-16 0.0007 00313 
T-15 0.0014 0.0618 
T- 14 0.0016 0.0739 
T- 13 0.0053 0.2391 
T-12 0.0081 0.3637 
T-1 1 0.0077 0.3444 
T-10 0.0052 0.2325 
......... ...... .....   T-9 0.0051 0.2267   
T-8 0.0071 0.3184 
T-7 0.0095 0.4265 
T-6 0.0087 0.3925 
-0.0008 -0.0745 
T-5 0.0036 0.1614 
-0.0059 -0.5802 
T-4 0.0016 0.0731 
-0.0079 -0.7733 
T-3 0.0030 0.1346 
-0.0065 -0.6387 
............... ..... .... .......................   T-2 0.0045 0.2035 
-0.0050 -0.4879 
T-1 0.0058 0.2622 
-0.0037 -0.3596 
TO 0.0039 0.1754 
-0.0056 -0.5494 -0.0019 . 0.1059 -0.0019 -0.2295 
TI 0.0078 0.3508 
-0.0017 -0.1655 0.0020 0.1093 0.0020 0.2347 
T2 0.0027 0.1202 
-0.0068 -0.6703 -0.0032 -0.1734 -0.0032 
---: iT3-756 
T3 
-0.0008 -0.0345 -0.0103 -1.0089 -0.0066 -0.3623 -0.0066 -0.7949 4p 
T4 0.0014 0.0648 
-0.0081 -0.7915 -0.0044 -0.2410 -0.0044 
_ 
-0.5221 
- 
T5 
-0.0014 -0.0616 -0.0109 -1.0681 -0.0072 -0.3954 -0.0072 -0.8565 
T6 
-0,0075 -0.3370 -0.0170 -1.6708 -0.0134 -0.7318 -0.0134 -1.5851 -0.0061 -0.3543 -0.0061 -1.0726 
T7 
-0.0102 -0.4571 -0.0197 -1.9337 -0.0160 -0.8785 -0.0160 -1.9030 -0.0088 -0.5088 -0.0088 -15405 
T8 
-0.0041 -0.1844 -0.0136 -1.3369 -0.0100 -0.5454 -0.0100 -1.1815 -0-0027 -0.1580 -0.0027 -0.4784 
T9 
-0.0027 -0.1212 -0.0122 -1.1985 -0.0085 -0.4682 -0.0085 -1.0142 -0.0013 -0.0767 -0.0013 -0.2321 
TIO 
-0.0004 -0.0173 -0.0099 -0.9711 -0.0062 -0.3413 -0.0062 -0.7393 0.0010 0.0570 0.0010 0.1725 
T11 0.0042 0.1873 
-0.0053 -0.5234 -0.0017 -0.0914 -0.0017 -0.1980 0.0055 0,3202 0.0055 0.9693 
T12 0.0028 0.1271 
-0.0067 -0.6551 -0.0030 -0.1649 -0.0030 -0.3573 0.0042 0.2427 0.0042 1 0.7348 
T13 0.0023 0.1033 
-0.0035 -0,1940 0.0037 0.2121 
T14 
-0.0030 -0.1358 -0.0089 -0.4861 -0.0017 -0.0955 
T15 
-0.0024 -0.1075 -0.0082 -0.4515 -0.0010 -0.0591 
T16 
-0.0010 -0.0430 -0.0068 -0.3727 0.0004 0.0239 
T17 
-0.0013 -0.0577 -0.0071 -0.39M 0.0001 0.0050 
T18 
-0.0050 -0.2244 -0.0108 -0.5943 
.......... 
-0.0036 -0.2094 
T19 
-0.0030 -0.1334 -0.0088 -0.4832 -0.0016 -0.0925 
T20 
-0.0031 -0.1411 -0.0090 -0.4925 -0.0018 -0.1023 
T21 
-0.0041 -0.1838 -0.0099 -0.5447 -0.0027 -0.1572 
T22 
-0.0022 -0,0987 -0.0080 -0.4408 -0.0008 -0.0478 
T23 
-0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0059 -0.3251 - 4- 0.0013 0.0740 
T24 
-0.0022 -0.0969 -0.0080 -0.4385 -0.0008 -0.0454 
T25 0.0039 0.1754 
-0.0019 -0.1060 0.0053 0.3048 
T26 0.0010 0.0465 
-0.0048 -0.2634 0.0024 0.1390 
T27 
-0.0015 -0.0685 -0.0074 -0.4039 -0.0002 -0.0090 
T28 0.0006 0.0251 
-0.0053 -0.2895 0.0019 0.111 5_ 
T29 
-0.0032 -0.1423 -0.0090 -0.4940 -0.0018 -0.1039 
T30 
-0.0045 -0.1998 -0.0103 -0.5642 
_-0.0031 
-0.1778 1 
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Continu (c) BEO Portfolio 
Day CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt I DW1983 
T-30toT6C . T-Value T-6toT12 T-Value TOtoT60 T-Value TOtotl2 T-Value T6toT60 T-Value T6toTI2 T-Value 
T31 
-0,0091 -0.3622 -0.0139 -0.7626 -0.0067 -0.3867 
T32 
-0.0123 -0.5526 -0.0182 -0.9951 -0.0109 -0.6316 
T33 
-0.0103 -0.4624 -0.0161 -0.8850 -0.0089 -0.5156 
T34 I 
-O. OM -0.4332 -0.0155 -0.9494 -0-0083 1 -0.4781 
T35 
-0.0074 -0.3337 -0.0133 -0.7278 -0.0061 -0.3501 
T36 
-0.0017 -0.0751 -0.0075 -0.4119 4 0003 -0.0174 
T37 
-0.0028 -0.1243 -0.0096 -0.4720 -0.0014 -0.0807 
T38 
-0.0025 -0.1100 -0.0083 -0.4546 -0.0011 -0.0623 
T39 0.0001 0,0053 
-0.0057 -0.3137 0.0015 0.0861 
T40 0.0011 0.0479 
-0.0048 -0.2617 0.0024 0.1408 
T41 
-0.0040 -0.1795 -0.0098 -0.5395 -0.0026 -0.1517 
T42 
-0,0074 -0.3337 -0.0133 -0.7278 -0.0061 -0.3500 
T43 
-0.0113 -0.5071 -0,0171 -0.9396 -0.0099 -0.5731 
T44 
-0.0118 -0.5306 -0.0177 -0.9682 -0.0105 -0.6033 
T45 
-0.0081 -0.3638 -0.0139 -0,7645 -0.0067 -0.3887 
T46 
-0.0039 -0.1755 -0.0098 -0.5345 -0.0025 -0.1465 
T47 
-0.0051 -0.2296 -0.0110 -0.6007 -0.0037 -0.2162 
T48 
-0.0079 -0.3526 -0.0137 -0.7509 -0.0065 -0.37441 
T49 
-0.0077 -0.3454 -0.0135 -0.7421 
... . 
-0.0063 -03651 
T50 
-0.0033 -0.1483 
........... 
-0.0091 -0.5013 
.. ... 
-0.0019 -0.1116 
T51 
-0.0069 -0.3118 -0.0128 -0.70 10 
--- - -- ... . 
-0.0056 -0.3218 
T52 
-0.0043 
_ 
-0.1913 -0.0101 -0,5538 
- -- . 
-0.0029 -0.1669 
T53 
-0.0027 -0.1215 -0.0086 -0.4687 -0.0013 -0.0772 
T54 
-0.0048 -0.2160 -0.0107 -0.5841 -0,0034 -0.1987 
T55 
-0.0035 -0.1577 -0.0094 -0.5128 -0.0021 -0.1237 
T56 
-0.0051 -0.2310 -0.0110 -0.6023 -0.0038 -0.2179 
T57 
-0.0092 -0.4139 -0.0151 -0.8258 -0.0079 -0.4533 
T58 
-0.0117 -0.5268 -0.0176 -0.9637 -0.0104 -0.5985 
T59 
-0.0169 
1 
-0.7583 0.0227 -1.2464 -0.0155 -0.8962 
T60 
-0.0165 1 -0.7391 0.0223 -1.2229 
=-0.0151 1 
-0.8715 
Note: Bold numbers are significant at 5% lewel of significance or less. 
ýSource: FTSE1,0, OCARbyDeay. As 
Ffý E 1'66fi est (DW 1983). As 
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Continue (AS. 10) (d) SSO Portfolio 
Day CARt DW1983. CARt I 
- 
DW1983 
- 
CAR IDW1983 CARt I DW1 983 CARt ý 7 DAW1983 CAR I UW-1-983 
T-30 to T6C T-Value T T-6 to T12 T-Value TotoT60 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value T6 to 6 O T-Value T6toTI2 T-Value 
T-30 0.00.54 0.1924 
T-29 0.0055 0.1949 
T-28 0.0056 0.1883 
T-27 0,0106 0.3W 
T-26 0.0209 0,7034 
T-25 0,0243 0.8198 ----- --- --------- - --------  --- - --- 
T-24 0.0229 0.7706 
T-23 0.0238 O. 8W7 
T-22 0.0261 0.8792 
T-21 0.0335 1.1272 
T-20 0.0339 1.1405 
T-19 0.0305 1.0272 
T-18 0.0310 1.0451 
T-17 0.0287 0.9657 ---- -------  
+-- 
------ - 
T-16 0.0339 1.1411 ...... ----  .........   
T-15 0.0307 1.0329 
T- 14 0.0386 1.3012 
T- 13 0.0437 1.4715 
T-12 0.0421 1.4169 
T-11 0.0452 1.5235 
T-10 0.0453 1.5275 
T-9 0.0458 1.5430 
T-8 0.0469 1.5805 
T-7 0.0560 1.8862 
T-6 0.0629 2.1189 0.0069 0.5091 
T-5 0.0626 2.1099 0.0066 0.4895 
T4 0.0702 2.3644 0.0142 1.0465 
T-3 0.0707 2.3817 0.0147 1.0843 
T-2 0.0748 2.5203 0.0188 1.3876 
T-1 0.0882 2.9712 0.0322' 2.3745 
TO 0.0857 2.8872 0,0297 2.1905 
-0.0025 -0.1027 -0.0025 -0.2224 
T1 0.0860 2.8967 0.0300 2.2115 
-0.0022 -0.0910 -0.0022 -0.1971 
T2 0.0840 2.8290 0.0280 2.0632 
-0.0042 -0.1738 -0.0042 -0.3764 
T3 0.0885 2.9799 0.0325 2.3935 0.0003 0,0106 0.0003 0.0230 
T4 0.0840 2.8308 0.0280 2.0672 
-0.0042 -0.1715 -0.0042 -0.3715 
T5 0.0857 2.8868 0.0297 2.1897 
-0.0025 -0.1031 -0.0025 -0.2234 
T6 0.0863 2.9074 0.0303 2.2348 
-0.0019 -0.0780 -0.0019 -0.1689 0.0006 0.0265 0.0006 0.0802 
T7 0.0871 2.9345 0,0311 2.2940 
-0.0011 -0.0449 -0.0011 -0.0973 0.0014 0.0613 0.0014 0.1856 
T8 0.0882 2.9706 0.0322 2.3732 0.0000 
-0.0007 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0025 0.1079 0.0025 0.3265 
T9 0.0905 3.0500 0.0345 2.5469 0.0023 0.0962 0.0023 0.2085 0.0048 0.2100 0.0048 0.6357 
TIO 0.0878 2.9579 0.0318 2.3453 
-0.0004 -0.0163 -0.0004 -0.0354 0.0021 0.0914 0.0021 0.2768 
Tll 0.0915 3.0839 0.0355 2.6210 0.0033 0.1376 0.0033 0.2980 0.0059 0,2535 0.0059 0.7676 
T12 0.0886 2.9837 0.0326 2.4019 0.0004 0.0153 O 
. 
0004 066-331 0.0029 0.1247 0.0029 0.3775 
T13 0.0915 3.0823 0.0033 0.1356 0.0058 0,2514 
T14 0.0849 2.8602 
-0.0033 -0.1356 -0.0008 -0.0342 
T15 0.0887 2.9872 0.0005 0.0194 0.0030 0.1291 
T16 0.0842 2.8381 
-0.0040 -0.1627 
T 
-0.0014 -0.0627 
T17 0.0861 2.9013 
-0.0021 -0.0854 0.0004 0.0187 
T18 0.0815 2.7450 
-0.0067 -0.2764 -0.0042 -0.1824 
T19 0.0834 2.8093 
-0.0048 -0.1978 -0.0023 -0.0997 
T20 0.0797 2.6850 
-0.0085 -0.3496 -0.0060 -0.2596 
T21 0.0730 2.4583 
-0.0152 -0.6265 -0.0127 -0.5511 
T22 0.0645 2.1719 
-0.0237 -0.9763 -0.0212 -0.9196 
T23 0.0683 2-3006 
-0.0199 -0.8191 -0.0174 -0,7540 
T24 0.0638 2.1500 
-0.0244 -1,0031 -0.0219 -0.9479 
T25 0.0696 2.3442 
-0.0186 -0.7658 -0.0161 -0.69" 
T26 0.0800 2.6952 
-0.0082 -0.3372 -0.0057 -0.2465 
T27 0.0747 1 2.5178 _ 
-0.0135 -0.5538 -0.0110 -0.4746 
T28 0.0715 2.4083 
-0.0167 -0.6975 -0.0142 -0.6154 
T29 0.0690 2.3253 
-0.0192 -0.7889 
F-ZO- 16-7 
-0.7222 
1 
T30 0.0723 2.4345 
-0.0159 -0.6555 
. 
0134 
-0.5818 
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Continu (d) SSO Portfolio 
Day CAM DW1983 CAM I DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt IDW1983 
T-30 to T6C T-Value T-6toT121 T-Value TOtoT60 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value T6toT60 T-Value T6 to T 12 T-Value 
T31 0.0648 2.1945 
-0,0234 -0.9610 -0.0208 -0.9034 
T32 0.0625 2.1052 
-0.0257 -1.0578 -0.0232 -1.0054 
T33 0.0619 2.0850 
-0.0263 -1.0824 -0.0238 -1.0313 
T34 0.0637 2.1458 
-0.0245 -1.0082 -0.0220 -0.9531 
T35 0.0606 2.0413 
-0.0276 -1.1359 -0.0251 -1.0876 
T36 0.0612 2.0606 
-0.0270 -1.1123 -0.0245 -LO628 
T37 0.0636 2.1427 
-0.0246 40119 -0.0221 -0.9571 
T38 0.0757 2.5513 
-0.0125 -0.5129 -0.0100 -0.4315 
T39 0.0794 2.6764 
-0.0088 -0.3601 -0.0062 -0.2706 
T40 0.0824 2.7773 
-0.0058 -0.2369 -0,0033 -0.1408 
T41 0.0889 2.9951 0.0007 0.0291 0.0032 0.1393 
T42 0.0879 2.9604 
-0.0003 -0.0132 0.0022 0.0947 
T43 0.0882 2.9711 1 0.0000 
-0.0001 0.0025 Oý 1085 
T44 0.0878 2.9592 
-0.0004 -0.0147 0.0021 0.0932 
T45 0.0822 2.7692 
-0.0060 -0.2468 -0.0035 -0.1513 
T46 0.0889 2.9935 0.0007 0.0271 0.0032 0.1372 
T47 0.0833 2.8060 
-0.0049 -0.2018 -0.0024 -0.1039 1 
T48 0.0818 2.7548 
-0.0064 -0.2644 -0.0039 -0.1698 
T49 0.0821 2.7670 
-0.0061 -0.2495 -0.0036 -0.1541 
T50 0.0871 2.9354 
-0.0011 -0.0437 0.0014 0.0626 
T51 0.0781 2.6319 
-0.0101 -0.4145 -0.0076 -0.3279 
T52 0.0760 2.5608 
-0.0122 -0,5013 -0.0097 -0.4193 
T53 0.0706 2.3777 
-0.0176 -0.7249 -0.0151 -0.6548 
T54 0.0683 2.3009 .. .................. - 40199 
-0.8187 -0.0174 -0.7536 
T55 0.0700 2.3596 
-0.0182 -0.7471 -0.0156 -0.6781 
T56 0.0723 2A374 
-0.0158 -0.6521 -0.0133 -0.5781 
T57 0.0686 2.3097 
-0.0196 -08080 -0.0171 -0.7423 
T58 0.0673 2.2685 J -0.0209 -0.8583 -0.0184 -0.7953 
T59 0.0661 2.2256 1 
-0.0221 -0.9107 -0.0196 . 0.8505 
I T60 J 0.0608 1 2.0490 1 
-0.0274 - 1.1264 -0.0249 -1.0776 
Note: Bold numbers are significant at 5% le\el of significance or less. 
.... ..... ýource: FT'S'E1iOOCARbyDeay. >Qs i 
-f66fiest(DW1983)As 
... I 
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Appendix (A5.11) 
Summary Tables of CAR of Different Signal Definition in terms of the Sign and 
the Significance, During the Event Window for Each Portfolio 
CAR-BU SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 CAR-SEI SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 
to to 
ti ti 
t2 Q 
t3 t3 
t4 t4 
t5 t5 
t6 ++ t6 
t7 ++ t7 
t8 + ++ ++ t8 
t9 ++ ++ ++ t9 
tio + ++ tio 
tl 1 ++ ti 1 
t12 ++ H2 
: Indicates that CAR at this particular day is Positively Sign if icant at 1% (5%) level 
Indicates that the CAR at this particular day is Negatively Significant at 1% (5%) level 
T . -4--- 
CAR-BB SS MS Qsl QS2 QS3 QS4 CAR-SSI SS MS QS1 QS2 QS3 QS4 
to to 
ti ti 
t2 t2 
t3 t3 
t4 t4 
t5 t5 
t6 t6 
U U 
t8 t8 
t9 t9 
tio tio 
ti 1 ti 1 
t12 H2 
: Indicates that CAR at this particular day is Positively Sign if icant at 1% (5%) level 
Indicates that the CAR at this particular day is Negatively Significant at 1% (5%) level ýX 5(A5 11 ý. )Qs 
0 
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APPendix (A5.14) 
FTSE100 Cl mulative Abnormal Returns Where AR Computed According LSV (1994) Re-Te t s and T-test According to DW1983 During Different Event W 
a) Grou pI BUY POrffollo, ind ows 
DRY CAM DW1983 CARt DW1983 I CARt MG-13 CA DW1983 CAM DW1983 T-30 to T6( T-Value T-6toT12 T-Value j TOtotl2 je 
ITO 
to t6O T-Val T 6 
CAPh DW1983 
L 
.3 30 6,0023 0,1095 
ue to Q T T-Výfi- 76LoT60 T-Vakie 
-. 
. 
29 '0'0010 -0.0305 
T-28 40092 
-0,4346 
T-27 
. 
0.0134 
-0,6416 
T-26 
-0,0165 -0.7981 
T-25 '0.0199 -0,9647 
T-24 
-0.0179 . 0.8644 
T-23 
-0.0188 -0.9096 
T-22 
I 
-0.0209 -1ý0130 
T-21 
-0,0197 . 0.9519 
T-20 
-0,0161 -0.7785 
T-19 
-0,0140 -0.6735 
T-19 
-0.0141 -0.6779 
-0.0210 -1.0188 
T- 16 
-0.0255 -1,2396 
T-15 
-0.0270 -1.3157 
T-14 
-0.0261 -1.2880 
T- 13 
-0.0249 -1.2128 
T-12 
-0.0255 -1.2415 
T-11 
-0.0312 -1.5234 
T-10 
-0,0313 -1,5252 
T-9 
-0.0329 -1-606, 
T-8 
-0.0357 -1.7423 
T-7 
-0.0446 . 2.1836 
T-6 
-0.0449 . 2.1964 -0.0003 -0.0281 
T-5 
-0.0440 . 2,1509 0.0007 0.0714 
T4 
-0.0445 -2.1753 0.0002 0.0182 
T-3 
-0.0496 -14283 -(). 0050 -0.5356 
T-2 
-0.0535 -2,6231 -0-0089 -0.9619 
T-1 
-0.0596 . 2,9191 -0.0149 -1.6096 
TO 
-0.0594 . 2.9127 -0.0148 -1.5957 0.0001 0.0168 0.0001 0.0077 
T1 
-0.0601 . 2.9455 -0.0155 -1.6675 -0.0005 -0.0701 -0.0005 
-0,0323 T2 
-0.0558 -2,7354 -0-0112 -1.2077 0,0037 0.4859 0.0037 0.2243 
T3 
-0.0542 . 2.6564 -0.0096 -1.0348 0.0053 0.6948 0.0053 0.3208 
T4 
-0.0513 . 2,5100 -0.0066 -0.7143 0.0083 1.0823 0.0083 0.4996 
TS 
. 
-0.0458 -2.2419 -0.0012 -0.1277 0.0137 1.7915 0.0137 0.8270 
T6 
-0.0419 -2.0509 0.0027 0.2904 0.0176 2.2970 0.0176 1.0604 0.0039 0.7441 0.0039 2458 0 
T7 
-0.0379 . 1,8499 0.0068 0.7303 0.0217 2.8288 0.0217 1.3059 0.0080 1.5269 0.0080 . 0 5043 
TS 
-0.0313 -1.5245 0.0134 1.4425 0.0283 3.6898 0.0283 1.7034 0.0146 2.7942 0.0146 . OM29 
T9 
-0.0306 -1,4910 0.0140 1.5156 0.0290 3.7782 0.0290 1.7442 0.0152 2.9244 0.0152 0.9659 
TIO 
-0.0299 -1.4554 0.0148 1.5936 0,0297 3.8725 0.0297 1.7877 0.0160 3.0632 0.0160 1.0117 
Til 
-0,0253 -1.2308 0.0193 2.0852 0.0342 4.4667 0.0342 2.0620 0.0205 3.9379 0.0205 1.3006 
T12 
-0.0231 -1.1214 0.0215 2.32461 0.0365 4.7562 0.0365 2.1957 0.0227 4.3640 0.0227 1ý4414 
T13 
-0.0211 -1.0236 0.0384 2.3151 0.0247 1.5872 
T14 
-0.0206 -0.9996 0.0389 2.3444 0.0252 1.5980 
TIS 
-0.0214 -1.0402 0.0381 2.2948 OM44 1.5457 
T16 
-0.0215 -1.0451 0.0380 2.2888 0.0243 1.5395 
T17 
-0.0175 -0,8470 0.0420 2.530a 0.0283 1.7943 
T18 
-0-0190 -0-9196 0.0406 2.4422 0.0268 1.7010 
19 
-0,0099 -0.4732 0.0496 2.9873 0.0359 2.2751 
T20 
-0.0062 -0.2899 0.0533 3.2112 0.0396 2.5109 
T21 
-0.0016 -0.0573 0.0579 3.4954 0.0442 2.8101 
T22 0.0004 0.0290 0.0599 3.6008 0.0462 2.9211 
T23 
-0.0015 -0.0556 0.0580 3.4974 0.0443 2.8123 
T24 
-0.0043 -0-1980 0.0553 3.3235 0.0415 2.6291 
T25 
-0.0043 -0,1945 0.0553 3.32T7 0.0415 2.6336 
T26 
-0.0023 -0.0941 0.0573 3.4504 0.0436 2.7628 
T27 0,0014 0.0884 0.0609 3.6733 0.0472 2.9975 
T28 0.0051 0.2740 0.0647 3.9000 0.0509 3.2363 
T29 0.0062 0.3382 0.0658 3.97114 0.0520 3.3188 
T30 0.0102 0.5424 0.0697 4.2277 0.0560 3.5814 
T31 0.0129 0.6905 0.0725 4.4087 0.0587 3.7720 
T32 0.0171 0,8991 0.0767 4.6635 0.0629 4.0403 
T33 0.0162 0.8557 0.0758 4.6104 0.0621 3.9644 
T34 0.0202 1.0555 0.0798 4.8545 0.0661 4.2415 
T35 0.0174 0.9155 0.0770 4.6835 0.0632 4.0614 
T36 0.0156 0.8264 0.0751 4.5746 0.0614 3.9468 
T37 0.0173 0.9103 0.0769 4.6772 0.0631 4.0547 
T3 8 0.0231 1.2044 0.0826 5.0363 0.0689 4.4329 
T39 0.0223 1.1435 0.0818 4.9620 0.0681 4.3546 
T40 0.0238 1.2099 0,0833 5.0430 0.0696 4.4400 
M 
T41 0.0222 1.1437 0.0817 4.9622 0.0680 4.3550 
T42 0.0194 0.9986 0.0789 4.7850 0.0652 4.1683 
T43 0.0150 0.7873 0.0746 4.5269 0.0608 3.8965 
_. 
L44 0.0140 0.7388 0.0735 4.46T7 0.05M 3.8341 
T4. ý 5 0.0086 0.4629 0.0681 4.1306 0.0544 3.4792 
__L46 
0.0081 0.4424 0.0677 4.1056 0.0539 3.4528 
T47 0.0126 0,6676 0,0722 4.3807 0.0585 3.7425 
T48 0.0112 0.5936 0.0707 4.2903 0.0570 3.6473 
T49 0.0154 0 8073 0.0749 4.5514 0.0612 3.9222 
TSO 0.0165 . 0 8642 0.0761 4.6208 0.0624 3.9954 
- 
L5 1 0.0092 . 0 5076 o. o687 4.1852 0.0550 3.5367 
- 
- T52 0.0068 . 0 3961 0.0664 4.0491 0.0526 
3.3932 
_ 
LS3 O. OM . 0 3095 o. 0646 3.9433 0.0509 
3.2619 
_. 0.0058 . 0 3464 0.0653 3.98" 
0.0516 3.3294 
0.0091 . 0 5095 o. 0686 4,1876 
0.0549 3.5391 
T56 0.0102 . 0 5699 0.0698 4.2613 
0.0561 3.6168 
TS7 0,0147 . 0 7850 0.0742 4.5241 
0.0605 3.8936 
TS8 0.0210 . 1 0969 0.0806 4.9051 
Oý0668 4.2948 
TS9 0,0244 . 2667 1 0.0840 5.1125 
Oý0702 4.5132 I 
0.0268 . 1 3740 1 0. S. 24351 . 0,0726 4.65111 
- Nft: (Sold . & Maded T-stat) ft nificance or less, (cl nificant at 1% level Of Sig oto T-6M) blgnincam at 
5% and ( Italic T. Mt) Sigruricant at 10% 
Soume: Dec ile2SIzeTtest(DW83)F *SuyLSV( I 994). X1' 4 297 
Appendix (AS. 14) 
FrSE100 Cumulative Abnormal Retur ns Where AIR Computed According LSV (19%) Re-Tea 
a nd T-test According to DW1983 During Different Event Vfirdo,, s (b) Group 2B Oupi , 0  g Portfolio F' Dr r  0 li 
-Day CARt DW1983 CARt D18 93 Ll C Rt DW1983 
n 
 A:   = CARt 
t 
C 
-30 to T6C T T-Value T-6 to T12 Ue V! 11 alue To to 1 
: 
T Ju )tj 
:2 
02 -Value  e ITO 50 '0 TO t t6O 
: 
kRI DW 1963 
T-30 
. 
0,0008 
-0.0358 o - T60 T-Value 
T-29 
-o. 0017 -0-0740 
T-28 0.0008 0.0347 
T-27 
-0.0008 -0.0336 
T-26 
-0,0038 -0.1585 
T-25 
. 
0.0035 
-0.1525 
T-24 
-0-0054 -0.2368 
T-23 
-0.0088 -0.3906 
T-22 
. 
0.0095 
-0.4200 
T-21 
-0.0128 -0.5670 
T-20 
-o, 0105 -0.4645 
T-19 
-0,0083 -0.3682 
T-18 
-0.0072 -0.3198 
T-17 
-0.0048 -0-2119 
T-16 
-0.0045 -0.1985 
T-15 
-0.0028 -0.1253 
T-14 
-0.0015 -0.0648 
T-13 
-0.0027 -0.1213 
T-12 
-0.0062 -0-2721 
T-I 1 
-0.0087 -0.3848 
T-10 
-0.0103 -0,4547 
T-9 
-0.0112 -0.4959 
T-8 
-0.0104 -0.4599 
T-7 
-0.0113 -0.5008 
T-6 
-0.0165 -0.7310 -0.0052 
-0.5037 
T-5 
-0,0154 -0.6789 -0,0040 
-0.3898 
T4 
-0.0156 -0.6901 -0.0043 -OA143 
T-3 
-0.0202 -0.8937 -0.0089 -0.8598 
T-2 
-0.0172 -0.7597 -0.0059 -0.5665 T-I 
-0,0180 -0,7963 -0,0067 -0,6468 
TO 
-0.0152 -0.6705 -0.0038 
-0.3714 0.0028 0 3330 0 062-8 0 1537 TI 
-0.0152 -0.6718 -0.0039 
-0.3743 
. 0.0028 0 3295 . 0 0028 . 0 1521 
T2 
-0.0116 -0.5129 -0.0003 
-0.0265 
. 0.0064 0 7499 . 0 0064 . 0 3462 
T3 
-0.0127 -0.5594 -0.0013 -0.1282 
. 0.0054 0 6269 . 0 0054 . 0 2894 
T4 
-0.0143 -0.6297 -0.0029 -0.2821 
. 0.0038 0 4409 . 0 0038 . 0 2035 
TS 
-0.0140 -0.6175 -0.0026 -0.2553 
, 0.0040 0.4732 . 0 0040 . 0 2185 
. . T6 
-0.0071 -0.3145 0,0042 0,4078 0.0109 1 2749 0 0109 0 5885 0 0069 1 180 T7 
-0.0060 -0.2660 0.0053 0.5138 . 0.0120 1 4030 . 0 0120 . 0 6477 . 0 0080 . 
0 
2 3275 
0.0069 0.3897 
TS 
-0.0062 -0.2304 0.0061 0.5918 . 0.0128 1 4973 . 0 0128 . 0 6912 . 0 0088 . 2 5 
0.0080 0.4520 
T9 
-0.0052 -0.2286 0.0062 0.5959 . 0.0129 1 5023 . 0 0129 . 0 6935 . 0 0088 . 
635 
2 5761 
0.0088 0.4979 
TIO 
-0.0005 -0,0214 0.0108 1.0492 
. 0.0175 2 0503 . 0 0175 . 0 9465 . 0 0135 . 3 9477 
0.0088 0.5003 
T11 
-0.0013 -0.0580 0.0100 0.9690 
. 0.0167 1 9534 . 0 0167 . 0 9018 . 0 0127 . 3 7053 
0.0135 0.7667 
T12 
-0.0006 -0.0260 0.0107 1.0391 . 0.0174 2.0381 . 0.0174 . 0 9409 . 0 0134 . 3 9173 
0.0127 
0 0134 
0,7196 
0 7608 T13 0.0015 0.0659 0 0195 . 1 0531 . . . 0 0155 . T14 0.0026 0.1155 . 0 0206 . 1 1137 . 0 0166 
0.8790 
T15 0.0025 0.1085 . 0 0205 . 1 1051 . 0 0164 
0.9428 
0 93 T16 0.0002 0.0075 . 0 0182 . 0 9818 . 0 0141 . 
38 
0 8 T17 
-0,0038 -0,1670 
. 0 0142 . 0 7686 . O 0102 , 
039 
0 5794 TIS 
-0.0036 -0.1571 
. 0 0145 . 0 7807 ý 0 0104 . 0 5921 T19 0.0012 0.0550 . 0 0193 . 1 0398 . 0 0152 . 0 8650 
T20 0.0025 0.1121 . 0 0206 . 1 1095 . 0 0165 . 0 9384 
T21 0.0026 0.1160 . 0 0206 . 1 1143 . 0 0166 . 0 9434 
T22 0,0051 0.2251 . 0 0231 . 1 2475 . 0 0191 . 1 0837 T23 0.0079 0.3480 . 0 0259 . 1 3. Q77 . 0 0218 , 1 2419 
T24 0.0069 0.3070 . 0.0250 . 1 3476 . 0 0209 . 1 1891 
T25 0,0095 0.4199 0.0275 . 1 4856 . 0 0235 . 3344 1 
T26 0.0136 0.5989 0.0316 . 1.7041 . 0.0275 . 1.5646 
T27 0.0172 0.7591 0 0352 1.8998 0 0312 1 7707 
T28 0.0179 0,7903 . 0.0359 1.9379 . 0 0319 . 1 6107 
T29  9 0.0192 0,8490 0.0372 2.0096 . OM32 . 1 8863 
T30 0.0187 0.8262 0.0367 1.9817 0.0327 . 1.8569 
T31 0.0191 0.8418 0.0371 2.0008 0.0330 1.8770 
T32 0.0170 0.7523 0.0350 1.8915 0.0310 1.7620 
J 
T33 0.0200 0.8849 0.0380 2.0535 0.0340 1.9325 
T34 0.0180 0.7971 0.0361 1.9462 0.0320 1.8195 
T35 0.0151 0.6652 0.0331 1.7851 0.0290 1.6498 
T36 0.0114 0.5051 0.0295 1.5896 0.0254 1.4440 
T37 0.0092 0.4059 0.0272 1.4685 0.0232 1.3164 
. T38 0,0076 0.3343 0.0256 1.3810 0.0215 1.2243 
T39 0.0020 0.0869 0.0200 1.0788 0.0159 0.9060 
T40 0.0029 0.1263 0.0209 1.1269 0.0168 0.9567 
T41 0.0031 0.1353 0.0211 1.1378 0.0170 0.9682 
-_L42 0.0020 0,0880 0.0200 1.0801 0.0160 0.9074 
__L43 0.0002 0.0101 0.0183 0.9850 0.0142 0.8072 
-_L44 0.0014 0,0603 0.0194 1.0463 0.0153 0-8718 
_T45 0.0011 0.0492 0.0191 1.0327 0.0151 0.8575 T46 0,0021 0.0918 0.0201 1.0847 0.0161 0.9123 
_T47 0.0055 0.2414 0.0235 1.2674 0.0194 1.1047 
-_L48 0.0047 0,2077 0.0227 1.2264 0.0187 1.0615 
__L49 0.0059 0.2607 0.0239 1.2911 0.0199 1.1296 
- -LS-O 0.0058 0.2554 0.0238 1.2846 0.0198 1.1228 
- 
a$-, 0.0064 0,2825 0.0244 1.3176 OM04 1 1576 
- -TLS-2 0,0061 0.2677 0.0241 1.2996 0.0200 1.1386 
- -LS-3 0.0022 0.0988 0.0203 1.0933 
0.0162 0.9214 
T$4 0,0030 0.1327 OM10 1.1348 0.0170 O_%w 
Lr-ss 
-0.0030 
-0.1304 0.0151 0.8133 0.0110 04265 
- -L-56 -0,0046 -0,2014 0.0135 
0.7266 Oý0094 0.5352 
M 
-0.0019 40861 0.0161 0.8675 0.0120 OIS35 TSO 0.0029 0.1262 0.0209 1 1268 0ý0168 0.9566 
T59 0.0032 0.1419 0.0212 1.1459 0,0172 0.9767 
To 0.0014 0.0810 0.0194_ 1,0471 nn 
: OWMIRMT-ofat) SGnIftcant at 1% level of signiocance or less. (Sold T-stat) Significant at 5% and Utak T-stal) Signfficant at 10% 
S*jr": D6d62SiZOTt"NDW83)ForStiyLSV(1994). Xis 298 
Appendix (A5.14) 
FTSE100 Cumulative Abnormal Retur Where AR Com ns puted According LSV (1994) Re-T 
a est nd T-test According to DW1983 During Differ t en Ev ent VAnd ows (c) All Groups a %ý 0 PIS 5 t y I"710 u Portfolio rtro F  lio 
-Day CARI DW1983 CARt DW1983 CARt DW1983 )A A  e 
! 
CA Rt 
ft 
DW1983  l T-30 to T6C 
-Value T T-6toT12 T-Valu u n to, 
=u2T-Value 
Va I e To to M 0 t6O 
= 
TV 
= 
-Val I 
CAM ]T DW 1983 CAM DW 1983 
T. 30 0,0010 0,0697 ue 6 UtoTl? to T60 T-Value 
T-29 
. 
0.0013 
-0-0793 
T-28 
-0.0050 -0.3530 
T-27 
. 
0,0080 
-0-5813 
T-26 
. 
0,0111 
-0-8060 
T-25 
-0.0129 -0.9464 
T-24 
-0,0126 -0,9192 
T-23 
-0.0146 -1,0677 
T-22 
-0-0161 -1,1784 
T-21 
-0.0168 -1.2298 
T-20 
-0,0138 -1.0063 
T-19 
. 
0,0116 
-0,8468 
T-18 
-0,0112 -0.8162 
T-17 
. 
0,0141 
-10356 
T-16 
-0,0166 -1-2178 
T-15 
-0.0168 -1.2319 
T-14 
-0.0157 -1.1480 
T-13 
-0.0156 -1.1396 
T-12 
-0.0173 -1-2717 
T-11 
-0.0217 -1.5966 
T-10 
-0.0224 -1,6479 
T-9 
-0.0237 -1.7474 
T-8 
-0,0250 -1.8401 
T-7 
-0,0305 -2.2524 
T-6 
. 
0,0329 
-2-4271 
-0,0024 
-0.3723- 
T-5 
. 
0,0319 
-2-3506 -0.0013 
-0.2150 
T4 
-0.0323 -2,3797 
-0.0017 -0.2786 
T-3 
-0.0372 -2.7441 
-0.0066 -1,0761 
T-2 
-0.0382 -2-8180 
-0.0076 -1.2379 T-I 
-0.0420 -3.1011 -0.0114 -1.8574 
To 
-0,0407 -3-0062 
-0.0102 -1.6496 0.0013 0 2512 0 0013 0 1159 
TI 
-0.0411 -3.0356 -0.0106 -13141 
. 0.0009 0 1733 . 0 0009 . 0 0800 
T2 
-0.0371 -2.7402 -0.0066 
-1.0676 
. 0.0049 0 9548 . 0 0049 . 0 4408 
T3 
-0.0366 -2.7047 -0.0061 -0.9898 
. 0.0053 1 0489 . 0 0053 . 0 4842 
T4 
-0.0356 -2.6274 -0.0051 -0.8206 
. 0.0064 1 2532 . 0 0064 . 0 5785 
T5 
. 
0.0323 
-2.3860 
-0.0018 -0.2924 
. 0.0096 1.8920 . 0.0096 . 0 8735 
. T6 
-0.0272 -2.0048 0.0033 0.5420 0.0148 2 9007 0 0148 1 3391 0 0051 1 T7 
-0.0244 -1.7958 0.0062 0.9993 
. 0.0176 3 4536 . 0 0176 . 1 5943 . 0 0080 . 
4847 
2 2 8 
0.0051 0.4904 
T8 
-0.0202 -1.4878 0.0103 1.6732 
. 0.0217 4 2683 . 0 0217 . 1 9704 . 0 0121 . 
9 6 
3 4977 
0.0080 0.7592 
T9 
-0.0198 -1.4575 0.0107 1.7397 
, 0.0221 4.3487 . 0 0221 . 2 0075 . 0 0125 . 3 6161 
0.0121 
0 
1.1553 
TIO 
-0.0174 -1.2794 0.0131 2.1295 0.0245 4.8199 . 0 0245 . 2 2251 . 0 0149 . 3097 4 . 
0125 
0 0 9 
1,1943 
TH 
-0.0152 -1,1103 0.0154 2.4994 0.0268 6 2671 . 0 0268 . 2 4315 . 0 0172 . 4 9680 . 
14 
0 017 
1.4235 
T12 
-0,0136 -0.9926 0.0170 2.7571 
. 0.0284 5.5787 . 0.0284 . 2.5754 . 0 0188 . 5 4266 . 
2 
0 0188 
1.6409 
1 7924 
T13 
-0.0115 -0,8423 0 0304 2 7589 . . . 0 0208 . 1 5 T14 
-0.0108 -0.7863 . 0 0312 . 2 8273 . 0 0216 . 
98 6 
2 0577 TIS 
-0.0113 -0.8265 
. 0 0306 . 2 7781 . 0 0210 . 2 0059 T16 
-0.0124 -0.9025 
. 0 0296 . 2 6854 . 0 0200 . 1 9082 T17 0.0117 
-0,8545 
. 0 0303 . 2 7440 . 0 0206 . 1 9700 T18 
-0.0125 -0.9105 
. 0 0295 . 2 6756 . 0 0199 . 1 8979 
T19 
-0.0052 -03722 
. 0 0368 . 3 3331 . 0 0271 . 2 5904 T20 
-0.0025 -0.1723 
. 0 0395 . 3 5772 . 0 0298 . 2 8474 
T21 0.0002 0.0316 . 0 0421 . 3 8263 . 0 0325 . 3 1098 
T22 0.0024 0.1842 . 0 0444 . 4 0127 . 0 0347 . 3 3060 
T23 0,0025 0.1989 . 0 0444 . 4 0306 . 0 0348 . 3 3249 
T24 0,0005 0.0464 . 0 0424 . 3 8443 . 0 0328 . 3 1287 
T25 0.0015 0.1301 . 0 0435 . 3.9466 . 0 0339 . 3 2365 
T26 0.0044 0.3448 . 0 0464 4.2089 . 0 0368 . 3 5126 
T27 0,0081 0.6172 . 0.0500 4.5415 . 0.0404 . 3.8629 
T28 0.0105 0.8000 0.0525 4.7648 0 0429 4 0981 
T29 0.0117 0.8974 0.0537 4.8838 . 0 0441 . 4 2234 
T30 0.0138 1.0577 0.0558 5.0796 . 0.0461 . 4.4296 
T31 0.0155 1.1970 0.0575 5.2497 0.0479 4.6088 
T32 0.0171 1.3135 0.0591 5.3920 0.0494 4.7586 
T33 0.0178 1.3707 0.0598 5.4618 0.0502 4.8322 
TU 
__. 
L34 0.0193 1.4807 0.0613 5.5963 0.0517 4.9737 
T3 5 0.0164 1.2654 0.0584 5.3332 0.0488 4.6967 
T36 0.0138 1.0740 0.0558 5.0994 0. (962 4.4505 
T37 0.0139 1.0757 0.0559 5.1016 0.0462 4.4528 
T39 0.0165 1.2788 0.0585 5.3497 0.0489 4.7140 
I 
T39 0.0137 1.0494 0.0557 5.0694 0.0460 4.4189 
T40 0.0149 1.1350 0.0569 5.1739 0.0473 4.5290 
T41 0.0141 1.0842 0.0561 5.1119 0.0464 4.4636 
T42 0.0120 0.9249 0.0540 4.9173 0.0444 4.2587 
T43 0.0088 0.6865 0,0507 4.6261 0.0411 3.9521 
. rA. T  
-_L44 0.0087 0.6804 0.0506 4.6187 0.0410 3.9443 
___L4S 0,0054 0.4338 0.0474 4.3175 0.0378 3.6270 
-_L46 0,0056 0.4465 0.0476 4.3330 0.0379 3.6434 
_ 
T47 0.0096 0.7481 0.0516 4.7015 Oý0420 4.0314 
--L48 0.0085 0,6601 0.0504 4.5939 0.0408 3.9182 
--_L49 0.0114 0.8828 0.0534 4.8660 0.0437 4.2047 
-LS-O 0.0120 0.9283 0.0540 4.9215 0.0444 4.2631 L-. LS 
-1 
0.0080 0.6391 0.0500 4.5683 0.0404 3.8912 
-LS-2 0,0065 0.5321 0.0485 4.4376 0.0389 3.7536 
--. 
LS-3 0.0039 0.3366 0.0459 4.1988 0.0362 3.5020 
T54 0.0047 0,3928 0.0466 4.2674 0.0370 3.5743 
TLS 
_5 
0.0040 0.3457 0.0460 4.2100 0.0363 3.5138 
--LS6 0.0040 0.3472 0.0460 4.2118 0,0363 3.5157 TS7 0.0077 0,6158 0.0496 4.5398 0,0400 3.6611 
T58 
41 
0.0133 1.0373 0.0553 5.0546 0.0457 4.4033 
TS9 0.0154 1,1953 0.0574 5.2476 00478 4.6066 
0,0180 1,2303 0.05W 5.2903, 00484 4.651? j
-- 
NO at 1% level of significance or less, (Bold T-stot) Significant at 5% and Mak T-mt) Significant at 10% 
I 'ýOOMS: DOC#e2SizaTtest(DW83)ForStiyLSV(1994). Xis 299 
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Appendix (A5.14) 
FTSE100 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Where AR Computed According LSV (1994) p 
, 
e. Tea nd T-test According to DW1983 During Different EV&ft VAndows ) Group 1 Sell Portfolio 
-Day 
T-30 
T-29 
T-28 
T-27 
CARt DW1983 
T-30 to T6C T-ValUe 
-0,0031 -0.1 WL 
-0.0034 -0-1188 
. 
0,0041 
-0,1440 
0,0035 0.1231 
CARt 
T-6toT12 
DW1983 
T-Value P% " UVV19? J3 7 ITO'totI2 T-Value 
I CARt 
ITO to t6o 
DW1983 
T-Value 
CAM 
T69oTI2 
DW1983 CARt 
T-VnI-j. TA T60 
DW1983 
T-Value 
T-26 
T-25 
0,0090 
0.0136 
0.3169 
0,4809 
T-24 0.0269 0.9490 
T-23 0.0239 0.8440 
T-22 
T-21 
0,0213 
0,0278 
0,7529 
0.9825 
T-20 0,0251 0.8859 
T-19_ 0.0143 0.5034 
T-18 0.0226 0.7984 
T-17 0.0154 0.5427 
T-16 0.0229 0.8090 
T-15 0.0295 1.0413 
T-14 0.0392 1.3848 
T-13 0.0429 1.5135 
T-12 0,0515 1.8156 
T-J 1 0.0603 2.1271 
T-10 0,0677 2.3900 
T-9 0,0685 2.4152 
T-8 0.0682 2.4066 
T-7 0.0851 3.0018 
T-6 0,0886 3.1255 0.0035 0.2709 
T-5 0,0914 3.2257 0.0063 0.4902 
T4 0.0930 3.2800 0.0079 0.6089 
T-3 0.1040 3.6687 0.0189 1.4596 
T-2 0.1078 3.8023 0.0227 1.7520 
T-I 0.1110 3.9174 0.0260 2.0039 
TO 0.1227 4.3299 0.0376 2.9066 0.0117 1.0913 0 0117 5038 0 
TI 0.1234 4.3546 0.0383 2.9606 0.0124 1 1566 . 0 0124 . 0 5339 
T2 0.1168 4.1207 0.0317 2.4489 . 0.0058 0.5379 . 0 0058 . 2483 0 
T3 0.1178 4.1562 0.0327 2.5265 0.0068 0.6318 , 0 0068 . 0 2917 
T4 0.1182 4.1711 0.0331 2.5591 0.0072 0.6712 . 0 0072 . 0 3099 
T5 0.1168 4.1224 0.0318 2.4526 0.0058 0.5424 . 0.0058 . 0 2504 
. T6 0.1106 3.9036 0.0256 1.9737 
-0.0004 -0.0366 -OM04 -0 0169 
-0 0062 08522 0 006 T7 0.1115 3.9323 0.0264 2.0365 0.0004 0,0394 0 0004 . 0 0182 ý 
-0 0054 
- 
-0 7404 
- , 
2 
0 0054 
-02815 
TS 0.1123 3.9629 0.0272 2.1034 0.0013 0.1202 . 0 0013 . 0 0555 . 
-0 0045 
. 
-0 6214 
- 
. 00045 -0.2445 0 T9 0.1138 4.0166 0.0288 2.2211 0.0028 0.2625 . 0 0028 . 0 1212 . 
-0 0030 
. 
-0 4119 
- 
0 0030 
- 
2052 
0 1361 TIO 0.1090 3.8449 0.0239 1.8453 
-0.0021 -0,1917 
. 
-0 0021 
. 
-0 0885 
. 
-OM79 
. 
-10806 
- 
. 00079 
- 
. 03569 T11 0.0926 3.2675 0.0075 0.5816 
-0.0184 -1.7195 
. 
-0 0184 
. 
-M938 0242 -0 -3 3294 
- 
0242 
-0 
- 
1 0997 T12 0.0804 2.8373 
-0.0047 -0,3598 -0.0306 -2.8576 
. 
-0.0306 -1.3192 
. 
-0.0364 
. 0047 
-5 
. 0364 
-0 
- 
. 
-1 6530 T13 0.0888 3.1334 
-0 0222 -0 9576 
. . 
-00280 
. 
1 2722 T14 0.0876 3.0900 . 
-0 0235 
ý 
-1 0107 
-0 0293 
- 
1 3280 TIS 0.0880 3.1039 . 
-0.0231 
. 
-0.9936 
- 
-OM89 
- 
. 
-1 3101 T16 0.0900 3.1766 
-0.0210 -0 9048 
-0 0268 
. 
-12166 T17 0.0945 3.3329 
-0.0166 
. 
-0.7139 
. 
-0 0224 -10155 TIS 0.0971 3.4268 
-0.0139 -0 5993 
. 
-0 0197 -0 8948 T19 0.0924 3.2599 
-0.0186 
. 
-0 8031 
. 
-0 0244 
. 
-1 1095 T20 0.0907 3.1993 
-0.0204 
. 8771 
-0 
. 
-0 0262 -1 1873 T21 0.0820 2.8939 
-0.0290 
. 
-1.2501 
. 
-0 0348 
. 
-1 5802 T22 0.0864 3.0493 
-0.0246 -1.0603 
, 
-0 0304 
, 
-1 3803 T23 0.0867 3.0600 
-0.0243 -1.0472 
. 
-0 0301 
. 
-1 3665 T24 0.0887 3.1279 
-0.0224 -0.9643 
. 
-0 0282 
. 
-1 2792 T25 0.0835 2.9465 
-0.0275 -1 1859 
. 
-0 0333 
, 
-1 5126 T26 0.0742 2.6189 
-0.0368 -1.5861 
, 
-O G426 
. 
-1 9340 T27 0.0860 3.0346 
-0.0250 -1ý0783 . -00308 - -1 3993 T28 0.0863 3.0464 
-0.0247 -1.0638 -0.0305 
. 
-13840 T29 0.0802 2.8297 
-0.0308 -1.3285 -00366 -1-6628 T30 
T31 
0.0806 
0,0763 
2.8"2 
2.6938 
-0.0304 
-0.0347 
-1.3109 
-1.4945 
-0.0362 
-0,0405 
-1.6442 
-1.8376 T32 0,0740 2.6119 
-0.0370 -1-5945 -0.0428 -1.9429 T33 0.0836 2.9498 
-0.0274 -1,1818 -0.0332 -1.5083 
- 
- 
- 
T34 
T35 
T36 
T37 
T38 
T39 
T40 
___L41 
__. 
L42 
T43 
__L44 T45 
T47 
T49 
T49 
TSO 
-LS-I TS2 
TS3 
TSS , 
T38 
T$9 
0 
1 
0.0783 
0.0687 
0.0724 
0.0788 
0.0858 
0.0834 
0.0770 
0.0848 
0.0756 
0.0710 
0,0676 
0.0704 
0.0754 
0.0723 
0,0632 
0.0598 
0.0537 
0.0488 
Oý0493 
0.0421 
0,0362 
0.0370 
'0.0321 
10-0391 
0.0378 
0.0333 
10-0625 
1 
1 
2.7621 
2.4244 
2.5542 
2.7820 
3.0271 
2.9428 
2.7164 
2.9908 
2.6675 
2.5033 
2.3859 
2.4829 
2.6596 
2.5510 
2.2295 
2.1101 
1.8958 
1.7203 
1.7406 
1.4837 
1.2779 
1.3051 
1,1311 
1.3813 
1.3333 
1,1750 
2.2063 1 
-0.0327 
-0,0423 
-0.0386 
-OM22 
-0.0252 
-0.0276 
-0.0340 
-0.0263 
-0.0354 
-0,0401 
-0.0434 
-0,0407 
-0.0356 
-0.0387 
-0. (978 
-0,0512 
-0.0573 
. 
0.0623 
-0.0617 
-0.0690 
-0,0748 
-0.0740 
-0.0790 
-0.0719 
-0.0732 
-OW77 
-0,0485 
-1.4111 
-1.8235 
-1-6650 
-1.3868 
-1.0875 
-1 ý 1904 
-1.4669 
-1,1318 
-V5267 
-1.7271 
-1.8706 
-1.7521 
-1.5362 
-1.6690 
-2.0616 
-2.2075 
-2.4692 
-2.6936 
-2.6588 
-2.9726 
-3.2239 
-3.1907 
-3.4032 
-10976 
-3.1563 
-3-3496 
-2,0899 
-0.0386 
-00481 
-0.0444 
-0.0380 
-0.0310 
-0.0334 
-0.0399 
-0,0321 
-0.0412 
-00459 
-0.0492 
-0,0465 
-0.0415 
-00445 
-0.0537 
-0 M70 
-0.0631 
-00681 
-0.0675 
-00748 
-0.0806 
-OW99 
-00848 
-00777 
. 
0,0791 
-00835 
-00543 
-1.7498 
-2-1941 
-2.0172 
-1.7242 
-14089 
-1.5173 
-1-8086 
-1.4556 
. 
1.8715 
-2.0826 
-2.2336 
-2.1088 
-1.8815 
-2.0213 
-2.4349 
-2-56115 
-2.8641 
-10M 
-3.0637 
-3-3942 
-3.6589 
-3-6239 
-3.6477 
-3.5259 
-3.5876 
-3.7912 
-2,4646 
VIM T-stot) SGnificant at 1% level of significance or less, (OW T401) Significant at 5% and (Mak T-Sat) Significant at 10% 
1'1041109ý Dede2SizeTlest(DW83)ForSWILSV( I QQ4), Xls 300 
APPendix (A3.14) 
FTSEIOO CU mulative Abnormal Retur ns Where AR Computed According Lsv (1994) Re- T 
an . est d T-test According to DW1983 During Different Event windows (0) Group 2 Sell Portfolio 
CARt DW1983 EARt DW1983 
vv'9t$, J 7' L CARt L"v I j I-ARt T-30 to T6C T-Value T-6toT12 T-Value TO to 02 
TV I 
Tn r-iýn TAI f 
- 
t DW1983 CARI I DW 1983 
T-30 0.0025 0.0753 
T 6 to T12 T-Value T6 to T60 T-vakie 
T-29 0. ()011 0.0782 
T-29_ 0,0136 0,3416 
T-27 0.0246 0.5226 
T-26 0,0238 0,5236 
T-25 0,0351 0,7549 
T-24 0,0391 0.8784 
T-23 0,0404 0.9115 
T-22 0,0443 0,9969 
T-21 0.0464 1.0432 
T-20 0.0538 1.2045 
T-19 0.0609 1.3129 
T-18 0,0591 1.2758 
T-17 0.0463 1.0245 
T-16 0.0444 0,9603 
T-15 0,0540 1.1829 
T-14 0.0615 1.3495 
T-13 0.0595 1.3414 
T-12 0.0432 1.0202 
T-I 1 0.0372 0.9058 
T-I 0.0372 0,9154 
T-9 0,0444 1,0604 
T-8 0.0600 1.1826 
T-7 0.0550 1.3005 
T-6 0.0564 1.3536 0.0014 0.11F2 
T-5 0.0598 1.4525 0.0048 0.3326 
T4 0.0661 1.6079 0.0111 0.6727 
T-3 0.0605 1.4818 0.0055 0.3967 
T-2 0.0673 1.5861 0.0123 0.6250 
T-I 0.0654 1.5878 0.0104 0.6287 
TO 0.0703 1.7204 0.0163 0.9189 0.0049 0.3508 0 0049 0 1619 
TI 0.0645 1,5983 0.0095 0.6518 
-0.0009 0.0279 
. 
-0 0009 
. 0 0129 
T2 0.0543 1.3897 
-0.0007 0.1952 
-0.0111 
-0.5241 
- 
-0 0111 
. 
-0 2420 T3 0.0463 1.1943 
-0.0087 -0.2324 -0.0192 -1.0411 
. 
-00192 
. 
-04806 T4 0.0344 0.9800 
-0.0206 -0,7014 -O, o31O -1,6080 -0 0310 
-0 7423 TS 0.0383 1.0714 
-0.0167 -0.5013 -0.0271 -1.3662 
. 
-0.0271 
. 
-0.6307 T6 0.0357 0.9215 
-0.0193 -0.8295 -0.0298 -1,7629 -0-0298 -0 8138 -00027 -0 5839 -00027 01 A29 T7 0.0324 0,8871 
-0.0226 -0.9047 -0.0331 -1.8538 
-0.0331 
- 
-0 8558 -0 0060 
ý 7178 
-0 -OMOO 
- 
-02371 TS 0.0318 0.8601 
-0.0232 -0.9639 -0.0336 -1.9254 -0.0336 
, 
-0 8889 
. 
-00065 
. 
-08232 -00065 -02719 T9 0,0267 0.7714 
-0.0283 -1.1580 -0.0388 -2.1600 -0.0388 
, 
-0 9972 -0 0117 -1 1685 -0 0117 -03860 TIO 0.0168 0.5190 
-0.0384 -1.7104 -0.0488 -2.8278 -0.0488 
. 
-1 3054 
. 
-0 0217 
. 
-2 1515 
. 0217 
-0 -07106 _ T11 0.0170 0.5203 
-0.0380 -1.7074 -0.0485 -2.8242 -0.0485 -1.3038 
. 
-0 0214 
, 
1462 
-2 
. 
-0 0214 -0 7089 T12 0.0169 0.5234 
-0.0381 -1.7007 -0.0486 -2.8161 -0.0486 -1,3000 
. 
-0.0215 
. 
-2.1342 
. 
-0.0215 
, 
-0 7049 
- T13 0,0163 0.5802 
-00491 -1.2551 -00220 
. 
-06576 
_ T14 0.0160 0.5348 
-0.0495 -1.2861 0224 
-0 -0 6902 T15 0.0193 0.5990 
-0,0462 -1 ý2077 
. 
-0 0191 
. 
-06077 T16 0.0105 0.4056 
-0.0550 -1.4439 
, 0279 
-0 48564 T17 0.0093 0.3762 
-0,0562 -1.4798 
. 
-00291 -08943 TIS 0.0034 0.2222 
-0.0620 -1.6680 -0 0349 -1 0924 T19 0.0051 0.2640 
-0.0604 -1.6168 
. 
-00333 
, 
-1 0385 T20 0.0048 0.3090 
-0.0607 -1.5620 -0 0336 -0 9807 T21 
-0.0001 0.1873 
-0.0656 -1.7106 
. 
-00385 
. 
-1 1373 T22 
-0.0017 0.1563 
-0.0672 -1.7484 -0 0401 -1 1771 T23 0.0021 0.2380 
-0,0633 -1.6511 
, 
-0.0362 -1 0747 T24 
-0.0064 0.0528 
-0.0718 -1.8748 -0.0447 -13102 T25 
-0.0057 0.0533 
-0.0711 -1ý8742 -0 0"0 -13096 T25 
-0.0077 -0.0292 -0.0731 -1.9750 -0.0460 -14157 T27 
-0-0102 
-0.0923 -0.0756 -2.0521 -00485 -1.4970 T28 
-0.0145 -0,1808 -0.0799 -2.1602 -0.0528 -16108 T29 
-0-0205 
-0,3413 -0,0860 -2.3562 -00589 -1.8172 
T30 
-0.0136 
-0,2474 -0.0789 -2.2415 -0.0518 -16964 
T31 
-0.0123 -0.2191 -0,0777 -2.2070 -0-0506 -1.8601 
T32 
-0.0145 
-0,2644 -0.0800 -2.2623 -0.0529 -1 7183 
T33 
-0-0120 
-0.2094 -OV74 -2.1951 -0,0503 -1.6476 
T34 
-0.0072 
-0.1189 -0.0726 -2.0845 -0-(M55 -15311 T3S 40147 
-0.2719 -0.0801 -2.2714 -0.0530 -1.7279 T36 
-0.0204 
-0.4172 -0.0859 -2-4489 -0.0588 -1.9149 T37 
-0-0315 
-0,6245 -0ý0969 -2.7021 -00698 -2.1815 T38 
-0.0344 
-0.6410 -0.0998 -2.7223 -0.0727 -2.2027 T39 
-0.0421 
-0.8209 -0.1076 -2.9420 -0ý0805 -2.4341 T40 
-0.0330 
-0.6725 -0.0984 -2.7608 -0.0713 -2.2432 T41 
-0,0362 
-0.7544 -0.1016 -2.8607 -00745 -2.3485 T42 
-0.0334 
-0.7285 -0.0988 -2.8291 -0.0717 -2.3153 T43 
-0.0287 
-0.6239 -00942 -2.7013 -00671 -2.1806 T44 
-0,0238 
-0.4503 -0.0892 -2.4893 -00621 -1.9573 S 
-0-0272 
-0,4896 -0,0927 -2.5373 -00656 -2.0079 T46 
. 
0,0264 
-0.4787 -0,0919 -2-5240 -0.0648 -1.9939 
_T47 -0.0177 -0.3007 -0,0832 -2.3066 -00561 . 
1.7649 
T48 
. 
0,0173 
-0,3136 -0.0827 -2.3223 -00556 . 
1,7815 
T49 40148 
-0.2324 -0,0803 -2.2232 -00532 -1.67771 TSO 
-0.0191 
-0,2855 -&0845 -2.2881 -00574 .1 
7454 
TSI 
-0,0123 
-0.1109 -0,0778 -2.0748 -00507 -15208 TS2 
-0.0282 
-0.4300 40936 -2.4645 -00665 -1.9313 
-. 
T! 5-3 
-0.0303 
-0.4989 -00958 -2.5487 . 
00687 
-2.0200 
TS4 
-010320 
-0,4749 -0,0975 -2.5194 -00704 -1.9891 TSS 
-0,0365 
-0.5374 -0.1020 -2.5957 -00740 -2-0694 T36 
-0.0437 
-0.6923 -0.1091 . 
2.7849 
-0 Oen -2.2686 
TS7 
-0,0515 48536 -01169 . 2.9819 -00898 -2.4762 
T58 
-0-0577 
-0.9117 . 0,1232 -3.0528 -00961 -2.5506 T39 
-0,0486 
-0,7420 -0 1140 -2.8456 -0 
OM9 
-2.3326 
TGO 
-0-0401 
-0.5874 1 1 -01056 -2-65N -00785 -2-1336 N *'-Pji MhIW T. ftt) 310n ifiont at M -lvvW of significance or km. (B old T-6tat) Significant at 5% and O tW T. stat ) Significan t at 10% 
S OUMC DV Ae2SizaTiest(DW83)F orSeilLSV(IQQ4)-)(IS 301 
CUAPPOWIX 
(AS. 14) 
FrSE100 mulakive Abnormal Returns Where AR Computed According LSV (1994) Re-Test 
and T-test According to DW1983 During Dffftrw* Event Windows 1*1 All 
CARt DW1983 CAM DW1983 
L30 
IT-30 
to T6C T-Value 
-0,0019 -0.0667 
T-6 to T 12 T-Value TOtotI2 T-Value -83 ITO to t6O T-Value 
CARI DVVI983 IT6 
to T 12 T-Value 
CARi D'ý'. 1983 
T6 to T60 T-'ý ajue 
:: ff29 
T-28 
T-27 
T-26 
-0,0025 -0.0738 
-0.0004 -0.0016 
0,0078 0,2908 
0,0120 0.4566 
T-25 
T-24 
T-23 
0.0181 0,6786 
0,0294 1.1227 
0.0273 1,0447 
T-22 0.0261 0.9970 
T-21 0.0317 1.2100 
T-20 0.0310 1.1844 
T-19 0,0239 0.8956 
T-18 0,0302 1.1346 
T-17 0.0218 0.8268 
T-16 0.0274 1.0317 
T-15 0.0346 1.3092 
T- 14 0.0438 1.8620 
T-13 0.0463 1.7694 
T-12 0.0498 1.9136 
T-11 0.0555 2A395 
T-10 0.0614 2.3673 
T-9 0.0635 2. "Ol 
T-8 0.0645 2.4762 
T-7 0.0789 3.0270 
T-6 0.0819 3.1516 0.0031 0.2728 
T-5 0,0849 3.2725 0.0060 0.5374 
T4 0,0874 3.3741 0.0086 0.7597 
T-3 0.0950 3.6619 0.0161 1.3895 
T-2 0.0994 3.8132 0.0206 1.7207 
T-1 0.1016 3.9124 0.0228 1.9378 
TO 0.1119 4.3121 0.0330 2.8126 0.0103 1.0575 0.0103 0 4882 
Tl 0.1113 4.2900 0.0324 2.7642 0.0096 0.9990 . 0.0096 0 4612 
_ T2 0.1039 4.0163 0.0250 2.1652 0.0023 0.2749 . 0.0023 0 1269 
T3 0.1030 3.9777 0.0242 2.0807 0.0014 0.1728 . 0.0014 0 0798 
T4 0.1009 3.9144 0.0221 1.9422 
-0.0007 0.0053 
. 
-0.0007 0 0024 T5 0.1006 3,9054 0.0218 1.9225 
-0,0010 -0.0185 
. 
-0.0010 -0.0086 T6 0.0952 3.6648 0.0163 1.3959 
-0.0065 -0.6552 -0.0065 -01025 -00055 -09371 -00055 -03095 T7 0.0951 3.6772 0.0163 1.4231 
-0,0065 -0.6222 -0.0065 -0.2673 -0 0055 -0 8886 -0 0055 -02935 TB 0.0957 3.6938 0.0168 1.4593 
-0.0059 -0,5785 -00059 -0-2671 
. . 
-0 0049 -08242 
. 
-00049 -02722 - T9 0.0959 3.7081 0.0170 1.4908 
-0.0058 -0.5405 -0.0058 -0.2495 
, 
-0 0048 -0 7683 -00048 -0 2538 
_ TIO 0.0899 3.4720 0,0110 0.9740 
-0.0117 -1.1652 40117 -0ý5379 . . -0.0107 -1.6878 , -00107 -05575 Tll 0.0770 2.9786 
-0,0019 -0.1059 -0.0246 -2.4707 -0.0246 -1.1406 -0.0236 -3.6095 -0 0236 -1 1922 T12 0.0673 2.6117 
-0.0116 -0.9088 -0.0343 -3.4414 -0.0343 -1.5887 -0,0333 -5.0394 
ý 
-00333 -1,6641 T13 0.0738 2.8778 
-0.0278 -1,2637 -0 0268 -1 3218 T14 0.0728 2.8315 
-0.0268 -1ý3202 , . 
-0.0278 -1 3814 TIS 0.0738 2.8662 
-0.0278 -1.2778 -00268 -1 3367 T16 0.0736 2.8599 
-0,0280 -1.2856 
. 
-0.0270 -1 3449 T17 0.0769 2.9832 
-0.0247 -1,1350 
, 
-00238 -1 1862 T18 0.0778 3.0090 
-0.0238 -1.1034 -0.0229 -1.1530 T19 0.0744 2.8813 
-0.0272 -1.2594 -00263 -1ý3173 T27- 0.0730 2.8458 
-0.0287 -1,3028 -00277 -13630 T2 1 0.0651 2.5417 
-0.0366 -1.6743 -00356 -1,7542 
- T22 0.0682 2.6632 
-0.0334 -1.5258 -0.0324 -15979 T23 0.0693 2.7005 
-00323 -1.4802 -00314 -1.5498 T24 0.0690 2.6940 
-0.0326 -14862 -00316 -15582 T25 0.0651 2.5388 
-0.0365 -1.6777 -0.0355 -1.7579 
T26 0.0573 2.2294 
-0.0443 -2.0557 -0.0433 -2.1559 
T27 0.0662 2.5623 
-0.0355 -1.6491 -00345 -1.7277 
T28 0.0655 2.5411 
-0.0361 -1.6749 -0.0351 -1.7549 
T29 0.0594 2.2987 
-00422 -1.9710 -00412 -2.0667 
T30 0.0612 2.3441 
-0,0404 -1.9155 -00394 -2.0083 
T31 0.0581 2.2254 
-0ý0436 -2.0605 -0.0426 -2.1610 
T32 0.0558 2,1392 
-0.0459 -2.1658 -0.0449 -2.2718 
T33 ' 0.0639 2. "75 
-0.0377 -1.7893 -00368 -1.8753 
_ T. 1 4 0,0606 2.3189 
-0.0410 -1.9463 -00400 -2.0407 
T35 0.0515 1.9760 
-0.0501 -2.3652 -0ý0491 -2.4818 
T36 0.0532 2.0355 
-0.0484 -2.2925 -0.0474 -2.4053 
T37 0.0561 2.1567 
-0,0455 -2-1445 -0.0446 -2.2494 
T38 0,0610 2.3603 
-0.0406 -1.8958 -0.0396 -1.9875 
_ T39 
T40 
0.0575 2.2242 
0.0543 2.0832 
-0.0441 -2.0620 
-0.0473 -2.2343 
-00431 -2.1626 
-0.0463 -2.3440 
T41 
T42 
0.0598 2.2887 
0.0531 2.0213 
-00418 -1-9832 
-0.0485 -2.3098 
-00408 -2.07% 
-0.0475 -2.4236 
T43 0.0504 1.9179 
-0.0512 -2-4361 -00503 -2.5565 
T44 0.0488 1.8791 
-0.0529 -2-4M -0.0519 -24065 
T45 0.0502 1.9482 
-0.0514 -2.3991 -005N -2.5175 
T46 0.0544 2.1032 
. 
0.0472 
-2.2098 -00463 -2.3182 
_ T47 0.0537 2.0731 
-0.0479 -2.2465 -00469 -2.3569 
T48 0.0466 1.7936 
-0.0550 -2.5680 40541 -2.7165 
T49 
TSO 
TSI 
T52 
T53 
Tss 
T56 
TS7 
TSI 
T$9 
-M7- 
0.0444 1.7202 
0,0387 1.5180 
0,0361 1.4297 
0.0333 1.3339 
0.0271 1,0898 
0.0221 0.9222 
0.0218 0.9230 
0.0164 0.7195 
0,0204 0,8762 
0,0181 0,8146 
0.0184 0.7393 
0.0170 n 7RAII 
.. 
6 Z 44W t-hl M cinnifirAnce or less. (B 
-00572 -2.6776 
-0.0629 -2.9246 
-00655 -3.0324 
. 
0.0683 
-3.1493 
-00745 . 3. "75 
-0,0795 -3.6522 
-0,0798 -3-6513 
-0,0852 -3.8999 
-00812 -3.7085 
-0.0835 . 3.7837 
-00852 -18757 
-00846 -3.8624 
old T. Imt) Significant a t 5% and (Itabc T-ass 
-00562 -2-8109 
-0.0619 -3.0710 
-00645 -3.1845 
-00673 -3.3077 
-00735 -3.6217 
-0.0785 -3.6373 
-00788 -3.8363 
-00842 -4.0981 
-00802 -3-M5 
-0,0826 -3.9758 
-00842 -4-07'26 
-00836 -4.0586 
) Significant at 10% 
t'40MO: DGCWSinTint(DW83)FOrSoilLSV(1994) XIS 302 
Appendix (A5.15) (a) Buy Portfolios 
Means and Standard Errors of CARs of Different 
qlvn2l Definitions Durint the Event Window 
BUY N Mean Mean Mean + Mean 
- 
Stat Stadstic Std EffOT StdError StdError 
T068-s-S 295 
-0.00011 700179 0.00 1 Fq- "Z. 00 1 go 
TINS 295 0,00148 0.00237 0.00385 
-0,00089 
T213SS 295 0.00196 0.00303 0.00499 
-0-00106 
T38SS 295 0.00263 0.00356 0.00618 
-0=093 
TOSS 295 0.00153 0.00408 0.00561 
-0.00254 
T58SS 295 0.00480 0.00419 0.00899 0.00061 
T68SS 295 0.00830 0.00434 0.01264 0.00396 
T7BSS 295 0,00833 0.00448 0.01281 0.00385 
TBBSS 295 0.01291 0.00487 0.01778 0.00804 
TOSS 295 0.01147 0.00499 0.01647 0.00648 
TIOSSS 295 0.01229 0.00502 0.01731 0.00727 
TI I BSS 295 0.01039 0.00508 0.01547 0.00531 
T128SS 295 10.01022 10.00520 0.01542 0.00501 
ýftl le Signal 
TOBIVIS 103 0.00014 0.00249 0.00263 
-0.00235 
T1BMS 103 0.00081 0.00335 0.00416 
-0.00254 
T213MS 103 
-0.00227 0.00429 0.00203 
-0.00656 
T3131VIS 103 
-0,00202 0.00549 0.00348 
-0.00751 
T4BMS 103 
-0.00371 0.00604 0.00233 
-0-00975 
T5131VIS 103 
-0.00112 0.00606 0.00494 
-0.00719 
TOMS 103 0.00428 0.00628 0.01057 
-0.00200 
T7BMS 103 0.00157 0.00628 0.00784 
-0,00471 
T813NIS 103 0.00775 0.00678 0.01453 0.00098 
T9131VIS 103 0.00585 0.00718 0.01302 
-0-00133 
TIOBIVIS 103 0.00713 0.00711 0.01424 0.00003 
T1IBMS 103 0.00567 0.00733 0.01300 
-0,00166 
T12BMS 1103 10.00910 10.00756 10,01666 10.00154 
01 Signal 
TOBOI 74 
-0.00395 0.00342 
-0.00053 -0.00737 
TIB01 74 
-0.00529 0.00450 -0.00079 -0.00978 
T2BQI 74 
-0.00385 0.00539 0.00154 
-0.00923 
T3BOI 74 
-0.00206 0.00634 0.00428 
-0.00840 
T4BQI 74 
-0.00190 0.00759 0,00569 -0.00949 
T5BQI 74 
-0.00110 0.00742 0.00632 
-0.00852 
T6801 74 0.00182 0.00756 0.00938 
-0.00574 
T7801 74 
-0.00036 0.00780 0.00744 -0.00817 
T8BQI 74 0.00088 0.00825 0.00912 
-0.00737 
T9801 74 0.00109 0.00928 0.01037 
-0.00819 
T10BOl 74 0.00322 0.00881 0.01204 
-0,00559 
TIIBQI 74 
-0.00024 0.00885 0.00861 -0-00909 
T12801 74 10.00236 JO. 00929 10.01165 1-0.00694 
Q2 Signal 
TOO 73 0.00415 0.00346 0.00760 0.00069 
TIB02 73 0.00989 0.00531 0,01520 0.00457 
T2BQ2 73 0.01146 0.00720 0.01866 0.00426 
T3BQ2 73 0.01010 0.00864 0.01874 0.00146 
T4802 73 0.01065 0.00986 0,02051 0.00078 
T5BQ2 73 0.01650 0.00984 0.02634 0.00666 
T6BQ2 73 0.01913 0.00987 0.02899 0.00926 
T7BQ2 73 0.02025 0.01004 0.03029 0.01021 
TOB02 73 0.02365 0.01095 0.03460 0.01270 
T9BQ2 73 0.01918 0.01044 0.02963 0.00874 
TIOBQ2 73 0.01586 0.01089 0.02676 0,00497 
TI 1802 73 0.01376 0.01128 0,02505 0.00248 
T12802 73 0.00819 0.01127 10.01946 1-0.00307 
Q3 Signal _ 
T0803 74 0.00324 0,00387 0.00710 
-0.00063 
TIB03 74 0.00368 0.00469 0.00837 
-0.00102 
T2803 74 0.00477 0.00583 0.01060 
-0.00106 
T3803 74 0.00797 0.00691 0,01488 0.00106 
T4BQ3 74 0.00722 0.00713 0,01435 0.00009 
T5803 74 0.00968 0.00798 0.01766 0.00170 
T61303 74 0.01360 0.00865 0.02225 0.00495 
T71303 74 0.01700 0.00957 0.02658 0.00743 
T8803 74 0.02236 0.01056 0.03291 0.01180 
T9903 74 0.01724 0.01090 0.02814 0.00635 
TIOB03 74 0.01998 0.01084 0.03082 0.00914 
TI 1803 74 0.01601 0.01073 0.02673 0.00528 
T12BQ3 74 
. 
0.01417 
. 
0.01155 
. 
0.02573 0.00262 
Q4 Signal 
74 
-0.00380 0.00354 -0,00026 -0.00734 T1804 74 
-0.00226 0.00433 0. ()0207 -0.00659 T2804 74 
-0.00440 0.00560 0.00121 -0-01000 T3804 74 
-0.00541 0.00633 0.00093 -0.01174 T4BO4 74 
-0.00971 0.00777 -0,00194 -0,01747 TS804 74 
-0.00573 0.00805 0.00232 -0.01377 T6804 74 
-0.00120 0.00849 0.00729 -0.00969 T7BQ4 74 
. 
0,00340 0.00812 0.00473 
-0.01152 
TBB04 74 0.00491 0.00889 0.01380 
-0.00397 
T9604 74 0.00849 0. ()0929 0.01778 
-0.00()80 
110804 74 0.01014 0.00958 0.01971 O. OOD56 
T11BO4 
[ 
 74 0.01208 0.00978 0.02186 0.00230 
T 1211104 R 4. 0.01612 0.00949 j o. 02561 _ 
0.00663__j 
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Appendix (A. 5.15) (b) Sell Portfolios 
Means and Standard Errors of CARs of Different 
SIjznal Definitions DurinE the Event Window 
ULL 
I 
N Mean Mean Mean+ Mean- 
&mole Signal Stat Statistic Std ErTor StdError StdError 
TOSSS 95 0,00905 0,00490 0,01395 0.00416 
TlSSS 95 0.00848 0.00699 0.01547 0.00149 
T2SSS 95 0.00005 0.00735 0.00740 
-0,00730 
T3SSS 95 
-0.00143 0.00750 0.00607 -0.00893 
USSS 95 0,00050 0.00837 0.00886 
-0.00787 
T5SSS 95 
-0.00276 0.00956 0.00680 -0.01233 
T6SSS 95 
-0.00707 0.01099 0.00391 -0,01806 
T7SSS 95 
-0.00714 0.01179 0.00464 -0.01893 
T8SSS 95 
-0.00643 0.01245 0.00602 
-0.01888 
T9SSS 95 
-0,00401 0.01280 0.00879 -0-01682 
TIOSSS 95 
-0.00779 0.01299 0.00520 
-0.02077 
TIISSS 95 
-0.01435 0.01361 -0.00074 -0-02796 
T12SSS 95 1-0.02147 10.01383 1-0,00764 1 
-0.03530 
MuMple Signal 
ro S -mS 34 0.00867 0.00650 0.01517 0.00217 
TISMS 34 
-0.00734 0.00898 0.00164 -0.01633 
T2SMS 34 
-0.01809 0.01068 -0.00741 -0.02876 
T3SMS 34 
-0.01430 0.01115 -0.00316 -0.02545 
USMS 34 
-0.01488 0.01298 -0-00190 -0.02786 
T5SMS 34 
-0.02024 0.01498 -0.00527 -0.03522 
T6SMS 34 
-0.02553 0,01872 -0.00681 -0.04425 
T7SMS 34 
-0.02814 0.02098 -0.00715 -0.04912 
T8SMS 34 
-0.03053 0.02174 -0.00879 -0.05227 
T9SMS 34 
-0.02846 0.02278 -0.00569 -0.05124 
T10SMS 34 
-0.02194 0.02294 0.00100 -0.04487 
TIISMS 34 
-0.02650 0.02473 -0.00177 -0.05123 
T12SMS 34 1-0.03449 10.02390 1-0,01059 1-0,05838 
ial Signal 
TOS01 24 0.00008 0.00425 0.00433 
-0.00417 
TIS01 24 
-0.00410 0.00915 0.00505 -0.01324 
T2SQI 24 
-0.01917 0.00766 -0.01152 -0.02683 
T3SQ 1 24 
-0.02207 0.00878 -0.01328 -0.03085 
T4SQ1 24 
-0.01670 0.01223 -0.00447 -0,02893 
T5SQI 24 
-0.02898 0.01390 -0.01507 -0.04288 
T6SQ 1 24 
-0.03211 0.01420 -0.01791 -0,04631 
T7SQ1 24 
-0.02570 0.01728 -0,00842 -0.04298 
T8SQI 24 
-0,02035 0.01641 -0.00394 -0.03676 
T9SQ 1 24 
-0.01989 0.01504 -0.00485 -0.03493 
TIOSQI 24 
-0.03078 0.01740 -0.01338 -0.04817 
T11SQ1 24 
-0.03999 0.02005 -0.01994 -0.06005 
T12SOI 24 1-0.04633 10.02207 1-0.02426 1-0.06839 
02 Signal 
TOS02 23 0.00597 0.00894 0.01490 
-0.00297 
TISQ2 23 0.00689 0.00985 0.01674 
-0.00296 
T2SQ2 23 
-0.00075 0.01048 0.00973 -0,01123 
T3SQ2 23 0.00554 0.01252 0.01806 
-0.00698 
T4SQ2 23 0.00980 0.01503 0.02483 
-0.00524 
TSS02 23 0.00831 0.01718 0.02549 
-0.00886 
T6SQ2 23 0.00177 0.01860 0.02037 
-0.01684 
T7SQ2 23 
-0.00473 0,01799 0.01326 -0.02271 
TOS02 23 
-0.01390 0.02122 0.00733 -0.03512 
T9SQ2 23 
-0.01800 0.02412 0.00612 -0.04212 
TlOSQ2 23 
-0.01325 0.02405 0.01080 -0.03730 
TIISQ2 23 
-0.00425 0.02379 0.01953 -0.02804 
T12SQ2 23 
-0.00428 10.02439 10.02011 1 -0.02867 
03 Signal 
TOS03 24 0.01496 0.01253 0.02749 0.00243 
TIS03 24 0.02918 0.01567 0.04485 0.01351 
T2SQ3 24 0.02139 O. OV23 0.03862 0.00416 
T3SQ3 24 0.01575 0.01826 0.03401 
-0.00251 
T4SQ3 24 0.01791 0.01848 0.03639 
-0.00057 
T5SQ3 24 0.02175 0.01921 0.04095 0.00254 
TBS03 24 0.02363 0.02156 0.04519 0.00207 
T7SQ3 24 0.02587 0.02278 0.04864 0.00309 
TOS03 24 0.02449 0.02188 0.04637 0.00261 
T9SQ3 24 0.02872 0.02347 0.05219 0.00526 
TlOS03 24 0.02082 0.02326 0.04408 
-0.00244 
TJIS03 24 0.01122 0.02347 0.03469 
-0.01225 
D2SQ3 24 0.00094 0,02476 0.02570 1 
-0.02381 
Q4 319 1 
TOS04 24 0.01508 0.01150 0.02658 0.00357 
TlSQ4 24 0.00188 0.01856 0.02044 
-0.01667 
T2SQ4 24 
-0,00130 0.01952 0.01822 -0.02082 
TUN 24 
-0.00464 0.01794 0.01330 -0.02257 US04 24 
-0.00864 0.02002 0.01138 -0.02865 
T5SQ4 24 
-0.01167 0.02414 0.01247 -0.03581 TSS04 24 
-0.02120 0.02980 0.00860 -0.05100 T7S04 24 
-0.02391 0.03254 0.00862 -0.05645 
T=4 24 
-0.01627 0.03590 0.01963 -0.05217 T9SQ4 24 
-0.00747 0.03573 0.02826 -0ý04320 TIOS04 24 
-0.00817 0.03598 0.02781 -0.04414 TliSQ4 24 
-0.02395 0.03821 0.01426 -0.06217 T12SO4 
. 
24 
. 
-Oý03550 0.03713 1 0.00164 1 -0.07263 
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Appendix (A5.17) Non-Parametric Test of Equality of Means of CAR Buy (Sell) of SS With Each of MS and OSs at Each Day of the Event Window 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
-331 Fu-y I TO TI T2 T3 T4 TS T6 T7 TS T9 T10 T11 T12 
MS Negative Ranks (MS<S9) 48 49 63 56 53 52 50 53 51 51 46 48 47 
Positive Ranks (MS>SS) 55 54 40 47 50 51 53 50 52 52 57 55 56 
Ties (MS-W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Z (WHeown Signed Rek. Teme) 
-0.847a -0-&Wa . 0.387a -OA24a -0 053a -0-048b -0.538b -0 426a -1 127a -0,497a -0717a -0 5Wm -0 QW4 
Asymp. Sig 04SUedll 0.3970 0.39W 0.6991 0.6713 Oý9502 0,9833 0.59M 0.6689 02598 06193 04732 0 55N 03392 
01 Negative Ranks (QI<SS) 34 33 32 33 35 32 31 34 32 34 32 29 35 
positive Ranks (QI>SS) 40 41 42 41 39 42 42 40 42 40 42 45 39 
Ties (QI-SS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Z (Wileezon Signed RmnkmTexf) 
-0,353a -0.307a -0.840b -0.833b -0.851b -0.757b -0871b -0 980a -1 099a -0 873a -1 317a -1 323a . 1490a 
Amyenp. Sig ('24miled) 0.7240 0,7590 0.4007 OM67 0.3947 04491 Oý38M 03268 02718 0.3828 0,1870 01860 0 IM3 
Q2 Negative Ranks (Q2<SS) 33 25 29 31 31 34 31 29 27 29 29 29 32 
Positive Ranks (Q2>SS) 40 48 44 42 42 38 42 44 46 44 44 44 41 
Ties (Q2-SS) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Z (Wilcoxon Signed RonksTest) 
-I. 6&, M -2.702& -2.232b -1.586b -1.600b -1.68fb -1.902b -2.268a -2.675a -2.3454 -2.125a . 2-265a -1.8640 
Arymp. Sig (2-twiled) 0.0920 0.0070 0.0256 0.1127 0.1096 0.0928 0,0572 0.0233 0.0075 0.0190 0.0336 0.0235 0.0024 
03 Negative Ranks (Q3<SS) 32 31 30 32 37 37 32 31 28 30 31 26 30 
Positive Ranks (Q3>SS) 42 43 44 42 37 36 42 43 46 44 43 48 44 
Ties (Q3-SS) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Z (WIlcoxon Signed RankaTemi) 
-1.393a -1.867a -1.341b -1.263b -1.290b -1.256b -1,460b . 1.9106 -2.397a -1,9560 -2.260m -2.222a . 1.91SO 
Asymp. Sig (2-talled) 0.1640 0,0820 0.1796 0.2065 0.1970 0.2090 0.1443 0.0562 0.0165 0.0505 OAY238 0.0263 0.0555 
04 Negative Ranks (Q4<SS) 42 37 36 39 35 40 32 37 36 35 29 25 24 
Positive Ranks (Q4>SS) 32 37 38 35 39 34 42 37 38 39 45 49 50 
Ties (Q4-SS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Z Micozon Signed RanksTemi) 
-0.1 08b -0.399a -0.305b -0.035a -0.251a -0.205a -0 692b -0.504a -1 265a . 1.6194 -2. Oi2a . 2.211a -2. GM* 
Anymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0,9140 0.59W 0.7808 09721 0.8022 0.8378 0.4888 06145 01988 0.1055 0.0"2 0.0270 0.0095 
SSI Sell I TO TI T2 T3 T4 TS T6 T7 T8 T9 TIO T11 T12 
MS Negative Ranks (MS<SS) 19 19 17 17 16 17 15 13 14 13 12 13 15 
Positive Ranks (MS>SS) 13 13 15 15 16 15 17 19 18 19 20 19 17 
Ties (MS-SS) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Z (Wileezon Signed RankmTem) 
-0.1688 -0.880b -0.673b -0,056a -0.131 a -0178a -0.299a -0,411a -0 898a -0 879a -1 309a -1 028a 4 748a 
Amymp. Sig (2-talled) 0,8863 0.3897 0.5008 O. 9W3 0.8959 OA590 0.7648 06808 0.3694 0.3795 01906 0,3037 OAW 
01 Negative Ranks (QI<SS) 13 14 11 12 12 12 9 10 9 8 7 7 8 
Positive Ranks (QI>SS) 10 9 12 11 11 11 14 13 14 15 16 16 15 
IN" (QI-SS) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Told 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Z (Wilcoxon Signed RankmTest) 
-0.061b -0.458b -0,274b -0,274b -0.122a -0.0131 b -0.487a -0.943a -1.095a -1.277a -1.125a -1 096a -1 Was 
Amymp. Sig (2-talled) 0.9515 48209750652 0,7843 0.7843 0.9032 0.9515 0.6265 03458 0.2735 02015 02604 0.2735 03011 
02 Negative Ranks (Q2<SS) 13 10 10 11 11 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 
Positive Ranks (Q2>SS) 11 13 13 12 12 15 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 
Ties (Q2-M) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 24 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Z (Wileozon Signed RankaTest) 
-0.229b -0.243a -0.608a -0.821a -0.943a -1.460a -1.338a -1A71a -0.912a 4669a -0.867a -1430o -1 521a 
Asymp. Sig (2-talled) 0.8192 0.8078 0.5430 0,4115 0.3458 0.1443 0.1808 0.2416 0.3815 0.5034 0.3880 O. Iw) 01283 
03 Negative Ranks (Q3<SS) 10 11 12 10 11 10 9 7 8 7 6 7 9 
Positive Ranks (Q3>SS) 14 13 12 14 13 14 15 17 16 17 18 17 15 
Ties (Q3-SS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Z (Wilcozon Signed RanksTest) 
-0.729a -0.886a -1ý343a -0.914a -1.229a -1.514a -1.6004 -2.057a . 2.314a . 22M& -2.37ia -2.286@ -1.943s 
Arymp. Sig (2-talted) 0.4662 0.3758 0.1793 0,3606 0.2192 0.1300 0.1096 0.0397 0.0207 0.0240 0.0177 O. Om 0.0520 
Q4 Negative Ranks (Q4<SS) 10 13 11 9 11 11 11 10 11 9 11 11 11 
Positive Ranks (Q4>SS) 13 11 13 15 13 13 13 14 13 15 13 13 13 
Ties (Q4-M) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Z (Wile-zon Signed RooksTest) 
-0,54am 4029b -0.371a -0 400a -0286a -0400a -0771a 4829a -1,1006 -1200m -1 
222a 
. 
10296 
. 
091441 
A"IL So (2-10,10d) 05841 0 9T72 0.7103 0,6892 0.7751 0.6892 04405 04073 02713 02301 02192 03037 0 36M 
Based on Negative Ranks 31 V) 
Based on Positive Ranks 
Appendix (A6.1) Total Number of Executive Directors and 
Total Compenation Paid to Chief Executive Officer (HPD) 
in FTSE100 during 1999 and 2001 
(in E Sterling Pound) 
1999 2001 
Serial No. of Exe- Highly Paid Serial No. of Exe- Highly Paid 
# cutives Director # cutives Director 
CoNo. #Exec99 HPD99 CoNo. #ExecOl HPD01 
4 5 432,012 4 6 625.1410 
9 9 1,336,610 9 10 544,886 
64 8 594MOO 64 5 780,000 
67 0 25,027 67 1 17,200 
79 9 2,485,000 79 7 3,805,000 
85 7 1,63 1 MOO 85 4 1,631,000 
101 3 195,114 101 5 233,898 
114 5 2,200,000 114 4 390,000 
117 7 645,000 117 5 1,075,687 
137 6 592,000 137 6 397,000 
139 5 674,000 139 7 705,000 
147 4 116,000 147 1 454,000 
148 3 437,000 148 4 595,000 
150 4 1,196,000 150 5 1,742,000 
157 5 826,000 157 4 1,008,000 
185 6 427,245 185 3 474,150 
186 5 816,124 186 3 899,957 
201 4 55K767 203 5 854,000 
203 2 714,000 211 5 632,000 
211 6 871,000 217 6 1,853,691 
217 7 938MOO 236 3 511,000 
236 2 458,000 237 4 1,355,701 
237 4 771 ý763 246 2 3,358,637 
246 2 6,807,640 249 3 1,278,000 
249 4 938,000 280 5 1,769,151 
280 2 567ý834 281 6 1,749,000 
281 6 919,000 309 4 214.468 
309 4 302,550 324 4 310,000 
324 4 558,060 331 5 484,500 
331 6 386,000 336 5 674,000 
336 4 493,000 338 6 703,000 
338 5 534,692 376 7 340,000 
376 4 320.000 386 3 529.500 
386 1 372,500 391 5 1,042,000 
391 711,000 402 5 224,140 
402 7 5 I&S 10 423 841.664 
42-1 4 896,000. 463 6 809.000 1 
317 1 11 
19 99 2001 
Serial No. of EXe- Highly Paid Serial : No. of Exe- Highly Paid 
# cutives Director # cutives Director 
CoNo. #Exec99 HPD99 CoNo. #ExecOI HPDOI 
463 6 893,000 523 3 422,000 
523 3 268,000 525 4 3,280,000 
525 4 2,513,900 526 5 573,659 
526 2 431,032 553 7 490,000 
553 3 458,000 657 6 816,000 
647 3 55ý032 688 2 279ý000 
657 6 63500 710 4 596,000 
688 6 1,723,000 713 5 925,000 
710 5 857,000 731 5 440,000 
713 10 405,000 739 5 580,000 
731 6 515,000 753 6 398,000 
739 5 610,000 785 4 554,000 
753 8 439,000 799 8 1,114,000 
785 3 745,000 813 6 794,000 
799 6 95800 831 3 1,244,444 
813 6 516M00 899 7 1,308,000 
831 4 697,409 900 3 347,000 
899 6 15372ý000 911 5 395,000 
900 2 115,000 923 6 867,000 
911 4 282,000 944 9 807,000 
923 5 674,000 946 3 75,000 
944 9 700MOO 983 5 1,228,000 
946 4 296,000 984 6 593,000 
984 9 969,000 1040 5 831,930 
1040 6 4355183 1082 4 489,000 
1082 4 355,000 1083 4 482,085 
1083 5 546ý285 1120 4 487,946 
1120 3 371,255 1126 5 1,052,000 
1126 3 474,000 1159 4 2,517,000 
1159 5 707,000 1161 10 1,005,000 
1161 11 858,000 1220 6 876,000 
1220 4 655,000 1222 6 297,000 
1222 7 178,000 1247 6 398,000 
1247 6 3291000 1254 2 1,390,000 
1254 4 503,000 1261 5 718,495 
1261 2 549,357 1270 3 1,044,000 
1270 4 1.4_5 ,0 00 1272 5 905,000 
1272 6 
_513,000 1279 6 983,000 
1279 8 872.000 1288 8 604,000 
1288 8 
_5_50,000 1296 4 976,000 
1296 S 546,000 1297 7 2,903,000 
1297 6 
-1,1 o-1,000 1311 S 5 15,000 
1311 S 
-1 ý, 2,000 1312 5 546,000 
1312 7 832.000 112 7 1,917,000 
1 -7 U- 8 4040 
. 
00 1. 1332 6 023.000 
31 8 
1 
1999 2001 
Serial No. of Exe- ffighlý Paid Serial NO. of Exe- Highly Paid 
# cutives Director # cutives Director 
CoNo. 
- 
#Exec99 HPD99 CoNo. #ExecOI HPDOI 
733 2 7 566,000 1333 5 556,000 
1333 7 297,148 1340 5 688,611 
1340 5 487,345 1372 2 969,872 
1357 4 384,503 1402 2 1,183,000 
1372 3 624,468 1403 7 734,000 
1402 5 2,410,000 1407 7 543,611 
1403 6 719,000 1425 7 1.115,000 
1407 8 260,404 1475 5 662,000 
1425 10 1,156,000 1484 8 1,173,000 
1442 6 527,992 1498 4 215,392 
1475 3 398,000 1545 8 1,153,075 
1484 9 79800 1550 4 944,850 
1545 9 961,323 1552 4 392,600 
1550 7 667,626 1573 5 1,758,000 
1552 4 443,600 1632 5 1,324,000 
1573 4 613,000 
1629 4 431,000 
1632 15 1,349,000 
N 100 100 97 97 
Wean 44 765,823 45 907,332 
Minimi 0 317 1 17,200 
Maxim 1999 6,807,640 2001 3,805,000 
StdDe 277.81 787,380 282.25 678,582 
Skewr 7.03 4.95 6.93 2.1 
Kurtoi 48.41 34-38 46.91 5.74 
Source: Corporate Registrar (PriceWaterHouseCoopers) 
Sept. 1999 & 2001, Published by HS Financial Publishing, London. 
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Appendix (A6.2/A) FTSE100 CEOs Personal and Job Characteristics, 
Shareholdings, Industry Sector and Cumulative Abnormal Returns in 1999. 
Comp 0 
Serial 
#I 
Years l 
in Post 
CEO 1999 
Education 0. Of Shares Held 
I 1--,, el Ordirtary haccn6ves 
Totai W 
No. of 
Elopioyees 
- 
=q, 
TOW 
Market 
Capitafimdioný 
Ear=gs 
Per 
Share 
E: 
ýL 
Ratio 
Se 
ladutry 
ServicdNot 
19" 
Annual CAR For Each Company 
CONO. 1 CeYPo I CeEdu I Cd$Oh r C. VIA # iý ly. L cap EPS PE Ind Buy I Sell Qrdin! Qý 
, 
BEO I SSO Incen6vel AIll'ordbli 
1 7 0 704,869 440,607 774 4,651 0.19 8 1 1.1070 1.1070 1.7460 2.3760 2.0610 1 i. 584o 
91 2 0 58,782 85.662 27,963 15,126 1.07 11 T- 
-0.3545 -0,3545 -2.6388 -2.6388 1-1 4967 
64 1 1 0 20,000 49.709 4.515 0.44 4 0 
-12024 -1.2024 1.4276 0.8766 1.1521 
-0 0252 67 1 0 84,826 22,927 29,617 11,819 0.26 8 1 0.0069 0.0069 0.0035 
79 4 1 68,388 717,003 4,500 3,829 0.24 6 1 1.1556 0.3660 0.7608 
-0.3492 -0.3492 02058 
85 1 0 36,423 150,833 249,000 13,130 6.31 32 0 1.4340 1.4340 
-1.8528 -1.8528 -0 2094 
101 7 1 5.003M() 205,000 314 1.801 0.22 38 0 1.0356 1.0356 Oý5178 
114 1 1 20.000 100,000 32,712 3,264 0.43 4 0 
-1.7724 -1,7724 
-0886 
117 2 1 63,804 0 34,000 40,852 1.10 43 0 
-1.8796 -1.8796 -09398 
137 1 9 1 427.891 231,726 12,724 6,690 0.49 6 1 
-0.3636 -03636 
-0 1818 
139 1 0 74,604 1,200,728 46,500 7,210 0.55 4 01 0.3258 0.3258 0 1629 
147 1 0 0 64,948 220 292 
-0.28 16 11 3.2672 3.2672 1 6336 
148 4 1 301,240 455,000 22,704 9,736 0.82 8 1 
10 7 1 34,464 21,692 80,200 27,407 1.27 18 1- 
-0.8025 -0-8025' -0.3804 -03804 -05915 
157 1 11 
-1 
191,568 317,335 82.616 7,141 1.05 9 1 
-0.8772 -0.8772 
-0 4386' 
185 3 1 7,406 12,683 18,894 14,557 0.31 4 1 
-0.2824 -0.2824 
-01412 
186 3 1 994 213,636 36,743 5,532 0.23 3 0 2.6208 2.6208 
-0.7392 -0.7392 O. WO8 
201 1 1 0 2,068 19,598 3,429 0.35 4 0 
-1.5978 -1.5978 
-07989 
203 4 1 76,022 752,455 40,454 6.263 0.51 13 0 
-0.3324 -0.3324 -01662 
211 12 1 79,123 23,195 
_ 
87,381 6,915 0.19 8 1 
-0.4329 -0.4329 -1,5168 -1 5168 -0.9749 
217 7 1 426,737 2,984 98.900 117,187 0.30 12 0 
-0.7468 -1.6026 -1.1747 0.9648 0.9648 -0,1050 
236 8 1 40,971 214,477 63,779 4,399 0.21 4 1 
237 1 0 26,902 236,058 57.884 11,315 0.47 7 0 
-1.5332 -1.5332 - -0.7666' 
246 1 1 0 0 4,629 1,020 0.16 1 1 
249 3 1 9.465 6,460 124,900 69,546 0.66 11 11 
-0.4824 -2.6832 -1-5828 -0.7914 
280 1 1 0 255,827 11,528 10,475 0.09 7 11 
-1.2084 0.8052 -0.2016 -0.0744 -0.0744 -0.1380 
281 6 0 207,741 316,190 38,643 8,028 0.57 8 0 0.0216 0.0216 
-1.0416 -1.3896 -1.2156 -0,5970 
309 11 0 1,575,000 325,000 5,302 1,437 0.14 7 1 
-0.1320 -0-1320 0.2100 0.2100 0.0390 
324 1 1 10.000 0 11,624 3,103 0.51 5 1 
331 8 1 151,492 919,976 204 381 
-0.04 5 0 -1.7436 -1,7436 -08718 
336 2 1 156,105 1,373,622 16,427 5.613 0.04 1 0 
339 1 80,837 375,728 
_ 
51,965 11,252 0.59 9 1 
-0.1128 -0.1128 -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0732 
376 2 0 150,000 4,594 6,005 2.203 0.4, ý 17 1 3.1968 3.1968 1.5984 
386 2 0 2,408.000 6,800,000 1,072 8,877 
-0. ()() 15 1 0.9392 1.1804 1.0598 0.7536 0.3444 0.5490 0.8044 
391 3 0 0 328,294 154,758 4,369 0.23 6 1 
402 3 1 87,144 745,365 46,487 3,280 
-o. 07 2 0 
' 423 10 1 58,614 80,600 14,094 3,501 39.64 704 1 0.9804 0.9804 
-0.5484 -05484 0.21EO 
463 1 10 1 205,033 844,378 21,519 5,537 0.51 13 1 
523 1 0 89,028 135,029 6,484 2.973 0.46 12 1 1-2.2104 
-1.3932 -1.8018 -3,0384 -3 0384 -2.4201 
525 1 1 5,000 0 101280 4,117 0.26 5 1 
526 3 0 6,896 859,906 __ 1,028 4.847 
-0.11 16 1 0.9648 0.9648 0 482T- 
553 8 1 25,200 273,549 14,900 1,460 0.57 10 1 
647 1 0 7,143 1,428,572 94 2.392 0.00 2 1 
657 
-2 
1 10,066 4,366 35,503 7,599 0,99 11 0 
-0.5040 -2.7596 -1.6318 -1.0188 -1.0188 -1 3253 
698 3 0 79,736 283,378 54,336 57,815 0.74 16 0 
-0.0132 -0.9516 -0.4824 -0.2712 -0.2712 -0 37-68 
710 6 0 61,522 1,045.548 72,293 11,279 0.85 12 1 
-1.398 -1.398 -0.699 
713 3 0 7,200 0 67354 " 6,372 0.45 6 1 1.5162 0.3708 0.9435 0.4718 
731 2 1 4,111 - 34.825 36,378 15,351 0.70 6 1 
-2,1456 -1.4472 -1.7964 -08982 
739 3 1 25,227 230,402 16,000 3,599 0.30 6 0 
-2.5248 -2.5248 -2,5248 -2.5248 -2,5248 
733 2 0 0 479,136 17,499 5,678 0.23 7 1 
-1.2222 -1,9656 -1.5939 -0.797 
785 18 0 152,628 1,081,855 46,702 3,732 0.23 3 1 0.0211 0.0211 
-1.9818 -1.9818 -0.9804 
799 4 0 87,895 167,388 144,521 62.089 4.49 70 1 0.4902 0.4902 0.2451 
913 1 1 21,000 353,695 W600 5.224 0.40 7 0 
-1.1025 -1-1025 -0,5513 
831 7 1 308,576 1,947,940 130,626 12,733 0.08 3 0 
999 8 1 357,619 1,784,672 110,216 9,435 0.46 7 1 
-1.8036 -1,8036 -0ý9018 
900 2 0 0 0 1,414 1,069 1.31 39 1 
911 12 1 78,490 35,476 494 4,625 0.53 8 1 
-0.7116 -0.7116 -0.1098 -0.1098 -0,4107 
923 7 1 1,125,976 31.203 7,899 7,601 0.32 6 1 0.6894 1.0614 0.8754 
-0.6636 -1.3140 -0,9888 -00567 
944 3 0 175,284 490,486 86.486 44,000 0.55 8 1 
-0.0286 1.0272 0.4993 -0.7164 -0.2568 -0.4866 0.0063 
946 5 0 352,174 1,052,867 5.670 2,656 0.57 36 7- 4.0260 
-0.4560 1.7850- 1.0072 1.0072 1.3961 
994 1 1 465 65 645,508 75,492 10,912 0.19 4 1 
-0.4404 -0.4404 -02202 
1040 10 0 , 95,717 1,044398 4.925 
. 
1,082 0.46 28 1 3.954 3.954 1.977 
1082 5 0 112,622 412,597 3.6N 6.147 0.87 4 - 0 
-1.3704 -1.3704 -06852 
1093 1 0 21,263 146,277 1 4,432 5,400 j 0.6 4 0 1 . .- 
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, 
20 1 9 0 173,059 542,379 10,839 2,576 0.35 4 1 
-1.8798 -1.8798 -1 9254 925 
-1 90261 
11 
, 
26 39 1 184.000 5,128.488 41,349 4,357 
-0.12 1 1 1 
1159 2 1 28,112 538,633 18,400 7,663 1.03 13 1 
-0.7956 -0.7956 O. AK12 092 0.722 
-0-0432 
1161 15 1 409.230 105,687 68,333 6,673 0.57 10 1 
-0.5712 -0,5712 -0,6144 0,2532 -0 80 .1806 -0 3759 
1220 4 1 65,353 5,014 22.834 17,921 0.59 9 1 
-1.0308 -1,0308 
-05154 
1222 1 1 0 0 1.093 738 0.30 10 0 5.259 5.259 5,3184 5.3184 5.2887 
1247 
. 
2 1 1,373 936 10,821 5,752 Oý84 11 1 
-0-9882 
-0.9882 
-04941 
1254 1 2 1 24,600 276,282 15,900 3,569 0.56 9 0 1.6104 1.6104 0.8052 
1261 1 1 1 0 0 13,807 5387 0.47 5 1 0.8464 0.8464 
-1.8144 -1.81" -0 4840 
1270 15 1 5,634,020 4,423,974 129,347 6,879 0.17 2 1 1 
1272 10 1 158,428 5,508 16,690 12,485 0.41 9 11 1.5048 1.5048 0.7524 
1279 1 3 1 6,100 285,963 28,628 12,417 0.86 12 0 
-1.7436 -1 7436 -31800 -3.1800 -2 4618 
1288 6 1 21,100 124,188 42,000 3,883 0.22 3 - 0 0.5820 0.5820 0.2910 
1296 1 1 23,474 785,811 44,489 7,216 0.56 5 -, 1 0.6040 0.6040 
-0.6720 -0,6720 -00340 
1297 11 1 70,650 62,094 29,645 11,430 1.14 13 1 
-1.1292 -1.1292 -0.5646 
1311 14 1 850,465 704,315 2 122 3,127 0.41 27 1 
1312 9 0 ", 966 527,825 178,958 7.243 0.46 4 1 0.2421 
-0.9612 -0.3596 0.6852 0.6852 0.1628 
1327 14 1 34,109 0 6,156 3,911 1.03 17 1 
-0.8532 0.4704 -0,1914 1.2168 1.2168 0.5127 
1332 11 1 162,728 169,918 47,121 3,959 0.52 6 1 
-1,0320 -1.0320 -05160 
1333 1 1 88,515 2,955 9,336 5,178 0.34 6 0 
1340 11 1 57,412 153,876 16,170 6,142 0.54 5 0 
-2.5302 -2.5302 0.4344 0.4344 -1 0479 
1357 10 0 680.116 427,904 17,426 2,850 0.21 6 1 3.4002 1.0445 2.2224 1.1112 
1372 7 0 365,000 1,841,000 40.800 50,066 0.06 5 0 
-1.1760 -0.9852 -1.0806 0.5694 0.5694 -02556 
1402 8 1 1,445,537 6,771,764 58,300 42,589 0.16 8 0 
-0.1572 -0.1572 -0.078F 
1403 3 0 23,888 300,322 13.873 2,722 0.02 0 0 
- 
1407 11 1 183.111 0 49,089 3,984 0.48 5 0 
-5.3166 -5.3166 -6.2148 -6.834 -6.52" -5.9205 
1425 2 1 76,484 378,599 26,500 9,910 0.70 10 1 
-1.644 -1.644 -0.822 
1442 2 1 1,000 47,000 7,110 4,635 0.40 6 1 
1475 1 0 55,495 2,007,096 4,975 5,710 
-0.15 3 1 1.7856 1.7856 0.892 8 
1484 7 0 1,319.539 2,444.971 198,342 10,996_ 0.12 2 1 0.3012 0.3012 . 0,1506 
1545 10 0 23,104 122,904 267,000 37,880 0.95 12 0 0.3084 0.3084 0.1542 
1550 3 0 524,123 725,161 15,080 3,376 0.80 7 1 
1552 6 0 12,177 9,184 10.128 4.399 0.83 8 0 0.3294 0.3294 0.1647 
1573 3 0 122.551 520,086 12,630 80,403 0.30 26 1 
-1.728 -1.728 1.186 0.9354 1.0607 -0.3337 
1629 5 0 1.639 271,750 7,598 5,258 0.32 3 1 
- 1632 13 1 4,498,921 6,445,912 25,577 4,239 0.28 6 1 2.5875 2.5875 2.474 2.474 2.530ý 
N 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 101 100 61 26 70 38 19 46 78 
Mean 6 1 334,945 695,596 41301 11754 0.93 20 1 
-0.20 -0.03 -0.16 52-05 -0.08 
- 
-0.36 -0.18 
Min 1 0 0 0 94 292 
-0.2'8 0 0 -2.53 -5.32 -S. 32 6.21 -6. R3 -0,52 -5.92 
Max 39 1 5.634,020 6,800,000 267,000 117,187 39.64 704 1 4.03 5.26 5.26 1999.00 5.32 5.32 5.29 
SkJD6V 5 0 914.570 1,329.627 51,321 18,293 3.99 76 0 1.42 2.05 1.59 324.38 2.43 1.94 1.29 
Skew 3 
-0 5 3 
.2 
3 9.46 8 
-1 0.85 0.05 0.40 6.16 -0.67 0.03 -0.11 
Kurtols 
rl 
-4 
-2 21 12 16 14 - 92.29 69 -2 0.89 1.94 2.20 38.00 3.18 1 2.48 8.21 
Source: Corporate Registrar (PricewaterHOUSec; oopers) bept. 1999, vurmisnea by: N5 mrianciai FuDusning, Lonaon. 
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41 9 0 716,129 380,237 971 5,645 0.19 9 1 _ 4,8336 4.8336 1 2.9460 2-5416 2.7438 37887 
9 4 0 76,081 66,616 31,268 16,016 1.38 11 1 2.5560 
-1.4568 0.5496 1,3680 1-3680 0.9588 
64 3 0 105,0(* 1,053,060 10.932 4,345 0.39 4 0 
-0-3264 -0.3264 -01632 
67 1 0 32,959 5,670 291617 191084 16.42 227 1 
79 12 1 4,648,507 1,674,027 6,544 8,717 0.58 11 1 2.5176 2.2140 2.3658 2.1576 2.1576 2.2617 
85 2 1 18,896 583,926 249,000 13.647 6.31 33 0 
-0.1200 -0.1200 -00600 
101 9 1 26,132.860 765,000 520 2,841 0.04 3 0 0.3432 0.3432 
-40512 -6,6024 -5.32681 -2.4918 
114 8 1 17,600 300,000 34,372 3,766 0.31 5 0 1 
117 5 1 73,935 259,634 38.191 61 
, 
311 1.45 35 0 1.4868 1.4868 0.0396 0.0396 - 0.7632 
137 9 1 94,145 385,861 13,559 7,214 0.50 7 1 0.0636 0.0636 
-1.8924 -1 ý8924 -0.9144 
139 7 1 870,450 738,776 84.900 11,372 0.06 4 0 2.4672 2.4672 0.9376 0.8622 0.8999 1.6836 
147 1 1 7,496 0 774 129 
-0.19 0 1 -2.5464 -2.5464 -1,2732 
148 5 1 482,588 440,000 20.933 10,608 0.75 8 1 
150 1 1 25,776 476,337 72,300 34.628 2.10 21 1 1.0176 1.0176 0.5088 
157 4 0 55,255 374,919 85.624 6,090 2.26 7 1 2.1276 2.1276 1.0638 
185 1 1 220.055 513,603 19,745 9,879 0.27 3 1 
186 1 1 0 0 29,800 7,607 0.26 4 0 
203 3 0 700 902,357 42,386 4,818 0.93 10 0 
211 6 1 60,589 31,804 80.529 5.991 0.55 7 1 0.2976 0.2976 0.1488 
217 9 1 1,051 942,090 B8,000 131,164 0.50 6 0 1.1604 1.1604 0.5862 - 
236 1 1 0 163,551 62.175 3,713 0.14 3 1 3.3336 3.3336 1.6668 
237 3 0 33,633 613,300 64,274 12.269 0.70 6 0 2.5299 2.5299 
-0 1044 -0.1044 1.21275 
246 3 1 0 2,138,000 10.730 14,889 
-0.14 8 1 
249 5 1 1,358,320 7,194 133,400 41.777 
-0.16 6 1 -0.9606 -0.9606 -03396 -0.3396 1 -0.6501 
280 4 1 38,151 2,216,481 7904 9,735 1.21 3 1 
- 
2.7096 
-3.2880 -0.2892 -0.1446 
281 8 0 1,086,952 976,729 36,446 9,829 0.37 5 0 1.7472 1.2051 
. 
1.4762 0.4626 0.4626 0.9694 
309 14 0 3.000,000 1,240,116 7,339 3,130 0,06 5 1 
-0.1836 -0.1836 -00918 
324 1 1 346,274 488,247 14,067 2,329 
-0.36 3 1 -1.7508 -1.7508 -11508 -1.7508 -1 7508 
331 10 1 313,588 192,300 1,785 2,911 
-1.55 11 0 -1.0356 -1.0356 -1.0356 -1.0356 . 1.0356 
336 4 1 141,569 1,881.849 28,294 8,930 0.11 2 0 
338 1 0 38,157 97,720 72.749 22,286 
-0.62 10 1 2.2020 0.3880 1195 0.6475 
376 4 0 327.512 7,545 11,059 1,599 0.14 3 1 
-4.2462 -4.2462 -2.1231 
396 1 0 0 2,316,492 3,280 2,588 
-0.17 4 1 
391 14 1 451,150 3,207,753 154,758 11,615 0.07 5 1 
402 32 1 250,764 792,508 64,700 1,810 
-0.41 1 0 
423 12 1 264,691 275,000 18,665 3,148 S. 84 158 1 0.0500 0.05 0.025 
463 12 1 I, OW, 683 3,007,955 29.298 4,392 , 0.25 2 1 
-1.3830 -1.3830 -0.6915 
523 16 0 581,431 0 6,290 1,888 
-2.07 7 1 -0.8320 -0.832 -1,0300 -1.03 -0.931 
525 3 1 3.918 534,829 9,987 3,472 0.21 4 11 
-0.3696 -0.3696 -1,1412 -1.1412 -0.7554 
526 1 0 5,000 349,800 2,733 2,109 
-0,06 1 1 
553 10 1 31,660 241,994 56,700 2,225 0.29 7 1 
657 12 1 63,108 1,220 42,962 7,599 0.67 11 0 1.3202 
-0.3096 0,5053 0.2484 -0.9696 -0.36061 0.07235 
688 13 1 212,547 4,408,646 6,029 127,529 0.97 20 0 0.6231 1.6944 1.15875 0.7866 0,5532 0.6699 0.91433 
710 1 0 156,769 1,016,560 72,293 4,362 0.35 2 1 0.6216 0.6216 0.3108 
713 4 0 30,000 150,787 69.708 6,280 0.31 6 1 1.5888 1.5888 0.7944 
731 3 1 41,195 101,380 39488 18,295 0.76 8 1 
-1.3062 -1.3062 -0.6531 
739 6 1 99,221 340,135 24! 700 3,722 0.42 5 0 1-1.1160 
-1.1160 -0.5580 
753 2 1 28,306 0 25,475 3,046 012 2 1 0.4938 0.4938 0.2469 
785 2 0 259,964 2,108,653 53,631 3,887 0.13 3 1 
799 7 0 299,941 198,544 169,858 75.809 0.71 8 1 
-0ý0559 -0.0559 -0.028 
813 3 1 104,193 581,262 45.130 3,159 
-0.12 4 0 1.5536 1.5536 07768 
831 11 1 355.576 2,933.168 93,509 2,975 0.04 1 0 
899 11 1 468,130 2,074,737 134,061 5.602 0.49 4 1 0.1260 0.1260 0.0630 
"0 
-3 
0 6,010 318,956 1,906 397 
-0.03 1 1 
911 3 1 87,739 205,872 1,096 4,602 0.60 9 1 
923 9 1 1,207,830 1,970,664 9,363 8,818 0.10 2 1 
-0.3180 0.2358 -0.0411 0.8448 0,8448 10.40185 
%4 5 0 178,751 763,065 85,847 40,034 0.70 7 1 
-0.6774 -0.6774 -0.5772 -0.5772 1-0.6273 
946 7 1 83,285 1,204.116 8,336 3,079 0.24 8 1 0.4992 
-20160 -0.7584 1-0.3792 
5 1 300,000 2,950,567 56M0 2,785 
-0.02 1 0 0.0444 0.0444 0.0222 1 
M 1 0 808.080 4,365.532 52,213 7,090 0.05 2 1 0.8040 0.8040 
-0ý6384 -0,6384 0.0828 
1040 11 1 148,868 1,044,353 5,745 2,156 0.20 4 1 
-0.7968 -0.7968 
. 
-2.0532 -0.7968 -1.4250 -1.1109 
082 6 1 118.898 619,212 7,523 7,054 0.42 5 0 1.2348 1.2348 0.6174 
1 0 40,000 67,550 4,947 3436 
-0.14 3 0 
20 11 0 336,244 490,498 8,750 3,609 0.30 6 1 
-1.7148 -1.7148 -0.8574 
26 41 1 184,000 6,136,188 41.466 5.329 
. 
0.29 2 1 
1159 L4 1 80,492 792.527 
1 
24,688 8,570 10,36 11 1 0.1140 0.114 0.057 
1161 1 17 1 413,914 645,851 41.853 1,775 10.25 3 11 1-0.7833 -0.7833 1_ 
__f) 
6 06948 1-0-04431 
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20 1 4 1 387,523 433,473 21.942 ý2 17,174 0.48 9 1 
1222 2 1 10,000 1,650.000 ". ) 1,024 378 
-0.02 1 0 
-42144 -4 2144 -2 1072 
1247 1 0 4,124 197,397 11.762 12697 
-1.03 3 1 
1254 1 0 579,473 4,092,777 18,900 6,550 0.71 10 
.0 
3.3327 1.1856 2.2592 1-6548 37716 2.7132 2 4862 
1261 1 0 74,071 2,751,584 15.288 7,608 0.08 6 11 1-3218 1.3218 Oý6609 
1270 18 1 5,643.265 6,022,269 99,950 4,777 0.19 2 11 
-0,2580 
-02580 -0 12'90 
1272 1 1 10,266 977,761 17,265 12,162 0.46 9 1 
-2,1824 -2A072 -2.2948 -1 1474 
1279 1 1 1 2,100 0 34,399 12.555 1.56 12 0 
-0.5244 -0.5244 0,2016 0.2016 -0 1614 
1298 9 1 117,290 610,459 46,600 3.588 0.11 2 0 . 2.5656 2ý5656 2.3652 2.3652 2.4654 
1296 3 71,340 1,006.548 51,720 7,111 0.04 5 1 1.9908 1.9908 
. 
0.9954 
1297 2 1 64,703 350,351 83.300 45,594 1.01 17 1 1.0956 1.0956 0.5478 
1311 16 1 8,504,650 4,500,000 4,632 2,980 0.09 2 1 
-0.4752 -0.4752 -0.2376 
1312 1 0 100,000 3,009,596 1851200 7,916 0.22 4 1 2.4996 2.4996 3.8892 3-8892 3.1944 
1327 16 1 264.375 332,319 4,747 2,563 1.22 11 1 1.8528 1.8528 1.8462 1.8462 1.8495 
1332 1 0 68,746 264,031 63.066 3,406 
-0.42 5 1 
1333 3 1 86,620 63,027 8,427 5,782 0.64 7 0 0.7926 0.7926 0.3963 
1340 2 1 86,316 142,385 22,401 9,060 0.21 5 0 1.9920 1.992 0.996 
1372 1 1 52,668 774,814 38,000 58,274 0.65 6 0 1.1124 1.1124 0,5562 
1402 1 1 212,547 4,408,646 108,185 127,529 0.97 20 0 0.9447 0.9447 0.5280 0.5280 0.7364 
140.3 4 0 326,750 351,000 15,521 4,279 0.81 14 . 0 0.6846 0.6846 0.5112 0.5112 0.5979 
1407 13 1 6 450,000 1,560 4,080 0.58 5 0 
-3.5400 -3.54 -72840 -7.284 -5.412 
1425 4 1 92,999 975,481 30,500 9,127 0.84 8 1 
-0.2388 -04830 -0.3609 -0 3384 -0.3384 -0,3497 
1475 1 0 194,508 2,762,408 9,280 2,124 
-0.24 1 11 1 
1484 19 0 1,653.850 3,459.189 152,210 17.445 0.15 3 1 0.2676 
-0.2550 0.0063 2.1696 -0 0444 1.0626 0.53445 
1498 12 0 59,608 487,644 2,692 259 
-0.09 0 1 V545 1 14 0 38,719 440,000 261,000 37,000 0.58 13 0 
-0.5622 -0.5622 -0.2811 
1550 5 5 481,713 1,531,804 13.446 2,965 4.13 6 1 0.6249 
-01008 0.26205 0.0156 0.65-40 0.3348 029843 
1552 2 1 3,000 3,579 11,052 3,595 0.88 7 0 0.5574 0.5574 0.2787 
1573 4 0 2.199,426 16.1$5,639 53,325 104,202 
-0-12 2 1 -0.6858 -0.6858 -1,3244 -1,3244 -1.0051 
1632 15 1 13,3X6,95 4 14.320.630 36,157 8,945 0.33 8 1 
-0.7686 -0.7686 -0.3843 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 97.00 98 97 53 22 63 33 22 43 73 
Mean 6 1 863,960 1,429,775 44698 14673 0.67 14 1 0.78 
-0.50 0.37 60.59 -0.18 -0.13 0.12 
Min 1 0 0 0 520 129 
-2.07 0 0 -3.54 -4.25 -4,2i -7,28 -6,60 -7.28 -5.41 
Max 41 1 26132860 16185639 261,000 131,164 16.42 322 1 4.83 2-21 4.83 2001.00 3.77 3.89 3. ' 9 
swoev 6 0 3134154 2438842 50,782 26.200 2.05 42 0 1.50 1.49 1.59 348.34 2.14 2.02 1.31 
Skew 2 
-1 6 4 2 3 70 6 -1 -0.03 -0,47 A19 
- 
5.74 
-1.12 -1.32 -o. ( ' 
Kurtois r 9 
-2 
- 47 21 5 11 -+ 3;. 00 38 
-2 0.74 0.70 1.05 
1 33.00 3.08 3.67 4.3 6 
j 
Source: Corporate Registrar (priceWaterHOUSeCoopers) Sept. 2001, Published 13y: HS Hnancial Publishing, London. 
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Appendix (A6.7) The Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading Panel Model 
CEO's Compensation and Number of insiders: Random-Effects Panel Models 
Random-Effects STATA OLS Regression Evidence From FTSE100 For Two-Single Years 1999 & 2001 
DependentVari; ble Panel A: various specifications Panel 5: CAR Pc-ý'O-cs 
CEO Pay 
-TWependent 
_S 
03e. doe 
oe e oe varsawes: 7- taTigic tat'st taw 
Constant 
9 
22.410- 23.430- 22.460- 23.480- 23.640- 25.540, ** 
No. Of Insiders 0.375 0.366 0.363 0.357 0.358 0.357 
- 
_3.260*** 
3.200*-** 3.250- 3.2DO*** 3.210-* 3-210- 
Years In Post 
-0.024 -0.020 
-0,450 -0.370 
Education 0.314 0.303 0.301 0.293 0.277 0.278 
3.060*** 2.970*** 3.050*** 2.990*** 2.840- 2.860- 
incentive Shareholdin( 0.018 0.019 0.017 
__ 
0.017 
1,390 1.420 1.320 1.370 
Employment 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.118 0.121 0.120 
2.840... 2.860*** 2.850*** 2.870- 2.950- 2.930- 
_ 
Capitalisation 0.110 0.106 0.112 0.107 0.119 0.113 
2.060** 1.98** 2.090** 2.020** 2-280** 2.200** 
EPS 
-0.013 -0,010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.028 
-0.290 -0.230 -0.310 -0.250 
-0.630 
Industry 
J 
0.086 0.082 
O. 850 0,810 
fu. lev 11 u29 10.704 i0. z9-5 -ff= -Truur -= 
17.140- 15. tW- 24.180- 17.070- 9.840- 18.430- 24 NC- 
0.266 0.308 0.275 0.157 0.057 0.202 0.289 
2.100- 1.660' 2.680- 1 180 0240 1 590 3.010- 
0.048 0.036 0.047 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.043 
2.540- 1.620* 3.450* 1.980** 0980 1.990** 3,330- 
0.162 0.187 0.172 0.167 0.128 0.144 0.180 
3220"* 2240** 4e! 60"* 3.310- 1 340 2.330- 4, W... 
0.054 0.003 0.047 0.059 0.081 0.097 0.074 
0790 0.030 OZ50 0860 0.730 1 5w 1 460 
0.117 0.081 0.098 0.121 0.223 0.137 0.122 
1.980- 0920 2.060** 2.010" 1.770* 2.330** 2.650... 
Ordinary Shareholding s 
CAR Buy 0.090 
1.750* 
CAR Sell 
-0.066 
-0,720 
CAR All OS 0.061 
1 480 
CAR BEO 0.009 
0160 
CAR SSO 
-0.022 
-Or! 70 
CAR ESO 
-0.002 
-0040 
CAR All 0.085 
2.240** 
No, of Observations 
No. of Groups 
Wald Chi2 
190 
2 
63.470 
190 
2 
62.840 
190 
2 
63.540 
190 
2 
62.990 
190 
2 
60.820 
190 
2 
60.620 
95 
2 
34.510 
47 
2 
19.030 
130 
2 
63.130 
69 
2 
27.940 
41 
2 
14.100 
89 
2 
36.830 
148 
2 
81.980 
Prob. > chi2 
R-Sq Within 
R-Sq Overall 
0.0000- 
26% 
26% 
0.0000*** 
25% 
26% 
0.0000*** 
26% 
26% 
0.0000*** 
25% 
26% 
0.0000- 
25% 
25% 
0.0000- 
25% 
25% 
0.0000- 
26% 
28% 
0.0041- 
32% 
32% 
0.0000- 
33% 
34% 
0.0001... 
31% 
31% 
0.0285** 
28% 
29% 
0.0(m... 
31% 
31% 
0.00001*1 
35% 
37 
IR-Squared Aclýusted 1 
' 
23% 1 1 23% 1 1 23% 1 1 23% 1 1 23% 1 1 23% 1 1 22% 1 1 20% 30% 11 23% 14% 25% 1 34' 
Fhe i 
-ratios, given beneath the coe 1 fficient values, are base d on the h eteroscedasticity-consistent standard- mors of W hite ( 1980). ( ***) Siqnificant at 1% or Less. (**) at 5% or Less. and 11 at 10% or Less. 
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Appendix (A6.8) The Managerial Incentive of Insider Trading Panel Model 
CEO's Compensation and Number of Insiders: Random-Effects Panel Models 
Random-Effects STATA GILS with Heteroskedasticity Regression Years 1999 & 2001 
hvicience From FI SF_1UU Vor [wo-bingle 
DependentVariable Panel A: various specifl cations 
CEO Pay tIIIIý 
IrpdePCn0enT L; oett, 
Varmics; IT -95 
2"1 J1 
1 T-'S(3fiSI, C 1' -- 
23.010- 24.020- 23MO- 24.010- 24.110- 25.960- 
No, of Insiders 0.373 0.363 0.362 0.355 0.355 0.353 
3.340- 3.270- 3.320- 3.260- 3.250'- 3.230- 
Years in Post 
-0.024 -0.019 
-0450 -0,360 
Education 0.315 0.304 0.303 0.295 0.280 0.281 
3.1150- 3.070- 3.150- 3.080- 2.920- 2.930- 
incentive Shareholdiný 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.017 
1 390 1 420 1 320 1 370 
Employment 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.122 0.121 
2.940- 2.960- 2.940- 2.960- 3.040- 3.010- 
Capitalisation 0.109 0.104 0.110 0.106 0.117 0.111 
2.080** 2.00- 2.100- 2.020- 2.270- 2.190** 
EPS 
-0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.026 
-0280 -0220 -0ý300 -0240 -0610 
industry 0.087 0.082 
0880 0840 
Ordinary Shareholdings 
CAR Buy 
CAR Sell 
CAR All CIS 
CAR BEO 
CAR SSO 
CAR ESO 
CAR All 
of Groups 
d Chi2 
). > chi2 
Likelihood 
I 
-ratios, gi ven 
Sionificant at 1 
0.058 
1 440 
-0.002 
-0040 
0.088 
2.420- 
95 47 130 69 41 89 148 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
36.300 24.630 65.220 51.580 21.190 49.900 88.590 
0.0000, 0.0004* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0017* 0,0000, 0.0000* 
-81.59 -37.32 -105.93 -42.00 
-39.28 -69.16 -121 
34 
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IL 
17-860- 17.420- 24.990- 19.980- 11,680- 2C 250- 24 730- 
0.259 0.341 0.270 0.207 0.192 0.241 0.298 
24140- 2.010- 2.710- 2.040- 0970 2 140- 
_3 
190--- 
0.049 0,033 0.047 0.039 0.025 0.032 0.044 
Z710ý lm620ý 3.530- 3.140- 1 070 2-350- 3 560- 
0.160 0.167 0.171 0.154 0.069 0.137 0.180 
1320ý 2.210- 4.250- 4.010- 0 B40 3.070- 4 600- 
0.047 0.039 0.044 0.110 0.106 0.116 0.078 
0710 0430 0830 24040- 1050 2.010- 
-1 
560 
0.122 0.083 0.099 0.112 0.276 0.133 0.121 
2.160** 0970 2.150- 2360- 2.360- 2.540- 2 670- 
0.089 
Panel 6: cAA Portf: o' , cs or' , 
-0.093 
-1110 
S 190 190 190 190 190 190 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
67.1 90 66.150 66.930 65.990 63.540 63.080 
0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0,0000; 
-183.74 -184.13 -183.84 -184.19 -184.12 -185.3 
eneatb I 
. 
or Less. (**) at 5% or Less. and (*) at 10% or Less. 
TING/yjA'*-s 
A. 91 , ýýRSITY 
010/ 
0.022 
0460 
-0.101 
